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Mauricio de Maria y Campos 
UNIDO Director-General 
Heading UNIDO since April 1993, 
Mauricio de Maria y Campos — a 
former Vice-Minister for Industrial 
Development in Mexico — first of all 
had to oversee a complete overhaul of 
UNIDO's objectives, tasks and staffing, 
a difficult job which is now nearing 
completion. Known to be a critic of 
the ambitious yet disappointing First 
Industrial Development Decade for 
Africa (IDDA I), in his interview with 
the Courier he pleads at the outset of 
IDDA II for a serious rethink of Africa's 
industrial development strategy. He 
also gives his views on how the private 
sector could try to adapt to rapidly 
changing conditions. 
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ERITREA 
The ACP Group's newest member is a 
nation forged in battle. After 30 years 
of guerrilla war which went largely 
unobserved by the outside world, 
Eritrea drove the Ethiopian army out 
in 1991 and won international 
recognition as a sovereign state in May 
last year. Peace and stability reign, but 
the ex-fighters now in government 
face a new challenge : rebuilding a 
ruined economy. And famine is an 
ever present threat. Though the war is 
over, self-reliance is still the guiding 
principle. 
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CHAD 
Contrary to popular belief, the 
Republic of Chad is more than just a 
huge, poverty-stricken expanse of 
land, 1 280 000 square kilometres in 
size and with a population of some six 
million souls. Our country report points 
to some aspects of its enormous 
economic potential — and to one of 
the main obstacles to real 
development : the absence of a state 
apparatus, and the ongoing war. But 
with démocratisation under way and 
many Chadians apparently firmly 
committed to democratic change, 
hope is springing anew. 
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DOSSIER 
Whether part of a 'liberal' sea-change, 
or just a passing fashion, privatisation 
is sweeping across the globe. Between 
1984 and 1991 the governments of a 
hundred countries — above all 
developing ones (particularly in South 
America and Africa) — have sold $250 
billion-worth of public enterprises. And 
the key conclusion of many experts is 
that this process of economic 
liberalisation and privatisation in the 
productive sector needs to be stepped 
up. It is widely believed that private 
investment, whether internally 
generated, or coming from outside, is 
essential for the successful relaunch of 
the developing countries' economies. 
Following a brief resumé of the impact 
of privatisation, the aim of our Dossier 
is to give a general analysis of the 
conditions for private sector 
participation in development. 
Pages 52 to 96 
VETO' ROUND-UP 
ACP-EU Council of Ministers 
Against the background of 
tremendous hope for southern Africa 
engendered by the successful transition 
of South Africa to majority rule, the 
19th session of the ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers took place in Mbabane, 
Swaziland, from 18 to 20 May 1994. It 
examined progress in the 
implementation of the Conventions 
and formally launched negotiations for 
the mid-term review of Lomé IV. 
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There is no way around it. When 
talking of Africa's industrial per-
formance, it is all doom and gloom. 
Whereas other developing con-
tinents have succeeded in produc-
ing 'tigers' or 'NICs', virtually none 
of this category of high industrial per-
formers can be found in sub-Saharan Africa 
— the possible exception of Mauritius 
serving only to prove the wider rule. While 
Africa's contribution to world industrial 
production has regressed, pressure is never-
theless growing on its private sector to 
adapt to rapidly changing conditions. 
Indeed, as démocratisation seems to go 
hand in hand with economic liberalisation, 
privatisation has become a must alongside 
the need to achieve international competi-
tiveness. But is sufficient entrepreneurship 
available in a proper 'enabling environ-
ment'? And what about restructuring cur-
rently underutilised industrial capacity to 
show, perhaps, that 'things can be made to 
work' and thereby impress potential inves-
tors? And then there is the informal sector. 
Is this the 'goose that lays the golden eggs' 
or is it too ineffective to contribute to 
industrial growth? 
These were some of the questions 
that The Courier put to Mauricio de Maria y 
Campos, who has been heading UNIDO since 
April 1993. A former Vice-Minister for 
Industrial Development in Mexico, his first, 
and perhaps most difficult challenge, was to 
oversee a complete overhaul of UNIDO's 
objectives, tasks and staffing — a job which 
Is now nearing completion. Known to be a 
critic of the ambitious yet disappointing First 
Industrial Decade for Africa, he pleads at the 
outset of IDDA II for a serious rethink of 
Africa's industrial development strategy, 
arguing the need for a 'local private sector 
ready to invest and to generate wealth' 
against a background of greater market 
integration. 
■ Mr Director General, you are now in the 
process of fine tuning UNIDO's restructur-
ing. What is the main philosophy behind 
this ? How far have you been able to carry 
it out and what will be the direct oper-
ational consequences, particularly as re-
gards the developing world ? 
— UNIDO, like any other inter-
national organisation, has had to under-
take a major change to adapt to the new 
world conditions — the whole process of 
globalisation, the changing roles of the 
private and public sectors, the growth of 
private sector development and so on. 
There are also new environmental issues, 
not to mention the changes that have 
occurred at the political level with the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union. All 
these elements pointed to a need to 
reform UNIDO. 
It was also clear, taking account 
of recent experience, that UNIDO had to 
become a different kind of organisation 
and one which was more efficient and 
healthier in financial terms. We reduced 
personnel, as you know, by 10%. Eighty-
five per cent of our expenditure is person-
nel-related, so this was something that 
could not be avoided. At the same time we 
had to undertake the major reforms 
needed to get UNIDO on the right track in 
the medium and longer term. And, as a 
result of all the consultations with Member 
States, we got approval for more funda-
mental changes in terms of work priorities 
and restructuring of the organisation. Since 
January (following last December's 
Yaoundé conference), I have been im-
plementing these reforms. These have 
involved a very rapid reorganisation of 
available resources and that has implied a 
redefinition both of our programmes and 
of the terms of reference of the various 
organisational units. 
We have also established new 
mechanisms for project management — an 
area that certainly needed reforming given 
that our technical cooperation was not as 
effective as one would have wanted. We 
decided to review the whole project cycle 
and to establish for the first time, I think, in 
the history of UNIDO, a complete new set 
of guidelines to deal with our technical 
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cooperation. This covers the whole process 
from the time a project idea is identified, 
through formulation and execution to the 
subsequent evaluation exercise. And I 
should say that I am very happy with what 
we have achieved. 
But more important than this is 
the fact that the Member States always 
wanted UNIDO to be a much more focused 
organisation, concentrating the expertise 
that it undoubtedly has on sectors and 
topics that are a priority for the developing 
countries. In this regard we have made big 
improvements. 
To summarise, at the Yaoundé 
conference, UNIDO was asked to concen-
trate on five major objectives. First of all, to 
assist developing countries in their process 
of industrialisation, giving special attention 
to international competitiveness, since 
these countries are now participating in a 
more globalised world with economies 
that are more open. Second, to pay 
particular attention to human resources in 
industrial development — not just tradi-
tional technical expertise, but also the 
acquisition of management skills. Third, to 
focus more on the private sector. Of course 
we continue to support public-sector 
enterprises, although our work in this area 
increasingly has to do with restructuring 
and privatising these enterprises. But the 
basic emphasis is on private enterprise and, 
in particular, small and medium — scale 
companies. Fourth, to promote inter-
national cooperation in the technological 
field — technology transfers and so on. 
Finally, there is the field of environmental 
protection and energy efficiency as it 
relates to the· industrial sector. Here, 
UNIDO is expected to play a greater role, 
as, indeec, it i; already doing. 
We expect UNIDO activities in the 
future to be geared more towards the 
specific needs of the countries concerned. 
In particular, we feel that we can be more 
effective in our technical cooperation. Of 
course there is a feeling of donor fatigue 
and everyone would like to see better 
results from their contributions to UNIDO. 
On this question of technical cooperation, I 
fully recognise that an organisation such as 
ours has to contribute in a way that allows 
developing countries to acquire local 
capabilities — so that the industrial 
development process can continue in the 
future. So building up local capacity will be 
a key objective of our future work. 
■ At the beginning of the year you 
declared, 'we cannot afford to allow any 
region of the world to be left behind'. In 
the same statement, you spoke of the 
industrial progress of Latin America and 
Asia. Is this an indication of a concern on 
your part that Africa is becoming mar-
ginalised? 
— Yes, I am very worried about 
Africa and particularly about the least 
developed countries of that continent. 
Over the last few years — indeed, going 
right back to the 1980s — Africa has not 
just been lagging behind but has been 
slipping back in terms of industrial develop-
ment. It is true that the level of particip-
ation of developing countries in the 
world's industrial output has increased, but 
if you look in more detail at what has 
happened you see that most of this is due 
to a few countries in Asia — notably South-
East Asia — not to mention China, which 
has grown very quickly in the past few 
years. Latin America's contribution to 
world industrial production has remained 
more or less stable while Africa has fallen 
back. I think that in an increasingly 
interdependent world, problems in one 
part must concern us all. It is important to 
have stability in global development. We 
have rising expectations fostered by the 
global communications revolution but it is 
dear, particularly in the case of Africa, that 
the lack of economic and social develop-
ment is increasingly the source of potential 
or actual political and social conflicts. This is 
something that we have to take into 
account. 
■ But it is no secret that you have been 
highly critical of Africa's so-called first 
industrial development decade (IDDA). 
What can realistically be expected from the 
second one, which was launched with 
some fanfare ? 
— I have been saying very clearly 
to African countries that we have to 
rethink all our strategies towards Africa 
and towards the second industrial develop-
ment decade. What we have to do is to 
review very carefully what Africa really is, 
what has or has not been achieved in 
recent years in terms of both macro-
economic and industrial parameters, and 
to make some fundamental changes if we 
are to make realistic progress. If program-
mes are to be successful, there have to be 
some major changes in the way things are 
done. Of course, the role of an inter-
national organisation such as UNIDO is 
really quite modest. We can only have a 
limited impact in one sector — industry — 
which itself is small in most African 
economies. Other areas, such as agricul-
ture, are obviously more significant. But I 
believe, nonetheless, that industry can and 
should have a role to play. 
Most countries have recently 
undergone a process of macroeconomic 
adjustment. The results have been varied 
but, realistically, one can only speak of a 
few places where the economy has started 
to move. Look at the situation in the 
francophone countries in the CFA zone. 
There has recently been a major change — 
one that was expected, and, indeed, 
inevitable — but we have to ask how one 
can capitalise on the new situation in terms 
of achieving effective industrial develop-
ment. We will shortly be having a meeting 
in Bamako to discuss this very subject, in 
close cooperation of course with de-
veloped countries as well with the states of 
the region that are directly affected. 
■ Given the rapid sequence of events in 
Africa over the past few years — in 
particular, the démocratisation process and 
the transition towards free market econ-
omies — most people recognise the need 
for these countries to achieve international 
competitiveness. Yet the changes seem to 
have taken the private sector by surprise, 
the 'enabling environment' appears lar-
gely to be lacking and there is still an 
absence of entrepreneurship. There are a 
lot of very good, efficient traders in Africa 
but they seem reluctant to invest in their 
own countries, even where they are 
potentially very productive. 
— I think you put it very ac-
curately, although there is certainly a 
commitment to an enabling environment. 
This was the clear message from the 
countries that participated in the Mauritius 
meeting last year. But this cannot be 
achieved overnight. There is no doubt that 
in many countries, the private industrial 
sector is very limited, with a wide spread of 
small family industries. But, as a result of 
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past industrial policies, what you also have 
in Africa is a lot of big or medium-sized 
state enterprises which grew up in a very 
protected environment. They lack ef-
ficiency and need to be restructured and 
privatised. There are two basic problems 
here. There isn't much of a private sector to 
start with and many of the entities 
involved have not been properly prepared 
for privatisation. 
■ Which presumably explains the criti-
cisms levelled by African experts against 
the privatisations that have taken place up 
to now. 
— That's right. From the UNIDO 
standpoint, we are just starting our work 
in the field of privatisation. We have been 
doing some very good work in countries 
like Peru and Poland and we will be 
tackling this shortly in Sudan. And what we 
have seen is that too much emphasis has 
been put on the process of privatisation 
perse. What is more important is to ensure 
that the process takes place within the 
framework of a wider economic and 
industrial policy. Insofar as it relates to the 
industrial sector, adequate consideration 
needs to be given to the pre- and post-
privatisation measures. This, of course, is 
something which applies in other parts of 
the world as well. We see, for example, in 
Poland that, very often, there is no private 
capital available for a successful privatis-
ation, so mobilising local or external 
investment funds takes on added signific-
ance. There is also the issue of training 
people so as to ensure that the privatised 
company will succeed. These problems 
exist elsewhere but they are, let us say, 
accentuated in the case of Africa. 
■ How do you make entrepreneurs ? 
— That really is the big question, 
isn't it, and it is something to which we 
now attach great importance. In the past 
people used to talk about the various 
approaches — of the World Bank as 
opposed to that of UNIDO, or of the UN as 
opposed to that of the European Com-
munity. Now all the organisations are 
involved in learning from and working 
with each other. Something we are now 
trying to do is to work more closely with 
the other organisations such as the EC or 
financial institutions. For instance, in the 
case of Sudan, there is a major project to 
assist the country in the privatisation of 
industrial enterprises but it is going to take 
place with World Bank funds. So we are 
trying to learn positive lessons from our 
experience and ensure that, in future, 
privatisation genuinely includes restructur-
ing, training and other general policy 
aspects that have to be coordinated within 
the process. That means strengthening 
private-sector institutions and creating 
new mechanisms, in particular to support 
new small enterprises. These sometimes 
have to be stimulated in a special manner 
to absorb those who have lost their jobs 
through the processes of restructuring and 
privatisation. 
■ But isn't there a dichotomy here ? The 
emphasis today is very firmly on the private 
sector but, if you look at those places that 
have achieved newly-industrialised 
country (NIC) status, you see that in 
virtually all of them the state played a 
major part in stimulating economic activity 
and growth. 
— Well, I think this is precisely 
one of the areas where international 
organisations now have to do a lot of 
rethinking. It is veny clear that in the past, 
most of the industrial development lead-
ing to import substitution took place with 
a very high level of government particip-
ation. Now, the emphasis is on deregu-
lation in private sector development. I 
think, bearing in mind the experience of 
privatisation, that the state and the 
private sector both have a role to play. 
What is important is that there is efficient 
participation in both cases. As regards 
industry, the private sector should play a 
major and fundamental role in investment 
and growth but there has, nevertheless, to 
be an understanding with the govern-
ment. The latter has to provide a general 
framework as well as giving support in 
some specific areas : areas such as human 
resource development, support for small 
and medium in scale industries, regional 
development and so on. 
In the provision of a general 
framework for stimulating growth, the 
private sector should, of course, play an 
increasing role to the extent that it can, 
but we should beware of what has 
happened in some places. Many insti-
tutions and frameworks have been de-
stroyed without adequate substitutes 
being created by the private sector be-
cause the latter was simply not ready to 
assume the new functions. We have 
discovered, perhaps, the merits of a more 
gradual approach in this regard. 
■ Still on the role of the private sector, 
there is widespread agreement on the 
importance of attracting foreign invest-
ment. If you look at sub-Saharan Africa, 
existing industrial capacity is extremely 
underutilised. It also badly needs to be 
rehabilitated and restructured. If what is 
already there could be made to work 
efficiently, would that not encourage 
foreign investors, who seem very reluctant 
to get involved at the moment ? 
You have an important point 
there. It is a basic fact that foreign 
investment will go to a country where local 
investors are also active. You will very 
seldom find countries where foreign in-
vestment can do the work by itself. In the 
final analysis, there has to be a local sector 
that can generate wealth and that is ready 
to invest. That is why it is so important to 
emphasise the development of the private 
sector itself. The other thing that is 
fundamental, of course, is the existence of 
a market. I think that support for industrial 
development in Africa in the recent past 
has been based on a wrong assumption. 
You can't simply change from a substi-
tution model to an open one in industrial 
development without taking into account 
the weakness of the African markets. Look 
at my own country of Mexico, which has 90 
million people. It is obvious to them that to 
achieve industrial growth, they have to be 
part of a bigger trading area — in this case, 
NAFTA. We are seeing the same thing in 
Europe. It is unrealistic to believe that small 
countries with limited purchasing power in 
their local markets can achieve real de-
velopment. It is important to start thinking 
in terms of bigger markets, especially for 
certain industries. There may be room for 
small enterprises, for example in the food 
sector, but if we are really thinking of or 
helping Africa to industrialise itself, this has 
to be done more and more within a 
context of greater market integration. 
Exports, of course, can also play an 
important role and the Lomé Convention 
and other preferential systems are import-
^ 
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ant in this respect. I am glad to say that 
people are beginning to recognise the 
need for wider markets. 
■ So you support development of inter-
African trade ? 
Yes. But moving from the po-
sition of realising that you need some 
market integration to actually being able 
to do something about it is a long process. 
And, let's face it, it is not just a matter of 
economic integration. The political aspects 
have to be tackled as well in order to have 
stable integration. 
■ Your own country, Mexico, has a large 
informal sector, although it is gradually 
diminishing. There seems to be a diver-
gence of view about the informal sector in 
Africa. Some see it as an important and 
dynamic area while others take the view 
that it does not really contribute to 
economic growth. 
— In this debate, I think there are 
important distinctions that need to be 
drawn. In the trade sector in particular, 
informal activities often do not really 
produce any additional value to society. On 
the other hand, in the industrial sector and 
in some services they can make an import-
ant contribution in terms of production 
and job creation. From the standpoint of 
UNIDO, it is the informal sector in industry 
that interests us. The reality is that this 
informal economy exists, for whatever 
reason, and what I would say is that we 
should be better equipped to deal with this 
reality. We need to be able to design 
mechanisms to support the development 
of enterprises even in the informal 
economy. My experience from Mexico and 
of other countries in Latin America is that 
the existence of an informal economy is 
often linked to the fact that the regu-
lations in place are sometimes excessive. 
Most of them are only suitable for larger 
companies. So it is important to have 
specific and simplified rules and mecha-
nisms to deal with the informal industries. 
Enterprises that are ready to operate 
within the system have to be given a 
realistic opportunity to do so. 
When I was the Vice-Minister of 
Industrial Development in Mexico, we 
decided on legislation to promote small 
and micro-scale industries. In order to start 
operating, enterprises only had to go 
through one 'window' to get all their 
approvals and so on. We also simplified tax 
schemes for small companies. This was a 
veny important change and many enter-
prises decided to formalise as a result. But 
even then, you have to recognise that only 
a part of the informal economy will react. 
In this respect, it should be possible in 
Africa to establish legal and institutional 
conditions that promote the formalisation 
of part of the informal economy. At the 
same time, we have to be ready to work 
with informal enterprises because, at a 
certain stage in their development, if they 
want to continue growing, they will have 
to make the transition into the formal 
system. 
■ Do you see agriculture and the rural 
populations as the basis for future indus-
trial development in Africa ? 
— They have to be. I think that in 
the next few years, capacities in the 
agricultural area, and indeed in other 
natural resources such as minerals, have to 
be reassessed in the context of present 
world conditions — trade patterns, price 
and market expectations and so on. But it 
has to be recognised that these are very 
basic assets which offer the best basis for 
development. I think it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that we cannot make big jumps 
in terms of industrial development other 
than in a few selected areas. Having said 
this, there are some countries that can 
have a different perspective, whether 
because of their geographical position or 
because they have good training and a 
well-developed human resource base. We 
have, for example, just had a meeting on 
investment promotion in Madagascar and 
it was impressive to see how many foreign 
investors were interested in the country. 
Madagascar has just had a change of 
government, but it is also a country that 
has an interesting population mix, as well 
as being close to Mauritius. It could well be 
a base for some industrial development 
and the possibilities are worth exploring. 
■ Mauritius is obviously one of the best 
performers among the ACP States. Two 
years ago, when I asked the President of 
Mauritius to explain his country's success, 
he gave me a very short answer. He said 
'we educated our people'. Do you agree 
that this is the key ? 
— I think that is a basic condition. 
In general there is a reassessment of the 
importance of investing in human re-
sources. This is an area where a lot of 
investment is clearly needed in Africa, 
particularly with a view to industrial 
development. The other big area, of course 
is infrastructures. In general, these have 
deteriorated and obviously roads, railways, 
telecommunications and so on are vital for 
industrial development. I would place 
particular emphasis on good telecommuni-
cations. Nowadays, if you want to work 
efficiently, and participate in world pro-
duction and trade, then you need to have 
good telecommunications links. 
■ Many people see the new South Africa 
as offering hope for the development of 
the wider region and indeed the continent 
asa whole. Do you see South and Southern 
Africa as having a 'pilot'function in Africa's 
future industrialisation ? 
— Definitely. We have high 
hopes that South Africa will join UNIDO 
soon. They have a very important role to 
play both generally and more specifically in 
industrial matters. Of course, South Africa 
has its own problems of regional develop-
ment but they have a clear idea of what 
needs to be done. This is one area where 
UNIDO can help, in terms of technical 
cooperation, and we would envisage that 
effective results could be achieved within a 
reasonable time. 
But, more important, I think that 
South Africa can have a very dynamic part 
to play as a catalyst for industrial develop-
ment, initially in the southern part of 
Africa, but, over the longer term, in the 
continent as a whole. I think it can play a 
big role through its investments and 
through its technical expertise. Moreover, 
it can offer a bigger show case than what 
we have seen up to now — showing that 
industrial development is a possibility in 
Africa as long as the basic issues that we 
have just been discussing can be over-
come. ■■ 
Interview by Roger De Backer 
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Following applications made by 
Austria, Sweden, Finland and 
Norway to join the European Com-
munities, accession negotiations 
with Austria, Sweden and Finland 
were opened officially on 1 Feb-
ruary 1993 and with Norway on 5 April 1993. 
The negotiations with the candidates which 
started in February 1993 were conducted in 
parallel, at various levels, in separate 
Conferences meeting at ministerial or 
deputy (ambassadorial) level. The negoti-
ations on a considerable number of chapters 
were facilitated by the existence of the Free 
Trade Agreements between the Community 
and the candidates, and the entry into force 
of the European Economic Area Agreement 
as from 1 January 1994, whereby the 
applicant countries were already committed 
to transposing into national law most of the 
existing EC legislation on the Single Market. 
A basic principle of the negotiations was the 
requirement that the applicant countries 
should accept the actual and potential rights 
and obligations attaching to the Community 
system, its legislation and its institutional 
framework — known as the Community 
'acquis' — subject (if necessary) to technical 
adjustments and, in exceptional cases, to 
temporary exemptions and transitional 
arrangements. 
The negotiations were concluded 
at the political level with Austria, Sweden 
and Finland on 1 March 1994 and with 
Norway slightly later, on 16 March, owing 
to the need for further negotiations on 
some outstanding issues, notably fisheries. 
Following this political agreement be-
tween the European Union and the applic-
ants on all points raised by both sides, the 
final outstanding chapter, Institutions, was 
settled by the Union at loannina on 
27 March 1994. The Accession Conferences 
then agreed on all negotiating chapters on 
30 March. 
The final texts (a Treaty, an Act 
of Accession with Annexes and Protocols, 
The enlargement of the 
European Union and the 
ACP countries 
by Francisco Granell* 
* Director, Task Force on Enlargement European 
Commission. 
I declarations) were agreed upon 
I at the final session of the Acces-
I sion Conferences at deputy minis-
I terial level on 12 April 1994. This 
I meant that negotiations which 
I took Spain and Portugal more 
I than six years and Greece more 
^^^ than three were completed in 
little over 12 months. 
The European Parliament gave its 
assent on 4 May and, after the signing of 
the Treaty and Acts by the Sixteen in Corfu 
during the European Council, the ratifi-
cation process can now go ahead with a 
view to admitting the new members into 
the European Union by 1 January 1995. 
The impact of 
enlargement on 
LDCs: the main 
factors 
This first enlargement of the 
European Union will have a major impact 
on both current and acceding members of 
the Union, as well as an effect on less 
developed countries (LDCs). 
This impact will depend on many 
factors. An attempt to assess the effect and 
some of the most significant factors 
involved is set out below. 
The interest shown by the acceding 
countries in developing countries. 
The interest of the new would-be 
member countries has manifested itself in 
both their trade and their cooperation 
policies towards the developing countries. 
As regards trade policy, each of 
the potential new Member States has had 
a long history of preferential mechanisms 
to improve market access for developing 
countries. These mechanisms, which are 
part of the United Nations-devised GSP 
schemes date, as does the European 
Community's, from the early 1970s and 
have brought significant gains to develop-
ing countries. 
As regards development cooper-
ation, these countries are among the most 
committed donors of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA). It is true that because of 
the relatively small size of the applicants 
the volume of their assistance is not 
particularly large compared to that of the 
current European Union as a whole. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of 
the decade their total ODA accounted for 
about US$ 4,500 million per year, which, in 
1991, exceeded the ODA flows from the 
European Community (as distinct from its 
Member States) at that time. Furthermore, 
Sweden's ODA is of the same order of 
magnitude as that of the Netherlands, and 
Norway's is about the same as Spain's or 
Denmark's. 
More significantly, the commit-
ment of the three Nordic countries to 
funding ODA, when measured in propor-
tional terms, is among the highest in the 
world. Thus, while ODA as a proportion of 
Gross National Product (GNP) is barely 
0.20 % in the case of the United States and 
0.43 % in the case of the European Union, 
the Nordic countries reach, and even 
exceed, the United Nations accepted 
target of 0.7 % of GNP. There are only two 
European Union members, the Nether-
lands and Denmark, that meet those 
targets. Likewise, except for Austria, their 
ODA in per capita terms is two or three 
times as large as the European Union's 
average (see Table 1). 
Furthermore, the political sensi-
tivity of these potential new Member 
^ 
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States to development cooperation runs 
parallel to that of the European Com-
munity, particularly as regards some of the 
issues it considers of priority interest for the 
Lomé Convention. 
More precisely, the Nordic coun-
tries in particular have been at the fore-
front of support för good governance and 
for human rights and democracy issues in 
developing countries. They are also par-
ticularly sensitive to income distribution 
and other social agenda issues. Finally, they 
make strong use of, and offer substantial 
support to, non-governmental organis-
ations in development cooperation. On all 
these grounds, we can expect these 
countries to be good supporters of Com-
munity action in these areas of cooperation 
with ACP countries. 
The enlargement of the Internal Market 
The enlarged market which 
membership of the acceding countries will 
create will provide additional export 
opportunities for the developing countries. 
This effect should not, however, 
be exaggerated. First of all, these countries 
only add 25 million additional consumers 
to the Union (i.e. fewer than 10% of the 
existing consumers in the Union). Secondly, 
most of the trade effects associated with 
the accession have already taken place or 
are already taking place as a result of the 
implementation of the European Economic 
Area, which has removed virtually all 
barriers between the present Union mem-
bers and the former EFTA countries (of 
which the acceding countries were the 
core). 
Furthermore, membership of the 
Union will not create trade in all sectors. 
For example it will not affect some 
agricultural subsectors with strict regu-
lations governing the question of intra-
Community preference. 
In spite of all that, the opportu-
nities created by the enlarged market 
should not be discounted. Firstly, in spite of 
the already low trade barriers between 
current and acceding Members of the 
European Union, there is still room for 
additional trade benefits to be derived 
from the elimination of remaining barriers 
and from the implementation of others. 
Secondly, the Blair House arrangement, 
the Final Uruguay Round agreement and 
the impending solution of the 'banana 
problem' are leading to a convergence of 
agricultural policies as between the current 
and acceding Member States of the Union, 
thus reducing the potential for trade 
diversion effects. 
As developing countries enjoy 
preferential treatment under each of their 
industrialised partners' GSP schemes, the 
trade effects of the accession have impli-
cations that go beyond what is said in the 
Member Countries of the European Community 
and the Accession Countries 
Mombers Number "., Develop-
PopulcHion GNP GNP (per of the of votes ment 
(million) (billion S) capita S) European in the effort : 
Parliament Council ODA/GNP 
Germany 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Spain 
France 
United Kingdom 
Greece 
Netherlands 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
79.8 
9.8 
5.1 
39.1 
57.0 
57.3 
10.3 
15.0 
3.5 
57.7 
0.4 
10.6 
7.8 
5.0 
4.3 
8.6 
1846.0 
209.5 
133.9 
547.9 
1278.6 
1024.7 
75.1 
312.3 
42.8 
1186.5 
13.7 
73.3 
174.7 
116.3 
110.4 
233.2 
23 030 
20 880 
25 930 
14 020 
22 300 
17 760 
7 180 
20 590 
12 100 
20 510 
35 260 
7 450 
22 110 
22 980 
25 800 
26 780 
99 
25 
16 
64 
87 
87 
25 
31 
15 
87 
6 
25 
21 
16 
15 
22 
10 
5 
3 
8 
10 
10 
5 
5 
3 
10 
2 
5 
4 
3 
3 
4 
Data from the World Bank Atlas 1994, Treaty and Act of Accession and Development Assistance Committee 
of the OECD. 
paragraphs above. The main implication 
here is that because, as part of the 
accession negotiations, the acceding coun-
tries have accepted that the European 
Union's GSP scheme is part of the 'acquis 
communautaire', the scheme will become 
part of the policies of the acceding 
countries. 
As a result, the benefits from the 
enlarged market will be compounded by 
the fact that, as argued below, the benefits 
currently enjoyed by ACP countries, in 
terms of market access to the European 
Union, and embodied in its GSP scheme are 
superior to those they enjoy in their trade 
with the acceding countries. 
The explanation for this is as 
follows. While acknowledging the dif-
ficulty of making precise comparisons, it is 
probably true that the Community's GSP 
scheme and that of the acceding countries 
are similar in general terms : they are 
similar in country and product coverage (as 
regards manufactures, and particularly 
textiles, the European Community's co-
verage is wider), even though the acceding 
countries do not set quantitative limits on 
GSP benefits. Instead, their GSP schemes 
often exclude some countries or certain 
imports from some countries. 
Roughly speaking, then, both 
sets of GSP schemes seem to be com-
parable in the benefits they grant. As a 
result, developing countries trading with 
the acceding countries are unlikely to be 
made significantly better off, or worse off, 
by the adoption of the Union's GSP scheme 
from the moment of accession. 
Yet, the acceding countries do 
not have, as regards ACP countries, the 
particularly generous special GSP schemes 
which the European Union has granted 
covering, in particular, most of their 
agricultural exports, and including the 
removal of all quantitative limits on their 
preferences relating to industrial products. 
An increase in the external actions of 
the enlarged Union 
The new members of the Union 
are upper-income countries and are likely 
to be relatively significant contributors to 
the European Union budget and the 
European Development Fund (EDF). The 
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new members will also participate in the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). 
As the acceding countries' com-
bined GDP amounts to about 9% of the 
combined GDP of the enlarged Union, the 
expectation is that the Community budget 
of future years will increase by about that 
amount and that the EDF will also be 
increased. In that case, and even ac-
knowledging that a major part of the new 
resources will be directed to the financing 
of intra-Union expenditure, it can be 
expected that, purely as a result of the 
accession, the resources available for 
external policies might increase. 
The effects of accession on 'ex-
ternal' budgetary expenditure are harder 
to gauge as the matter will not be settled 
for several months yet. 
Nonetheless, it is almost certain 
that the accession of the applicant coun-
tries will result in an increase in the 
resources available for external policies, 
rather than a reduction in the contri-
butions made by the other Member States 
to the Union budget and, as regards the 
signatories to the Lomé Convention, the 
European Development Fund. 
In the worst-case scenario, 
namely that much of the increase in the 
budgetary resources of the Community 
will be used for the financing of 'internal' 
policies, an increase in development 
cooperation expenditure seems reason-
able. 
While it is not possible at this 
stage to foresee where these increased 
funds for 'external policies' will be allo-
cated, it is safe to infer that a part of them 
will go to the additional budgetary finan-
cing of cooperation activities with ACP 
countries : food aid, NGOs, environmental 
issues, etc. 
Foreign trade of applicant countries 1992 (million ECU) 
Focusing on ACP 
countries  I
During the enlargement negoti-
ations the applicant countries 
accepted the Lomé Convention 'acquis' in 
its entirety as it stands today and also 
agreed to the lines laid down for the mid-
term review of the Lomé Convention 
approved by the Council in line with the 
proposals from the Commission. 
Concerning the participation of 
the four new Member States in EDF 
funding, it must be said that only at the 
end of 1994 or the beginning of 1995 will 
the EU negotiate a new financial protocol 
determining the 8th EDF. It will only be 
appropriate at this stage to establish the 
global amount of the EDF quota for new 
members. 
Since the GDP/official develop-
ment assistance ratio of the new members 
is higher than the Union's present average 
and since the new members have ex-
pressed their willingness to maintain some 
leadership in development cooperation, 
they are expected to contribute more than 
10% of the 8th EDF. 
The new members will also par-
ticipate fully in the capital and reserves of 
the European Investment Bank, which 
plays an active role in financing activities in 
the ACP countries. 
None of the new members of the 
Union has traditionally been specially 
interested in ACP countries : neither mig-
ration flows nor cultural ties have been 
significant and economic and trade re-
lations are relatively small. 
These countries' trade flows with 
ACP countries are rather limited: this 
region accounts for only 1 % of the applic-
ant countries' trade, which is well below 
the European Union average (Table 2). 
The full participation of the 
acceding countries in Lomé institutions and 
in the 8th EDF will be positive for ACP 
countries considered as a group. Further-
more, the acceding countries' concern for 
efficiency and accountability in the use of 
public funds, as well as their support for 
untied aid, will contribute to a better 
quality of development assistance from the 
enlarged European Union through the 
Lomé Convention. ■■ F.G. 
^ 
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Eritrea has at last rejoined the 
world's community of nations. 
Those who have watched the long, 
resolute, sometimes bitter and 
now victorious struggle for free-
dom can only congratulate its 
people on their success, and say welcome 
back to the map. After a generation of war 
and suffering, Eritrea threw off foreign 
occupation and rule three years ago, and 
became officially recognised as a sovereign 
state after a referendum on independence 
from Ethiopia in May 1993. The country has 
now joined the United Nations and the 
Organisation of African Unity and, since it 
was admitted to the Lomé Convention as of 
independence on 24 May 1993, it has been 
the 70th member of the ACP group. 
Eritrea is a country of some 
120 000 square kilometres situated north 
east op Ethiopia and bordering the Red Sea 
between Sudan and Djibouti, facing Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen. Sandy plains stretch 
along a seashore of 1080 km, where salt-
panning and fishing are the main economic 
activities, giving place inland to deserts in 
the north and west, while in the middle the 
land rises abruptly to a plateau which is the 
continuation of the Ethiopian highlands 
and on which stands the capital, Asmara. 
The variations in altitude produce wide 
differences in climate within short dist-
ances and a variety of crops is grown. The 
population of the highlands consists largely 
of settled farmers professing Christianity 
and speaking Tigrinya, a Semitic language, 
while the lowlands and northern moun-
tains are inhabited by nomadic or semi-
nomadic herders who speak a related 
language. Tigre, and several others, and 
who are Moslem by religion. Altogether 
there are nine ethnic groups with distinct 
customs and cultures, and the numbers of 
Christians and Moslems are roughly equal. 
The population is 85% rural, and is es-
timated at 2.5 million altogether, while up 
to a million more are believed to be living 
abroad. Statistics have generally to be 
treated with circumspection, however: 
those that exist were compiled by the 
Ethiopian authorities before independence 
and are said by the Eritrean Ministry of 
Finance and Development to be either 
incomplete or misleading. 
ERITREA 
jf? The rebirth 
of a nation 
One statistic (emanating from 
the World Bank) which the evidence of the 
eyes suggests is reliable is that 41 % of the 
population is under 16, and 17 % of it under 
six. Eritrea is certainly full of young people, 
a sad reminder of the sacrifices borne by 
the previous generation in the war — in 
which 150 000 people lost their lives, 
60 000 of them combatants and the rest 
civilians. So it would be tempting to talk in 
journalistic clichés of 'the young nation 
taking its first faltering steps', its insti-
tutions 'in their infancy' or coping with 
'teething troubles' and so on. But the 
country is old in experience — and in years. 
As a geopolitical entity in its own right 
Eritrea has existed for more than a century, 
which gives the territory a longer history of 
unity and organisation, albeit under fore-
ign domination, than most countries in 
Africa can boast. Like almost all African 
countries, indeed, it is a by-product of 
European colonialism, and perhaps the 
most coherent way of making sense of 
Eritrean history has been suggested by two 
writers to whom anyone interested in the 
subject is indebted, Cahsai Berhane and 
Elisabeth C. Williamson : they believe that 
the country's struggle for freedom should 
be regarded as first and foremost a matter 
of completing the process of decolonis-
ation. ' In that sense, Eritrea has simply 
achieved what other ex-colonies — French, 
1 In Erythrée : un peuple en marche, published by 
L'Harmattan, Paris, 1985. 
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British, Belgian — managed in the 1960s. 
Why did it take so long ? 
The genesis 
of Eritrea  I
Eritrea's existence as a single unit 
began in 1889, during the Euro-
pean powers' 'scramble for Africa'. This 
undeveloped, amorphous territory was 
not a prime cut in the carve-up of Africa, 
but the opening of the Suez Canal had 
brought the Red Sea and, through it, the 
rich trade routes of the Indian Ocean 
within easy reach of European navies, 
giving the Horn of Africa huge strategic 
interest to potential competitors in the 
game of imperial expansion. Of these, 
France and Britain were the chief rivals for 
control of the region, and it was to 
minimise French influence that Britain 
encouraged a smaller power, Italy, which 
already had a military toehold on the Red 
Sea coast, to establish its first full colony 
there. The hew colony, Eritrea, was offi-
cially proclaimed in 1890 under a name 
derived from the ancient Greek word for 
'red'. 
The main attraction of Eritrea for 
Italy was as a beachhead from which to 
seize a much larger and more profitable 
prize, the empire of Ethiopia to the south. 
After a steady military build-up, the attack 
was duly launched in 1896, but failed 
immediately when Emperor Menelik II 
routed the Italian invasion force and 
became the only African leader of the time 
to repulse a European army. The defeated 
Italians retreated to their colony, and for 
the next generation Eritrea was quiet. In 
the interests of settlers brought from Italy, 
large expanses of land previously held by 
native Eritreans had been confiscated and 
agriculture, for self-sufficiency and export 
production, was now expanded, while 
roads and railways were built, a power 
supply was established and light industry 
began to operate on a modest scale. 
Economic growth 
and the first 
stirrings of political 
life 
The early 1930s saw the rise of 
fascism in Italy, its dreams of a new Roman 
Empire were revived, and in its colony in 
Africa a new phase of economic growth 
began. Mussolini's armies realised the 
Duce's imperial ambitions by conquering 
Ethiopia in 1935, and Rome poured 
thousands of colonists and huge amounts 
of capital into Eritrea to turn it into a base 
for the exploitation of Italy's new posses-
sions. So the first economic foundations of 
a modern state were laid in Eritrea, though 
the benefits were largely enjoyed only by 
its Italian colonists; for the natives of the 
country it meant further subjection and 
dispossession, disrupting their traditional 
social, economic and political structures in 
the countryside, leaving many without 
land and creating, for the first time, an 
urban proletariat in the newly expanding 
towns. 
Far-reaching change came with 
the Second World War. When Italy entered 
the war on Nazi Germany's side in 1941, 
the Allies determined to break up Italy's 
African empire, and Eritrea was occupied 
by British forces under United Nations 
mandate in that year. Political reforms in 
the British period included the abolition of 
racially discriminatory laws, an expansion 
of education and the establishment of 
councils of Eritrean notables to advise the 
British authorities on the concerns and 
needs of the local population. Early prom-
ises of eventual self-determination were 
not kept, however. On the economic front, 
the heavy investment by the Italians in 
infrastructure came to a halt and much of 
the industrial sector was run down. New 
taxes hit particularly hard at the settled 
peasantry in the highlands. Economic 
distress combined with political frustration 
to foster the emergence of Eritrea's first 
political parties. As the British mandate 
was only seen as temporary, for a per-
manent solution some advocated indepen-
dence, while others began to call for 
federation with Ethiopia. The Coptic 
Church, to which Christians in both coun-
tries belong, took up the call and the 
United States and Britain urged federation 
strongly in the United Nations. The Em-
peror of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, argued 
that his country had geographical, his-
torical, ethnic and economic claims to 
Eritrea, on the basis of flimsy evidence that 
the two places had been united over a 
thousand years earlier. He took care. 
however, to make this irrelevant claim 
more convincing by offering the US the use 
of a military and intelligence-gathering 
base in Asmara from which to monitor 
political and military developments in the 
Middle East and the Horn. A United 
Nations resolution federating Eritrea and 
Ethiopia (and specifically overriding Erit-
rea's right of self-determination) was duly 
adopted in 1950 and the Federation came 
into being two years later. 
I
Recolonisation 
and resistance 
Eritrea was given a constitution 
entrenching democratic principles 
and civil rights but its partner in the 
federation was governed by an absolutist 
monarch who soon set about dismantling 
these liberal provisions. Freedom of ex-
pression and freedom to organise labour 
unions were abolished ; the heads of the 
Eritrean Government and legislature were 
replaced with appointees of Haile Selassie ; 
public meetings and all political parties 
except the one favourable to union with 
Ethiopia were banned. All vestiges of 
Eritrea's autonomous status were eventu-
ally stripped away and in 1962 its Assembly 
was forced at gunpoint to abrogate the 
Federation. Eritrea was absorbed into 
Ethiopia as a mere province. For Eritrean 
nationalists this was not reunion with a 
mother-country but a transfer from one 
form of colonisation to another. 
There was no reaction from the 
United Nations, but resistance was already 
being organised inside and outside Eritrea. 
A guerrilla group known as the Eritrean 
Liberation Front (ELF) became active 
within the country from 1961, and clashes 
with the regular Ethiopian Army began in 
1964, when a new regime in Sudan 
allowed the ELF to set up bases on its 
territory. Ethiopia had meanwhile adopted 
a pro-Israeli policy, the two countries 
seeing themselves as islands in a hostile sea 
of Moslems, and Arab countries began to 
supply the ELF with money and weapons. 
From its starting point in the western 
lowlands, the ELF extended its operations 
as far as the densely populated high 
plateau. 
"I 
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The movement was led, how­
ever, by Eritrean exiles abroad whose 
inexperience of the situation in the field 
prompted them to divide the military 
operation into separate commands on a 
tribal basis. In a major offensive launched in 
1967, Ethiopian forces, equipped by the 
United States, were able to pick these units 
off one by one and drive the resistance 
back to its bases — the start of perhaps the 
lowest point in its fortunes. Three years 
later, when ethnic, religious and political 
differences within the ELF became im­
possible to reconcile, a progressive wing of 
fighters who advocated involving the 
civilian population fully in the struggle and, 
in the process, radically reorganising Erit­
rean society on a non-feudal basis, split off 
to form the Eritrean People's Liberation 
Forces (EPLF). 
Struggling 
for freedom  I
The ELF decided to eliminate this 
rival by force, and from 1971 to 
1974 the opposing sides fought a civil war. 
In 1974, a military coup in Ethiopia 
overthrew the Emperor. The new regime 
in Addis Ababa, however, despite profes­
sing the same revolutionary principles as 
the EPLF, proved as committed to Eth­
iopian unity as the old. Even so, attempts 
to patch up relations between the resist­
ance factions for concerted action against 
Ethiopia ultimately failed, and by 1977 the 
EPLF, reconstituted as the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front, finally emerged as the 
dominant military and political force in the 
liberation struggle. In that year Ethiopia 
became embroiled in a border dispute with 
Somalia, and the EPLF was able to take 
control of nine tenths of Eritrean territory. 
But in 1978, supported now by the Soviet 
Union and with Cuban troops, Mengistu 
moved his army back into Eritrea and drove 
the EPLF back to the Sahel region in the far 
north. Many civilians from the towns and 
villages recaptured by the Ethiopians left 
their homes and retreated with the Front, 
which then embarked on a remarkable 
social revolution involving mass literacy 
campaigns and agrarian reform in the 
liberated areas. 
Eritrea, showing autonomous provinces and 
main towns. 
Source : Ministry of Finance and Development 
The EPLF's skill in mobilising and training its 
forces for 'people's war' and winning the 
civilian population over for 'people's 
revolution' has often been admired as a 
display of determination, discipline and 
organisation. Without romanticising what 
was achieved, it has to be said that the 
strategy of involving the ordinary people 
for the first time in consultations and 
decision-making, successfully organising 
education, health and transport systems 
with minimal resources and under constant 
bombardment from the air, reorganising 
land ownership on a collective basis, 
emancipating women and educating the 
population for a society free of class, ethnic 
or colonial oppression did an enormous 
amount to consolidate national feeling 
among a population of many different 
ethnicities, cultures, languages and re­
ligions. It is difficult to see what other 
policy could have cemented them together 
so successfully and trained them for final 
victory in the face of such overwhelming 
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Victory 
odds. And it is a remarkable fact that the 
deliberately self-reliant EPLF sustained this 
momentum for many years with little 
outside help beyond moral support from 
those who shared its radical convictions, 
and in the teeth of attacks from the largest 
army in sub-Saharan Africa. 
I
The war of attrition with small 
EPLF advances continued until 
1988, when the guerrillas seized 
an Ethiopian arsenal and were able to 
relaunch the offensive in alliance with the 
Tigrean People's Liberation Front, the anti-
Mengistu resistance movement which by 
now was active within Ethiopia itself. 
American-sponsored peace talks during a 
truce in 1989 and 1990 came to nothing, 
and after a final offensive the EPLF 
captured the last remaining Ethiopian 
positions, took the unconditional sur-
render of the Ethiopian Army and made 
their triumphant entry into Asmara on 24 
May 1991 — just three days after the 
Ethiopian dictator had fled from his own 
country. After 30 years of war, peace was 
declared at a national reconciliation con-
ference in July. Eritrea's right to self-
determination was recognised, subject to a 
referendum to be held in 1993. Ethiopia's 
continued right of access to the sea 
through the Eritrean port of Assab was 
also guaranteed. 
Although Eritrea was still not 
officially independent, the EPLF under its 
leader, Isaías Afwerki, took de facto 
control of the country and set about the 
awesome task of rebuilding the economy. 
At its congress in 1987, the Front had 
dropped Marxism-Leninism as its guiding 
philosophy and opted for Western-style 
democracy with a free-market economy. 
However, on attaining power it decided 
not to allow other political parties to form 
at least until independence had been 
achieved after a two-year transitional 
period. In any case there were no other 
organised political forces within the 
country seeking power. The referendum 
on self-determination was held on 23 to 25 
April 1993 : more than 99% of votes were 
in favour of independence, which was 
officially proclaimed on 24 May. 
The new government and much 
of the civil service was formed of ex-
guerrilla fighters. These, together with the 
rank and file EPLF members constituting 
the army, committed themselves in 1991 
to work for two years to reconstruct the 
country in return for just board, lodging 
and pocket money. Just before the re-
ferendum, however, the Front decided to 
extend the commitment by another four 
years, and a mass protest in Asmara was 
only quelled when Isaías Afwerki, who 
upon independence became President, 
promised the ex-soldiers that money 
would be found to pay them a proper 
wage. A year since then, the situation has 
not changed, and thousands of Eritreans in 
the public service are still making this 
personal sacrifice, apparently with good 
grace. Obedience and discipline are still 
natural reflexes for many Eritreans who 
took part in the liberation struggle, though 
some of their countrymen whose ex-
periences are different find it hard to 
accept what often seems to outsiders the 
austere, quasi-military style of command 
still practised by the leaders of the Front. 
A single party  ■
Economic recovery is making slow 
progress against daunting ob-
stacles (which are described in 
another article) and in the three years since 
liberation there has been little change in 
the political power structure either. Fight-
ers with impeccable EPLF credentials have 
been put in positions of influence in 
preference to technocrats, and leaders of 
the Front have said that when a multi-
party system finally comes, it will emerge 
from within the EPLF. Development part-
ners in the North, impressed by the 
determination of the people to solve their 
own problems, have come forward with 
short-term aid but have pressed for signs 
that démocratisation as they understand it 
is taking place before they will agree to 
make larger commitments. In February this 
year the EPLF held its 3rd Congress and 
voted to transform itself into a 'mass' 
political party, the People's Front for 
Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), the neces-
sary first step towards multi-party elections 
at some as yet unstated time in the future. 
Government and party are thus in theory 
separate entities, but the leading positions 
in each are still shared out among veteran 
guerrilla leaders, some of whom hold posts 
in both. The President of the Republic also 
chairs the PFDJ's 75-member Central Coun-
cil and its inner Executive Council of 19. 
Other prominent figures include Local 
Government Minister Mohamud Ahmed 
Sherifo, the Front's Secretary-General 
Alamin Mohammed Said, Defense Minister 
Mesfin Hagos and Foreign Minister Petros 
Solomon. Justice Minister Fozia Hashim is 
one of the two women and five Moslems in 
the reshuffled, 16-member Cabinet ap-
pointed on 4 March 1994. 
The Congress resolved that the 
Front should 'play an active role in the 
drafting and adoption of [a] Constitution', 
though without setting a date, and that 
Eritrea's legislative body, the National 
Assembly, should be constituted out of 75 
representatives of the PFDJ, all members of 
its Central Council, and an equal number of 
representatives elected by the population 
— at no specified time. Until these 
elections are held, members of the existing 
Provincial Assemblies, elected under the 
auspices of the Front, will occupy the 75 
seats not occupied by its direct oppointees. 
Before the elections, in other words, there 
will be no parliamentary opposition to the 
single party, and after them the balance 
will still be such that even if all 75 elected 
members oppose the Front, they cannot 
outvote it. At least now that the Front is a 
political party, rather than a movement to 
which only fighters in the liberation 
struggle could belong, aspiring politicians 
from other backgrounds have a potential 
outlet for their points of view — if they are 
prepared to join the party. 
Opposition 
excluded  I
A National Charter promulgated 
at independence banned other 
political parties for a four-year transitional 
period due to end in May 1997. The 
February Congress resolved that the Front 
should participate in drafting, adopting 
and applying a law on political parties, but 
meanwhile the ban remains in force. 
Several leaders of ELF offshoots have sunk 
their differences and joined the Govern-
ment in Asmara, leaving four opposition 
groups still operating, all of them outside 
Λ 
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the country. These are respectively Marx-
ist-Leninist (but claiming, like the PFDJ, to 
favour a mixed economy), Albanian-style 
Stalinist, Arab nationalist and Islamic 
fundamentalist in inspiration. The last of 
these is said to be supported by Sudan and 
to have influence among Eritrean refugees 
still living in that country. The Congress 
resolutions exclude any political activity 
with outside backing on the grounds that 
'there should be no foreign interference, in 
whatever form, in our national politics' and 
any group which split from the old EPLF in 
the past is to be kept out because 'political 
affiliations hinged on the negative ex-
periences of our armed struggle should not 
'Ultimately, deliverance will depend on our 
own efforts.' 
Isaias Afwerki, leader of the liberation 
struggle and now President of the Republic 
be tolerated as they are contrary and 
detrimental to the beginning of a new 
political chapter and the development of a 
healthy and democratic political culture'. 
The opposition groups variously accuse the 
EPLF/PFDJ of running a dictatorship, hold-
ing political prisoners, violating human 
rights, betraying and oppressing the peo-
ple of Eritrea and simply running the 
country incompetently. Their views do not 
reach the general public in Eritrea, how-
ever, as the one newpaper and one radio 
station in the country are run by the PFDJ. 
A press code which may alter this state of 
affairs is to be drawn up, but again no date 
has been set. 
Démocratisation 
and 
self-reliance 
The official in charge of political 
affairs in the PFDJ's Council Office, Yemane 
Ghebreab, who has the reputation of 
being the political brains of the PFDJ, 
adopts a firm attitude to the attaching of 
political conditions (démocratisation, re-
spect for human rights, good governance) 
to delivery of aid from the North — an 
attitude which is characteristic of the 
Front's response to any outside sugges-
tions regarding the way it governs Eritrea. 
'Those are issues that we are working on 
ourselves,' he says. 'Démocratisation, for 
instance, is something that is more import-
ant to us than it is for any particular donor. 
We feel démocratisation, not just in Eritrea 
but everywhere, should not be a ruse, a 
ploy to receive outside assistance but that 
it should be home-grown, internally 
driven, because we see many instances 
where supposed démocratisation, multi-
party elections, have taken place just to 
satisfy donors, and those elections have 
not changed the governments in those 
countries in any way. Démocratisation is 
important for us not as a means of 
receiving assistance but as a means of 
building a healthy society in our country. 
We fought for it all these years.' 
Building a healthy society in-
volves, in the words of the 3rd Congress, 
'reinforcing the unity of the Eritrean 
people', and that means reconciling the 
interests not just of several disparate 
ethno-linguistic cultures but of societal 
groups who have quite different expec-
tations, depending on whether they spent 
the period of the liberation struggle at 
home or abroad, in the EPLF-liberated or 
Ethiopian-controlled areas in Eritrea or in 
poor or rich countries in exile. The country 
has been divided into ten theoretically 
autonomous provinces (Asmara, Sahel, 
Barka, Gash Setit, Senhit, Semhar, Ha-
masien, Seraye, Akele Guzai and Denkalia), 
each run by a provincial assembly through 
which the people are encouraged to find 
solutions to their own problems. On a 
practical level this decentralisation policy 
works fairly well, but political control is still 
kept by the Front and exercised through 
provincial governors appointed from 
Asmara. For the time being, a few more 
years of 'democratic centralism' may be the 
best way of maintaining and deepening 
the social harmony it took so long to 
achieve. 
Eritrea's leaders feel that they 
have a right to guide their country towards 
its future without foreign interference 
because they liberated it without foreign 
help. As President Isaias Afwerki put it in an 
address to the United Nations General 
Assembly on 30 September last year, from 
the moment in 19 50 when that body voted 
to federate his country with Ethiopia, 
'despite the repeated appeals of the 
Eritrean people, the United Nations re-
fused to raise its voice in the defence of a 
people whose future it had unjustly 
decided and whom it had pledged to 
protect. Not once in 41 years did Eritrea, 
scene of the longest war in Africa, and 
victim of some of the grossest violations of 
human rights, figure in the agenda of the 
United Nations.' As Eritreans gird themsel-
ves up to rebuild their country, the 
President went on to say, 'Ultimately, 
deliverance will depend on our own 
efforts, on the mobilisation and efficient 
utilisation of our resources.' Now that 
foreign aid is being offered, it is welcome, 
indeed essential, but international donors, 
including the European Union, have had 
occasion to observe that Eritreans accept 
money, like advice, only if it will help them 
achieve their priorities, not, in the Pre-
sident's words, 'on the basis of the interest 
and agendas of donors'. 
Top item on the PFDJ's agenda 
for the mid-term future is putting the 
country back on its feet and providing a 
decent life for Eritreans. 'The building of a 
strong and effective national government 
is a vital instrument for [...] the attainment 
of stability and development', the 3rd 
Congress resolutions say, adding that the 
success of such a government depends on 
institutional capacity building, which 're-
quires resources, effort and time'. In Eritrea 
today resources are few, but effort and 
time are commodities of which the count-
ry's liberators are clearly prepared to put in 
even more than they have already, to 
make sure that they get the society they 
want. ■■ Robert Rowe 
the Courier n° 146 · ¡uly-.iugust 1994 r A careful balance 
Eritrea's foreign relations 
I
Relations between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia today are excellent. 
During the war, there was close 
cooperation between the EPLF and 
Ethiopia's liberation movement, 
which originated in Tigray, a pro-
vince of Ethiopia bordering on Eritrea. Their 
membership is drawn from the same groups 
and their ideological attitudes, in resistance 
and then in government, have developed 
along comparable lines. 
Yemane Ghebreab, a former 
Deputy Foreign Minister who is now 
responsible for political affairs in Eritrea's 
ruling party, says the war left no acrimony 
on either side of the border. 'We have not 
raised the issue of reparations or the 
division of assets. Ethiopia itself is in bad 
shape because of the war and the policies 
of the previous government, and instead 
of looking back we feel we should be 
looking towards the future.' A joint 
commission looks at cooperation in agricul-
ture, industry, energy, transport, com-
munications, finance and banking, and 
there are positive signs of progress : 'The 
volume of goods passing through the port 
of Assab to and from Ethiopia is five times 
higher now than it was during the highest 
period under the Mengistu government. 
So it shows that Eritrea's independence has 
not in any way choked Ethiopia.' 
There is freedom of movement 
across the border, and Ethiopian Airlines 
has resumed flights between Addis Ababa 
and Asmara. Many Eritreans employed in 
the Ethiopian administration before in-
dependence have gone home to work in 
the Eritrean public service, and Ethiopian 
nationals in similar positions in Eritrea were 
allowed to stay on, provided they were 
fluent in the new official language, Tig-
rinya. The 85 000 Ethiopian military per-
sonnel taken prisoner when the EPLF took 
over Eritrea were expelled, with their 
families. 
Eritrea's economic, as well as 
political, links with Ethiopia are so close 
that President Meles Zenawi of 
Ethiopia has said he could not 
exclude the possibility that one 
day the two countries might form 
a confederation, though there are 
no plans for this at the moment. A 
potential cause of friction is the de 
facto currency union between 
Eritrea and its former oppressor. It 
means that Eritrea has to keep in 
step with the fiscal and monetary 
policies of Addis Ababa although it does 
not fully agree with some of them, 
including deficit financing. Ethiopia has 
also adopted a structural adjustment 
programme, which affects Eritrea's econ-
omic options. The ultimate solution might 
be a regional currency, and a technical 
team has been set up by the Bank to 
consider that and other ideas. 
Relations with Eritrea's other 
large neighbour, Sudan, are poor. It is up to 
Sudan to decide its own internal policies, 
says Mr Yemane, 'but unfortunately the 
government in the Sudan has not limited 
its ideological orientation to its borders. It 
has been actively supporting an extremist 
fundamentalist movement, the Islamic 
Jihad, in Eritrea. We have told them this is 
not consistent with developing positive 
bilateral relations.' Islam, he points out, 
was introduced to Eritrea before the 
Sudan, and its adherents, who constitute 
half the population, have always lived 
peacefully alongside the country's Chris-
tians, so attempts to radicalise Islamic 
opinion in Eritrea will only destabilise the 
country. Matters came to a head early this 
year when a subversive mission from the 
Sudan was intercepted at the border and 
the gun battle which ensued left 20 dead. 
Of equal concern is that the Sudanese 
government is forcing Eritrean refugees 
there to join the Sudanese Army and the 
people's defence forces, which Eritrea 
regards as a violation of the refugees' 
hurtfan rights. 
A cooling of relations with Sudan 
may also help persuade certain foreign 
donors which object to that country's 
militant Islamism, notably the United 
States and Britain, to respond more 
generously to Eritrea's requests for aid. 
Eritrea would like to resume the 
role it had in the 1950s as a trade and 
services centre for Arab countries, and 
there has been some interest from Arab 
investors. President Isaias Afwerki has 
visited Saudi Arabia and relations with that 
country are now cordial, despite Saudi 
support in the past for the opposition ELF 
movement. This piece of fence-mending is 
seen as an important sign of Eritrea's wish 
for good relations with the whole of the 
Arab world, which had been irritated by 
the President's decision to visit Israel for 
medical treatment last year. Eritrea shares 
security interests with neighbouring Arab 
countries and has adopted common po-
licies with them. At the same time, its good 
relations with Tel Aviv reassure the United 
States, in particular, that Eritrea will not be 
drawn into any attempt to turn the Red 
Sea into an Arab or Islamic lake. 
On the African scene, Eritrea has 
made forthright criticisms of what it sees as 
failure by the Organisation of African Unity 
to champion unity, cooperation, human 
rights and development, but has neverthe-
less joined the OAU and seems determined 
to remind it of the high ideals it was set up 
to serve. The country would like to see the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought 
and Desertification revised into an effect-
ive instrument for regional cooperation on 
infrastructure and some form of economic 
integration evolving gradually with the 
other member states (Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda). As 
a member of the Preferential Trade Area it 
seeks closer trade ties with eastern and 
southern Africa. ■■ R.R. 
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Few newly independent countries 
can have inherited such a legacy of 
destruction as Eritrea. The cost of 
freedom in terms of loss of human 
life, displacement of population, 
economic and social disruption and 
environmental degradation was enormous, 
and the return to normality will be long and 
painful. But despite limited resources, Erit-
rea has embarked on the task of its own 
recovery with its customary efficiency and 
determination. 
As one member of the Govern-
ment contemplating Eritrea's economic 
situation put it, 'We are starting from 
below zero'. A large proportion of the 
country's population — about one in five 
of all Eritreans—still lives in exile and most 
of them will some day want to return. The 
statistics have to be treated with caution, 
but the Commissioner for Eritrean Refugee 
Affairs, Gerense Kelati, puts a tentative 
figure of between 700 000 and 900 000 on 
the numbers of Eritrean refugees scattered 
all over the world. The more fortunate of 
these, perhaps, are in the economically 
advanced countries of Europe, America, 
the Middle East and Australia, and may 
choose to stay there, at least until they can 
be sure of better economic prospects at 
home ; but the bulk of the diaspora share 
with their countrymen in Eritrea the 
difficult economic and political conditions 
of the Horn of Africa. Of these, some 
420 000 are estimated to be living in one 
country alone, Sudan. 
The flow of refugees to Eritrea's 
eastern neighbour started as soon as the 
armed liberation struggle broke out in 
1961/62, with the biggest influx occurring 
in 1967, when the imperial Ethiopian 
government set about destroying hun-
dreds of villages in Eritrea's eastern, 
northern and western lowlands, to smash 
the economic and political base and source 
of information of the liberation move-
ment. Many thousands more fled in 1975, 
'Starting from below zero' 
Repatriation, 
reintegration, 
reconstruction 
this time from the highlands, when the 
liberation fighters encircled Asmara and 
the Ethiopian Derg terrorised the sur-
rounding villages to flush them out. With 
successive offensives (for example, the 
attacks launched with Soviet help in 1978), 
more people were driven out of their 
homes, for wherever the liberation move-
ment was fighting, the civilian population 
was in danger. Drought also forced many 
nomads and villagers out in search of food. 
The ones who were able to settle in the 
Sudan were lucky : others had to walk all 
the way to Libya, many died in the deserts 
on the way, and some who went the other 
way drowned in cyclones as they tried to 
escape across the Red Sea. 
Eritrean government policy is to 
allow anyone who wants to return to do so 
freely, and some 80 000 have so far come 
back from Sudan of their own accord. They 
report that the Eritreans there are settled 
in five zones, including the capital, Khar-
toum, but mostly in the east near the 
Eritrean border. Some of the refugees, 
mostly old people, women and children, 
live on food aid in camps run by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; 
35% of these households are mother-
headed families, the able-bodied men 
having joined the liberation movement in 
the past or gone further afield to look for 
work. The Sudan also runs a settlement 
programme whereby refugees from the 
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camps (about half the total, according to 
the World Refugee Survey of 1993) are 
moved on to land which they are then 
allowed to cultivate together with the 
local population, using inputs provided, at 
least to begin with, by international 
donors, in what is intended to be a form of 
integrated rural development. Others are 
settled, without land, in areas where they 
can sell their labour to local farmers. (One 
commentator has wondered, however, 
whether the main effect of such schemes 
has really been to develop Sudanese 
agriculture on the backs of cheap Eritrean 
labour and international aid, rather than 
home? Family loyalties and ties of friend-
ship are traditionally close in Eritrea, but 
many exiles no longer have anyone close to 
them left at home. And the society at large 
has little more than goodwill to spare. The 
urban centres cannot take any new ar-
rivals: the existing population already 
stretches services to the limit, and there are 
no spare jobs or affordable housing. 
Instead, the Provisional Government has 
started settling returnees from Sudan as 
farmers in fertile but under-occupied 
lowland areas in Gash Setit and Barka 
provinces, in the West. There, of course, 
they need water, medical services, roads. 
promote refugee self-sufficiency and integ-
ration into the local population.)
 
1 The 
remaining Eritrean refugees have settled in 
towns and villages, where they have low-
paid casual jobs but few prospects of any 
better work in the Sudan or of getting exit 
visas to richer parts of the world. Con-
ditions for all are hard, especially in the 
camps, where some have been living lives 
of enforced dependency for many years — 
more than 25 years in one camp visited 
recently by a voluntary aid agency, the 
Eritrean Catholic Secretariat. 
I
Returning home 
So what are the prospects for the 
95% of Eritrean refugees who, 
according to Gerense Kelati, want to come 
1 Shoa Asf aha. Un espace agraire loti au Soudan : 
les sites d'installation des réfugiés érythréens, in 
'L'espace géographique', 1992, No 4, pp. 347-356. 
Returnees from exile wait their tum for 
resettlement at a temporary place of refuge 
in the lowlands 
schools, shelter (the environment is gen-
erally so degraded that there is not even 
wood to burn as fuel, let alone build 
houses) and, to begin with, handouts of 
food. Animals, tools, seeds and ploughs 
must be provided, and training given in 
income-generating skills such as building 
and carpentry. A project for repatriation 
and reintegration of half a million refugees 
was submitted to a donors' pledging 
conference a year ago and received inter-
national endorsement, but pledging was 
not up to expectations so, with its own 
resources, the Government is preparing 
reception and transit centres to hold 
returnees temporarily. The effects of a 
mass return at one go would be cata-
strophic for Eritrea (and, incidentally, for 
the agricultural areas of the Sudan which 
they have been helping to develop), but 
prospects in Eritrea are so poor that for the 
moment the refugees are better off 
staying where they are. 
Relief and 
rehabilitation  ι 
I alone in needing, and receiving, 
government help. The war has left 
thousands within Eritrea displaced, dis-
abled or bereaved of parents and bread-
winners. Eritrea's Social Affairs Authority 
says that a survey in 1992, after liberation, 
found, for example, that 90 000 children in 
the country had lost one or both parents— 
one sixth of them were the children of 
fighters lost in the war. One in five orphans 
had also been disabled. For orphans 
without other support, the government 
runs a number of homes, the aim being to 
reunite the children with near relatives so 
they can leave and grow up in their own 
communities; 3000 children have been 
reunited with their families in this way 
since liberation, and more could be done if 
there were more international aid. And 
there is a special programme to help the 
5000 children living on the street. 
There are 60 000 disabled people 
in Eritrea altogether, 13 000 of them ex-
fighters and the rest civilians with con-
genital deficiencies due to malnutrition 
and illness. For them, too, the Social Affairs 
Authority is introducing community-based 
rehabilitation, and runs a vocational train-
ing centre so disabled people can become 
self-supporting. Those who cannot 
manage for themselves (the paraplegic 
and critically injured) are looked after in 
special camps for the bedridden which 
existed even during the liberation struggle. 
There are also workshops making artificial 
limbs for the country's 4000 amputees, as 
well as physiotherapy centres and schools 
for the blind and deaf. 
Another camp caters for Eritrea's 
'internal refugees', the estimated 10 000 
people displaced within the country. The 
elderly with no means of support are 
looked after here, while the young are 
given jobs or helped to set themselves up in 
farming or other activities. The ultimate 
aim is to return displaced people to their 
Λ 
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by the Government or by the Front. That 
means fitting oneself into the normal social 
and economic settings.' Once that is' 
achieved, ERRA will be one step nearer 
being able to concentrate on long-term 
sustainable development. 
Food 
emergency 
places of origin and, as with other cate­
gories, rehabilitate them in the com­
munity. 
Taking 
responsibility  I
Eritrea has a parastatal Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency, ERRA, 
which has special programmes for fitting 
demobilised liberation fighters back into 
society and the economy. ERRA's Deputy 
Director, Teclemichael W. Giorgis, says 
26 000 combatants have already been 
demobilised, on the basis that the youn­
gest and most recently recruited are 
discharged first, since they are the best 
able to adapt to civilian life. Many have 
gone on to higher education and some will 
be able to go into the civil service or the 
regular army depending on their abilities 
and skills. Among the older fighters there is 
a complex mix of backgrounds, from 
illiterate former nomads to educated town 
dwellers, but the agency's object, again 
with very limited resources, is to help them 
all acquire a training in a specific trade and 
take responsibility for themselves. 
Inescapably, people who have 
survived in these exceptional circumstances 
for years can find it difficult to lead normal 
lives again now the emergency is over. 
Tight discipline and military organisation 
which were assets in wartime have tended 
Food aid is arriving at Eritrea's main port 
faster than the infrastructure can cope 
with it... 
to make those who lived under the 
umbrella of the Front so institutionalised 
that having to fend for themselves can 
come as a severe shock. 'It isn't easy,' says 
Mr Teclemichael, 'but the purpose of 
reintegration is to put people into a 
different situation, where they can support 
themselves, rather than making them lead 
the collective or regimented social ex­
istence in which we were all taken care of 
■
What Eritrea, through self-help 
and discipline, has managed to 
achieve for these 'problem' groups, both 
before and since liberation, is impressive. 
But there are limits to what can be done 
with mere admiration. There is a crying 
need for money, especially to pay for the 
most basic necessity of all : food. Four out 
of five Eritreans depend for a living on 
| subsistence agriculture, yet such were the 
ί upheavals of war that at liberation, 
according to the Minister of Agriculture, 
Tesfai Ghermazien, most inputs and means 
of production had been lost and most 
smallholders were producing virtually no­
thing, let alone enough to feed the 
country. A national agricultural rehabili­
tation programme devised by the Ministry 
and financed primarily by NGOs was 
immediately launched. It involved provid­
ing smallholders with seeds, fertiliser, farm 
tools, oxen and camels. What could be 
... but bad harvests this year mean still more 
is needed country report - Eritrea 
done was limited : for a village of 200 
households, the Government could only 
afford to provide three or four oxen. 
Nevertheless, thanks to hard work and the 
good rains of 1992, the programme had 
considerable social and economic impact. 
Last year, however, was a dif-
ferent story : after erratic rains, followed 
by plagues of locusts, grasshoppers and 
rats, an estimated 80% of crops failed, and 
two-thirds of the population had to 
survive on food aid. This year pests and late 
rains have struck again, and Eritrea is back 
on panic stations. The United Nations 
Children's Fund, UNICEF, said recently that 
1.5 million Eritreans were threatened with 
famine, but the country could not afford to 
import the 400 000 tonnes of food it 
needed to make up its cereal shortage. To 
cap it all, the harvests in October and 
November this year are also expected to be 
poor. Politely, though with more than a 
hint of reproach, officials point out that 
food shortages in Eritrea are well known to 
be chronic, not cyclical, so appeals are 
made regularly every year, yet the inter-
national community's response has never 
covered more than about half of the 
country's requirements annually. Some 
countries and organisations were reluctant 
to help Eritrea separately as long as it was 
officially still a province of another country 
(though the European Community has 
aided it since effective liberation in 1991). 
Eritrea's peasant farmers work together to 
terrace their hillsides and dig reservoirs... 
'But now the sovereignty issue is resolved,' 
the head of ERRA says, 'we have to step up 
into regular structural food aid from now 
on.' 
The Government has set up 112 
food distribution sites all over the country, 
and an early warning system through 
which local administrations alert the cen-
tral ministries to shortages. But an efficient 
administrative structure is let down by 
weaknesses in the physical infrastructure. 
Ships laden with sacks of food for both 
Eritrea and Ethiopia are actually arriving at 
the war-damaged port of Massawa faster 
than the cranes can unload them or the 
lorries carry the deliveries away, and some 
of the food has been spoiling as it waits. 
The railway which might have carried the 
food inland from Massawa was wrecked in 
the war and is said to be beyond repair. 
Eritrea's other poit, Assab, is separated 
from the main centres of population by 
hundreds of kilometres of near-desert, 
with no practicable road for goods traffic 
across it. Apart from the Massawa-Asmara 
road, most of the roads in the interior are 
in poor condition. The main problem in the 
highlands, consequently, is not the 
amount, which is adequate, but distri-
bution. In the lowlands the problem is both 
at once. 
All this in a country which be-
tween the world wars was a food ex-
porter. Well-organised commercial farms 
used to send fruit and vegetables to the 
Middle East and Europe, and the Minister 
of Agriculture says there are actually good 
prospects for reviving the commercial 
sector, and improving conditions for sub-
sistence farmers, provided the country's 
. so once arid land will produce enough to 
feed them, and a little extra to sell 
^ 
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proper management. In 1993, for example, 
rainfall was average for Eritrea, but did not 
come when the crops needed it most. Yet 
at the same time several seasonal rivers 
were flowing, and continued to do so for 
half the year. If there were reservoirs to 
catch the river water, Eritrea, the Minister 
believes, might be able to produce enough 
to feed its people even in critical drought 
years. 'If we can develop our water 
resources', he enthuses, 'given the sun-
shine duration that we get in Eritrea — 
and there is seldom a frost — we can 
possibly grow two or three harvests a 
year'. This conviction has been the spur to 
yet another display of solidarity and hard 
work by Eritrea's people: the dam and 
irrigation schemes. Under government 
supervision, whole villages have worked 
with basic tools to build earth and loose 
stone dams across highland valleys so as to 
trap water at the upper end and use it in 
the dry season to irrigate fields of crops 
planted lower down. The area of land 
under cultivation in Eritrea has been 
expanded by a quarter since liberation. 
Some villages have started to diversify 
from subsistence cereals into crops such as 
tomatoes and onions which not only 
improve the diet but can be sold to buy 
fertiliser and pesticides. Trees are also 
being planted and terraces built to stop soil 
erosion on hillsides. These schemes are still 
new and relatively modest compared to 
the needs, but, subject to proper study of 
their possible side-effects on the environ-
ment, they offer a real hope of improve-
ment for the future. 
Three busy men : 
Ogde Abraha, Minister of Trade, Industry and 
Tourism... 
Reviving 
the economy  I
Looking beyond the rehabilitation 
required for mere survival of the 
population, Eritrea has the rudiments of an 
industrial sector which it hopes to restore 
to at least its former position. Thirty years 
ago, light industrial plants set up in the 
Italian colonial period used to produce 
textiles, leather products, food, glass and 
beer for the local and export markets, but 
the war and the Ethiopian Government's 
policy, from federation in 1952 onwards, of 
deliberately wrecking the macroeconomic 
prospects of its recalcitrant province had 
shattering effects. Under the Derg almost 
all factories were nationalised : some were 
Tesfai Ghermazien, Minister of Agriculture... 
closed and turned into barracks, their 
machines dismantled and transferred to 
Addis Ababa, others were merely allowed 
to run down through neglect. The average 
age of the plant and machinery Eritrea 
inherited at independence is 38 years. 
Through lack of foreign exchange for spare 
parts and introduction of new technology, 
most surviving factories are operating 
below capacity, and deficient infrastruc-
ture elsewhere in the economy creates 
bottlenecks. Because of power shortages, 
for example, textile mills work only one or 
two shifts instead of the previous three. 
The State at present controls 42 working 
factories and almost 700 small-scale work-
shops, and a private sector hardly exists. 
and Halle Woldense, Minister of Finance and 
Development 
The guideline for industrial re-
habilitation, according to the Minister of 
Trade, Industry and Tourism, Ogbe 
Abraha, is the general national policy of a 
free-market economy, mixed in the sense 
that the Government has the first say in 
deciding the objectives for economic de-
velopment and will participate in those 
areas where the private sector is unwilling 
to become involved or is not performing 
well. Sensibly, the Government is focusing 
on renovating industries which work 
largely with local raw materials (85% to 
90% in the case of the glassworks, for 
example), so that it can make progress on 
its own; but it is also keen on setting up 
joint ventures with private or foreign 
investors. The priority sectors chosen are 
textiles, cement, glass and brewing. An 
investment code published after liberation 
in 1991 welcomes foreign capital from any 
source, and is being made even more 
liberal. 'Every economic sector is open and 
there is opportunity to grow your seeds in 
every sector of the economy,' says the 
Industry Minister. 'Choice is up to the 
investor. There are no restrictions and no 
priorities.' Eritrea's comparative advan-
tages, he believes, are peace and stability, 
a strategic location with easy access to the 
outside world, and the wherewithal to 
turn out quality products at low cost. 
There has already been interest from 
potential foreign investors, notably in Italy, 
though actual projects are not yet under 
way. To make the investment environ-
ment more attractive, now that Eritrea has 
joined the Lomé Convention, the Govern-
ment plans to draw on programme re-
sources and European Investment Bank 
credits for what it regards as its main role in 
relation to the economy: rebuilding the 
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infrastructure — electricity, communi-
cations and transportation — which inves-
tors require. 
Free markets?  I
ls such a 'hands on' development 
strategy actually compatible with 
a free-market economy? 'It is as well to 
remember the situation we have inherited 
from the previous, Ethiopian government,' 
explains Haile Woldense, the Minister of 
Finance and Development. 'Theirs was a 
centrally planned economy and they left 
the country completely devastated. We 
did not inherit any institutions capable of 
policy formulation or project preparation, 
or the statistical data necessary for our 
development planning. We don't know 
exactly what our natural resources are or 
what potential there is for developing 
them. The private sector had been com-
pletely strangled, and we inherited many 
war victims, many refugees and internally 
displaced people. We had to have a big 
' liberation army, and now the combatants 
have to be demobilised — and there is no 
absorbing capacity in the society to re-
integrate all these people. So you can 
imagine how difficult a job it is to have a 
market-oriented economy. And because 
the supply of basic necessities is very short, 
you can imagine how distorted the market 
is. So, to a limited extent, the Government 
considers it positive to have intervention in 
this distorted market, but it wants to limit 
its role to a regulating and supervising 
one ; it wants to create a healthy environ-
ment and conducive conditions for the 
private sector to come back to life and 
assume its proper role in leading the 
economy.' 
The Governor of the Bank of 
Eritrea, Andebrhan Weldegiorgis, ham-
mers home the point : 'The management 
of economic affairs should be delegated to 
the private sector. As a matter of principle 
and policy we are moving towards that 
and trying to disengage the State from a 
direct role in the economy, particularly in 
the managing of the productive sector.' 
And not just manufacturing : services and 
utilities too. When asked whether posts 
and telecommunications, electricity and 
water might one day be privatised, Mr 
Andebrhan says : 'There is really no area 
where the Government intends to hold a 
monopoly'. And future plans to turn 
Eritrea into a regional centre for trade and 
sen/ices, including finances and even med-
ical care, will confine the Government's 
role to the prevention of abuse. 
Pragmatism 
and independence 
I entation was decided on some 
years before the country was fully libe-
rated, at the EPLF's unity congress in 1987. 
Should we be surprised at the turn against 
the centrally planned economy which the 
EPLF, in its early Marxist days, had origin-
ally advocated ? 'The EPLF as a movement 
of the new generation in the 1960s could 
not remain outside the influence of the 
general revolutionary and leftist trends of 
the '60s,' says Finance Minister Haile 
Woldense. 'But during all this process of 
the struggle we came to realise from a 
practical, pragmatic point of view that we 
had indulged our emotional sentiments 
enough and, when faced with practical 
problems, especially the challenges of the 
liberation state, we had come to our 
senses, I would say. We have come to know 
the realities and the best courses that one 
has to follow.' 
So the economic policy line the 
Government is working out now coincides 
largely with World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund recipes for structural ad-
justment. But it stresses that it is not taking 
orders from Bretton Woods or anyone else. 
'These are measures we are adopting 
ourselves because we feel they can work 
for us and in our society,' says the head of 
political affairs for the ruling party, 
Yemane Ghebreab. 'What we have seen in 
Africa, Asia and other countries supports 
the view that economic policies need to be 
very flexible, that there is no one formula 
for economic success, and therefore the 
idea that you can prescribe one package 
for every country and every society and 
that it will work is not acceptable.' 
The European Union is among 
the donors which have rallied round with 
financial and technical support for the new 
nation, but Eritrea is impatient for more 
recognition of what it has achieved. 'Here 
we have a government that is very 
committed, that is free from corruption, 
that can make very effective, maximum 
use of whatever limited resources can be 
made available to the country,' Mr 
Yemane says. 'Here we have a society and 
a population that will not wait with folded 
arms for assistance but will go out to tackle 
its problems with whatever limited re-
sources are available. Therefore we feel it's 
a country and a government that deserves 
support. It's very ironic that in this present-
day world it is when you cannot put your 
house in order and you put your house in 
flames that you receive assistance — the 
majority of the resources go to the 
countries that are hopelessly in trouble, 
while little effort is made to help other 
countries that can stand on their own two 
feet. We feel that's unfair.' The curve 
through immediate relief and rehabili-
tation efforts is an upward one, that is to 
say, and now is the time to start helping 
sustain the momentum towards longer-
term development. In the context of 
Africa, Eritrea is an inspiring example of 
self-help, competence and stability. An 
investment in its future can only bring 
worthwhile dividends to both sides. ■■ 
R.R. 
"t 
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The story of how Massawa is rising 
from its ruins through the hard 
work of its citizens is a tribute to 
tenacity and good organisation 
and deserves to be told as an 
example of how the whole of 
Eritrea is gradually being rehabilitated. 
Massawa is the larger of Eritrea's 
two ports on the Red Sea coast, and its 
oldest city. Traders from ancient Greece 
and the Egypt of the Pharaohs used to sail 
into this natural harbour before the 
Christian era, and the hot and humid town 
has always been a major transit point for 
goods to and from the highlands which rise 
behind it. It is still vitally important not just 
to Eritrea but to Ethiopia, too, as its 
northern outlet to the sea. Thirty years 
ago, before Eritrea's war of liberation 
began, it was a prosperous place with a 
population of some 80 000 engaged 
mainly in cement manufacture, salt-pan-
ning, ice production, harbour working and 
commercial fishing. Health, education and 
transport facilities were good. 
But the port's economic and 
strategic importance also proved to be its 
misfortune. During the long struggle for 
independence, Massawa was one of the 
prizes over which the liberation move-
ments and the central government fought 
longest and hardest. In 1977 the Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front briefly occupied 
the city but was driven out again by the 
Ethiopian Army with supporting bombard-
ment from a Soviet naval force based in the 
port. Many of Massawa's citizens fled, 
enrolling in the secessionist forces themsel-
ves or becoming refugees or migrant 
workers abroad. The physical and econ-
omic damage done to the city on this 
Grisly remains of Ethiopian army deserters 
executed just before the Derg lost Massawa 
occasion was not repaired through the 
succeeding years. 
In 1990 the EPLF finally returned 
and captured the major part of Massawa 
from the forces of the Ethiopian Derg, 
which then bombed the city repeatedly for 
six months, from the landward outskirts by 
day and from warships off the coast by 
night. As well as the once picturesque old 
town, the residential suburbs, the port and 
many factories were badly damaged and 
some parts of Massawa were reduced to 
rubble. In the latter stages, before the 
Mengistu dictatorship collapsed in May 
1991, whole neighbourhoods were de-
stroyed by Ethiopian bombing of civilian 
targets. One of the worst cases was the 
village of Hargigo on the edge of 
Massawa ; it was once home to a popu-
lation of 16 000, but three successive 
bombing raids, in which whole families 
were burned to death in their houses, 
obliterated it and the survivors all fled for 
their lives. 
At liberation, only a quarter of 
Massawa's original population was left. 
The schools were all wrecked, and the 
largest hospital, with 1000 beds, had been 
bombed out, along with many small clinics. 
For 20 000 citizens, there was only one bus, 
and not one public latrine. The antiquated 
pipes (built during the Italian occupation) 
Bomb damage to a historic building 
in old Massawa 
which carry the city's water supply were 
losing half their content in leaks — and the 
supply was already meagre following 10 
years of drought. There were no trucks to 
pick up the rubbish which choked the 
streets, and the road surfaces had been 
pulverised by the Ethiopian army's tanks. 
When the defeated army fled, it had taken 
all government and private money out of 
the banks with it, leaving the city and its 
inhabitants penniless. 
One of those who returned to 
Massawa with the EPLF was the man who 
is now its mayor. Musa Hussein Naib. After 
an exile of 25 years, he was horrified to see 
the destruction inflicted on his birthplace 
and to discover the loss of so many relatives 
and friends. But there was little time for 
dwelling on the past. The dead bodies of 
many Ethiopian soldiers littered the 
ground, posing an immediate threat to 
public health. A pile of human remains and 
clothing found stuffed into ammunition 
boxes was all that remained of an Et-
hiopian unit which had deserted, been 
recaptured and punished with execution. 
Citizens' assemblies were organised to 
mobilise people for cooperative work, and 
cleaning the city up ultimately took several 
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months. Working voluntarily and unpaid in 
their free time, mechanics put up bus 
shelters and got a few scrapped buses back 
into running order, so that people no 
longer had to walk everywhere — a 
welcome relief in a climate where merciless 
sun alternates with torrential rain. 
Unemployment was initially se-
rious, but some traders and private en-
trepreneurs, shops and restaurants, were 
able to start operating shortly after 
liberation, and city hall kept on workers at 
state-owned enterprises, teachers and civil 
sen/ants. Although Massawa has very rich 
fishing grounds, the Derg had forbidden 
offshore fishing as an alleged threat to 
security, so work was started to encourage 
fishermen back into their trade, with the 
Ministry of Marine Resources helping them 
acquire or make nets and boats and repair 
the ice factory. As income began to be 
generated, the city continued with the 
next (and, no doubt, less popular) stage of 
the normalisation process, collecting taxes, 
and the technical ministries helped out 
with supplies and equipment for public 
works. This meant that schools were soon 
able to open again in partly repaired 
buildings, while the doctors and nurses still 
in the city were all concentrated at a small, 
undamaged hospital intended for 50 or 60 
patients but by then accommodating 600. 
The power supply system had 
been severely damaged. The city's three 
generators were old and lacked spare 
parts, and all the supply lines were down. 
After arduous restoration work and the 
installation of new generators acquired 
Private houses are once again rising 
from the rubble 
with foreign aid, Massawa now has ca-
pacity of 3000 kW, a modest figure but 
enough to meet the existing demand from 
domestic users and small-scale industries 
with a surplus left over for the capital, 
Asmara. 
To keep the city supplied with 
water, work started, even as the Ethiopian 
bombardment continued, on digging a big 
underground reservoir, by hand and usu-
ally at night to escape detection by 
overflying bombers. This reservoir has had 
to be kept filled, however, by trucking 
water in from outside. There is an ample 
source of fresh water 60 km to the south 
which will be more reliable than the 
present arrangement if the money to tap it 
can be found. 
To cope with the huge housing 
shortage, Mayor Naib sought central 
government help with restoring some 200 
houses at public expense and encouraged 
private investors (mainly Eritreans return-
ing from abroad with some capital) to 
repair other derelict houses and rent them 
out. All housing had been nationalised 
under Ethiopian rule, but in Massawa 
properties were restored to the original 
owners, where possible, or compensation 
was paid. The demand for housing, how-
ever, still outstrips the supply, and the 
shortage is actually discouraging refugee 
Massawans who would like to come back. 
Massawa today is steadily re-
covering the appearance of a place of 
human habitation but still displays the 
gaping scars of war — not just wrecked 
buildings but large expanses of sandy 
wasteland where whole streets used to be. 
To make the burden of recovery even 
heavier, a violent hurricane struck in April 
last year and destroyed another 400 
houses. Makeshift settlements on the 
fringes of the city house hundreds of 
returnees waiting for a proper home. Most 
of those from the Eritrean refugee camps 
in Sudan and Saudi Arabia have only had 
experience of unskilled work paid by the 
day, and facilities will have to be set up to 
train them in useful trades before they can 
hope to find permanent jobs. More hos-
pital buildings are needed, and there are 
still not enough premises for all the city's 
young people to be able to go to school. 
There are reasons to be cheerful, 
however. The port is functioning again, 
EPS 
Thirty years of war made for a spirit of 
friendship and cooperation. ' 
says Massawa's Mayor, Musa Hussein Naib 
and the European Union has financed the 
construction of large storage sheds on the 
quayside. At present most of the move-
ments at the docks involve the unloading 
of international food aid for Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, but the independence agree-
ment provides for unrestricted use of the 
port by Eritrea's now landlocked neigh-
bour, so, as and when Ethiopia's trade 
picks up, Massawa can only benefit from 
the increased business. New cranes and 
tugboats are being bought in anticipation. 
The cement factory is so far back to two 
thirds of its production capacity of 60 000 
tonnes a year, and the salt pans will be 
producing more than 120 0001 a year once 
repairs are completed. 
Repopulation of once devastated 
neighbourhoods has started: 1000 new 
settlers are bringing Hargigo back to life, 
for example. The judicial system is back in 
action, with lower and appellate courts 
operating. For local government purposes, 
the city has been divided into three zones, 
each with an annually elected council, 
while a larger council for the whole 
conglomeration meets every three 
months. Mayor Musa Hussein Naib is proud 
that city hall, though poor, is now finan-
cially self-sufficient and not a burden to 
central government. How have he and his 
fellow citizens achieved this remarkable 
recovery? 'The spirit of the people here is 
very encouraging,' he says. 'We get things 
done.' And to underline the lesson that, 
however severe the hardships Massawa 
has been through, the suffering has been 
turned to good account, he adds : 'Thirty 
years of war tied the people together and 
made for a spirit of friendship and cooper-
ation. That was its merit.' am R.R. Women's liberation 
I
Of the thousands of fighters who 
sacrificed some or all of their best 
years, and even their lives, in the 
cause of liberating Eritrea, seven 
out of 20 were women. They were 
active both in the armed forces and 
in civilian society in the liberated areas, and 
not just as cannon fodder or in ancillary 
roles. Many of them, both among the 
,t¿ 
educated and from the illiterate peasant 
population, had the commitment, talent and 
force of personality to overcome traditional 
ideas of male superiority and rise gradually 
to positions of power and influence. Some 
now occupy leading positions in the in-
dependent state, and one of those who 
made her mark is now the leader of the 
Union of Eritrean Women, Ascalu Men-
kerios. 
The Union, she explains, was set 
up by the EPLF in the late 1970s as a 
network of women's study groups among 
the Eritrean diaspora in Europe, America, 
the Middle East and Sudan, as well as in the 
liberated and even the still colonised parts 
of Eritrea, not to mention the heartland of 
the enemy, Ethiopia itself. Its objects were 
to organise women in defence of their 
interests, raise their political consciousness, 
contribute to the liberation movement 
both with labour and financially, and 
muster political support for the struggle to 
throw off foreign domination, a struggle 
to be waged together, of course, with 
Eritrean men. 
For Eritrean women, though, 
Ascalu Menkerios says, there was an extra 
adversary to be fought, and on their own 
home ground : the view deeply ingrained 
in their culture that they were inferior to 
men and had no role to play in any social 
organisation outside the home and the 
family. A popular and pernicious saying 
had it that 'A woman with brains is like a 
donkey with horns.' Both Muslim and 
Christian communities were dominated by 
their men, who treated women as second-
class citizens, denied them property rights, 
kept them in poverty and mewed up at 
home with no access to education and 
social services. 
Women had never been 
involved in political action or, 
indeed, economic life, and as a 
result lacked the skills and ex-
perience required, so the first task 
of the Union was to run crash 
courses to develop women's ca-
pacity for leadership. As the first 
steps in the emancipation of any 
oppressed group have to be a 
realisation ofthat oppression and 
a determination by the group 
itself to assert its rights, the 
Union's workers had in most cases 
to start by trying to give women a sense of 
their own worth and convince them that 
they had an essential contribution to 
make. Pamphlets and audiovisual material 
were produced to put these messages 
across. However, very few women could 
read, so mass literacy courses were or-
ganised! Once they could read and write, 
many of the women put their new skills to 
further practical use by taking training in 
shopkeeping and simple accounting, which 
gave them a chance of getting out of their 
houses and playing a part in the economic 
life of their communities. Then they began 
to move into politics. In the elected 
people's assemblies set up by the EPLF, a 
quota of 15% was reserved for female 
members, and many intelligent and 
courageous women emerged as represen-
tatives from previously unpoliticised 
groups such as the nomadic community. 
These assemblies in their turn set up 
departments for economic affairs, edu-
cation, health, social affairs and political 
activity in which women proved themsel-
ves capable of being active and effective in 
all aspects of community life. 
Since Eritrea was liberated in May 
1991, these projects have continued. Nine 
out of ten women still cannot read or 
write, so the emphasis is still on literacy, as 
well as health, poverty alleviation, skills 
and leadership training, with some new 
additions. Training centres in the provinces 
give typing and tailoring courses for 
women, and those who want to set 
themselves up in self-supporting occup-
ations can draw from a special credit and 
loan fund ; these initiatives are particularly 
important for female returnees from the 
war and the many women who have lost 
their husbands and are bringing up families 
on their own (80% of internally displaced 
households inside Eritrea come into this 
latter category). The Union now concen-
trates on implementing NGO-donated 
Making their contribution to future 
prosperity, peasant women from a part-
Muslim, part-Christian village in the highlands 
help to build an irrigation dam 
»■·;'■ ."■·..■ 
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projects such as schools, with the modest 
dues paid by its 200 000 registered mem-
bers. 
Another prominent female ex-
combatant is responsible within govern-
ment for other programmes of social 
assistance. Amna Nur Hussein, after many 
years in exile, now runs Eritrea's Social 
Affairs Authority, which concerns itself 
with orphans, the disabled, internally 
displaced people and abandoned street 
children — after what her country has 
been through, these are large responsibi-
lities. 'Now that we have our liberation,' 
she says, 'we women must fight to 
maintain our position. Because we are in 
the Third World, and because of the level 
of development of the country, we might 
face some obstacles, but we are sure that 
because we shared in everything with our 
brothers, and if we work hard, we will 
achieve equal opportunities. A change in 
culture will depend on development.' 
The battle to win over hearts and 
minds has to be waged right down at the 
grass roots. For example, from the outset 
the Union of Eritrean Women trained 
midwives and traditional birth attendants 
not just in healthcare skills but as social 
transformers whose task was to try to 
eradicate oppressive customs. Some of 
Eritrea's diverse ethnic groups regarded 
menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth 
with revulsion, and imposed methods of 
control and dietary restrictions which 
seriously weakened the health of mothers 
and babies alike. Health workers tried to 
persuade communities to modify these 
practices, and also pointed out the harmful 
side-effects of female circumcision and 
infibulation. The fall in the numbers of 
women and newborn children dying in 
areas where these habits are changing is 
'If we women work hard, we will achieve 
equal opportunities. ' 
Amna Nur Hussein, Secretary for Social Affairs 
testimony to the effectiveness of this 
campaign. 
Obstacles to progress remain, 
however. Male-chauvinist ideas may be 
starting to retreat, but some old patterns 
are not yet dying : women still have to do 
the bulk of household work. On a typical 
day a village woman will have to get up 
early to grind grain for the family's food, 
collect water and firewood, look after the 
children, wash and cook — and go to the 
fields to work with the men, who have had 
to do none of these things. Small wonder 
that thousands of women enrol for literacy 
classes but never find time to attend. And 
those that do manage to come cannot 
concentrate on the lessons as the children 
generally have to come too — families 
tend to be large and existing daycare 
centres only have room for one child per 
woman. Appeals for foreign help to build 
more crèches have produced little result. 
Local communities themselves will not be 
able to afford the cost until they get good 
harvests for two or three years, and that 
shows no sign of happening for the 
moment. 
And consciousness-raising among 
some women still has a long way to go. 
Talking of the people's assemblies, Ascalu 
Menkerios reveals that in some areas 'even 
women themselves would prefer to elect 
men because they think only they are fit 
and capable, and that it's only the EPLF's 
influence that is bringing the women in. 
There are even examples when it comes to 
the ownership of land : the government 
declared that all Eritrean nationals have an 
equal right to property, without discrimi-
nation of sex, and it was decided during 
the liberation struggle that women could 
own land. But now, in certain areas, when 
women discuss this issue, they will say no, 
we have to own land with our husbands 
and not alone.' This tends to happen 
mainly in the highlands, where the EPLF 
with its emancipating ideas did not arrive 
till late in the liberation struggle; in the 
lowlands, where the resistance first star-
ted, it is not such an issue. In any case there 
are huge amounts of unused land in the 
lowlands, suggesting that Eritrea conforms 
to the general principle that when re-
sources and opportunities are plentiful, 
sexual equality raises fewer hackles among 
men, but that when there is a shortage and 
'We have to have women who are confident 
and competent and decisive. ' 
Ascalu Menkerios, head of the Union of 
Eritrean Women 
somenone has to make sacrifices, it is the 
women who lose out. 
The EPLF also passed laws elim-
inating dowries, under-age marriages and 
the requirement for virginity before mar-
riage, and puts out magazines which teach 
women their new rights. But some women 
are still hostile to these unfamiliar ideas. 
'It's always linked to the level of literacy. 
The only real factor for change is if women 
are capable of reading for themselves, 
keeping notes, reading them back and 
digesting them — because otherwise they 
forget. It needs a lot of work, making them 
understand where their real interest lies.' 
So the pressure for women's 
rights continues — and it goes right to the 
top : 'We have 20% of the government 
who are women,' the Union's leader says. 
'That is good for a beginning.' But they 
want no special favours. 'We don't want to 
have women just because women ought to 
be there ; we have to have them confident 
and competent and decisive.' 
So much for educating and im-
proving the situation of Eritrea's women, 
but what about its men ? For many years 
there was a public administration depart-
ment of the EPLF which used to give men 
and women the same courses in equal 
opportunities. Now the Union of Eritrean 
Women has taken over the job of raising 
consciousness among both sexes equally, 
and fewer men nowadays are cracking 
jokes about donkeys with horns. According 
to Ascalu Menkerios, advancing on both 
fronts at once is the only way to get 
results : 'That's how we succeeded in 
changing the laws and attitudes during the 
liberation struggle, because men and 
women worked together, fought to-
gether, suffered together, discussed to-
gether and believed in the change. And I 
think it should continue that way, because 
it should not be the responsibility just of 
women to change the whole society.' mm EU-Eritrea cooperation 
by Claus Kondrup and Richard Zink
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I
The ongoing and immediate 
cooperation between the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and Eritrea falls 
both within and outside the Fourth 
Lomé Convention and began as 
soon as the Provisional Govern-
ment of Eritrea gained power in May 1991. 
Lomé IV cooperation includes a short-term 
crash programme and support to refugees 
and returnees. Cooperation outside Lomé IV 
includes food aid, food aid storage and 
handling facilities, port rehabilitation, the 
provision of seeds and co-financing with 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Further cooperation in the near 
future will follow up on the short-term 
crash programme, in particular in the 
fields of infrastructure and rehabilitation, 
and also through co-financing with NGOs. 
I
Short-term crash 
programme 
The European Development Fund 
has committed ECU 20 million to 
the short-term crash programme to aid 
reconstruction and recovery in Eritrea. The 
programme will improve living conditions 
in rural areas, upgrade the road network 
and strengthen the institutional infrastruc-
ture. It includes the following compon-
ents: 
Asmara-Massawa Road (ECU 9 million) 
The supply of equipment and 
materials to enable two road teams to 
plan, supervise and carry out repairs to the 
main road between the capital, Asmara, 
and the seaport of Massawa. The work will 
be carried out by direct labour under the 
Ministry of Construction with some tech-
nical assistance. 
The road will be repaired where 
necessary and the main part will be fully 
rehabilitated. The existing surface will 
typically be scarified and compacted to 
provide a foundation, to which 
will be added a 15 cm layer of 
hard core and an asphalt coating 
5 cm thick. Most of the equipment 
has already been supplied follow-
ing an open invitation to tender. 
Small-scale irrigation dams (ECU 
3.6 million) 
The crash programme 
has supplied equipment and ma-
terials to enable two teams to 
construct five small-scale irrigation dams in 
a period of 18 months. The work will be 
carried out by direct labour under the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
The necessary hydrogeological 
studies have been completed, and the five 
irrigation dams will be built to a standard 
design, which, depending on the size of 
each dam, will incorporate a basic filter, an 
impermeable core and rip-rap facing, and 
the necessary irrigation schemes. The dams 
will be complemented by anti-erosion 
works, including community terracing and 
reafforestation projects carried out prim-
arily on a cash-for-work basis. 
Once the five dams have been 
built, the equipment will be used to 
construct and maintain other small-scale 
dams in Eritrea. 
Water supply (ECU 1 million) 
The programme has supplied 
equipment, including two drilling rigs, and 
materials for the drilling of 50 boreholes 
and the rehabilitation of existing wells. The 
work will be carried out by direct labour 
under the Ministry of Water Resources. 
Local communities will be closely 
involved in the selecting, studying and 
managing of water points (decentralised 
cooperation), and special committees will 
be established locally to organise and pay 
for maintenance work. The work will be 
executed with the support and full involve-
ment of the local population and, where 
possible, in cooperation with NGOs. 
Education (ECU 800 000) 
Support to the education sector 
includes rehabilitation of primary schools in 
Gash Setit Province and in part of Barka 
ECU 9 million is to go towards rehabilitating 
the road between Eritrea's two main cities, 
Asmara and Massawa 
■ 
* The authors are respectively the European 
Commission's Civil Engineering Adviser and Rural 
Development Adviser for Eritrea. 
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Province. Emphasis is given to decentral-
ised cooperation, the micro-project ap-
proach and labour-intensive methods of 
rehabilitation and construction. 
Activities in the education sector 
include reconstruction of school rooms 
with support from local voluntary labour. 
As far as possible, the building materials 
and furniture required will be produced 
locally. Priority is being given to the 
rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, as 
opposed to new building. The work will 
primarily be carried out by direct labour 
under the Ministry of Education. 
A study has reviewed existing 
proposals, gathered background inform-
ation and compared different possibilities 
of implementation to give a sound basis for 
carrying the work out. Work plans are 
under preparation. 
Health (ECU 2.4 million) 
Support to the health sector and 
to the Ministry of Health includes a 
preventive rural health care project and 
rehabilitation of health infrastructure. 
The preventive rural health care 
pilot project is to last up to three years and 
will be executed in a subregion of Senhit 
Province (from Keren towards Asmara). 
The pilot project will include training of 
nurses and community health workers for 
primary health care, and development of 
village-level health facilities (health posts) 
with the active participation of the local 
population. The pilot project will also 
Small-scale dams like this one in the highlands 
will trap water for irrigation 
include an assessment of the population's 
ability to pay for health care, in order to 
ensure that the approach is sustainable and 
can be duplicated nationwide. 
The regional hospital in Keren 
will be rehabilitated and upgraded. Exist-
ing health stations will also be rehabili-
tated and new ones constructed to cover 
the project area, which is the same as for 
the preventive rural health care project. 
Institutional support and technical 
assistance (ECU 1.9 million) 
The institutional support will 
include technical assistance to the main 
ministries, particularly the Ministry of 
Finance and Development and the Ministry 
of Agriculture. 
A long-term technical assistance 
expert with thorough knowledge of EU 
procedures will assist the national author-
ising officer (NAO) and the implementing 
agencies with such tasks as project assess-
ment, implementation procedures, pro-
curement, tendering procedures for pur-
chase of materials, provisional and final 
acceptance of equipment and materials, 
book-keeping, coordination, monitoring 
and evaluation. The expert will also join 
the unit managing the Recovery and 
Rehabilitation Project for Eritrea. 
Technical assistants are helping 
the administration with the preparation 
(assessment) and ex-post evaluation of the 
main components of the programme, such 
as the study of the five dams, the social 
infrastructure study and the preparation of 
tender documents as well as with assess-
ments of selected sectors at regional and 
national level and the preparation and 
establishment of a national remote sensing 
database. 
Pan-African Rinderpest Campaign (PARC) 
Outside the crash programme, 
the Government has requested support 
from the Pan-African Rinderpest Campaign 
programme. A first tranche of ECU 150 000 
has been approved by the Commission. 
Returnees and 
refugees  I
Articles 254-255 of the Fourth 
Lomé Convention give the EC the 
means to support returnees and refugees. 
Cooperation with Eritrea in this area 
includes a malaria control project and a 
small-scale irrigation project, both of which 
are located in the western lowlands. 
In the course of the last 30 years, 
because of war and frequent droughts, 
more than 400 000 Eritreans have taken 
refuge in Sudan. With the end of the war in 
1991, these refugees have gradually star-
ted to return to Eritrea. Most of those 
coming back from Sudan through the 
frontier town of Teseney in the western 
lowlands of Eritrea are expected to settle 
in the Gash Setit region. The population of 
refugees in this region is expected to reach 
30 000 during 1993. 
The Malaria Control Project (ECU 
740 000) will support the fight against 
malaria primarily by introducing bed nets 
impregnated with insecticides against 
mosquitos but also through support for 
treatment of malaria, and technical assist-
ance. The results expected are improved 
malaria control and a considerable reduc-
tion in morbidity among the 60 000 or so 
refugees as well among the resident 
population of Gash Setit. It is furthermore 
intended to replace the environmentally 
dangerous DDT with less harmful chemicals 
and alternative treatments. 
The Small-Scale Irrigation Project 
(ECU 1.7 million) will enable about 
400 families of returnees with farming and 
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irrigation skills to build up and run sus-
tainable farm units, producing fruit and 
vegetables as cash crops as well as for 
subsistence. The returnees will be settled in 
small-scale pump irrigation schemes (total 
area 600 000 hectares) alongside the banks 
of rivers with groundwater resources. 
The western lowlands have a 
high potential for increasing national 
agricultural production. The Eritrean 
Government therefore intends to en-
courage agricultural development acti-
vities in this area, for example by providing 
basic infrastructure and encouraging irri-
gated agriculture. 
The returning farmers face an 
economy with a degraded infrastructure 
and agriculture. They often find the basis 
for production destroyed with wells, 
pumps and access roads degraded and 
drinking water wells filled. 
One of the objects of the irrig-
ation project is to settle 300 families with 
no male family head on one-hectare farms 
growing mainly traditional (semi-intens-
ive) vegetables, with five families sharing 
one well, engine and pump ; and a further 
100 families on three-hectare farms with a 
well and motor pump each, growing cash 
crops and traditional (semi-intensive) ve-
getables. The project also aims to provide 
drinking water for communities consisting 
altogether of some 40 000 returned vil-
lagers by drilling 20 wells, to provide 
schooling facilities for communities of 
some 20 000 returnees by rehabilitating 
two elementary schools and constructing a 
community education centre, and to 
improve the health situation of around 
20 000 people by rehabilitating two health 
stations. 
Cooperation 
outside Lomé IV 
I
The Vice-President of the European 
Commission, Manuel Marin, 
recently visited Eritrea as the guest of 
President Isaias Afwerki for the joint 
signing of the country's first National 
Indicative Programme under the Lomé 
Convention. Mr Marin, who is the 
Commissioner responsible for development 
and cooperation, was at the head of a 
high-powered delegation from the 
Commission which stopped in Asmara on 
22 May on the way back from the ACP-
EU Council of Ministers' meeting in 
Swaziland. 
Under the new cooperation agreement 
the European Union will give Eritrea ECU 
35 million (just over 250 million birr) via 
the European Development Fund over the 
next two years. All the funds will be in 
the form of grants which do not have to 
be repaid, and the size of the package 
makes the EU one of the largest donors 
to Eritrea. Since 1992 it has contributed 
some ECU 105 million to the country's 
development efforts. 
The assistance programme will cover 
several areas and projects of national and 
regional importance, with the focus on 
repairing Eritrea's shattered infrastructure 
and beginning preparatory studies for the 
next five-year financial protocol to 
Lomé IV. Improving water resources and 
developing the transport system are top 
of the list for study with a view to later 
financing. 
Mr Marin also officially informed the 
Eritrean authorities of the Commission's 
decision to give ECU 3.7 million for the 
financing of six NGO projects which form 
part of the rehabilitation programme for 
Eritrea. 
The visit also saw the official inauguration 
of a 7200 m
2 shed built with European 
Commission finance in the port of 
Massawa. The huge shed is intended for 
unloading and sheltering of food aid 
shipments on their way to Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, and is the first project completed 
by an international donor since the 
country became independent. 
■
Cooperation between the EU and 
Eritrea outside Lomé IV includes 
food aid, construction of food aid storage, 
improved handling facilities in the port of 
Massawa, the purchase of seed and co-
financing with NGOs. 
In 1992, food aid (cereals, veget-
able oil, pulses, milk and sugar) from the EU 
came to 99 400 tonnes, equivalent to 
about ECU 29 million. The figures for 1993, 
which included 12 400 tonnes of sorghum 
purchased locally, were 65 200 tonnes and 
ECU 27 million respectively. In 1994 pled-
ges have so far been made for about 
30 000 tonnes of food (first tranche) to the 
value of about ECU 13 million. 
An open shed of 7200 m
2 has 
been constructed by a private contractor in 
the port of Massawa to improve the food 
aid storage facilities. Food aid handling 
facilities are also being upgraded. The total 
budget for this is ECU 2 million. 
The EU is funding the purchase of 
cereals and vegetable seeds through the 
FAO, giving ECU 500 000 in 1992 and ECU 
3.6 million in 1994. 
Part of the huge food aid unloading shed 
built in Massawa with EU funds 
Co-financing with NGOs amoun-
ted to about ECU 2.3 million in 1993. 
Since the Provisional Govern-
ment took power in Eritrea in May 1991, 
the European Commission has committed 
a considerable amount, exceeding ECU 
20 million, to this new country. In the 
meantime, following the declaration of 
independence and accession to the Lomé 
Convention, a new indicative programme 
of ECU 35 million has been allocated to 
Eritrea. UM CK. &R.Z. 
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One swallow may not make a 
summer, but it is possible to start 
an article on Chad with some good 
news. President Gaddafi's Libya is 
abiding by the ruling of 3 February 
1994 in which the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague confirmed that 
the Aozou strip belonged to Chad. This part 
of the country had been occupied by Libya 
for more than 20 years and was supposed to 
be completely evacuated by 30 May under 
the agreement reached on 5 April between 
N'Djamena and Tripoli at Syrta in Libya. The 
two countries also agreed to sign a treaty on 
friendship, good neighbourliness and 
cooperation. The news, and particularly the 
implementation of the Court's ruling, was 
welcomed by the people of Chad and by 
those currently involved in the country's 
political life, including the Higher Council of 
Transition (the provisional parliament) and 
its President Lol Mahamat Choua, the 
Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), Pre-
sident Idriss Deby and the leaders of the 
many political parties which sprang up when 
the principle of political pluralism was 
recognised. But will this success in the 
dispute with their northern neighbour be 
enough to make the Chadians realise that 
they form a territorial community which can 
pull together and assert itself as such at 
home and abroad? The new democratic 
prospects suggest that it could be. 
Chad has had a turbulent political 
history, although perhaps no more so than 
many other African countries, where 
conflict has been less visible but every bit as 
destructive. The long period of instability 
and armed conflict was presaged at the 
country's first independence event on 
10 August 1960, when André Malraux, 
who represented France at the festivities, 
spoke of a feeling that Chad's political 
disturbances had not yet ended 'in this 
time when hesitant freedom is often 
tinged with blood'. The new President, 
François Tombalbaye, responded with a 
solemn proclamation that 'Chad is in-
dependent and sovereign.' The so-
vereignty was soon to be apparent, in 
particular at home, when, in January 1962, 
CHAD 
Redesign the state before 
launching a modern 
economy 
■ Ε - ^ 
the pluralist assembly was dissolved to 
make way for a House elected in a single-
party ballot. The preamble to the consti-
tution adopted soon afterwards (16 April 
1962) referred to the 1789 French Declar-
ation of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen and the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, but such things were 
soon forgotten and disenchantment set in. 
The political situation got worse, graduat-
ing from squabbling in the shade to armed 
conflict in the open. This has been going on 
for almost 30 years now, with ups and 
downs, as in N'Djamena at the moment, as 
people try to hang on to the new belief — 
democracy. 
A difficult move 
to democracy  I
The profusion of political parties 
which sprang up after François 
Mitterand's speech at La Baule in 1990 and 
The City of Abéché, Ouaddaï region. Chad is a 
vast land of contrasts and determined men 
and women, who have been shaped by 
nature and for some, since infancy by 30 years 
of war 
the fierce debates which broke out among 
the opposition and in the newspapers 
(their very ferocity can be put down to a 
certain disinclination on the part of Chad's 
entrenched power groups to countenance 
a 'model' once labelled 'unsuitable' or 
'imported'), testify to both the interest 
and the hope which the prospect of 
democracy triggered. For the people of 
Chad, 1993 began with hope and, for 
many of them, enthusiasm too. The 
Sovereign National Conference (CNS — see 
interview with the President of the CST), 
which started in mid-January, was to bring 
democracy, peace, freedom and justice, as 
promised by the Conference emblem, 
borne aloft by the dove of peace. 
The arrangements for choosing 
CNS members were laid down by the 
"I 
the Courier n° 146 · july-august 1994 country report - Chad 
preparatory committees, which were al-
ready firmly under the influence of those in 
power. The representatives who were to 
sit in theses 'States General'—some 840 of 
them — came from all walks of life and fell 
into five categories, including about 120 
officials of varying kinds (ministers, sol-
diers, prefects, mayors, judges, am-
bassadors etc.). Their mandate was to 
establish democratic institutions and 
greater freedom. How did such fine 
intentions at the outset lead to the 
difficult, uncertain and delicate transitional 
situation which was still in effect at the end 
of the first quarter of 1994? 
The opinion in N'Djamena isthat 
the CNS is responsible for what is termed its 
'failure'. Some delegates wanted to sweep 
away the existing institutions, but they did 
not win the day and those in power hung 
on to their prerogatives throughout the 
session. An expanding agenda, most of the 
items on which could not be settled by a 
provisional body, made the conference 
drag on and led to people trying to outbid 
each other. As some participants said, it 
was when the difficulties began to be 
smoothed out that the grievances took 
hold. After several extensions, a charter of 
transition was adopted, maintaining the 
President of the Republic in office and 
increasing his powers. This charter, a kind 
of transitional government programme, 
was ably drafted but over-optimistic, for 
no provision was made for any material 
resources to run the programme, nor was 
there any allowance for the resistance and 
conformity inherent in any established 
power. The transition, which was sup-
posed to come to an end in the spring of 
this year, was extended for 12 months, 
until April 1995. A second Head of Govern-
ment, Delwa Kassiré Coumakoye, replaced 
the first, Fidèle Moungar, but, as the 
President of the CST glumly made clear, 
'the problems are the same.' As one 
observer put it : 'The National Conference 
was a disappointment. It failed to perform 
its main task of setting up new institutions. 
Parties which called loudly for democracy 
were unable to get on with each other and 
the coalitions which they formed — the 
Forum for Change and the Union of 
Democratic Initiatives — were as short-
lived as they were inefficient. On 7 April 
1993, when he made the closing speech, 
Idriss Deby was the winner.' 
A year on, at the time of The 
Courier's visit in April 1994, the political 
situation in Chad was still explosive. 
Disorder, violence and insecurity, caused, 
the opposition claimed, by the absence of 
any political will at the top, got worse. The 
much maligned army was in the throes of a 
major overhaul ('deflation'), with France's 
help, and its numbers were to be cut from 
50 000 to around 25 000, 'which is still too 
much,' according to the head of the CST's 
Human Rights Commission. But this, visibly, 
is not even/body's opinion, as was proved 
when a top civil servant responsible for 
operating the military staff cuts was 
murdered in N'Djamena in broad daylight. 
In this climate of uncertainty, 
anarchy almost, the economic, financial 
and social situation is cause for con-
siderable concern. Tax and excise fraud has 
severely reduced government revenues 
and, despite help from outside the Govern-
ment, civil servants no longer get their 
salaries regularly (see interview with the 
Prime Minister). There have been strikes in 
every sector and neither schools nor the 
university functioned in 1993. The count-
ry's future seems seriously compromised. 
Assets hold out 
the promise 
of development 
The current situation casts a 
shadow over the future. Yet the country 
has major assets which spell promise for its 
economic and social development. 
Unsuspected agricultural resources 
The impression is that Chad 
possesses the sort of poor, desert-like land 
which precludes agriculture, that basis of 
all sustainable development. But things are 
not what they seem. Studies of farming 
and climate have shown that Chad's 
territory, 1800 km from north to south and 
1000 km from east to west, in fact covers 
three major agricultural zones. 
First of all, there is a Sahara zone, 
with less than 300 mm of rain a year, 
where oases are farmed to produce dates 
and there are gardens of wheat and alfalfa 
Youngsters in northern N'Djamena. 
Will they be the democratic generation 
instead of the fighting one ? 
and irrigated vegetables, plus some fruit 
growing, mainly of grapes and figs. 
Then comes the Sahel zone, 
which is suitable for gum arabic, a cash 
crop, and vegetables, fruit and grain, 
particularly at Kanem. It also has protein-
rich blue algae growing spontaneously in 
the stagnant lakes (agricultural specialists 
claim that little is made of it, despite a 
major potential outlet as a diet supple-
ment for the often undernourished child-
ren both in Chad and elsewhere on the 
continent) and crystalline salt deposits. 
Annual rainfall is between 300 mm and 
800 mm, the land is very fertile (it is an area 
of lakes) in Kanem, Batha, north of the 
Guéra and in Ouaddai and Biltine (a 
mountainous part), where there are plenty 
of fruit trees, onions, sesame, groundnuts 
and cowpeas. There would be a good 
future for all these crops if the marketing 
problems were handled better and, above 
all, if the national agricultural policy 
concentrated less on imports and more on 
domestic production. 
The third major agricultural zone 
is the Sudan-type region, with more than 
800 mm of rainfall p.a. This covers the 
whole of the south, which is known for its 
cotton production (Mayo Kébi, the Logone 
and Moyen Chari) and has a number of 
food crops — sorghum and maize (also 
grown in the Sahel zone), millet, sesame, 
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groundnuts and manioc, plus an ap-
parently very sound proposition, wetland 
sorghum, which is produced in Baguirmi 
and along the Cameroon border. 
So the agricultural potential is 
enormous and could well meet the bulk of 
the country's food requirements. Al-
though output depends very much on the 
hazards of climate, the annual grain 
harvest ranges between 0.6 m and 1 m 
tonnes. The figure was 970 0001 in 1992, 
for example. 
Cotton 
This was introduced by force in 
1920 and is still an important part of the 
national economy, having become a na-
tural, voluntary activity for peasants in the 
south. It is the only cash crop to provide a 
money income for some 300 000 producers 
in the Sudan zone of Chad and it generates 
50% of the state's export earnings. How-
ever, although output has risen regularly, 
even in wartime, and there have been 
peak harvests of 100 000 t of cotton seed 
for a yield of more than 900 kg per ha, the 
first cotton crisis in 1988 and the world 
price collapse pushed production costs up 
considerably (CFAF 1000 per kg) when 
cotton seed was selling for a mere CFAF 
500 per kg on the international market. 
Every year, Chad can now turn out more than 
600 000 t of sorghum, a staple food 
There were major deficits, running into 
tens of billions of CFAF, throughout the 
cotton sector as a result and an emergency 
meeting of Chad's leading funders (includ-
ing the European Union) had to be called 
to right the situation. The first cotton 
salvage operation was a success, but a 
second world crisis occurred in 1992 and a 
price slump worsened the deficits. It 
became apparent that Cotontchad, the 
cotton production-marketing board, was 
not being managed to best advantage and 
was running a CFAF 6 billion deficit (before 
devaluation), the equivalent of FF 120 mil-
lion. An agreement between the Caisse 
Française de Développement (CFD), other 
funders, including the African Develop-
ment Bank (ADB), and the Government led 
to a recovery plan in July 1993. Devalu-
ation of the CFAF meanwhile put up 
Cotontchad's revenue, so the consolidated 
loss should be less than anticipated and 
export earnings should improve substan-
tially, because, even if costs go up, they 
should not double. However, even if the 
whole cotton sector benefits during 1993-
94, the boost to the consolidated account 
is likely to be offset by the deficits in the oil 
and soap works resulting from the pegging 
of prices in these two sectors. The losses 
here amount to approximately CFAF 
1.8 billion p.a. 
The price paid to the producers of 
cotton seed has gone up by CFAF 80-90 per 
kg, without any change in the dues, so the 
peasants should see a substantial rise in 
their income, although it could well decline 
again in 1994-95 with the repercussion of 
Cattle rearing is one of Chad's main 
export activities 
the delayed increase in the dues scheduled 
for that period. However, a drive to 
improve management and organisation 
and, in particular, to bring in new varieties 
of cotton should make for an increase in 
the productivity and output of the plan-
tations. If this puts the per hectare yield of 
cotton seed up from 700 kg to around 
1.21, it will help protect income levels in 
the event of a drop in producer price. If 
production improves, 1994-95 should see a 
harvest of about 150 0001 of cotton seed, 
with a ginning yield (ratio of fibre to seed) 
of 38.60%, i.e. 57 9201 of cotton fibre. 
Releasing 
the brakes  ■
Different studies have already 
proved that Chad has good arable 
land and peasants who are still very 
dynamic, despite the suffering imposed by 
years of fighting. Both of these augur well 
for the rapid expansion of agriculture, but 
there are a number of brakes on the system 
which still have to be released if the farm 
sector is to be able to prove itself. They 
include, alongside the lack of security and 
the very poor state of repair of the roads, 
all the more or less fanciful taxes invented 
by traditional, military or administrative 
authorities in prefectures and other places 
and the rain barriers which turn into 
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customs posts in the rainy season. These 
many obstacles to free movement of goods 
in the country and the region are holding 
back the development of agriculture and 
the production of marketable surpluses 
which would enable the economy to 
flourish. The producers are very wary and 
do one of two things — either concentrate 
on subsistence and only market the bare 
minimum, or sell all their produce when 
the market is right or under the pressure of 
particular tradesmen, and then find them-
selves strapped in periods between har-
vests when peasant debts soar. On top of 
that, agricultural research resources are 
wanting or diverted for other ends, so 
most of Chad's managerial class, who are 
reputedly of a very high standard, are 
unable to display their professional poten-
tial. 'The authorities always have an 
opportunity to divert resources earmarked 
for particular destinations,' a Chad farm 
leader told me, which is 'one of the 
country's most serious problems.' 
The poor results of development 
aid are often (rightly) put down to poor 
investment absorption capacity. In 
N'Djamena, some people wonder whether 
it is not more a question of putting the aid 
to good use. According to a World Bank 
expert, there are numerous blockages in 
the economic machinery making it im-
possible to take ideas or projects to their 
logical conclusion. How can the blockages 
be cleared ? What can the funders do ? The 
doubtful or sceptical response is that 'until 
people realise what the general good 
means to some of our leaders, for a long 
time to come cooperation will go on being 
nothing more than whistling in the dark.' 
Political conditionality marks the begin-
ning of outside pressure here, but 'it is not 
working' — and not just in Chad either, as 
my contact was quick to point out. This 
means that 'some morality has to be 
Despite a transport privatisation drive, 
peasants still have to use animals to shift their 
produce over long distances 
Moving goods over Chad's tiny network of 
surfaced roads. 
The state of the roads is one of the biggest 
handicaps to the national economy 
introduced into the equation, but it can 
only come from inside.' In other words, 
'the political dimension of the African 
countries' problems is greater than any 
outside incentive, unless, 'the expert 
claims, 'they stop or completely overhaul 
the present system of aid to Chad and 
other African countries in general.' But the 
World Bank consultant said that, since the 
political aspects of the problem are 
deemed to be sensitive, the question is still 
one of instilling morality into the workings 
of the economy and the administration for 
the general good. This is the only way to 
develop Chad's vast economic and human 
potential, which is held back by demoralis-
ation and lack of organisation.' 
I
However, as is to be expected, 
Chadians in some circles rightly or 
wrongly think that international cooper-
ation can sometimes be a factor contribut-
ing to inertia (see interview with 
Mr Kassiré and Mr Kebzabo). After the 
first round-table talks between funders in 
Geneva in 1987-88, many people believed 
that the country would take off again with 
the fighting over, (although the Faya 
region was still occupied). The funders 
were very enthusiastic about relaunching 
the economy and they all went ahead with 
their programmes and projects, which they 
Stopping day-to-day 
management 
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in many cases had devised on the country's 
behalf. As it was Government policy to 
take whatever was offered,
1 everything 
was accepted, regardless of conditions, 
and the consistency of the different 
schemes was sometimes sacrificed as a 
result. Things were consequently very 
vague and the door was open to abuse. 
Criticism was sharp, particularly in the 
ranks of the opposition. There was a 
feeling that the whole system should be 
reorganised and that Chad should stop 
waiting on the outside world and produce 
an economic policy and clearly defined 
methods of its own. 'We must say what we 
need in the light of what we ourselves feel 
and what we ourselves want to do,' one 
engineer told me. 'And, of course, we must 
undertake to stick to what we have 
decided.' This is particularly important now 
that the funders themselves are no longer 
willing to start again on the same basis as in 
1987-88. 
A positive change might be trig-
gered if development schemes and stra-
tegies reflected some internal vision, I 
heard in N'Djamena, since this would make 
it possible to move away from manage-
ment on a day-by-day basis and look to the 
future, fixing goals for agriculture and the 
other areas of the economy. This is 
particularly important since, from the year 
2000 onwards, Chad could have a struc-
tural grain deficit unless there are new 
agricultural schemes which are more 
suitable, better run and designed to take 
up the major challenges of self-sufficiency 
and security. 
In this process of analysis, one 
expert said, cooperation staff should also 
take a look at their role vis-à-vis the 
Government. 'The people accept every-
thing. They do not make enough of their 
own wishes and demands... probably 
because their critical spirit has been blun-
ted and this has led them to keep their 
views to themselves.' But the freeze of self-
expression is beginning to thaw, showing 
that the Chadians are 'well-aware of the 
difference between what they want and 
what they get in development.' 
Striking oil 
1 Any Chadian technician who gave an opinion or 
passed judgment on a programme was apparently 
dismissed immediately. 
I
One striking thing about everyday 
life in N'Djamena in mid-1994 was 
the long queues of cars waiting to 
fill up at the petrol stations. The bulk of 
Chad's fuel comes from Nigeria, but supply 
had been cut because of the border 'strike' 
which started when the CFAF was de-
valued in January this year. The situation is 
paradoxical on two counts, since another 
neighbour and franc zone member, Ca-
meroon, produces oil and Chad could also 
cover the bulk of its own energy require-
ments from the major oil deposit dis-
covered at Kanem several years ago. The 
ultra-light petroleum could supply 80% of 
national needs, a Shell manager in 
N'Djamena told me, but the refinery 
projected for the past 10 years has never 
seen the light of day. The high cost of the 
investment may have something to do 
with this, but that is apparently not the 
Village well north of N'Djamena. 
The users know how important this kind of 
investment is 
real reason. The suggestion in some 
quarters is that the refinery has not been 
built because of the problem of concluding 
a transparent contract for the construction 
of the complex. The project still stands, but 
it will come to nothing unless the fraud 
problem is addressed. 
The Kanem ultra-light deposit is 
not the only one. There are major crude 
deposits in southern Chad, at Sarh and 
Komé in particular, with an estimated 
potential output of 200 million t. Boring is 
going on at Bongor and in the Salamat 
region, where the many faults mean that 
there is a good chance of striking oil. But 
Chad will probably not be able to make an 
economic job of exploiting its oil for some 
time to come, because of the problems of 
shifting it. Work has not even started on 
^ 
the Courier n° 146 · july-august 1994 country report - Chad 
the projected pipeline from Doba to the 
port of Kribi (in Cameroon), a route which 
the Government prefers to the shorter one 
to Port Harcourt in Nigeria. But working 
the major deposits at Doba is still the best 
bet when it comes to boosting the 
economy over the coming decade. As the 
unfortunate experience of other African oil 
producers is there to prove, oil alone will 
not solve Chad's economic difficulties, but 
it would be wrong to underestimate the 
importance of reserves which could cover 
domestic requirements, cut the costs of 
energy (the most expensive in the world, it 
is claimed in the capital), encourage related 
industrial activities and put more money in 
the state coffers. On the other hand, an 
international report says that Chad's oil 
'could be one more factor for déstabil-
isation in enabling various parasitic struc-
tures to survive without concern for the 
real economy, which will long be agricul-
ture-based.' Oil alone will not lead to the 
creation of a viable industrial sector, 
particularly with African economic organis-
ation and management, but it 'can help 
complete the déstabilisation and de-
moralisation of a society and an economy,' 
the report concludes. 
Secondary and 
tertiary sectors  I
Chad's tertiary sector is still a 
marginal one, representing less 
than 2,0% of GDP. The informal nature of 
most small and medium-sized businesses, 
the precarious situation of 'big' companies 
and the fact that there is no credible, 
coherent tax or legal system considerably 
dampens the multiplier effect of primary 
sector improvements. Since 1990, the 
estimated turnover of the country's big-
gest firms, which can be counted on the 
fingers of one hand, has declined regularly 
by between 3% and 23%, and recovery 
plans have failed, particularly at Sonasut, 
the national sugar ref inen/, despite a surge 
in domestic demand over the past three 
years. As in many other areas of the 
economy, this is put down to the 'general 
increase in fraud,' which has already led to 
the collapse of the Société Tchadienne des 
Textiles (STT), poses a direct threat to 
Sanasut and shackles the Brasseries du 
Logone. The water and electricity board 
has also run into problems to do with 
management and with some of its cus-
tomers, who have stopped paying their 
bills. 
Trade in the tertiary sector has 
felt the full force of the latest surge in 
fraud. For example, the consortium of the 
three oil companies operating in Chad is 
estimated to be suffering 50% losses, 
although not to the benefit of other 
recognised importers. 
The banking sector is weak, 
because of meagre private deposits and 
the volatility and exiguity of public de-
posits which declined by something like 
CFAF 7.5 billion in the year prior to the 
devaluation of 12 January 1994. The 
change in the exchange rate of the CFAF 
against the French franc automatically 
increased the volume of deposits in those 
of Chad's banks involved in foreign ex-
change dealings by 80% and enabled them 
to balance their books again, but it has still 
not made it possible to finance economic 
schemes, which are rare. And few refunds 
are made. The expatriate director of a 
major private bank in N'Djamena said that 
the Chad Development Bank (BDT) has 
funds available, but nothing to spend them 
on. There are no businesspeople. 'Chadian 
entrepreneurs are political entrepreneurs,' 
he told me. The rest are discouraged by the 
failure to stick to the rules of competition. 
'The state helps disorganise the market 
with its system of favours ... and until we 
have the rule of law here and there is no 
political pressure on business, there will be 
no productive investments either.' 
Prospects  I
In the words of Premier Kassiré 
Coumakoye, Chad is a 'traumat-
ised' country and the extent of its 
needs and the unbalanced political, econ-
omic and social set-up inherited from 
30 years of warfare bears this out. It is 
particularly difficult to suggest what the 
future might hold, but the bases for 
economic progress are there, first of all in 
the establishment of democracy and free-
dom, the absence of which at present is 
dearly the greatest handicap to national 
capacity building. There are other found-
ations in the country's resources, in its 
cotton and livestock and grain and dates, 
which do not just go to the domestic 
market, but could also do very well on the 
regional and international markets. There 
is new export potential in fishing, rice 
growing and market gardening too. The 
country's current political climate, with its 
military overtones provides no real reassur-
ance that the democratic transition will 
turn out well, but success with the advent 
of democracy is the key to everything 
which can be done in N'Djamena in a year. 
The state of Chad has to be redesigned 
from scratch before any kind of modern 
economy can be relaunched. ■■ 
Luden Pagni 
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The Head of Chad's second Govern-
ment of Democratic Transition, 
N.D. Kassiré Coumakoye, is a 
sportsman turned politician. He has 
held the central African long jump 
record for years, is chairman of the 
Viva-PNDP party and has lost none of his 
fighting spirit. On the general situation in 
Chad and those burning issues of modern 
Africa, human rights and democracy, he 
goes straight to the point. Should poverty 
be overcome first and democracy estab-
lished second or the other way round? He 
says what he thinks. And he gives his views 
on Chad's opposition, on corruption and on 
cooperation, with the European Union in 
particular. 
■ How is the democratic process going in 
Chad? 
— It is taking its course and the 
people are right behind it. It is easy to see 
—you only have to hear us talk — that our 
country has come a long way since the 
30 years cf war when we lurched from 
anarchy to dictatorship. However, the 
people are traumatised and that makes it 
difficult for democracy to take root. If you 
do not have the right conditions for peace, 
if you do not have a prosperous economic 
environment, if you do not have stability 
and if you have a poor state which has no 
resources or ill-exploited assets, you may 
well wonder whether democracy and 
poverty can exist side by side. I do not think 
they can. 
The second thing is that war 
influences people and it has made the 
people of Chad quick to revolt. They are 
volatile and they need time to learn to live 
side by side again and to tolerate and 
forgive each other. The general climate of 
uncertainty and intolerance does nothing 
to help the establishment of democracy 
here. That is how we see the situation here 
at the moment. 
But setting these problems aside, 
we believe we should put our trust in the 
people, for they have all the intellectual 
Which should come first 
— tackling poverty or 
building democracy? 
and moral resources they need to 
overcome three decades of up-
heaval. We have to disarm nation-
wide and make for general re-
conciliation. 
'No government 
programme' 
■ The President of the Republic, 
the Higher Council of Transition and you 
yourself. Prime Minister, are the three main 
bodies of the transitional period. Do you all 
agree on what needs to be done ? 
— The Council and I are working 
well together. There is the odd problem, of 
course, because the Council is not a 
homogeneous body, but our relationship 
at the moment is a good one. The whole 
point of transition is to work up to 
elections. There is no Council programme 
for this, for the transitional programme 
was produced by the Sovereign National 
Conference. There is no government pro-
gramme, for the programme was pro-
duced by the Sovereign National Con-
ference. The Council's only job is to 
monitor and control the implementation 
of the Conference decisions. The Govern-
ment's job is to run the programme. But 
the programme cannot do it all. For 
example, you can't announce that you are 
going to stop the people of Chad fighting 
each other and achieve reconciliation once 
and for all. I don't think you can. At the end 
of the 20th century, that is something 
which even old nations cannot do. The 
Government agrees with the election 
timetable and we are consulting with the 
Council on it, but there is the problem of 
Nouradine D. Kassiré Coumakoye, 
the Prime Minister 
the means of running the programme 
properly and organising the elections. We 
need external contributions for that. We 
have the political will and now we need 
the means of putting it into practice. 
I
'Human rights 
misunderstood' 
■ We hear a lot about what are 
apparently serious violations of human 
rights. How do you see it ? 
— We are committed to human 
rights here in Chad. Democracy can only be 
built with due respect for human rights. I 
^ 
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am a Doctor of Law and a student of 
politics as well and I know what that 
means. The basic question is whether 
poverty and liberty can live side by side. 
We have the example of Yugoslavia, right 
in the heart of Europe, before us. Do they 
respect human rights there? Does freedom 
live up to its name in countries at war? I 
think that the basis of government action 
has to be the defence of human rights. 
■ That is a principle there is no reason to 
doubt. But what I actually wanted to know 
was how far these declarations of principle 
have been put into practice in Chad... 
— We respect human rights. 
Chad is now one of the countries which 
respect human rights. But, in their minds, 
people are not sure what all this means. 
They think that human rights are the right 
not to be punished for doing wrong or 
that, because of human rights, they have 
to go on strike. Anything. They think that 
human rights entitle them to be harmful 
and unpleasant with impunity and that is a 
gross misunderstanding, for human rights 
involve duties and limitations for the 
citizen. But I believe that we really do 
defend human rights now here in Chad. 
Turn on the radio and you hear people 
being rude about us. They are there, but 
we let them get on with it, for if there is 
one country which has total freedom of 
the press, that country is Chad. 
■ The human rights organisations would 
not agree with you. They say that there are 
more and more violations of human rights 
and freedom here and that those re-
sponsible get off scot free... 
— They are right to say so, I 
know, but they are wrong too. They are 
within their rights to think that those who 
violate fundamental rights should be taken 
to court straight away. But, unfortunately, 
most of the heads of these organisations 
are not legal people. Those who run the 
human rights associations are mixtures and 
the associations become a platform and 
can even be a sinecure for those at the top. 
We believe that you also have to respect 
the human rights of the accused and make 
thorough investigations before passing 
judgment. 
'Picking up the 
economy' 
■ What are the Government's 
economic aims ? 
— To revive the economy. And 
the first way of doing that is to combat all 
the fraud that occurs because the informal 
sector has spread so much. We have 
already had results. Priority number two is 
to reconstitute the economic fabric, which 
was completely destroyed, and priority 
number three is to rationalise public 
finance. We shall also be concentrating on 
reviving agriculture, particularly food crops 
and livestock. But all the Government's 
plans also depend on factors outside our 
control — rainfall, for example, and the 
devaluation of the CFAF, which was 
imposed from outside — and they have 
given us a grain shortfall of something like 
40% this year. But we have hopes of 
getting through these hard times. 
■ Your external partners do not accept 
that devaluation was imposed from the 
outside. They say that the change in the 
exchange rate was imposed for purely 
economic and monetary reasons. 
— The devaluation had to do 
with colonisation. There is no need to beat 
about the bush. The whole economy of the 
countries in the franc zone is completely 
integrated with and dependent on the 
economy of the former metropolis. As I 
told another journalist, if we wanted to 
prevent devaluation, we should have 
prevented colonisation first. 
■ How are the social pact negotiations 
going ? 
—The pact we are aiming at is an 
agreement on pay and about five months' 
arrears, but we have hit a problem, 
because the unions want more than a pay 
settlement. We think that they want more 
than the basic deal, particularly the UST 
(the Chad Trade Union Confederation), 
which I mention by name. The UST is 
riddled with people from political parties 
trying to use it as a political springboard to 
destabilise the regime and four federations 
disagree with the direction it wants union 
action to take. The talks are continuing and 
we do not understand what is behind the 
UST's strike call. But the Government will 
know how to assess the situation. And the 
UST must shoulder its responsibilities and 
pay its strikers' wages, just as it would have 
to anywhere else. 
■ Isn't it quite easy for people in power to 
imagine that their opponents are behind 
the unions or the press in any disagree-
ment or severe criticism of the Govern-
ment ? 
— That is exactly what I mean. 
Africans are devious. Instead of creating 
parties to express their political opinions 
and exercise their freedom more honestly, 
they hide from the parties in case anyone 
recognises them and they use humani-
tarian organisations as a front for their 
attempts to destabilise the regime. If the 
Finance Ministry goes on strike, for ex-
ample, who pays the civil servants ? That is 
sabotaging the Government's efforts. 
Africa's oppositions express themselves 
violently. Rwanda is an example — killing 
in the name of freedom. It's wrong. 
■ Is violence necessarily a one-way 
phenomenon ? In other words, isn't there 
some element of cause and effect which 
links the development of violence to the 
absence of the rule of law ? 
— The rule of law must be 
founded on reality. Our states were 
concocted arbitrarily and, now we have 
regained our freedom, parties form more 
along tribal than national lines. It is 
something that few of them are able to 
transcend. And it does not only happen in 
Africa either. When there is no broad basis 
of understanding on which to forge a 
consensus, the political thinker who said 
that society is by nature a society of conflict 
turns out to be right. And conflict is very 
acute in poor societies where people fight 
to take control. They don't fight for an 
ideal. They fight for power. They fight to 
take over the running of the country and 
to redistribute the revenue to their parents 
and family. That is why some want to hang 
on to power and others fight to get it. Or 
they use the political parties to impose 
themselves and take control of society, 
thus becoming forces of inertia in the 
democratic system. 
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So there are the consequences of 
poverty, plus the consequences of colonis-
ation and the foreign powers stepping in 
to support tribe A against tribe B, or 
party C against party D for reasons with 
which we are all familiar. As a student of 
politics, I believe that this is the reason for 
the situation in which Africa finds itself 
today. Of course, the degree of violence 
depends on the individual country and on 
the individual behaviour of the leaders of 
tribes with monopolies and on the power 
of the administration and the army or, 
today, of the trade unions. The develop-
ment of democracy must be accompanied 
by economic and social progress. It would 
be wrong for international cooperation to 
underestimate the economic side of de-
mocracy. 
What about 
corruption?  I
B They say that, if there had 
been less corruption in Africa, and 
in Chad of course, development would 
have gone a long way. 
— You have to look at things 
globally and see whether it is corruption 
that prevents development. They say it 
does. But corruption is a universal pheno-
menon. If our countries here in Africa were 
rich, there would be no need for external 
aid and there would be no point in 
corrupting us. 
There is corruption in Africa, of 
course there is, and it is a force of inertia 
which is all the stronger in the poor 
countries. But if you look at the external 
aid Chad gets, it has come to nothing. I 
think we should be brave enough to say 
that the external aid put into Chad and the 
whole of Africa since 1960 has been badly 
directed. Let me make myself clear. The 
people who give the money enforce things 
which are at variance with the needs and 
the outlook of our people. When they give 
aid, at the same time, they send out 
technical assistants and experts to manage 
it. And those technical assistants and those 
experts may well be running projects which 
are unprofitable or of no interest to the 
local people. The funders often prefer to 
do what they want, which may have 
nothing to do with what we actually need. 
I say that in all honesty. Aid is not given to 
sectors where it would be of direct benefit 
to the people. 
The second thing is that we are 
short of managers. But the managers who 
come out to back up our staff do not come 
to give us charity. They work for money. 
Are they saints ? God alone can say. But I 
do not believe that Africa has congenital 
corruption. If African workers were paid in 
accordance with their work and skills, there 
would be far less corruption. A cooper-
ation officer who comes to Chad now takes 
home something like CFAF 4 000 000 a 
month, which is about FF 40 000, but the 
civil service pay of his Chadian opposite 
number, who has identical qualifications, is 
only about CFAF 75 000 (FF 750). The 
difference is where they come from. What 
is the one who takes home FF 750 com-
pared to the one who takes home 
FF 40 000 for the same job ? What is the 
pay of an African from the franc zone 
compared to the pay of someone from the 
metropolis ? A country's wealth starts with 
work. And let us not forget the deterior-
ation in the terms of trade. Our cotton 
costs a thousand times less at export than it 
does when turned into goods and sold on 
the domestic market. There are plenty of 
things hampering the Africans' drive to 
develop their economies. Another one is 
that foreign investment in our countries 
goes into public companies run by those 
who give the money and take the profits 
home with them. Few profits are ploughed 
back here and this undermines the com-
panies' potential for expansion, with 
bankruptcy as a frequent result. To be 
frank, Africans are not the only ones to 
blame for the their countries' development 
failures. 
■ What do you think about the aid which 
the European Union channels into Chad ? 
— I think that cooperation be-
tween Africa and the European Union is 
not just fundamental. It is vital. It is an act 
'The European Union has given Chad some 
remarkable help' 
of human solidarity which has to be 
encouraged and heightened to prevent 
any widening of the gap between us. We 
should look at what Europe has done and 
thank it. The European Union has given 
Chad some remarkable help and the thing 
we want most is for it to continue and to 
increase in both quantity and quality. That 
too would be a contribution to our 
democratic process. BB Interview by LP. 
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SU President of the CST : 
The President of the Higher Council 
of Transition, the parliamentary 
body during Chad's shift to de-
mocracy, answers The Courier's 
questions and outlines the main 
problems of the period of trans-
ition. 
■ What was the object of having a 
National Conference for Chad's democratic 
transition ? 
— Chad's National Conference 
was held after a long, hard battle between 
political organisations and civil society over 
the very principle of setting up such a 
thing. As you know, this country has lived 
through more than 30 years of civil war 
and none of the regimes which we have 
had has managed to put an end to this 
fratricidal fighting — which, let me remind 
you, is maintained and fuelled by people 
abroad. And since many Chadians failed to 
realise the fact, they were taken in and 
fought each other instead of showing 
mutual respect. The toll of all these years of 
internecine warfare is hundreds of 
thousands dead and many other victims — 
widows, orphans and disabled. The burden 
of 30 years of fighting weighs heavy. But 
people in political parties and civil associ-
ations showed their goodwill and, with 
support from one or two friendly coun-
tries, they decided that what Chad needed 
was a forum in which to discuss its 
problems. We agreed to call that forum 
the Sovereign National Conference (CNS). 
It sat for three months, during 
which time it passed some very serious 
texts combined in the National Charter and 
the Specifications, the Charter being the 
legal document governing the period of 
transition and the Specifications covering 
priority and non-priority action to be taken 
by the CNS-appointed Government. 
Roughly, the idea was to take rapid steps 
to get the country into a normal de-
mocratic routine. National and regional 
administration had to be reshaped, elee-
'Without free, 
transparent elections, we 
would push the country 
nearer the brink.' 
I tions organised, a new consti-
I tution prepared, an election code 
I devised and, most important, the 
I army restructured — the national 
army was a crucial problem—and it all had 
to be done before any really free, pluralist, 
transparent elections could take place. 
The first Government to emerge 
from the National Conference, which was 
led by Fidèle Moungar, was unable to live 
up to the country's expectations and was 
censured after six months of office by the 
Higher Council of Transition. The Moungar 
Government of course was beset with 
difficulties in running its programme and, 
importantly, it was in the light of its record 
alone that it was overturned, in accord-
ance with Article 94 of the National 
Charter. 
Men 
and institutions  I
Another Prime Minister, 
Nouradine D. Kassiré Coumakoye, 
was elected, but the problems are still 
there. Chad has spent years in internecine 
warfare and institutions alone (even provi-
sional ones) will not help it, for what it 
needs is men of great political will who are 
devoted to serving the country's higher 
interests by ensuring transition. This means 
avoiding all political calculation, but, alas, 
politicians being what they are, they are 
often moved by interests prejudicial to the 
nation. As President of the CST, which 
supervises Government action in accord-
ance with the National Charter and the 
Specifications, I expect the leading lights of 
transition to rise above personal consider-
ations and put Chad's higher interests 
before their own. Transition is a delicate 
part of the democratic process and the 
Govenment's part in that transition is no 
less delicate. It is the job of the President of 
the CST to ensure that the CNS' pro-
gramme, as laid down in the Specifications, 
is properly applied and I do my utmost to 
ensure that the Government shoulders its 
responsibilities to enable Chad to become a 
real democracy at last. 
People still accuse us of laxism, 
which is entirely without foundation. The 
CST is a parliament, not a government. It is 
the Government which is responsible for 
the affairs of state over a given period and 
it is up to it to listen to complaints and do 
more to make a success of transition, 
because the CST cannot spend all its time 
censuring the Government. Chad's inter-
ests go far beyond the period of transition 
and if that transition fails, the country will 
go backwards and the consequences for 
the whole population could be even more 
tragic. That, of course, is something we 
have to avoid. 
■ What can the CST do to speed up the 
transition measures and get genuinely 
democratic elections organised? 
— As I said just now, the first 
Government fell behind with the CNS 
transition programme and we all know 
why. The then Prime Minister and the 
current President of the Republic failed to 
agree on matters of substance and they 
argued about them and this silted up the 
machinery of state at a vital moment in the 
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démocratisation process. I myself ex-
perienced the very difficult period of the 
first Government of transition. It got off to 
a bad start because the two most import-
ant people in the executive were unable to 
agree. 
Postponement 
■ What did they disagree 
about ? Freedom ? Or something 
else ? 
— It was about how to run the 
country, as fundamental as that. There was 
no special issue, freedom or anything else. 
They simply failed to agree on how the 
country's affairs should be managed. They 
had different approaches, although they 
should have been united, because the CNS 
Specifications were very clear about what 
they had to do. But it was less a question of 
rules and regulations than of personal 
incompatibility. The process of transition 
was held up as a result, the elections have 
been postponed for 12 months and there is 
a timetable of Government action, fixing 
firm dates for decisions on priority trans-
ition issues on which the Government and 
the CST are to agree. Our idea in shifting 
the dates was to prevent the Government 
from playing on pressure of time to table 
bills which did not guarantee fair elections. 
Everyone knows and there is no 
need to beat about the bush. We shall see 
just who wants or does not want the 
transition to democracy to be a success. It 
would be a pious hope to imagine that 
everything in the Specifications could be 
achieved in the space of 12 months, but it 
would be incomprehensible and of great 
concern to the people if the Government 
were unable to manage to complete the 
basic priorities that will enable democratic 
elections to take place in a year's time. The 
most important thing for us all here in 
Chad today — over and above the 
economy and the security issues, of course 
— is to know we will have free, de-
mocratic, transparent elections this time 
next year. This is what our whole move to 
democracy hinges on. For a government 
formed through proper pluralist, honestly 
organised, democratic elections, will have 
the trust and the democratic legitimacy it 
needs to undertake some of the reforms in 
the Specifications which will take more 
time and money to implement. 
■ Constitutions, electoral codes and elec-
toral registers are three things which have 
caused a great deal of controversy and 
argument in most African countries which 
have already organised their elections. 
How can they be tackled in the democratic 
process in your country, do you think ? 
— The first, essential thing is the 
constitution. The CNS laid down guidelines 
and, at the beginning of the year, the 
Government set up a technical committee 
to work on them. This institutional tech-
nical committee came up with a draft 
constitution, based on the CNS' ideas, 
which I have read and personally find 
acceptable, and this was then passed to the 
Government, which now has to have it 
looked at by a joint committee of political 
parties, civil associations and, of course, the 
Government itself. The same committee is 
now working on the electoral code, which 
is both in the form of a bill and a charter for 
the political parties. I should add that a 
High Communication Council (HCC) has 
also been set up. The CNS drafted the text 
on this and the CST transmitted it to the 
Government, which passed it recently, so 
the members of the HCC can be appointed 
soon. The HCC is an independent body and 
we shall make sure that its remains so, for 
without independence, it will be unable to 
ensure the equality and equity among the 
various factions on the electoral scene. 
When it comes to the electoral registers, 
the present Government is unable to give 
the decentralised authorities what they 
need for a census of the population and 
very serious consideration has to be given 
to the financial and physical resources 
Loi Mahamat Chona 
'If transition fails, the consequences for the 
whole populaton could be even more tragic' 
involved, because they are vital if we to 
have a reliable electoral roll. 
But there is more to it than that. 
There is also the fact that decentralised 
administrative staff have to be impartial 
and this raises the problem of appoint-
ments by people in power. We believe that 
the people appointed to top jobs in 
prefectures and other local government 
districts should be able to keep power, 
their country and the political parties 
separate. Under Order No 15 setting up 
political parties, civil servants and soldiers 
are supposed to keep their political 
opinions to themselves, but that is not 
what is happening at the moment, which is 
a serious problem. The people currently in 
power make sure that only political broth-
ers-in-arms and friends get the top jobs in 
the prefectures and this puts a question 
mark over the impartiality of those who 
are going to have to supervise the whole 
process and the organisation of elections. It 
goes against everything the CNS decided 
and we denounce it. 
But we believe that the Govern-
ment has time to change all this. Let me 
take this opportunity of warning the 
Government of the danger of ignoring the 
criticism of its management of transition. It 
does no credit to the current leaders of the 
state. 
The people of Chad 
know about 
democracy 
The people of Chad, just like the 
people of Europe and elsewhere, know 
"I 
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about democracy. They can see the value 
of it and its importance to their future and 
they do not want to have their options 
reduced or taken away from them. But, 
clearly, the people of Chad cannot make a 
success of their democratic transition today 
unless they have plenty of support. There 
are forces which will long continue to 
impede that essential move to a de-
mocratic system and we therefore believe 
that the democratic nations of Europe 
should help establish democracy in Chad. It 
is in the interests of democrats the world 
over for democracy to be solidly es-
tablished in Africa, just as in all the other 
places where it is the chosen way of 
governing the people. We believe that 
what we call the democratic nations should 
be behind the democrats wherever de-
mocracy is under threat. I want to see 
democracy planet-wide. After the 
thousand and one kinds of dictatorship 
tried out all over the world, there should 
be no doubt in the minds of Africans and 
democrats everywhere that democracy is 
the best form of government and there 
should be no barriers to its establishment. 
Until anyone can show me that 
there is any better form of government, I 
shall believe that democracy must be 
encouraged in Chad and elsewhere on this 
continent and I should like to insist on the 
Chadians' will to establish a democratic 
system here in Chad. So Europe, and some 
countries in particular, must understand 
that we can no longer cope with any 
system other than a free one here. We 
have made real progress with freedom of 
expression, certainly, but there is more to it 
than that and we have to keep up the 
pressure on those in power to ensure 
substantial progress with public and poli-
tical freedom. The democratic transition 
must be a success and the Government 
must be committed to the decisions of the 
Sovereign National Conference. 
■ How does the CST control Government 
action ? 
— Under Article 94 of the Higher 
Council of Transition, the Assembly needs a 
fou r fifths majority to censu re Government 
action. But this should not be seen as a 
sword of Damocles hanging over the 
leaders' heads, because our job is to 
encourage the Government to run the 
transition in accordance with CNS deci-
sions, not to prevent it from doing so. 
There is no cause to seek to topple the 
Government unless there are serious fai-
lings of the sort which brought down the 
Moungar cabinet. And it would be un-
productive. It is in everybody's interest for 
the Government to get it right, because 
failure would complicate the country's 
economic and political situation and delay 
the establishment of the democracy which 
we aspire to here in Chad. Other than for 
controlling Government action, the CST's 
job, is that of any elected assembly. 
■ What do you have to say about the 
idea that African countries are not ready 
for democracy ? 
— I think it is quite wrong. The 
Chadians and the other Africans have 
always been democrats. In Chad itself, the 
single party was institutionalised in 1963 
and those who put the idea across pre-
sented it as a brilliant system and imposed 
it almost throughout the continent. But 
now we can see what the consequences 
and the limitations are and I think the time 
has come to encourage the establishment 
of democracy, not just in Chad, but 
throughout Africa and the whole world. 
The example 
of Rwanda  I
Look at Rwanda, which is in the 
headlines at the moment. Very 
serious things which we Africans cannot 
countenance are going on there and in 
neighbouring Burundi. No-one can se-
riously suggest that this is just an ethnic 
problem. That is quite wrong. The conflict 
arose, above all, because the state was not 
organised democratically and there was no 
such thing as freedom and justice for all 
Rwandans. The anti-democrats are re-
sponsible for the present tragedy in 
Rwanda. I am horrified at the situation. I 
never expected it to get to this, although 
escalation was on the cards for a year. I 
should like to take this opportunity of 
saying, once again, that democracy is not a 
luxury, but a vital necessity for Chad and 
for Africa and it has to be promoted by 
every possible means. We have wasted a 
generation during which we could have 
established ven/ democratic institutions 
and behaviour. We do not want to repeat 
the mistake we made 30 years ago. If the 
notion of democracy needs interpreting, 
we here believe that it means happiness 
and stands for such things as freedom to 
come and go, to say what we think, to 
choose our future and to choose our 
leaders and reject them if they stop serving 
the common interest. Africans are very 
sensitive to this idea of democracy. 
■ You mentioned the creation of a High 
Communication Council. How does it 
ensure its independence and, equal access 
of politicians to state-run media ? 
— This is a typical problem for 
communication organisations in Africa and 
I do not believe that our organisation is any 
different, for it too will find it difficult to 
operate and maintain its independence. In 
Chad and elsewhere in Africa, the powers-
that-be monopolise government inform-
ation services for their own benefit and for 
the benefit of their brothers-in-arms and 
this does not make the job of an institution 
like the HCC any easier. We on the CST are 
careful to avoid any potential barrier to 
HCC operation and we should not hesitate 
to censure the Government if it gave us 
good reason for doing so. 
Your question also suggests one 
or two more general remarks on the 
African governments' attitudes to de-
mocratic prospects. The fact that they 
wielded undivided power, without risk, for 
decades led them to believe that the state 
belonged to them — hence the huge 
problems we have with moving down the 
path to democracy now. Heads of State 
refuse to see power change hands, armies 
virtually never serve the interests of the 
nation and the 'official' press cannot 
produce any reliable information on the 
economic, political and social realities of 
the nation. In Chad more particularly, we 
have rebels who have no political program-
mes but manage to threaten the process of 
transition nonetheless. It causes us concern, 
which is why I should like once again to 
underline the major importance of an 
honest transition to democracy. I believe 
that, without free, transparent elections, 
we would push the country nearer the 
brink. And that we do not want. UM 
Interview by LP. 
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According to Chad's opposition 
leaders, the period of transition 
may have been extended to 
April 1995, but a whole month 
(April 1994) then went by without 
the Government giving any signs 
of speeding up the work to meet the new 
deadlines, particularly for Implementing the 
Specifications. The Institutional Committee 
continued with its appraisal of the draft 
electoral code, following the recent com-
pletion of its examination of the Consti-
tution, but that was all. Otherwise, the 
groundwork for Chad's move to democracy 
seemed to have come to a halt. 
The postponement of the gen-
eral election from 1994 to 1995 is an 
indication of just how things are drag-
ging. The general state of disorganisation 
of the country's economic and social life, 
after 30 years of warfare, provides at 
least a partial explanation for this. It is 
said, in N'Djamena, that the people spent 
so much time in an informal system that 
no one now finds it very easy to sub-
stitute order for chaos. The government 
and the opposition differ in their analysis, 
but it is generally agreed that the security 
situation has deteriorated, the climate is 
bellicose and the economic situation is 
disastrous. 
The Courier interviewed Saleh 
Kebzabo, President of the National Union 
for Development and Renewal (UNDR) 
and former Minister in the first (Moungar) 
Government of Transition, who outlined 
the opposition's proposals for a smooth 
transition to democracy. He began by 
suggesting how to avoid the difficulties 
and disputes typical of so many African 
countries during and after elections. 
Look at what was said at the 
Sovereign National Conference — the 
guidelines are to be used in drawing up the 
electoral code, just as they were, in part, 
for the Constitution — and you can see 
that the idea was to keep things balanced. 
Politically speaking, first of all, the power is 
shared both between the President of the 
Our programme 
and our ideas 
have to be convincing 
says Saleh Kebzabo, 
President of the UNDR 
I Republic and the executive and 
I within the executive. The system 
I establishes a ranking, with the 
f head, the Prime Minister, ap-
I pointed from within the par-
f liamentary majority. It has to be 
admitted that the Committee which draf-
ted this constitutional principle has not 
done much to respect it, but I believe that 
the scheduled debates on the draft consti-
tution will be the opportunity to bring 
things into line with the CNS guidelines. 
A two-round system is to be used 
for the elections. The municipal ballot will 
have to be postponed, but the Higher 
Council of Transition (CST) has confirmed 
the constitutional referendum and the 
parliamentary elections and the presiden-
tial poll, in that order. 
Will this allow us to avoid what 
has happened in other African countries, 
where most of the elections have been full 
of irregularities? I do not believe so, 
because it will take proper political will to 
settle Chad's problems through dialogue 
and those currently in power do not have 
that will. This is a source of grave concern 
to the opposition and among the whole 
population. We know that foreign powers 
which supported President Deby are begin-
ning to wonder whether he really does 
want to organise free, transparent elec-
tions. 
The Rwandese 
syndrome  I
Europe has only a hazy idea of 
Africa's problems. The practical 
realities, all the little details which often 
Saleh Kebzabo, President of the UNDR 
shape the course of events escape the 
Europeans or are misunderstood by them. 
We in the opposition know that the 
political situation here could blow up at 
any time if the people in charge of the 
affairs of state try to fudge the democratic 
principles. It is these principles that offer a 
way out of 30 years of political stalemate 
and towards institutions and a govern-
ment whose strength is the trust of the 
people rather than the force of arms. That 
is the only way of avoiding what one might 
call the 'Rwandese syndrome', or at least 
the paralysis of the state that we see in 
some neighbouring countries. 
Our party, the National Union for 
Development and Renewal, therefore, 
recommends not just having Chad's elec-
tions supervised by international ob-
servers, however reliable they may be, but 
also—and this is most important—calling 
on the assistance of UN forces to enable us 
to head off the problems which other 
countries have had. 
-f 
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■ Does the opposition offer a genuine 
alternative ? Who is in it and what is its 
programme ? 
On the face of it — and from a 
media standpoint — this is a valid ques-
tion, but it is based on a false premise. In 
fact, as I point out when I attend meetings 
and campaign events, it is the people in 
power who have no programme. I have 
often been on radio and television arguing 
that the MPS has no programme and so far, 
neither the President of the Republic nor 
any of the other leaders of his party have 
offered any proof to the contrary. 
The opposition has certain weak-
nesses because we have been following a 
different course from other African coun-
tries. We have had war and armed conflict 
here in Chad. In this country, people who 
are discontented pick up a weapon, go off 
into the bush and start organising re-
bellions of one kind or another against the 
existing regime. That has not happened a 
great deal elsewhere. In other countries on 
this continent, the bulk of the disputes and 
political struggles have taken place within 
the normal social set-up and the political 
parties have then formed and taken over 
the struggle and given it momentum. Here 
in Chad, we had politico-military move-
ments before genuine political organis-
ations saw the light of day, because we 
have had war here for 30 years. This may 
also be why we do not have the opposition 
leaders they have in other countries. Here, 
the parties were formed after the MPS 
came to power, some prompted by the 
MPS itself as the National Conference 
approached and others set up with a view 
to providing proper democratic alternat-
ives. This explains why there is no domin-
ant party here which has thrown up a 
leader to steer the opposition. 
It is a paradoxical situation. There 
is no political combat because here in Chad 
we only know about armed combat. The 
idea of locking horns in the political arena 
involves a new element which people will 
have to learn — or perhaps releam. You 
may have the impression that there is no 
opposition, but in fact the vast majority of 
the country is opposed to the MPS. 
But we are well aware that a 
large, scattered opposition will not have 
the strength to win elections and steer the 
democratic changes which the Chadians 
want. So, for several months now, all the 
parties and organisations calling for 
change have been discussing the formation 
of a united front before we go to the polls. 
If we went into the ballot divided, as we 
are now, it would be suicide for us and for 
the country. We have responsibilities and 
we have to shoulder them. 10 of the main 
political groups are aware of this and are 
working to unite us around a basic 
programme with which we can win the 
elections and then proceed to democratise 
the nation. 
State resources 
squandered 
. å <■ 
I ■ How far can these 10 parties 
agree, offer a proper political and econ-
omic alternative and avoid the in-fighting 
and personal attacks whichareso typical of 
African politics ? 
Let me remind you of something I 
said just now — that those currently in 
power have no programme and, as a 
corollary, that their record over the past 
three years has been an entirely negative 
one. Anyone can see that. It makes our job 
a great deal easier, of course, for we do not 
need to attack any individuals. 
Then there is crime, which has 
reached very serious proportions. People 
kill for anything here in Chad at the 
moment. Weapons abound in this country 
and there are at least 10 killings every day. 
We have to talk about it. 
Economically speaking, everyone 
knows that it took the people currently in 
power only two years to demolish all the 
achievements of the Hissène Habré regime, 
which made a good job of managing 
finance and the economy in general. All 
the financial assets and other state re-
sources which Hissène Habré had built up 
were squandered, putting the clock back 
10 years. This policy of dissipating state 
resources and letting economics and po-
litics stagnate has left us entirely de-
pendent on assistance. The Government 
cannot even come up with a credible 
recovery plan. The present leaders do not 
have the administrative ability to propose 
Restructuring and relaunching food crops. 
Irrigated maize fields in Chad 
to the funders a project worthy of the 
name, to defend the interests of the 
country. This situation I have just briefly 
outlined is another area in which we differ 
from many other African countries. 
I
Proposals from 
the opposition 
The alternative offered by the 
united opposition — for not all 
the opposition parties will be joining the 
group — will be to set personalities aside 
for the benefit of the higher interests of 
the country. Our aim is to revive Chad and 
the group has to be disciplined if we are to 
do this. We therefore need to put up no 
more than three candidates in the first 
round of the presidentials, and then back 
whichever one of the three does best, in 
the second round. It would be even better 
if we could field just one candidate. 
Economically speaking, I tend to 
think that countries like ours and the 
countries of Africa in general do not need 
experts to run the economy. It is primarily a 
question of common sense, I think, and I 
said as much at the National Conference. 
We do not need major economic and 
financial theories — which is where I think 
that the World Bank and the other 
organisations make a big mistake, because 
they give us over-complex plans for things 
which are basically easy, possibly even too 
easy. That is why the IMF, the World Bank 
and the other organisations always have 
more failures than successes in Africa. The 
level of our economies here does not 
warrant the type of expertise or the type 
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of resources we are offered. What we need 
is grass roots management to release 
domestic and external resources gradually, 
in stages and in the light of our needs. It 
will take more common sense than finan-
cial resources to put our economies in good 
order. In other words, our problems are 
more organisational than financial. 
How can we bring common sense 
to the management of the affairs of state ? 
We in the opposition believe that it can 
only be done in a democratic framework 
and we therefore suggest that the first 
five-year parliamentary term which begins 
in 1995 be devoted to improving the 
democratic institutions of the Republic and 
to defining our major economic priorities 
— the restructuring of farming and live-
stock, health, education and training, the 
rationalisation of public f ¡nances, an exploi-
tation and management plan for the 
country's potential resources and so on. 
And let us not forget peace, for peace will 
be a logical product of the rule of law 
which will prevail when the country has 
been restored to democracy. This, overall, 
is what we, together, want to offer the 
voters. 
I
An end to 
ideological warfare 
■ What sort of society are your 
proposals aiming at? 
As far as my party, the UNDR, is 
concerned — and this may apply to the 
other parties as well — I should like to 
emphasise that the ideological war is over. 
The cold war is finished. Capitalism has 
won the day over communism and socia-
lism, and is a contemporary reality. The 
new world order, as we see it now, is a 
liberal capitalist order and anyone who 
tries to resist it is living in the past. So one 
part of the programme has already been 
drafted. It is important to be realistic and 
realise that we are subject to international 
management via the World Bank and the 
IMF and that they have set up program-
mes, accepted by the present or previous 
Government, on which we cannot really 
renege. We shall be forced to go along 
with a number of options which have 
already been taken and are now being put 
into practice in more than half the count-
ry's economic sectors. 
So I do not really see how we can 
innovate or basically undo what is being 
done, for it is a liberal society that we want 
to create. Management is all-important. 
We can improve and make a better job of 
managing, organising and running the 
economy and the state. And a liberal 
economy will not work without a de-
mocratic system. Something which gets 
little attention, but has caused many of the 
economic disasters of the African nations 
today is the fact that single-party systems 
— dictatorships, that is — were combined 
with an economic laissez-faire approach, 
which inevitably favoured those who held 
the reins of power, and sucked in imports. 
The latter were also sustained by a 
currency, the CFAF, which had no econ-
omic basis. The rules of internal and 
external competition have never worked 
in Africa. 
To sum up, let me say that our 
programme involves good management, 
using our skills, calling on creative emu-
lation and fighting the nepotism which has 
done so much damage to Chad and the 
whole of Africa. Skills must be recognised 
and rewarded in Africa today. 
Another thing I should like to 
mention is scientific and technical research. 
It is expensive, of course, but until we 
resolve to have it, we shall never manage 
anything sustainable at national level. For 
the past 30 years, Africans have been 
trained in every subject all over the world, 
but I think it is high time that these 
scientists came and worked in Africa. It is 
time that economists for example sug-
gested African development models in-
stead of trotting out Keynes' and other 
people's theories designed at entirely 
different times and for entirely different 
situations. They need a democratic frame-
work to encourage them, of course, for 
without freedom, there can be no scientific 
progress to serve mankind. Another thing 
which affects everyone is housing. In this 
country, the ministry in charge of housing 
assessment deems that baked earth 
houses, such as the one I live in, are worth 
nothing, but they are comfortable and 
perfectly safe. This is a field in which we 
could encourage research so that more 
people could have decent homes at low 
prices. 
Act now  I
Countries anxious to help the 
African democratic process often 
have no real idea what to do or 
when to do it. We in Chad need logistical 
help above all, before and during the 
elections. In a year's time, we shall have 
elections which are decisive for the count-
ry's future, but no one has yet given any 
thought to the technical organisation of 
the polls. A year is a very short time. This is 
why we want the aid for the census, the 
electoral roll, the polling stations, the 
information on how to vote and the 
polling supervision to be provided quickly. 
We want the question of transporting of 
voting facilities nationwide and other 
issues to be tackled immediately. All this 
has to be done now if there is to be any 
chance of meeting those election dates. 
South Africa could be a fine example here. 
Transition has been under way here for a 
year, but the census for the elections has 
not even begun and people are beginning 
to wonder why the Government is holding 
back. 
In the democratic process here in 
Chad, we should like to see an inter-
national presence long in advance. The 
political situation in the Central African 
sub-region is extremely critical. We cannot 
allow the transition to democracy to fail, 
and have Chad embark on yet another era 
of instability. ■■ Interview by LP 
"I 
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The advent of democracy has 
brought to light the crucial human 
rights problem in Chad (as in other 
African countries), where the fun-
damental rights and freedoms situ-
ation has been worsened by 30 
years of internal warfare. Setting the 
political and economic démocratisation pro-
cess in motion could have heralded rapid 
improvements on the human rights front, 
but organisations which deal with such 
problems say that things are not going well. 
The Courier met the heads of two of these 
organisations in N'Djamena, Ahmat Ma-
hamat Hassan and Khadidja Touré, both 
members of the CST, and leaders of the 
Human Rights Commission, an organisation 
set up by the Higher Council of Transition 
(CST, the provisional parliament), and Enoch 
Djondang who runs the Chad Human Rights 
League (LTDH), an independent body set up 
to defend citizens' rights and freedoms. 
Ahmat Mahamat Hassan began 
by explaining what the CST's Human 
Rights Commission did. 
'The CST's Human Rights, Free-
dom and Communication Commission is 
made up entirely of MPs, in other words 
advisers to the Republic, and its job is to 
monitor and supervise the Government's 
implementation of resolutions which the 
Higher Council of Transition adopts in the 
course of its duty. The Sovereign National 
Conference (CNS) ruled that the Govern-
ment should adhere to the various inter-
national human rights conventions and 
treaties and, of course, the national 
situation has to be considered too, par-
ticularly the way the police, the army and 
the judiciary behave towards individual 
rights and freedoms. Individual rights are 
still often violated by the police today and 
there are plenty of cases of torture in the 
prisons and other, secret places of de-
tention.' 
Mr Hassan told me that 
human rights associations could 
report such cases straight to the 
Commission or by letter to the 
CST, which then ordered investig-
ations or invited the Government 
to stop the offending acts. 
'We also have to make sure that 
the State and its police guarantee in-
dividual freedom — the freedom to come 
and go, the free movement of individuals 
and goods and freedom for foreigners on 
our soil,' he said. 
The Commission's third job was 
to set up a general system to ensure 
freedom of the press. Mr Hassan recounted 
that 'as an MP, I tabled a bill whereby a 
High Communication Council was set up, 
for the first ti me in this country's history, to 
make sure that the media's freedom of 
expression is scrupulously respected and 
journalists have freedom of action.' De-
mocracy meant involving the people in 
management and decision-making, he 
said, and this meant giving them objective 
information. 
Freedom of the 
press — progress 
and innovation 
The HCC was already a great step 
forward, a major innovation. Chad had 
never had an independent body of this 
kind to guarantee the right to information 
before and tribute should be paid to the 
fine job which the Chad Journalists Union 
did at the National Conference, for it was 
this which made it possible to produce 
Chad's first communication charter. And to 
safeguard the independence of the HCC, 
members were to have the sort of status 
and rules of procedure which would 
protect them from political pressure. 
But human rights associations in 
N'Djamena and other sources said that 
individual rights and freedoms had been 
flouted. 
'They may well not be wrong,' 
Mr Hassan agreed,' because the situation 
in this country is rather a complex one and, 
if they are to understand what is going on, 
people need to realise that we are cur-
rently trying to exist as a State with 
authority of its own. As a State, we are 
being reborn and the people are concerned 
with everything which will help make Chad 
a country under the rule of law. There is 
still violation of human rights and free-
doms here in Chad, it is true, and one 
explanation is that the country has not yet 
completely emerged from the civil warfare 
which has caused so many upheavals. But 
that does not constitute grounds for 
violating the fundamental rights of the 
individual, which is why we on the CST and 
other bodies have to continue putting 
pressure on the executive and all the other 
forces, particularly the army and the police, 
involved in violating the rights of the 
citizens of Chad. 
'It must be an unflagging, united 
effort, geared more to some targets — the 
army — than others. You must realise that 
Chad does not yet have a proper, disci-
plined national army with the military ethic 
of protecting the country's external bor-
ders. What we call the army is currently a 
series of different armed groups which go 
in for frequent human rights violations and 
create a permanent climate of insecurity 
here, especially in N'Djamena.' 
There was also the problem of 
state authority not being respected, with 
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when it comes to shouldering the re-
sponsibilities of the state. Yet, in the fight 
for democracy, women do battle and are 
tortured and imprisoned in exactly the 
same way asmen. Not only do we work for 
human rights in general. We also work to 
get democracy to push back the frontiers 
of the macho approach which currently 
dominates political life in this country. Take 
but one example. The wise men, as they 
are called, those men of experience con-
sidered to have done the country great 
service, have never included a wise 
Khadidja Touré 
'Women were subject to the same political 
maltreatment as men' 
civil disobedience by some clans. Not that 
they put themselves forward as such, but 
they could do what they liked all over the 
country. So human rights were violated, 
and on a grand scale in some places. 
However, 'hope and a clear head 
are what we need in looking for solutions 
to these problems, because our future here 
in Chad is at stake. It will take hard work to 
build a genuinely democratic state where 
human rights are guaranteed.' 
Men and women 
alike 
|__ 
I the CST Human Rights Commis-
sion, said that men were not the only ones 
to have their individual and fundamental 
rights undermined, as might have been 
expected in African society. There was a 
huge change here too; women were 
subject to the same political maltreatment 
as men and that trend, ultimately, could 
spread, because women were entering the 
political arena in exactly the same way as 
men. But she regretted that this was only a 
semblance of equality, for it was only the 
difficulties which were shared. Equality 
was never otherwise apparent in the 
expression of these rights and freedoms in 
society. 
'Here in Chad, as indeed all over 
Africa, women are second-class citizens 
woman. Yet plenty of women have fought 
and suffered under every dictatorship we 
have had here in Chad. We, the women of 
Chad, believe that, in our predominantly 
Moslem country, it is through democracy 
and our political action that we shall 
change the conservative outlook of the 
men who monopolise the political life of 
the nation. Since the Sovereign National 
Conference, women here have begun to 
realise what they are worth and what they 
can do in politics and in economic life.' 
LTDH President Enoch Djondang 
'Our one aim is respect for 
fundamental rights and 
democracy' 
Enoch Djondang is the man 
behind the Chad Human Rights League, 
which wasset up in January 1991 just after 
the army, under Colonel Idriss Deby, the 
present Head of State, took power. Va-
rious leading personalities support it. The 
first thing it had to do, Mr Djondang said, 
and do quickly, was tackle the human 
rights and political freedoms issue in Chad, 
where so much damage had been done 
under previous rulers, particularly the 
Hissène Habré regime, without so much as 
a murmur from public opinion. 
'It was very soon clear that the 
authorities had to toe the line on human 
rights because of La Baule,
1 but nothing 
was actually done for the rights and 
freedoms of the citizens of Chad,' Mr Djon-
dang said, before answering The Courier's 
questions. 
1 The French town where, in 1990, President 
Mitterrand called on African Heads of State to make 
their countries democratic ones — Ed. 
■ What sort of human rights violations 
have you had in Chad ? 
— In our first year, we noted that 
the political police were back, with all that 
entails, rather as it used to be under 
Hissène Habré. Because of action we took 
and pressure from public opinion, some 
types of violation became less frequent 
and less serious, but not to any great 
extent. Currently, the threat to human 
rights and the main violations can be put 
down to the staff of what are in fact official 
institutions and organisations. The Pre-
sident of the Republic's bodyguards are the 
worst offenders. We know that they have 
committed all sorts of crimes and 
threatened both individuals and human 
rights organisations, but the authorities 
have said they are out of control, so they 
are never punished, and so they go in for 
rape and pillage and extortion of every 
kind, particularly in the eastern and 
southern parts of the country. 
The basic rights of the citizen — 
freedom of movement, freedom of ex-
"ï 
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Enoch Djondang 
'Our defence of human rights here in Chad, 
and even in Africa, will not stop just because 
power changes hands' 
pression and freedom of the press — are 
shackled too. 
On the economic front, the peo-
ple's rights are undermined on the pretext 
of keeping law and order and containing 
the uprising in the south, where whole 
villages, with their crops and sometimes 
the people living in them, have been 
burned to the ground. This was done by 
armed groups in the name of security and it 
frightened the villagers in the end, so they 
stopped farming and fled. 
■ Do the LTDH and the CST Commission 
work on strategy and problem assessment 
together? 
— The CST has not lived up to 
expectations, but this has less to do with its 
lack of determination than with the 
conditions at the end of the National 
Conference. Everyone wanted to go one 
better and now the people on the CST are 
trapped. It shogld never have happened. 
As to any cooperation with the Human 
Rights Commission, I am sorry to say that 
that organisation has never sought any 
contact with the Chad Human Rights 
League, which is the leading human rights 
organisation in the country at the present 
time. Although we are now into an extra 
year of transition, the Commission still has 
not made any reports on the subject to the 
UN Human Rights Commission, as far as we 
know. You could say that the Commission 
is more theoretical than practical in its 
approach to defending human rights and 
freedoms. Political parties do not all get 
the same news coverage or opportunity to 
express their ideas in the state-controlled 
media, for example, but what does the CST 
Commission do about it ? We have no idea. 
■ How are your relations with people in 
political circles ? 
— Difficult. On the one hand, 
those in power and those close to them 
suspect us of siding with the opposition 
and, on the other, the opposition wants us 
to involve ourselves in politics and virtually 
do its job for it in an attempt to win it 
favour and confer legitimacy on its action 
to ease its path to power. 
We do not opt for either side. 
Our defence of human rights here in Chad, 
and even in Africa, will not stop just 
because power changes hands. If the 
Government did what was necessary to 
protect the rights and freedoms of the 
people, we of course could do nothing but 
approve. We should lose all our credibility 
if we failed to acknowledge that the 
Government was taking positive steps to 
advance the causes which we ourselves 
defend. But the Government is currently 
taking no such steps. In exactly the same 
way, if the opposition undertook to 
defend the rights and freedoms of the 
people of Chad now, while it is not in 
office, we should of course acknowledge 
that. Let me add that, if the opposition did 
its job properly, the country might not be 
in the bad state it is today. We have no 
biases. Our only concern is to defend 
human rights in Chad and the job would be 
made very much easier if people at the 
National Conference had agreed to state 
the problems clearly, as we asked and as 
we are still asking now. 
There are logistical and political 
problems in the field, but we are trying to 
avoid any partisan approach across the 
territory in which we have to work. We 
believe that Chad can become a de-
mocratic country which respects the rights 
and freedoms of every individual. It is high 
time that it became a normal country 
which it has not been for 30 years. 
Defending human 
rights is a question 
of practical action 
■ What do you think the international 
organisations should do ? 
— Making development aid con-
ditional on democracy and human rights is 
a good thing. But we now know that what 
governments say and what actually hap-
pens to the people are a long way apart. 
Human rights organisations, as pressure 
groups, should have the support and 
encouragement of the bodies which want 
to see human rights respected in the 
countries they assist. Without firm action 
upstream to back up the organisations' 
work downstream in the field, the defence 
and promotion of fundamental human 
rights in Africa would not get very far. It is 
all a question of practical action. 
■ Are you involved in any regional or 
continental coordination of your action ? 
— Continent-wise, yes. We meet 
in the Inter-African Human Rights Union — 
its headquarters are in Ouagadougou — 
every year to discuss the problems as they 
arise in the different countries and look at 
ways of making action more efficient. 
There is also a central African coordination 
scheme, based in Zaire. South Africa apart, 
ours is the African region where human 
rights are under the greatest threat, which 
is why we call on the international organis-
ations to do something more about it than 
read government reports. ■■ LP. 
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N'Djamena's leading paper is a 
weekly publication which saw the 
light of day in the difficult times 
before the beginning of the dé-
mocratisation process. Its original 
print run of 20 000 copies dropped 
quickly to 15 000 and was down to 6000 four 
years later, a rapid decline due more to 
economics than politics. The readers, civil 
servants for the most part, had lost the bulk 
of their purchasing power over a very short 
period and spending money on news lost its 
appeal. But the print-run, like the reader-
ship, has picked up again slightly now and 
the Chadians are clearly anxious to know 
what is going on once more. 
With this need for news now 
manifest among the population, economic 
operators might have been expected to 
give support or the state tax incentives to 
help the press with its much needed 
improvements, as has happened in some of 
the developed countries. But the editor of 
N'Djamena Hebdo says that most firms are 
state firms and cannot 'run the risk' of 
advertising in a publication which the 
authorities 'wrongly' see as an opposition 
paper, since that would be giving it the 
direct or indirect benefit of public re-
sources. 
Private enterprise 'does not have 
any business acumen or marketing skills 
either,' Yaldet Oulatar says. But private 
firms behave as they do mainly because 
they run no commercial risks by not 
advertising their merchandise. Brasseries 
du Logone, for example, do not advertise 
their beer, because demand is considered 
to be greater than supply and there is no 
point in spending money on publicity, even 
for new products. This is the natural result 
of having a monopoly in what is in principle 
a liberal economy. 
So the press has considerable 
economic difficulties to contend with, but, 
in view of the role that information is 
destined to play in the organisation and 
operation of the political, economic and 
social life of any democratic country, they 
are not its most insurmountable problems. 
Despite the 50% rise in all production costs 
with devaluation in January this year, 
Pioneering weekly 
of the Chad press 
things could still look up for the press in 
Chad. 
The state press seems to get no 
favours from the Government. The 
journalists' working conditions are no 
better and they have no chairs in their 
editorial offices or equipment for radio and 
TV reporting etc. So why does the state, 
which has adopted many aspects of 
France's press regulations, do nothing 
about it? The head of N'Djamena Hebdo 
says it is because the leaders see no threat 
to their powers and do not believe they 
have to account to anyone. What other 
reason could there be for the failure to 
provide any public justification for the 
extension of the transitional period, Yaldet 
Oulatar wonders. And he is not alone. 
The state could have helped 
develop the private press with tax and 
customs incentives on imported paper and 
other materials, or on the newspapers' 
domestic spending, but it is determined to 
see it as nothing more than an opposition 
weapon against the Government, which 
entirely falsifies any proper view of the 
whole, Yaldet Oulatar claims. N'Djamena 
Hebdo is not an opposition paper, he says. 
'Our job is to contribute to the public 
discussion of the political, economic and 
social problems of the nation. Chad is in a 
difficult situation today, for many reasons. 
Editorial office at N'Djamena Hebdo. 
Mr Yaldet Oulatar, the Editor (standing) 
and we, along with the bulk of public 
opinion, criticise it — which automatically 
makes the leaders think we are opponents, 
but we are not. And even if we did have 
political reasons for not agreeing with the 
Government, what would be wrong with 
that in a democracy?' 
The political problems of the 
private press reside in the fact that the 
Government does not apply the principles 
of democratic freedom to which it sub-
scribes in its announcements. He emphas-
ises the editorial independence of his 
weekly. 'We are credible because we are 
independent of the authorities and the 
politicians. That is also why many of the 
expatriates who have left Chad subscribe 
to N'Djamena Hebdo; to keep in touch 
with the way things are going here'. 
Whatever the problems attached 
to printing the news in the present 
circumstances, Yaldet Oulatar says, 'we 
shall carry on. Democracy cannot be built in 
the absence of free and reliable inform-
ation. This information and the existence 
of a free press are particularly essential 
when leaders try to deprive the people of 
what they need to make informed de-
mocratic choices.' ■■ LP. 
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Chad is a vast, landlocked 
country, 1 280 000 km
2 in area, 
1800 km from north to south and 
1000 km from east to west. No other 
African country is further from the sea. Its 
three ports of entry are all more than 1700 
km away — it is 1770 km to Port Harcourt 
(Nigeria) by road and rail, 2000 km to 
Douala (Cameroon), the most popular 
route, also road and rail, and 3000 km to 
Pointe Noire (Congo) by road and river via 
Bangui (in the CAR) and railway from 
Brazzaville. 
Area: 1280 000 km
2, including the 
Aouzou Strip. 
Population: 6 million (1992 estimate). 
Literacy : 30% approximately, despite a 
20% increase in the number of primary 
teachers since 1985. 
Growth rate: 2.4% p.a. 
Capital: N'Djamena. 
Main towns: Sarh, Moundou and Abéché. 
Official language: French. 
Other common languages: Arabic and 
Sara. 
The economy: Farming and herding 
occupy more than two thirds of the 
population and account for about 40% of 
GDP. 
GDP : CFAF 392.4 billion (FF 7848 million) in 
1992, i.e. before devaluation of the CFAF 
(January 1994). Imported goods and ser-
vices (non-factor) were an estimated CFAF 
216.7 billion. 
Per capita GDP : $300 approximately (CFAF 
180 000 post-devaluation = FF 1800). 
Main products: Sorghum and little millet 
— 600 000 t (1993), as against 648 0001 in 
1991-1992 ; maize — 31 000 t (1992) ; rice 
— 60 000 t; groundnuts — 244 000 t; 
sugar cane — 300 000 t. 
Other crop — cotton (the main export) 
yields have been irregular — 170 000 t in 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
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1991-1992, as against 125 000 t of cotton 
seed in 1992-1993. 
Livestock : More than 6 million head, 
including 1 million cows. 
Balance of payments : Very poor, despite 
major net transfers (of approximately CFAF 
477 billion), with no counterpart, in 1985-
1992. 
External debt: Equal to about 50% of GDP 
in 1992, compared with 39% in 1990. 
Short- and long-term official debt — $28.7 
million and $546.9 million respectively in 
1991 ; debt servicing — 6.9% of exports of 
goods and services; multilateral debt — 
$63.3 million (1991). 
Banking and loans: A generally poorly 
balanced banking and monetary situation, 
with fewer external assets and the business 
account down from CFAF 34 billion in 1991 
to CFAF 17.8 billion in 1992 — because, 
inter alia, of the decline in outside aid and 
hesitation regarding the CFAF. Credits to 
the central administration have improved 
considerably, but state-owned and private 
businesses have seen only a relative in-
crease and parts of the private sector have 
had no improvement. However, in the 
absence of jobs, the banks, which have 
always been fairly comfortable, have seen 
their position improve a great deal since 
devaluation. 
Sources: Bank of France and French Min-
istry of Cooperation. 
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Europe changed capitals on 22 
February, when Antwerp handed 
the crown to Lisbon, the Gem of 
the Tagus, soon to sparkle with 
attractions worthy of its glittering 
title. The choice of institutional 
capitals for the European Union has always 
been attended by administrative bargain-
ing, of course, but the choice of cultural 
capitals seems to come less from officialdom 
than from the heart. It is always a chance to 
give an opportunity to a magnificent but 
relatively unnoticed city. 
Lisbon, or the 
traveller's 
temptation 
It was in 1985 that the idea of the 
European City of Culture was put forward 
by the then Greek Minister of Culture and 
member of the European Council, Melina 
Mercouri (who died only a few weeks ago), 
and instituted as an annual event in which 
one city becomes the cultural capital of the 
Community for a year. It was only right and 
proper that Athens, in all its mysterious 
beauty, should be elected the first time 
round. There followed a whole series of 
outstanding cities, with the romance of 
Florence, the boldness of Amsterdam, the 
nostalgia of Berlin, the beguiling elegance 
of Paris, the pride and joy of Glasgow, the 
sweetness and enchantment of Dublin, the 
bewitching spell of Madrid and the heady 
attraction of Antwerp. Every year, another 
city steps into the limelight and is stimu-
lated to reveal its own cultural life in what 
is, above all, a gigantic festival which takes 
over the whole city for the whole year. 
Lisbon fortunately, never wants to switch 
off. Its streets and innumerable squares 
have become a vast meeting place forever 
filled with strollers, the tireless guardians 
of a kind of flame of life. Walking is an 
introduction to travelling and the Tagus is 
the traveller's temptation, in the words of 
the poet Alfonso Lopes Vieira. 
In 1993, Antwerp celebrated its 
year as cultural capital of Europe under the 
banner of : "Should art be beautiful ? What 
does 'beautiful' mean ?" Lisbon 94, Portug-
al's year of culture organisers went for the 
more embracing : 'Lisbon, crossroad of 
cultures' as a tribute to the ideas of the 
city's perhaps most famous scion, Fernando 
Pessoa, the highly talented poet who said 
that his country's gift to Europe was 
universalism — not pretentious omneity, 
but a dynamic movement towards others 
and an absorbing of what they have to 
offer. Indeed Lisbon is often seen as the 
most African of the cities of Europe and the 
most European of the other cities. 
Beautiful Lisbon is accessible and 
rich, elegant and sociable and it is on a 
human scale. And full of surprises. The 
surprise of a perfume redolent of distant 
oceans, beguiling and playful with a tang 
of fresh mint. 
It is always busy and, for many 
travellers, the second symbol of the city is 
indeed the whole look of these streets 
paved with colourful mosaic, in which each 
of the thousands of tiny cobbles has been 
"I 
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hewed to a point and liltingly pushed hard 
and firm into the earth. 
Typical tiles  I
And of course there are azulejos, 
the Portuguese tiles that are the 
trademark of the city. The azulejo 
— from 'az-zulayi' or little stone — is a 
marriage of Arab and Christian art and of 
Lisbon and Northern Europe, which the 
Moors brought with them in the Middle 
Ages. Magnificent examples of this era still 
survive. At that stage, the tiles, which 
replaced carpets, were, typically, blue on a 
white background. The work of the 
Mudejars, which was Iberian Christian art 
of Arab influence, had little effect on the 
azulejo, but later on, Valencian art came to 
trouble the still waters of the blues and 
brighten them with sparks of other col-
ours. Until then, most tiles were imported, 
but, between 1550 and 1560, a large order 
for tiles was placed in Antwerp, which 
meant that a large number of Flemish 
craftsmen had to settle in Portugal, where 
they passed on their know-how to the 
Portuguese. 
That was the beginning of the 
truly Portuguese production of the art 
form which was destined to be the symbol 
of the country, and of the capital first and 
foremost. With the Renaissance and travel 
to distant parts, the Arab influence made 
itself felt again and the tiles began to 
evolve, moving from the decorative to the 
pictorial, becoming a work of art and a 
form of legal tender in the heyday of the 
Feitorias or trading posts. They featured in 
Manueline art, that flourishing school of 
Portuguese Gothic, and then, up in the 
ranks of true art, they became an increas-
ingly frequent replacement for engravings 
in the Portuguese colonies, with the added 
advantage of serving as ballast on the 
voyage out. And they were still practical 
too, for tiles are an efficient protection for 
floors and walls. An azulejo production line 
was set up to meet the demands of rapid 
rebuilding after the earthquake in 1755. 
The tiles have come into their 
own again, as both art and decoration, 
over the past 10 or 20 years. The moderns 
have espoused the azulejo and the stun-
ning decorative art in the Lisbon metro is 
the proof. Pomar's designs dedicated to 
Pessoa, the poet, are prominent in this 
underground collection, copies of which 
were presented to the Brussels metro 
during the Europalia Portugal Festival in 
Brussels (autumn-winter 1991), which was 
in some ways a dress rehearsal for Lisbon 
1994. Lisbon has its azulejo museum, of 
course, but the whole city is a live 
exhibition of these typical tiles, in which 
artists, designers, painters and architects 
daily take up the challenge of using this 
ancient art for up-to-date creations. Indus-
trial techniques would of course make 
production easy, but most tiles are still 
made by hand, even in firms with a huge 
output. 
Lisbon has been shaped by artists 
who have enhanced their creations with 
the legacy of distant lands, of Goa and 
Angola and Brazil and Mozambique. The 
Lisbon 94 organisers are emphasising the 
city's historic capacity for exchange and 
going for cultural démocratisation in all its 
forms, from taking art out into the street 
to extending open arms to young artists. 
Culture year is a springboard for the city, 
and many creative workers from the 
worlds of art, music, dance, drama, the 
cinema and more have been invited to 
perform. There are hundreds of events and 
we can only deal with a handful of them, 
not necessarily the most important either. 
Honour goes to one special art 
form, the city itself, starting at the roots 
and the civilisations which forged it. 
'Subterranean Lisbon' is an archaeological 
exhibition tracing the family tree from 
before man down to the city's own big 
bang, the earthquake of 1755, which 
swallowed up two thirds of the buildings 
and was the start of a new life for the city 
under the leadership of the then Prime 
Minister, the Marquis of Pombal. But it 
does more than light the path from 
dinosaurs to disaster, for it traces feelings 
too, through the different strata of human 
contact, the Greek ruins, the Roman 
theatre, the baths of Cassius, the ancient 
cathedral and more. It is a journey of 
discovery which visits all those who, from 
the Palaeolithic age onwards, have nestled 
in the bosom of Lisbon and in the welcom-
ing arms of the Tagus; Greeks, Romans, 
Northern Europeans and, finally, Arabs, all 
whispering their own names for the city, 
Olisipo, Felicitas Julia, Aschbouna... and 
Lisboa, given by Alfonso Henriques, the 
man who conquered it one day in 1147, 
created the Portuguese nation and became 
its first king. 
Lisbon 94 has to spotlight the 
architecture and the whole city, with a 
special focus on the great cultural buildings 
of course, but also on the romance of the 
lively streets, and months were spent on 
the wholesale renovation of fine sites, 
buildings and open spaces and cultural 
facilities which had been abandoned or put 
to little use. The 'Seventh Hill' project 
combines architectural, social and econ-
Two worlds meet in the azulejo : Arab and 
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omic activity, including rehabilitating buil-
dings, restoring the heritage, developing 
parks, organising meetings and local 
events, giving incentives to tradesmen and 
encouraging relaxation areas and so on in 
what is considered to be the city's romantic 
quarter, where most of the important 
events of the past two hundred years have 
taken place. 'Seventh Hill' is a melting pot 
of life and art and man and city. Professor 
José-Augusto França, one of the prom-
oters, put it this way : 'The street gives us 
what we have and culture gives us what it 
has.' 
Two main tours are on offer, 
both T-shaped routes along the avenues of 
great houses, parks and cultural facilities 
which frame the city. The central meeting 
point is the Terreiro do Paço, the square 
where, for centuries, travellers bound for 
distant lands have crossed the paths of 
homecomers, fresh off the ships which 
have brought their baggage and their 
hearts, those ingredients which were to 
make Lisbon the city of here and else-
where. 
A few years ago, a fire in the 
Chiado, one of the most picturesque 
cityscapes in Europe, hit the headlines 
across most of the European press and 
television. The mass of intertwined alleys 
lined with little houses and boutiques and 
art and craft workshops made the fire-
men's job impossible and, although re-
building is under way, the bitterness of 
those who love that part of the city lingers, 
for the aesthetic jumble of the Chiado can 
never be recreated. The exhibition on 
'Lisbon, the Chiado, Alvaro Siza Vieira — 
the Strategy of Memory' is extremely 
critical of the authorities' hand in city 
planning. 
The people of Lisbon tend to take 
a very cautious approach to the develop-
ment of their city and visitors can easily 
imagine that it is a protected gift. One 
paradoxical stroke of good fortune was 
that Portugal's economic development 
was lagging behind in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when the knell sounded for architecture 
and so many towns were scarred by 
manifestations of modernism, and so 
Lisbon did not have the money to massacre 
its masterpieces -— as, say, Brussels did — 
and emerged virtually unscathed. The 
coast to the north and even very popular 
resorts such as Monte Estoril and Cascais 
have very few high-rise buildings to disrupt 
the harmony of the lovely old houses and 
fine tum-of-the-century hotels on the 
slopes of the Sintra mountain chain — 
where visitors to Lisbon during this special 
year can escape for a day or two, as indeed 
Lord Byron used to, year after year, gaining 
inspiration from the lushness of what are 
probably Europe's most luxuriant natural 
surroundings. 
The many lives of a 
scion of the city 
Many of the exhibitions and 
poetry events are being held in Fernando 
Pessoa House, opened last year in honour 
of one of Lisbon's most cherished sons. 
Pessoa (1888-1935), the most famous 
Portuguese writer of the 20th century, 
strongly influenced his own generation 
and Lisbon loomed large in his works. 
Pessoa is not just a man and a poet. He is a 
whole artistic universe, who lived several 
lives, for the apparently timid artist pushed 
back the frontiers of the artistic alias, not 
only publishing under several names, but 
actually living the life attached to each 
name, each with his own past, his own 
psychology and his own dreams. There 
were young men, old men, impulsive 
poets, blasé engineers and more and, it is 
said, their lives became increasingly prone 
to overlap and their writings appeared one 
over the other on the written page, in 
every direction, top to bottom, bottom to 
top... All these people published one major 
work, but hundreds of poems and texts. 
Pessoa was Ricardo Reis, Alvaro de 
Campos, the English writer Alexander 
Search, who of course wrote in English, and 
more, and he left thousands of pages 
behind him which publishers the world 
over have not yet managed to print. 
People talk about the Pessoa 
effect. Countless articles, university theses 
and other works have been written about 
him at home and abroad. But nothing has 
changed. Many see his enigmatic writings 
asa pillar of modern western culture. In his 
lifetime, many artists tried to paint the 
man who hated being photographed 
because photos immortalised one facet of 
what he felt was an inevitably multiple 
being. Many still paint imaginary portaits 
now he is dead. 
Pessoa was born in Lisbon, lost his 
father at the age of five and then went to 
live in Durban (South Africa) with his 
mother when she remarried. He came 
home to Lisbon when he was 17 and hardly 
ever left it again until he died, gazing at 
the city, talking to it and describing it 
incessantly. 
Music from the 
depths of the soul 
Fado, which comes from deep 
down in the soul of Portugal and par-
ticularly the soul of Lisbon, can be summed 
up in one word, 'saudade', which has no 
need of translation. Hear a note or two of 
fado and your heart melts, capturing all 
the twisting and meandering and intricacy 
of a word which 'nostalgia' renders only 
imperfectly. In his 'Book of Laughter and 
Forgetting', Milan Kundera mentions the 
equally untranslatable Czech word 'litost', 
a kind of veneration and sorrow for one's 
own suffering. The two words must be 
linked. There is an exhibition of fado at the 
National Museum of Ethnology, but, in 
addition, a whole series of cultural events 
throughout the year is communicating the 
whole meaning of this art form. There are 
concerts and displays and lectures and 
research by a group of academics from the 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa and the 
Museu Nacional de Etnologia and leading 
figures from the art world. The results of all 
this are to be published in a series of works 
under the general title of Fado — 1994. 
Reports and recordings of essential tradi-
tional fado pieces will also be available. The 
exhibitions include an existing collection of 
documents plus other photographs, prints, 
musical instruments, popular booklets, 
sheet music and other items. The multi-
disciplinary research covers ethnology, 
sociology, anthropology and so on. Tribute 
will be paid to the acclaimed Queen of 
Fado, Amália Rodrigues. 
The current research could well 
reveal the exact origins of fado, a recent 
genre, dating from the first half of the 19th 
"I 
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16th century and similarities with the songs 
of the troubadours of the Middle Ages. 
The word 'fado' apparently comes from 
the Latin word 'fatum' (fate) and sadness 
sticks to these songs like a second skin. 
Recent generations of fado performers 
have been tempted by the idea of a 
cheerful fado, but the Lisbon version 
remains close to its origins, a melancholy 
style which plumbs the depths of human 
suffering. 
Lisbon is the European capital of 
culture for 1994, the 20th anniversary of 
the spring revolution which brought the 
country out of the long night of dictator-
ship and colonialism, liberating both it and 
the peoples under its yoke. 25 April 1974 
will always be remembered as the date of 
Portugal's modern awakening to de-
mocracy, to Europe, to itself and to the 
pride which for many years was hostage to 
one of the harshest colonial regimes that 
ever existed. The big celebration of this 
event, on the Terreiro do Paço, the heart of 
the city of a thousand squares, is the 
'Colour of the revolution' exhibition, a 
display of art with a sociological slant, in 
that it is intended to make people think 
about popular genres of the period — 
graffiti, posters and lithographs. But no 
celebration of the spring revolution would 
be complete without a tribute to José 
Afonso and his 'Grandola', the song 
broadcast on radio on the morning of 25 
April 1974 as the signal for the Portuguese 
army to rise up against the Caetano 
regime. Many groups sang Afonso's songs 
and a double album came out on 25 April 
this year, the 20th anniversary of the 
revolution. There is an exhibition of his life 
and work and his works are due to appear 
in print. 
The tropical court  I
Also in culture year, Lisbon is 
screening the 100 best European 
films — this is not to be taken 
literally — in its '100 days — 100 films' 
festival. One of the many other film 
festivals is devoted to Jean Renoir, the 
French movie-maker, who would have 
been 100 this year, and the organisers have 
also managed to compile a programme of 
films depicting Lisbon. These pictures, from 
all ages of the cinema, have been specially 
ordered for the occasion and include 'A 
Lisbon Story' by the German Wim Wen-
ders, who did such a fine job on his native 
Berlin in two masterpieces — 'Der Himmel 
über Berlin' and 'Faraway so close'. A 
fictional documentary called' A town like 
other towns', by a young Portuguese film-
maker, Joaquim Leitão, was screened on 
27 February as the curtain-raiser for Lisbon 
European Capital of Culture. This 35 mm 
film was post-produced in high-definition 
and portrays high definition feelings on the 
delicate frontier between mirth and mel-
ancholy, against an artistic background of 
constant ambiguity — perhaps a bid to put 
'saudade' on celluloid. 
Now to drama. Lisbon 94 has 
called on artistes from every comer of the 
globe, for it refuses to live in 'The days 
when we knew nothing about each other' 
— the title of one of the plays by German 
playwright Peter Handke being staged in 
the city this year. The first of these involves 
a game of hopscotch, a kind of labyrinth, 
which is none other than our world, in 
which seven travellers form a constellation 
in the shape of a question-mark. The 
second, 'A game of questions', is a piece 
without words in which 300 characters 
lead the audience through the scriptures, 
fables and contemporary myths. The many 
plays specially written for culture year 
include three specifically about Lisbon, one 
of which has the revealing title of 'Fados' 
and is a sophisticated multimedia presen-
tation of the voice of the city. Another 
piece not to be missed is 'Angels in 
America' by the American writer Tony 
Kushner, whose handling of the AIDS issue 
has the audience on a knife-edge of 
emotion. 
Lisbon 94 puts the spotlight on 
the cultures and peoples who have 
brought the city to life. The exhibition of 
Companhia Nacional de Bailado. 
Lisbon's many attractions amply warrant the 
city's title of European cultural capital, 1994 
Angolan carving is one of the best events 
and is already in demand in many inter-
national museums. Here, the visitor is 
immersed in the art of every one of 
Angola's ethnic groups, moving from 
sculptures to some of the finest examples 
of masks and ritual objects and everyday 
items, of which Lisbon probably has the 
best collection in the world. 
In a completely different register, 
the Portuguese-speaking countries of 
Africa are represented at the second Luso-
Afro-Brazilian symposium on the Por-
tugese language and what its many users 
have contributed to it, an event organised 
by the institutes of Portuguese letters, 
Brazilian culture and African studies at the 
Lisbon Arts Faculty. 
'Dancing in Cape Verde' is a 
tailor-made spectacular inspired by the 
island and its music and performed by Cape 
Verdean dancers and musicians and Por-
tuguese dancers. The biggest Portuguese-
speaking country, Brazil, is there, with the 
'Countless States of Being' exhibition at 
the Museum of Images of the Unconscious 
and the 'Rio de Janeiro — capital of the 
Empire (1808-1821)' display of the splen-
dours of the Portuguese court in its years as 
a tropical court. 
Lisbon has espoused so much 
influence from far and digested so many 
cultural nutrients. Art treasures from the 
different lands visited by the Portuguese, 
particularly Angola, went down into its 
bowels in the earthquake of 1755 and, 
perhaps, in hundreds of years' time a 
dumbfounded archaeologist will dig them 
up again. UM 
Hegel Goutier 
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Whether part of a 'liberal' sea-
change, or just a passing fashion, 
privatisation is sweeping across the 
globe. Between 1984 and 1991 the 
governments of a hundred coun-
tries — primarily developing ones, 
and particularly in South America and Africa, 
— have sold off $250 billion-worth of public 
undertakings. And the key conclusion of 
many experts is that this process of econ-
omic liberalisation and privatisation in the 
productive sector needs to be stepped up. It 
is widely believed that private investment, 
whether internally generated, or coming 
from outside, is essential for the successful 
relaunching of the developing countries' 
economies. 
After briefly outlining the impact 
of privatisation, our dossier discusses the 
conditions in which private enterprise can 
contribute to development. Alain Le Noir 
brings a point of view from the world of 
banking and Stephen McCarthy (EIB) 
investigates the support which inter-
national aid can provide for private busi-
nesses. 
Moving on to industry, we 
review the work of economist Sanjaya Lall, 
who wonders whether industrialisation is a 
sensible answer for Africa or just one more 
reason for the failure of development 
more generally. Luis Ritti (European Com-
mission) looks at industrial cooperation 
and says how ACP growth may be founded 
on private enterprise and the private 
sector. The work of the CDI (Centre for the 
Development of Industry) is discussed in an 
interview with Wilhelm de Jonge, a 
member of the CDI Joint Board, and 
Philippe Queyrane (consultant) says what 
businesses themselves expect. Paolo Logli 
(European Commission) then discusses the 
private sector as an EU-ACP cooperation 
priority and André Huybrechts (consultant) 
looks at how the promotion of Euro-ACP 
partnerships can serve industrialisation in 
the ACP States. Then Martin Minguella 
(European Commission) considers the 
future of industrial cooperation under the 
Lomé Convention and Virginie Vanhaever-
beke (ACP-EU Courier trainee) asks wheth-
The role 
of the private sector 
er former emigrants have a future as 
businesspeople. 
Four case studies complete the 
dossier — an SME-SMI support scheme in 
receipt of EU finance since 1987 ('Produc-
ing businessmen in Mali') by technical 
assistant Olivier Donnet, the cases of 
Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, 
investigated on the spot by Hegel Goutier, 
and a Zimbabwean point of view by 
project leader Ms Tsitsi Musiyina. ■■ DD 
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ment decided to return companies 
nationalised by the socialist Al-
lende Government to their former 
owners. It was called reprivatis-
ation. 
For the past 20 years, 'they have 
been selling off everything everywhere', as 
Guy Herzlich put it in Le Monde on 25 
January earlier this year. Between 1984 and 
1991, the governments of 100 countries sold 
off $250 billion-worth of state-owned com-
panies, primarily in the developing world 
and especially in Latin America and Africa. 
Between 1980 and 1987,450 out of 700 real 
privatisations took place in the developing 
world, as, between 1988 and 1992, did 80% 
of privatisations involving more than 
$50 000 each. Public sector reform and 
privatisation have been among the key 
elements in structural adjustment program-
mes since the early 1980s and they feature in 
two-thirds of the World Bank's program-
mes, half of them in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Why privatise?  I
The two main aims of what some 
people have called the new ortho-
dox economic policy are to make 
the economy more efficient, obviously, 
and to take the pressure off public 
finances. 
The economic efficiency which 
privatisation is supposed to bring about is 
not just produced by transferring owner-
ship. It all depends on how interested the 
new owners are in proper business man-
agement in a context of economic liberalis-
ation. 
If a situation in which profits are 
privatised and loss socialised is to be 
avoided, it would be wise to do more than 
effect a simple legal transfer of ownership 
and define the move in terms of the 
market (Zaki Laidi, Enquête sur la Banque 
Mondiale, Fayard, Paris, 1989). Some 
economists maintain that privatisation is 
still the only safe way of making the 
economy more efficient and bringing 
about lasting institutional change. We shall 
return to this later, when dealing with the 
concept of indirect privatisation. Going 
beyond the matter of economic efficiency. 
HI Privatisation: 
by necessity or 
g| from conviction? 
privatisation can also be argued to 
be the only logical way of going 
about the necessary restructuring 
— a thankless and unpopular task 
which many governments, in de-
veloped and developing world 
alike, therefore delegate to the 
private sector. 
The second and even 
more obvious aim of privatisation 
is to relieve the pressure on 
government spending, especially 
when governments are heavily in debt. But 
it can lead to contradictions if taken to 
extremes. If, say, a State's financial require-
ments continue to rise, it may be tempted 
to privatise not only any competitive state-
owned firms, but also its public services, 
which — unless a religion has been made 
of private enterprise and the complete 
dominance of market forces — have other 
functions than to be purely profit-making, 
have to be provided by the community and 
are often economically and politically 
strategic. 
Cash-strapped governments, 
particularly in the developing world, may 
be moved to try to privatise firms which 
run at a heavy loss. But this can often be 
counter-productive as far as the general 
dynamics of privatisation are concerned, 
because such firms have no attraction for 
the private buyer and there is no certainty 
that they will be any more efficient in a 
competitive market economy. 
Limited 
impact  I
Most observers admit that actual 
achievements have been meagre 
and that the undertakings concerned have 
mainly been small ones in terms of capital 
and payroll. So those which waste the most 
public money have been spared. 
In its last report on adjustment in 
Africa, the World Bank said that the 
hardest changes to carry out were privatis-
ation, reform of state-owned companies 
and the creation of systems of public 
finance. It suggested one or two reasons 
for this, pointing out that the reform of 
state-owned companies had failed to 
trigger any private-sector development 
because it had not been able to stop these 
companies enjoying privileged access to 
budgets, credit facilities, tariff and non-
tariff protection or special tax status or, 
more generally, to prevent them from 
being shielded by the regulations. 
More systematically, there are 
various economic, financial and political 
reasons to explain why privatisation has 
had a limited effect on the developing 
nations, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Some of the economic reasons 
are structural and others cyclical. 
In most cases, privatisations occur 
against a background of limited resources 
in small economies. The systems of finance 
in the countries concerned do not perform 
well, financial and economic transparency 
is generally poor and the workings of the 
economic policy are complex. The nation's 
private business sector may be narrow-
based and therefore have little capacity to 
absorb anything. Also, in a situation in 
which it is already difficult to mobilise 
private capital from abroad, attracting 
takers for state-owned companies is even 
more of a struggle. 
It may be easier to remove other 
obstacles related to the ongoing economic 
situation — for example, overcoming the 
effects of a long tradition of predomin-
antly public ownership, or using external 
aid to help make up for a shortage of local 
businessmen, capital investment, tech-
nology or management skills. Govern-
ments could also make what is currently 
considered to be an unreliable, even risky 
economic environment secure by trying to 
convince private operators that the climate 
of investment in their countries is not just 
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abrupt switch to a completely free-enter-
prise system from a collectivist or state 
system of the type so common in Africa 
after independence. A jump from a system 
of social objectives to a system geared to 
capital, or money, is bound to fall short. 
Let us not forget that, in the 
market economy, the law is that the 
strongest man wins. There is no way round 
it: the weakest are condemned — to 
death — and there is no appeal. On an 
international scale, Africa is the weakest 
(with 1% of world trade) and, without 
safeguards or security, the law of the 
market could well wipe it off the map, 
particularly since it has already been 
pushed onto the sidelines by the recession 
and African businesses are fighting a losing 
battle with their competitors on other 
continents, particularly Asia. 
The answer to this, and some-
thing which would attract and keep 
private sector businesses, is a strong, 
credible State. It is all very well to talk 
about support for the private sector, but 
since it is not possible to support every-
thing at once, it could well weaken the 
public sector. The infrastructure, the psyc-
hology and the 'market forces' spirit have 
to be created and they cannot just be 
decreed. 
How can civil service wages be 
cut if they are already inadequate ? How 
can a primary school teacher be expected 
to survive if he has not been paid for five or 
six months? In conditions such as these, 
how can a government clamp down on 
civil sen/ants and expect the civil service to 
offer the quality of welcome and the 
services that are vital to the promotion of 
private enterprise? The fact that a large 
section of the population is getting poorer 
also reduces demand and makes it increas-
ingly difficult to sell consumer products. 
If private enterprise is to be 
attracted, then the workings of the state 
sector have to be overhauled at once. The 
working of the legal system have to be 
reviewed. While I am delighted that the 
countries of the franc zone are now to 
Looking to the private sector to supply the 
capital to set up a development finance 
institution is the wrong approach 
have their own community business law, 
the law in fact already exists and, since all 
the franc zone countries in fact have based 
their law on French law, they already have 
a form of community law. The most 
important thing, however, is the enforce-
ment of the laws and, here, it is less a 
question of training judges (they tend to 
be very competent) than of making sure 
that they are honest... which they will only 
be if they are properly paid and, most 
important, if the legal system is entirely 
independent of the political authority. 
Customs officers, taxmen, police-
men, other civil servants and judges have 
to serve the nation instead of (as happens 
all too often) serving themselves. 
Unless the civil service is sound, 
credible and trustworthy, the private 
sector will not be interested. The role of 
the State is decisive to the development 
strategy, as we have seen in Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan and indeed in France, 
particularly during the post-war era. 
Alongside the State, there is the 
role played by the central banks. Greater 
supervisory powers for them and greater 
independence for the banking commis-
sions vis-à-vis governments are a step in 
the right direction, since both these things 
protect savings and make it easier to keep 
them in Africa and, without those savings, 
private investment would be inadequate 
or depend on outside sources. I am far 
more critical of the monetary policy of the 
central banks. Although I admit that 
priority in our western economies goes to 
backing the currency (and the Bank of 
France did remarkably well with its loan 
restriction policy in the early 1980s), it 
seems to me to be obvious that the priority 
for a developing country is development. 
So I do not understand why 
selective loan policies everywhere have 
given way to quantitative policies, always 
angled towards restriction. It is a pity that 
interest rates (which are often too high) 
and credit squeezes constitute a brake on 
private initiative. 
How is it possible to talk about 
support for the private sector on one hand 
and penalise it on the other? Everyone 
involved in development has to agree to 
go in the same direction, even if the steps 
taken to get there cannot always be 
reconciled with the conventional theories 
emerging from Washington. 
Marshalling 
capital  I
The structure of the financial 
systems also needs to be built on 
further. 
Development banks, all too often 
scuppered by bad management, need to 
be replaced by the only organisations 
which can give private firms the help they 
need, i.e. specialised institutions, includ-
ing: 
— venture capital companies; 
— collective guarantee organisations; 
— stock exchanges; 
— artisans' banks; 
— low-rent housing associations ; 
— mutual savings and loan funds. 
Talking about privatisation but 
not providing the means of bringing it 
about amounts to putting the cart before 
the horse. 
Specialised business finance insti-
tutions have to be created or improved. As 
we know, trading banks are short-term 
banks and, as such, only rarely venture into 
long-term loans (investments, for ex-
ample) and only then via external lines of 
credit on harsh terms. And, of course, if the 
banks are privatised, their priority is 
profitability and investments involve too 
much risk. 
The capital of these development 
finance institutions should be as follows : 
— a maximum of 20% from the State; 
— 50% from the ADB, the CFD, PROPA-
RCO, SFI,the EIB etc.; 
— 30% from economic partners, the CCI, 
big firms etc.. 
I should like to make clear that 
looking for the capital for a development 
finance institution in the private sector is 
the wrong approach. Development finan-
cing is too risky an exercise to be reconciled 
with trying to make a profit. Senegal and 
"I 
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the other places which do not have 
development banks any longer know just 
how big a gap is created by their demise 
and it is not clear to me that the FPE can fill 
it, however much capital is put in by the 
ADB. 
— Venture capital companies are essen-
tial. Venture capital is a vital comple-
ment, a forerunner even, of SME 
investment loans. It makes it possible 
to marshal enough long-term capital 
without reimbursement costs and to 
respond appropriately to the particular 
needs of the company at a particular 
stage in its development, be it for start-
up capital at the outset or develop-
ment capital to facilitate expansion. 
Company capital may be structured as 
above, or as arranged by one or more 
funders (PROPARCO or the Society for 
promotion and participation for econ-
omic cooperation, the APDF or African 
Project Development Facility, SIDI or 
the Investment and Industrial Develop-
ment Company, etc.) or private oper-
ators. 
— A stock exchange is a vital comple-
ment to venture capital. Africa is 
under-capitalised — $6 billion for the 
whole continent, as against $140 bil-
lion in South Korea alone. Stock ex-
change capitalisation as a percentage 
of GDP is 2% in Morocco, 3% in Nigeria 
and 67% in Malaysia. 
Stock exchanges suitable for African 
needs have to be set up. 
In Port Louis, 23 companies are quoted. 
In Abidjan, nothing worked for 
10 years, but things are picking up now 
Newly established processing and production 
companies have to be given the time to 
obtain the resources they need to fight their 
competitors on other continents on equal 
and there are plans for regional expan-
sion. A regional stock exchange cre-
ation plan for western Africa has been 
on the drawing board for nearly three 
years. It is being assessed by the BCEAO 
and is not expected to come to any-
thing before 1995, which is a very long 
time. 
— Collective guarantee systems 
One of the main barriers in the way of 
access to loans, which are often used 
for setting up SMEs, is the inadequacy 
or total absence of any security. Banks 
are often unjustifiably blamed for 
being too demanding here, but it is 
perfectly reasonable for a money 
lender to take every precaution, par-
ticularly if he is committing himself to a 
company for a number of years. If 
security is no personal oppered and the 
political, social and economic environ-
ment is unstable, then personal security 
must be replaced by collective guaran-
tees as a matter of urgency. This is 
what the guarantee funds of the SCM 
(the French mutual guarantee system) 
type do. They have made a remarkable 
contribution to the development of 
loan facilities for artisans in France since 
1920 and in Morocco over the past 
10 years. 
SCMs should be promoted by profes-
sional associations, working closely 
with the banks. 
Lastly, I should like to say some-
thing aboutthe need to protect companies 
in the private sector; something which 
goes against the traditional doctrines of 
the Bretton Woods organisations. I must 
emphasise the merciless nature of the rules 
of the market economy. A firm which 
starts out, with few resources, in a fragile 
economic environment has no chance of 
success unless it has some protection, if 
only during the early years, against outside 
aggression on the part of much tougher 
firms from Europe, Asia and elsewhere. It is 
appalling to see that, at a time when 
protectionism is still the norm all over the 
world, Africa is the only continent not 
allowed to resort to it. I do not want to see 
protectionism perpetuated ... but newly 
established processing and production 
companies have to be given the time to 
obtain the resources they need to fight 
their competitors on other continents on 
equal terms. 
I believe in private enterprise, but 
the results of the past few years certainly 
prove that we tried to go too fast and 
were perhaps too quick to sing the praises 
of private initiative : 
* $ 8.8 billion-worth of private invest-
ment in Africa in 1989 ; 
* $ 4.9 billion-worth of private invest-
ment in Africa in 1991. 
We also tried to move too fast 
witch the 'new white withcraft' form of 
privatisation, Alain Henry of the CFD 
(France's official development bank) wrote 
recently. 
Development needs private 
enterprise. It needs strong private busi-
nesses which perform well. But it would be 
a mistake to believe that the private sector 
will save Africa on its own, particularly 
since the important thing may well not be 
the firm's (public or private) status. Does it 
not all hinge on the quality of manage-
ment not really being compatible with 
local customs and outlooks? As Alain 
Henry, a CFD executive, wrote in 'Afrique 
Contemporaine' recently, 'African peoples 
are apparently unaware of our conception 
of efficiency. The commonest way of 
handling this in the private sector so far has 
been to call in expatriate managers, who 
are not there just to provide training, but 
to dravy the fire when extremely ruthless 
decisions have to be taken. In the event, 
the revival of African businesses by Euro-
peans could well be useful, but the cost of 
having the Europeans there compromises 
the hopes of being competitive in the long 
term. And going beyond privatisation 
itself, the problem of the Africanisation of 
management is a real one, as is that of 
management methods in the African 
context.' 
It is out of the question to 
improvise encouragement of the private-
sector and the switch to the market 
economy which goes with it. Such things 
have to be prepared and that means 
financial instruments and tax and social 
incentives. The private sector cannot be 
promoted unless the ground to receive it is 
sufficiently fertile and provides sufficient 
incentive to inspire the trust without which 
there can be no businessmen or busi-
nesses. ■■ 
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private business 
I
In recent years the total flow of 
financial aid from donor countries 
and agencies to the ACP States has 
been equivalent to around ten 
percent of the letter's national 
income — though this is an average 
figure which disguises great variations 
between one country and another. Apart 
from technical assistance which consumes a 
major part of aid flows, most of this aid has 
been for public sector projects and program-
mes. Even when aid is used for import 
support programmes the public sector also 
benefits through the flow of counterpart 
funds. 
Development economists increas-
ingly question this concentration of effort 
and finance on the public sector. They argue 
that it is private entrepreneurship working 
in the context of competitive markets which 
.ultimately drives economic development — 
whether at the level of a small farmer trying 
a new seed variety or a multinational 
company investing in a factory. Moreover, 
unlike the public sector, the private sector, 
being constrained by the discipline of the 
market place, cannot afford to waste 
resources by investing in unviable busi-
nesses or unproductive white elephants. 
■
The constraints 
Aid has always been used, with 
greater or lesser success, to help 
small farmers and small enter-
prises, particularly in the informal sector. 
But I wish to focus here on the private 
business sector. Given the new focus on the 
role of the private sector in economic 
development, what help can aid give? 
Putting the question is easier 
than finding the answer. There are three 
by Stephen McCarthy* 
* European Investment Bank, Directorate for 
Economic and Financial Studies. The views expressed 
by the author do not necessarily represent the 
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! difficulties. First, if aid agencies 
I were to throw money, in the form 
f of grants or highly concessional 
I loans, at private businesses there 
I is a risk that the essential cjiscipline 
I of the market place would be 
I eroded — much as the ready 
I availability of concessionary 
I finance to governments has often 
! encouraged ill-judged public in-
vestments. In short, aid finance for private 
business could easily undermine the very 
features of the sector which make it an 
attractive vehicle for economic develop-
ment. 
While the previous point is about 
efficiency, the second is more to do with 
equity. Suppose two enterprises are com-
peting in the same domestic market, let us 
say for the manufacture and sale of plastic 
buckets, and one of them happens to 
attract a grant or a very soft loan from a 
donor agency. It will immediately have an 
unfair advantage vis-à-vis the other. Who 
is to be the arbiter of such largesse? 
Third, there can also be a distort-
ing impact on the financial sector. An 
efficient financial system is essential for a 
healthy expanding private sector. The role 
of banks is to attract domestic savings 
which they then lend to business clients. 
The skill of bankers, and the contribution 
that they make to development, is in 
assessing credit risks and the credit stand-
ing of the various potential borrowers. 
Nevertheless, in many ACP countries the 
banking sector has been neglected in the 
past. This mistake is now being rectified, 
particularly in the context of structural 
adjustment programmes. It would be a 
backward step to promote subsidised 
credit operations, against which the dom-
estic banks could not compete, and 
thereby undermine the financial sector 
reforms which have already occurred. 
I
The possibilities 
This looks like a rather pessimistic 
analysis; almost as if anything 
that the donor agencies might do 
to support private business would actually 
have long term consequences likely to 
undermine the veny sector that they wish 
to promote. Is there really nothing that can 
be done? Are the donor agencies con-
demned to watch private sector develop-
ment from the sidelines, unable to play a 
useful role? 
I believe the situation is not quite 
so bleak. The availability of additional 
investment finance from donor agencies 
must in itself represent an incentive for 
private sector development. But the con-
clusion is that the exact terms of donor 
support for the private business sector 
have to be very carefully designed so that 
they are sensitive to the problems dis-
cussed above. I would like to suggest three 
options which are open to aid agencies : 
offer loan finance at rates of interest that 
reflect local market conditions; provide 
equity finance for businesses; or give 
technical assistance and support. Each 
approach has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Loan finance on market terms. Here the 
donor agency makes a soft loan or even a 
grant to the government (or Central Bank) 
of the country concerned. The finance is 
then re-lent to the banking system, includ-
ing to specialised agencies such as develop-
ment banks, but on terms that reflect local 
market conditions. As a result the govern-
ment itself retains the subsidy component 
(the grant element) of the aid finance. 
The advantage of this mechanism 
is that it minimises any risk of market 
distortion as a result of the intervention of 
the aid agency, since it mimics, as it were, 
the normal workings of the financial 
^ 
the Courier n° 146 · july-august 1994 dossier 
market. The main disadvantage is that 
many governments have a tendency to 
interfere excessively in the functioning of 
the private sector and to provide finance 
through the government may encourage 
such interference. 
Providing equity finance. A second poss-
ibility is for the donor agency to offer 
equity, or risk taking, finance either 
directly to private sector enterprises or, 
more commonly, through one of the 
growing number of venture capital oper-
ations in the ACP countries. There is 
certainly a great need here ; shortage of 
equity is one of the major constraints to 
the growth of private business in the ACP 
countries. But the officials from the donor 
agencies have to reinterpret their role in a 
new way — no longer seeing their task as 
giving money away, but rather behaving 
like venture capitalists looking for the 
highest possible return. This is a psycholo-
gical change which many find difficult or 
impossible to make. Yet if it is not made, 
and finance is simply 'given away' to 
business projects with no real expectation 
of a return, then we have again all the 
dangers of undermining the discipline of 
the market place that were discussed 
above. Probably the only way forward is to 
work through real venture capitalists who, 
right from the start, have different object-
ives and who operate in a different culture 
than that of aid officials. 
Providing technical support. In fact the 
greatest constraint to private business 
development in the ACP countries is 
probably not a shortage of finance but of 
entrepreneurship, of modern business and 
technical skills, of banks and businesses 
that can survive in a market economy, of 
marketing expertise and of access to 
information on overseas markets, technical 
possibilities and so on. There is much scope 
here for donor intervention, both at the 
level of the entrepreneurs themselves and 
with the financial intermediaries, though 
probably more through local 'capacity 
building' than through feasibility studies 
and consultants' reports. Technical assist-
ance can also be used to support the policy 
and institutional framework, for example 
the legal arrangements and business re-
search. 
If all three approaches are taken 
together and mixed judiciously according 
to particular circumstances there is plenty 
of scope for aid agencies to promote 
private business sector development. 
Experience in the East Asian 
countries suggests that there might also be 
a fourth approach, which is to provide 
subsidised credit to enterprises but only 
after they have demonstrated that they 
can perform, for example in export mar-
kets '. So success is rewarded on a post hoc 
basis. How this could be adapted to normal 
aid agency procedures, which almost 
invariably finance investments ex-ante, is 
an intriguing question which merits further 
study. 
I
El Β experience 
Under the framework of the 
successive Yaoundé and Lomé 
Conventions, the European In-
vestment Bank has had concessional 
finance to support private sector develop-
ment in the ACP countries for over two 
decades. Of the three approaches discussed 
above it has had direct experience with the 
first two — loan finance and equity 
operations. For the latter it has had access 
to 'risk capital' provided under the success-
ive Lomé Conventions. This financial instru-
ment is perhaps unique among donor 
agencies and has proved itself to be 
remarkably flexible. It is used increasingly 
to provide equity finance to private 
enterprises in the ACP countries. The third 
approach, technical support of various 
kinds, falls more within the purview of the 
European Commission itself and the CDI. 
So what has been the ElB's actual 
experience ? In the 1960s and 1970s private 
sector development was usually taken to 
mean in practice investment by large 
corporations often with foreign sharehold-
ings. But the focus of EIB operations 
gradually changed. Development banks or 
development finance institutions were set 
up in most ACP countries and the EIB 
established relations with many of them, 
as also did many of the Bank's sister 
institutions such as the CDC, PROPARCO, 
DEG etc. By the early 1990s between a 
' See for example The East Asian Miracle 
published by the World Bank in 1993. 
quarter and a third of EIB lending in the 
ACPs was being made in the form of lines 
of credit (or what the EIB calls 'global 
loans') through local financial institutions 
in the ACP countries concerned. These local 
banks are responsible for receiving and 
appraising investment proposals by SMEs 
in their country and taking investment 
decisions, the ElB's role being essentially 
that of reviewing the decisions made as 
well as monitoring the continued good 
standing and creditworthiness of· the 
intermediary banks. 
By the end of 1993 the EIB had 
supported nearly 1300 small and medium 
ACP enterprises in this way through local 
intermediaries. Often the SMEs concerned 
do not even know that their finance has 
come from the EIB — but then why should 
they? They deal with their local bank 
which takes responsibility for the loan 
which is made. From the point of view of 
the enterpreneur it need not matter that 
the EIB is the ultimate source of finance. 
The only problem is that sometimes the 
politicians do not know either ! One ACP 
parliamentarian once asked me why the 
EIB did not finance SMEs in his country. I 
was able to point out that in fact we were 
actually working through not one but two 
development banks in his country. 
The merit of this approach is that 
it draws on local knowledge and expertise 
in making lending decisions and puts 
responsibility where it really belongs — 
within the country concerned. Neverthe-
less some problems have emerged. The 
development banks have rarely been fully 
integrated into the rest of the local 
financial sector, have often proved unable 
to raise funds domestically and as a result 
became excessively dependent on conces-
sional finance from donor agencies. Gen-
erally the solution is both to encourage the 
development banks to become more 
commercially oriented but also to work 
with and through commercial banks as 
well. Moreover, the growing number and 
sophistication of venture capital com-
panies working within the ACP countries 
offers exciting new possibilities particularly 
in the use of risk capital for equity and 
quasi-equity financing. For these oper-
ations, even more than for loan finance, 
local knowledge and active management is 
essential for success. ■■ S.M. 
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static' in a world of constant technological 
advance. It nevertheless underlines the 
scale of the challenge for industry in Africa 
which presumably must first 'catch up' 
before it can aspire to 'keep up'. 
Lall goes on to argue that even 
where the macroeconomic conditions and 
physical infrastructure are right, the prog-
ress of industrial development depends on 
a complex interplay of three sets of 
factors: incentives, capabilities and insti-
tutions. To aspire to the East Asian model 
of economic success, he avers, all three 
must be present. The economic concepts 
involved are complicated but, at the risk of 
doing the author an injustice, we will 
confine ourselves here to a rough sum-
mary. 
Incentives are, perhaps self-evid-
ently, the factors or circumstances which 
prompt an entrepreneur to produce goods 
(or services) for sale. The existence of a 
market for a given product is clearly a key 
incentive in this context while competition 
from other producers (generally regarded 
as a good thing in maximising economic 
efficiency at a macro-economic level) may 
diminish the value of the incentive. This 
takes us fi rmly into the field of trade policy. 
Governments can preserve or strengthen 
the incentive to produce for home markets 
by erecting trade barriers and this is a 
policy which many African governments 
have adopted in the past. But its shortcom-
ings are well-known. As Lall puts it, where 
the protection is 'indiscriminate and per-
manent' there is no premium placed on 
efficiency gains and the result is likely to be 
stagnation. Most people now accept the 
general proposition that export-oriented 
trade regimes are preferable to import 
substituting ones but an industrial strategy 
based on exports can be risky. Given that 
such a strategy implies lowering one's own 
trade barriers the incentives offered at 
home may wither in the face of more 
efficient foreign competition without suf-
ficient selling opportunities abroad to 
compensate for the loss. It is rarely possible 
to 'ring fence' one's own market at the 
same time as seeking to gain access to 
markets abroad (although some non-
reciprocal arrangements do exist in agree-
ments between developed and developing 
states, including, of course, the Lomé 
Convention). 
For Africa this is a basic dilemma. 
Lall rightly poses the question as to 
whether incentive liberalisation can be 
exploited by African entrepreneurs, 
whether now or in the future, to achieve 
export-led growth. To find the answer, he 
says, we need to look at the other two 
factors listed, namely capabilities and 
institutions. 
It is probably fair to say that 
capabilities are at the centre of the debate 
about African industrialisation. The cap-
ability of a company or individual en-
trepreneur to succeed is influenced by a 
multitude of factors — the state of the 
infrastructure, the availability of capital, 
access to vital inputs, the expertise of those 
engaged in the process (at all levels) and so 
on. Lall acknowledged that African capabi-
lities have been undermined by externa! 
factors (such as low commodity prices) as 
well as by local mismanagement, but he 
maintains that even if these elements were 
not present, significant problems would 
remain 'within the industrial sector itself, 
that would affect investment efficiency.' 
He focuses heavily on the skills deficit (with 
reference to the high cost of foreign 
expertise), pointing out that much of 
Africa 'has little traditional experience of 
modern commerce or manufacturing.' This 
is not to say that there is a shortage of 
entrepreneurial drive but 'the drive to 
profit from opportunity', he insists, 'is not 
the same as the entrepreneurial capability 
required to organise, set-up and run 
modern industry.' 
The author notes that there is a 
process which must be gone through if one 
is to arrive at a stage of advanced industrial 
development : in other words a progres-
sion from 'smaller or simpler to larger, 
more complex activities' involving the 
accumulation of experience and skills along 
the way. He further argues that 'the 
inherited structures of African economies, 
shaped by colonial rule, have placed them 
far down on the learning curves'. Despite 
attempts to 'force the pace' which have 
included the 'Africanisation of industry via 
public enterprises' and promotion of small 
scale industry, he believes that it has not 
been possible to bypass the learning 
process. 
Lall goes on to look at education 
and training as perhaps the key source of 
capability acquisition. 'The relationships 
between education and industrialisation', 
he states, 'are important and binding.' An 
analysis of historic and more recent data 
soon reveals the extent of the challenge for 
sub-Saharan Africa. From an extremely low 
base in the mid 1960s (primary education 
for four out of 10, secondary education for 
four out of 100 and virtually no tertiary 
opportunities), the continent has seen 
some progress — but it still lags a long way 
behind other developing regions. 
Of all the information Lall pro-
vides, perhaps the most striking is the fact 
that 'the best education by far was 
provided by Mauritius'. It is surely no 
coincidence that this country provides the 
region's top economic success story as well. 
Lall also highlights the import-
ance of vocational training — an area 
where Africa also lags behind and which is 
recognised as being essential for successful 
industrial development. 
The third component of 'capabi-
lities' is technological effort and here 
again, the African experience has been 
disappointing. As the author notes, 'no 
enterprise can achieve efficiency, even if 
well-endowed with skilled employees, if it 
does not undertake conscious, directed 
efforts to collect and assimilate new 
technical knowledge.' Lall acknowledges 
that this may not be necessary at the early 
stages — the success of the Asian 'tigers' 
was built initially on the exploitation of 
imported technology—but it is something 
that he believes must happen eventually if 
success is to be maintained. At present, 
very few African firms are engaged in 
regular R&D activities. 
The final element, institutions, is 
dealt with briefly by the author. He points 
out that 'firms cannot function efficiently 
as isolated units' and refers to the sys-
tematic building of institutions by the NICs 
covering a wide range of fields — stan-
dards, quality control, training and so on. 
These are important foundation stones of 
an advanced industrial economy and 
although Africa has some institutions of 
this type in place, the coverage is still 
piecemeal. 
"I 
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Interaction  I
Each of the determinants dis-
cussed above — incentives, capa-
bilities and institutions — is signi-
ficant in the debate about industrialis-
ation, but Sanjaya Lall places particular 
stress on the way in which they interact. He 
believes that 'African industrial develop-
ment has been beset by a pattern of 
interaction... that has held back growth 
and, in some cases, led to a vicious spiral of 
decline.' He points for example, to the fact 
that the region 'built up its physical 
industrial structure faster than its cap-
ability or institutional structure.' He high-
lights the failure to expand education and 
training. And he speaks of failed develop-
ment projects 'which lie littered across the 
continent' because they did not take 
account of structural weaknesses arising 
from capability or institutional deficiencies. 
His conclusion, without dismissing the 
important role played by incentives, is that 
insufficient attention has been paid to the 
other two 'determinants', namely capa-
cities and institutions. As a result, the 
interaction required for successful indus-
trialisation has not been forthcoming. 
In the concluding section of his 
study, Sanjaya Lall seeks to draw some of 
the threads of the discussion together and 
to consider the policy implications of his 
analysis. He makes the general premise, 
which follows logically from the preceding 
discussion, that policy-makers 'must add-
ress the entire spectrum of determinants of 
industrial performance if they wish to 
broaden, deepen and improve their indus-
trial base.' 
On incentives he supports the 
principle of trade liberalisation but without 
accepting the dogmatic viewpoint that 
'the market always knows best'. In this 
vein, he reviews the arguments for and 
against protectionism, before concluding 
that selective intervention may sometimes 
be justified in order to give carefully 
targeted sectors the 'space' needed to 
build up competitiveness. At the same 
time, however, he stresses the rigour that 
is needed in adopting such an approach, 
pointing out that 'the preconditions for 
the efficient deployment of selective 
intervention are quite demanding.' 
It is in the area of capabilities that 
Sanjaya Lall sees the greatest need for 
action. Here, he focuses on the need to 
expand formal education and training. He 
also argues that this must be 'substantially 
supplemented' by in-firm training. Again 
he sees a role for the government, par-
ticularly in supporting the provision of 
appropriate skills training in the targeted 
industries mentioned above. 
How does a country with a low 
skills resource base generate enough 
energy to ignite the touchpaper of indus-
trial take-off. Lall does not offer any 
miracle solutions but he does suggest that 
foreign technical assistance, which admit-
tedly has a poor record in Africa, performs 
better where there is a longer term 
commitment (three to five years is sug-
gested) from the technicians involved. He 
also argues that African governments need 
to do more to stimulate technological 
activity, advocating in this context, the 
promotion of consultancy organisations 
and on the institutional side, support for 
industry associations. Special strategies are 
needed, he believes, to stimulate engineer-
ing and sub-contracting both of which 
have been slow to develop. 
Finally, he refers to the import-
ance of the broader economic setting. 
A modem bottling plant in central Africa 
supplies beer for the local market. 
'Policy makers must address the entire 
spectrum of determinants of industrial 
performance if they wish to broaden, deepen 
and improve their industrial base' 
pointing out that 'a competitive, outward 
looking regime is likely to call forth an 
appropriate set of responses.' 
Few would dispute Lall's asser-
tion that 'there cannot be any 'quick fixes' 
for the problems of African industrialis-
ation'. The author's own analysis shows all 
too clearly the complexities involved in 
devising appropriate strategies and the 
fact that difficult decisions are likely to be 
needed. He concludes on an upbeat note, 
however. Although 'the political economy 
of the situation may well dominate its 
economics'. Lall believes that'if rationality, 
good advice and the strong demonstration 
effect of the NICs prevails, economic 
considerations will ultimately determine 
the outcome' — in which case, he asserts, 
'the broad approach proposed here needs 
to be applied rather than the more partial 
ones currently in use.' ■ Simon Homer 
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The development policies of the 
European Community as implem-
ented through the principles laid 
down in several Lomé Conven-
tions, have, for many decades, 
largely tended to ignore the crucial 
role of entrepreneurship and the private 
sector in the sustainable and effective 
development of the ACP countries. The 
results of such a strategy are that, after 
more than 35 years of aid, our development 
cooperation has failed in general terms to 
make ACP countries more prosperous and 
less dependent on foreign assistance. In fact, 
if one looks for example at the actual 
economic state of most sub-Saharan African 
countries, it will be easily seen that it is 
worse than 30 years ago when most of them 
acceded to independence. 
If for decades it was, for strategic 
reasons, possible to maintain development 
policies aimed essentially at promoting 
trade and the development of social 
infrastructure in the ACP countries, such 
options make little or no sense today. In 
reality, the downfall of Communism in the 
former Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War, have led many developing 
countries to change strategies and to 
adopt more realistic political and economic 
policies (of which liberal and market-
orientated systems have been commonly 
accepted and embraced). It is now univers-
ally agreed that people are the means and 
the end of development. Present political 
and economic thinking favours private 
sector initiatives as the cure for today's 
deteriorating economic and employment 
problems of the majority of ACP countries. 
We cannot, therefore, ignore the changes 
that are taking place nearly everywhere in 
the developing world and must also adapt 
to respond efficiently to the new needs of 
our ACP partners. Since the end of the 
1980s more than half of sub-Saharan 
African countries have adopted economic 
reforms or structural adjustment program-
mes, virtually all of them with support 
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growth 
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from the World Bank. And since 
structural economic reforms are a 
means to achieve an important 
end, which is that of generating 
sustainable economic growth, 
more and more ACP countries are 
turning to the European Union to 
seek help in developing the pro-
ductive sectors of their economies. 
In fact, a country's entry into economic 
reform does not bring about a miraculous 
recovery overnight. Changing the struc-
ture of an economy is a long-term process 
that can only succeed if it is accompanied 
by proper private sector promotion pro-
grammes and projects that aim to ge-
nerate long-term economic growth. The 
objective of all concerned is to reduce 
poverty, create wealth and jobs, develop 
private enterprises and thus ensure sus-
tained growth. 
The Lomé IV 
Convention and the 
development of the 
private sector 
The Lomé IV Convention, signed 
in December 1989, already takes into 
account the economic needs of the ACP 
countries and provides for special instru-
ments that aim to encourage industrial 
cooperation — articles 77 to 98 — as well 
as trade development, mining develop-
ment, development of services, tourism 
and enterprise development (articles 110 
to 113). Of particular importance for us are 
naturally the provisions in favour of 
enterprise development which underline 
particularly that : 
— Present ACP efforts to restructure their 
economies should be complemented by 
efforts to strengthen and enlarge their 
productive base ; 
— Enterprises constitute one of the main 
instruments for achieving the objectives of 
strengthening the economic fabric, en-
couraging inter-sectoral integration and 
increasing employment, incomes and the 
level of skills of the ACP States ; 
— The private sector needs to be made 
more dynamic and to play a greater role, in 
particular through small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME), which are better suited 
to conditions prevailing in the ACP econ-
omies. Micro firms and crafts should 
equally be encouraged and supported ; 
— The fostering of ACP entrepreneurship 
is crucial to unlock the considerable poten-
tial of the ACP States. 
Armed with such provisions, the 
Division in charge of industrial cooper-
ation, private investments and enterprise 
development at the European Commission 
has, since the signing of the Lomé IV 
Convention, been assisting those ACP 
countries that have requested support to 
develop the productive sectors of their 
economies (and for which such assistance 
was foreseen in their indicative program-
mes). The concept has been one of 
rigorously using EDF funds to build in-
tegrated programmes that comprise : 
— The development of an appropriate 
environment (legal, fiscal and adminis-
trative) in which the private sector can 
operate; 
— The use of effective structures or 
organisations that provide professional 
and advisory services, including training 
and follow-up sen/ices; 
— Credit lines and financial facilities. 
Furthermore, the programmes 
include two courses: one leading to 
business creation and the other to the 
growth of existing enterprises, in both 
"t 
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rural and urban areas. Since they have 
started in sub-Saharan Africa where priv-
ate enterprises are greatly dominated by 
micro and small-sized enterprises, they 
have mainly concentrated on this type of 
company (which means that women have 
been one of the groups that has benefited 
most from the programmes). Based essen-
tially on quality and growth and on 
developing local capacities and responsibi-
lities, these enterprises create jobs with a 
relatively modest investment thus provid-
ing an important contribution to the 
economy by producing goods and sen/ices 
that are essential to the daily life of 
developing countries. When the program-
mes were being developed, it was decided 
that they should be pursued in an in-
tegrated manner and in a proper 
sequence. And because in the majority of 
ACP countries there is an important 
relation between agriculture, industry and 
the service sector, linkages were explored 
in order that the programmes could 
produce a harmonised development of all 
sectors of economic activity. At that time, 
it was also observed that ACP micro and 
small-sized enterprises were mainly found 
in the following sectors of activity : 
— Food processing (especially bakeries, 
small-scale food production and beve-
rages) ; 
— Processing of metal and wood : crafts, 
furniture workshops, smithies, machine 
shops, welding shops and sen/icing work-
shops for cars, bicycles and motor cycles ; 
— Textiles (especially clothing). 
These sectors have always re-
ceived priority assistance, since they are 
characterised by the fact that all of them 
are labour-intensive and often run by 
women, in a process that requires low 
levels of technology. Private sector de-
velopment programmes are presently 
being carried out in 42 ACP countries and 
regions, to the tune of ECU 227 million. 
Sub-Saharan Africa takes the lead with 
35 programmes, followed by the Carib-
bean region with 7 programmes. It is 
expected that the Pacific countries will 
soon ask to profit also from our expertise 
and assistance in this field of private sector 
development. If one adds these figures to 
those of the private sector programmes 
being developed by other services of the 
Commission — such as in the field of trade. 
tourism, trade fairs and industrial fora, 
services, mining and credit lines to NGOs — 
the total sum being spent on private sector 
development amounts to more than ECU 
400 million. 
From assessments made so far, 
the results of these programmes are 
globally positive. In fact, after three years, 
more than two-thirds of the enterprises 
assisted by the programmes are said to be 
running normally (good sustainability) and 
the rates of reimbursement of loans, 
according to the countries, have reached 
between 80% and 90% (which are par-
ticularly high). Moreover, several hundred 
companies have been formed or expanded 
and thousands of jobs have been main-
tained or created. These encouraging 
results prove not only that public funds, 
when used with method, professionalism 
and rigour, can be an important source of 
development aid, especially for economic 
development purposes, but also that, 
under the present conditions of most ACP 
countries, there is no better substitute for 
that kind of aid. 
Conclusion  I
For those that have shown scepti-
cism at the use of EDF money and 
the services of EC officials to 
promote private sector programmes, the 
results so far conclusively show that they 
have underestimated our capacity to 
manage and promote such programmes 
efficiently. Private sector development can 
be said to be one of the European Union's 
best responses to the problems of develop-
ment of the ACP countries in these final 
years of the 20th century. This has been 
clearly understood by the Member States, 
as can be seen from the mandate given to 
the European Commission to negotiate 
with our ACP partners the establishment 
of a 'special grant' for private sector 
development. Such an instrument, if ac-
cepted, could certainly increase possibilities 
of a better and diversified package of aid 
products to the ACP countries, thus 
allowing us to reach the more formal and 
modern sectors of their economies. In fact, 
research demonstrates that to consolidate 
our results we also need to help the 
modern SME sector, for this type of 
company is essential for the long-term 
development of an effective industrial 
sector which is able to support ever-
growing competition. This in turn can lay 
the foundation for the transformation of 
an economy based on traditional and 
outmoded technologies into a more mod-
ern economy based on efficient and 
updated technologies. Besides, the special 
grant could also be used to pursue several 
other actions that were not properly 
developed during the first half of the 
'Lomé IV Convention' due to the lack of 
resources, such as : the creation or expan-
sion of financial institutions capable of 
mobilising local savings and providing 
credit (at market terms) to a wide spec-
trum of borrowers (including those of 
private SMEs) ; support for Chambers of 
Commerce and industry and professional 
associations ; provision of help with priv-
atisation programmes; improvement in 
regulatory policies as well as administrative 
and practical procedures and provision of 
more technical assistance in terms of 
productivity improvement, technology 
transfer and skills training. Altogether, 
they form a package of private sector tools 
that can definitely combat poverty and 
social inequalities and promote sustainable 
growth, employment, training and 
wealth. ΜΛ LR. 
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Now retired, Wilhelm de Jonge, is a 
former 'Adviser in International 
Economic Relations' at Philips Inter-
national. Drawing on his vast ex-
perience in North-South industrial 
relations, he has, since the early 
1980s (Lomé II) been involved in successive 
advisory and governing bodies of the Centre 
for the Development of Industry (CDI). 
Today, he is one of the three European 
members of its Joint Executive Committee, 
which also includes three ACP members. An 
'outsider' with more knowledge than most 
of the CDI's inner workings, he is well placed 
to give a critical yet constructive view of the 
work of the Centre. The Courier put to him a 
number of commonly voiced criticisms 
which he in turn, puts into perspective, 
while emphasising the uniqueness of the 
CDI. 
■ Mr de Jonge, you can draw on more 
than 10 years involvement with the CDI. 
What ■ do you consider to be its main 
strengths and weaknesses ? 
— Well, you have to look at the 
product — and that has improved despite 
the fact that there are organisational 
improvements that could still be made. But 
there is still the basic problem of fluctu-
ation. Every five years, activity slows down 
because the CDI isn't sure how much 
money will be available and what plans it 
can adopt for the first year of the next 
Convention or the next financial protocol. 
The result is a certain lack of continuity, 
even if everybody tries to deny it. 
■ So although the CDI has existed since 
Lomé I, it is effectively a regional five-year 
project ? 
— Yes, this cannot be avoided. 
There is no other possibility unless you 
make it a permanent institution in which 
the ACP does not take part. Otherwise, it 
has to be linked to the Convention, which 
has these five-year cycles. 
■ With its focus on industrial develop-
ment in the ACP States, the CDI has to 
work in a very difficult environment. Many 
An interview with Wilhelm de Jonge# 
member of the CDI 
Joint Executive Board 
of the countries involved are heavily in 
debt and, in sub-Saharan Africa at least, 
the development of industry has come to a 
standstill and in many cases, slipped back. 
What does it mean for the Centre to be 
confronted with such a challenge ? 
— It means, I think, that what-
ever the CDI can do, it is always positive, 
but it will always be on a small scale. The 
Centre has to work at levels where other 
institutions do not reach and that is very 
costly. 
■ The EC's Court of Auditors said the 
work of the CDI was marginal. Would you 
agree ? 
— No. It works at a very low level 
with small enterprises that are just above 
the informal sector. To succeed here, you 
have to put in a lot of time and effort ; you 
need to be very inventive and innovative. 
Each case presents new problems and you 
cannot take on too large a workload. If you 
look at the projects individually, and at the 
increase in projects over the years, I don't 
think that you can say the CDI's work is 
marginal. 
■ Would you say the Centre fills a gap in 
the sense of getting involved in areas not 
covered by other organisations ? 
— I think that the CDI is the only 
organisation in the world that works at this 
level. More attention should actually be 
paid to it because it is there that the motor  -ι 
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of industrial and economic development is 
to be found. Large private companies do 
not need the CDI. It is the small, under-
resourced concerns that may have no 
telephone or fax, that do not have access 
to foreign language skills or have no 
specific book-keeping departments, that 
need the inputs which the CDI can give. 
■ Is the Centre accessible enough ? If you 
ask people in the field about the CDI you 
often find that they have no knowledge of 
it, or they think it is 'out of reach' within 
some government bureaucracy. 
— My experience on trips for the 
CDI is that even government officials are 
not always fully aware of what the Centre 
does. In the field of private business, where 
the CDI operates, there is in fact no 
infrastructure which it can make use of to 
penetrate the sector. 
■ What about development banks ? 
— No. In my opinion, these are 
institutions that small entrepreneurs do 
not go to because they have to pay high 
interest charges and because they come 
with problems that the banks cannot solve. 
■ So the CDI itself has to reach out to the 
small entrepreneur ? 
— Yes, I think so. I believe it was 
decided in Lomé IV that there should be 
more decentralisation, which is quite 
correct, but it is also very costly and I don't 
think that aspect has been recognised. The 
CDI is trying to solve this by setting up 
sen/ice companies. The first country where 
this was supposed to happen was Burundi 
but, unluckily, things have come to a 
standstill there. This doesn't mean the idea 
is wrong and the Centre is still pursuing it. 
The next attempt to set up a bureau will be 
in Trinidad. Of course it is only an experi-
ment but if you do not venture into this 
field you will not learn how to succeed in 
future. There are no textbooks in this area. 
I think people sometimes criticise the CDI 
because they expect too much of it. 
■ What should one expect of it ? 
— From its experience, the CDI 
should try to paint a picture — a visual 
image — of the markets where they are 
operating. If I am talking to a small 
European entrepreneur who makes furni-
ture I can probably visualise his factory. But 
his ACP counterpart may not even have 
premises—he could be working outside. It 
is only when you do this that you realise 
how difficult it is to provide help. The main 
needs are usually technical assistance and 
training, but veny often the organisation is 
so small that it can not spare the man-
power to be trained. That is the kind of 
picture the CDI has to paint about where it 
operates. 
■ Is the structure of the CDI too un wieldy 
for the field in which it operates ? 
— No, I don't think so. Of course, 
because the CDI has to show resu Its. it does 
work with some larger enterprises but I 
don't think it should go any higher. There 
are other banks and institutions that can 
take over in these circumstances and the 
concerns can also make use of their own 
resources. If anything, it should be looking 
lower down the scale. 
■ You have been quoted as saying—and 
I paraphrase here — that the CDI is an 
illegitimate child with many parents. Could 
you elaborate on this ? 
This is just a figure of speech, but 
it is correct. It is an illegitimate child — 
nobody wants to pay for it, but everybody 
wants to decide what it should do. 
■ Is this because it lacks a clearly defined 
policy and plan of action ? 
— Not really. It is because of the 
superstructure within which the Centre 
exists. Looking at the Convention, it all 
seems straightforward. You have the 
Council of Ministers, the Committee of 
Ambassadors, the Council on Industrial 
Cooperation (CIC), the Board and the 
Centre itself. And if you look at what the 
Centre's tasks are — these are set out in 
only a few articles — it is all very clear and 
you think 'this is ¡deal'. But then you 
discover all the rules, regulations and staff 
requirements that the Council has laid 
down and you find that it is bound hand 
and foot, and that everybody interferes. 
We have a problem at the 
moment over internal regulations which 
have to be put to the CIC. It is clearly laid 
down in the rules drawn up by the Council 
of Ministers that when the Centre presents 
its proposals, they can be brought into 
effect immediately and the CIC has to react 
within three months. If one of the coun-
tries in the CIC does not agree to a 
proposal, no decision can be taken. Now, in 
the matter of the internal regulations, this 
was the case and a lot of extra effort has 
had to be put in to get even/thing straight. 
The three months have in the meantime 
long since passed and rules which should be 
permanent are therefore still provisional. 
And then of course you have the 
problem that it is the child of 82 parents (70 
ACPs and 12 EU countries). Parity has to be 
assured, even though it is not specifically 
mentioned in the Convention. The practice 
is for the management to alternate be-
tween the ACP and the EU, so you 
introduce a political element into the 
Centre. Then it says, in one of the 
regulations, that staffing should reflect the 
fact that the CDI is an international 
organisation. This is interpreted by some to 
mean that there should be a fifty-fifty split 
between ACP people and Europeans. That 
makes it very difficult. It says nowhere that 
it has to be like that, but it has happened in 
practice. 
■ If I read you correctly, would I be right 
in saying that you have a problem, not 
with the idea of ACP-EU parity per se, but 
rather with the choice of the right person 
for the right job ? 
— Yes. The principle of parity is a 
proper one because it is a joint EU-ACP 
project, but this doesn't mean it should be 
completely rigid. When you have a strict 
parity rule, politics inevitably come into it 
and you find yourself sometimes having to 
serve two masters. 
■ On a related point, it is sometimes 
suggested in industrial circles that the 
people at the top of the CDI often have 
little experience of industry. Do you see 
that as a problem ? 
— Yes, I do. There doesn't need 
to be any difficulty as long as they are good 
managers but the problem is that the 
management changes every five years and 
that does not lead to continuity. This is an 
issue that has to be resolved. The organis-
ation needs to be a permanent one, there 
should be a lot more delegation of power 
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to below the management level and the 
management itself should have its tasks 
clearly defined, with more time being 
devoted to promoting the Centre. 
As for this issue of parity, it is 
already there in the Council of Ministers, 
the Committee of Ambassadors and the 
C1C. If you want to bring it down to the 
actual operational level of the CDI, then I 
think you have to be very careful. How, for 
example, can you have parity between the 
functions of the Director and the Deputy 
Director when, by definition, one must be 
answerable to the other? If you really 
want to show that it is a combined project 
of both ACP and EU you should have only 
one managing director, with the job 
alternating between a European and an 
ACP person. But in this context. I think five 
years is too short a time. You should allow 
for the possibility of a ten-year term. 
The arrangement we have now 
has not worked and we should not 
experiment with it any further. 
■ Another criticism of the CDI that is 
often voiced concerns the apparent slow-
ness Of its reaction in responding to 
requests from ACP business people. 
— Yes, I have heard this remark 
from other people and I think it is serious 
enough that it should be looked into. I 
know from the system that has been put in 
place by the present management that the 
processing of requests and projects can be 
checked regularly. But it could be that 
there are problems in the decision-making 
or in getting the final signature. I don't 
have enough information to comment 
further but I will certainly be pressing to 
ensure that something is done about this. 
■ The CDI plays an active role in bringing 
people together, studying and appraising 
proposals and giving the 'green light' but 
after that, it withdraws. Some critics argue 
that if the Centre could take even just a 
minimal stake in a joint venture, then that 
would help to convince people that the 
project is worthwhile. What is your view of 
this? 
— I presume you mean in the 
form of capital. Well that is something the 
CDI is forbidden to do. This question has 
been brought up in the past but we have 
always been told that it is impossible. We 
should be trying to work together with the 
European Investment Bank, even if the EIB 
is not itself present in many of the countries 
concerned and there are sometimes dif-
ficulties because the amounts are too 
small. But it is surely something which 
should be looked into, because we need to 
try to be inventive. Alas, it is not possible 
for the Centre on its own to do anything 
about this. 
■ One of the ways that the CDI promotes 
joint ventures and partnership is through 
industrial fora. But apparently, those who 
attend them are more likely to be traders 
wanting to sell something rather than 
potential investors. What is your ex-
perience ? 
— I haven't really got sufficient 
experience to give you a real opinion but I 
do think that you should approach these 
fora with great care. You need to prepare 
them properly, have a good selection of 
projects, make it clear to those taking part 
what is expected of them and then provide 
a suitable follow-up. 
And, even then, you shouldn't 
expect too much because you have to 
think of how private enterprise works. 
There may be many small companies in 
Europe that are able and, ultimately, 
willing to do work with an ACP concern. 
But they are not necessarily the type of 
people who attend fora. The same applies 
to the small ACP entrepreneurs we are 
aiming to help. If you really want to reach 
them you have to go and look them up. 
You need to realise that these kinds of 
people are working from early in the 
morning to late at night to earn a living 
and they don't have the time or money to 
go to these kinds of events. 
■ Do you see the CDI as having a role in 
helping to transform informal sector ac-
tivities into properly streamlined enter-
prises ? 
— I would say that the CDI 
should be involved in that but it would 
require a lot more in the way of resources 
because it can't be done from one centre, 
whether in Brussels or elsewhere. You 
need to have decentralised activity on the 
ground. 
■ Most of the ACPs' existing industrial 
capacity is either grossly underutilised or 
has come to a standstill. Does the CDI have 
a particular role in rehabilitating and 
restructuring of existing industries and 
perhaps attracting potential investors by 
showing them that it is possible to get 
things that already exist working again ? 
— This has been part of the CDI's 
programme in the past but, as far as I 
know, nothing much is happening at the 
moment. Rehabilitation is obviously a 
good thing because some infrastructure is 
already there and what is usually needed is 
extra inputs. And technical assistance 
doesn't just mean providing skilled man-
power, instruction booklets, or training 
courses. It can involve something as simple 
as replacing a piece of equipment that is 
missing. A lot of small ACP entrepreneurs 
have difficulties in obtaining spare parts or 
equipment. They may have sufficient local 
funds but it is difficult for them to get 
import licences and buy the foreign ex-
change. Some attention should be paid to 
this, I think. It could make life a lot easier 
for many small entrepreneurs. 
■ A lot of ACP countries are going 
through a process of economic liberalis-
ation — which includes extensive privatis-
ation. Some have privatised so rapidly that 
the firms concerned have ended up in the 
hands of people who are not entre-
preneurs. How do you make people into 
entrepreneurs ? 
— Entrepreneurship is like a 
snowball that gets bigger as it rolls. Of 
course, education is important here. And 
perhaps we should look at the guild system 
that Europe used to have. Each trade or 
craft had a guild and they trained their 
own people. You also need people who 
can sell. The trading or marketing instinct 
exists throughout the world and what you 
need to do is improve this skill and develop 
it. 
■ What is your view of the CDI's future ? 
— I think we need a clearer 
analysis of what can be done and that the 
CDI should be built on the basis of such a 
realistic picture. We should also recognise 
that the people who are there have 
sufficient know-how to adapt to any new 
situation that results from a more realistic 
assessment of what is achievable. UM 
Interview by R.D.B. 
't 
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EI What businesses want 
I
After more than 30 years of what 
we like to call industrial cooper-
ation, there is one simple, basic 
question it might be as well to ask 
(again). What do firms in the North 
and the South really want from 
such cooperation and, more precisely, what 
do they expect of the institutions which run 
it? A recent CDI (the ACP-EU Centre for 
Industrial Development) conference
1 was 
timely in posing the question. The ensuing 
discussion, which drew on direct CDI ex-
perience and reports from businesspeople at 
the meeting, highlighted one or two inter-
esting conclusions and revealed the motiv-
ation, and therefore the (different) needs, of 
the two sets of partners. 
What the ACP firms 
want  ■
There are three broad categories 
of ACP firms interested in one 
form or another of industrial cooperation, 
each with very different wishes. Without 
taking the classification of industrial 
cooperation 'candidates' too far, there is a 
clear distinction between them. 
— Promoters without any prior industrial 
experience, including some who have an 
idea for a project but no means of putting 
it into practice and others with financial 
resources but nothing to spend them on. 
The former tend to be young 
university graduates, who have no profes-
sional experience and aim to open a 
business to give themselves work and an 
income. They want virtually everything — 
share capital, loans, a technical and man-
agement partner and possibly even a 
market — and it goes without saying that 
their project achievement rate is extremely 
low, particularly without the right guaran-
tee systems and business support struc-
tures. 
The latter, typically, are business-
men (tradesmen particularly), although 
* Consultant. 
1 On the prospects of ACP-EU industrial cooper-
ation, Brussels, 9-10 November 1993. 
by Philippe Queyrane* 
this category also contains civil 
servants. They can raise capital 
and have some professional 
know-how, but they have no 
experience of industry and do not 
know which branch of it to 
choose. What they are looking 
for, first and foremost, are ideas 
for industrial schemes and tech-
nical partners, plus help with 
defining their needs, selecting a 
manufacturing process, equipment and so 
on. They often only provide a contribution 
in kind, with finance if need be, and an 
introduction to the local authorities. When 
these promoters try to take off without a 
technical partner, their failure rate is very 
high. 
— Small individual operators seeking 
simple equipment (maize mills, hulling 
machines, bagging machines etc.) involv-
ing appropriate technology and minimal 
cost. 
These people do not know where 
to go nor whom to approach and they 
need advice with making choices and 
possibly negotiating with suppliers too. 
This category contains what might be 
called the micro-businesses of the informal 
urban and rural sectors, seedbed en-
trepreneurs, a handful of whom could, 
with the relevant aid, move into the formal 
sector. The EU has often run major aid 
schemes under Lomé IV to help the de-
velopment of small firms of this type, in, for 
example, Mali. 
— Established businesspeople, often run-
ning healthy businesses with development 
potential. 
These operators are mainly inter-
ested in technology and/or technical sup-
port (aid to modernise, expand or re-
habilitate), or new outlets for their pro-
ducts in, say, the European Union. 
They need information and con-
tact with distributors or suppliers of 
equipment and do not always apply for 
financial assistance. This category tends to 
have the highest success rate. 
But whoever they are, ACP busi-
nesses welcome this opportunity of direct 
access to industrial cooperation, without 
any official intermediary. 
Not all enquiries in fact come 
from the private sector. ACP governments 
are anxious to make a success of structural 
adjustment, to have more businesspeople 
and to make them more efficient and they 
have also become frequent applicants for 
cooperation and wide-ranging industrial 
partnerships with Europe and other indus-
trialised nations. They want help in three 
main areas : designing and establishing a 
framework which is attractive to investors, 
creating industrial free zones and re-
structuring and privatising state firms. 
The varied range of applicants for 
ACP industrial cooperation is clearly re-
flected in the sort of help they require, 
although the differences have less to do 
with the nature than the degree of 
sophistication of the assistance. The assist-
ance which ACP businesses require may be 
simple or more complex, but it is likely to 
fall into one of four main categories. 
The first is assistance with pro-
duction. This involves such things as 
choosing equipment or negotiating with 
suppliers, starting up new equipment, 
making the most of existing equipment to 
boost productivity and/or production, and 
developing under-utilised, utilised and 
unutilised raw materials with a view to 
improving profitability and/or diversifying 
production. 
The second is assistance with 
marketing, which is of growing importance 
now that international competition is 
harsher. ACP businesses need help to 
diversify products and/or markets, to 
approach the EU's single market and to 
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develop their products by obtaining or 
creating trade marks. This holds out good 
prospects of North-South partnerships in 
such things as agreements, licences and 
franchises. 
The third is assistance with the 
financing of industrial projects, where ACP 
demand focuses on : 
— access to credit — the absence of 
organised capital markets, the shortage of 
venture capital available to the individual 
investor, an unwillingness to commit 
private capital and, lastly, the absence of 
any suitable guarantee systems are major 
obstacles for businesses which want to 
develop or to gain access to the banking 
system ; 
— financial engineering services which 
local trading and development banks are 
not always in a position to offer. This is 
where industrial cooperation has been able 
to take a step forward by (empirically) 
developing new forms of investment 
combining capital and technology, for 
which there is a considerable demand. 
Lastly, there is an increasing 
demand for assistance with management 
and/or training from ACP industrialists 
who realise the need for stringent business 
management and transfers of technology 
and training in this field. There are more 
and more direct and indirect requests for 
help with technical, commercial and finan-
cial management. And firms are not just 
asking for help on a one-off basis any more, 
for they are now taking a longer-term 
view involving such things as feasibility 
studies, financial engineering, pre-oper-
ational management, production support 
and day-to-day management. 
This short but practical catalogue 
gives a clear outline of the industrial 
cooperation institutions' ACP clientèle and 
its requirements, which are rather different 
from those of businesses in the European 
Union. 
What European 
businesses want  I
Unlike ACP firms, businesses in the 
European Union take no spon-
taneous interest in North-South industrial 
cooperation. ACP-EU partnership, in what-
ever form, is of no direct interest to any 
more than a handful — certainly far less 
than 1 % — of European companies. The 
CDI has slightly more than 1000 firms 
available for North-South partnership 
operations on file and it knows, from 
experience, that their profiles and atti-
tudes to industrial cooperation differ 
widely. So it is perhaps simpler to look at 
the European firms from the point of view 
of what they need and what sen/ices they 
expect of the industrial cooperation insti-
tutions. 
Research into the CDI data base 
has made it possible to classify the main 
motives of European firms under six 
headings. 
The first thing they want is to 
determine sources of raw materials and 
semi-finished products. According to Pat-
rick Keene, deputy head of division at the 
CDI, the approach tends to be the same 
whether it is a question of tropical fruit 
juice, hides and skins, fish and crustácea, 
tropical wood or marble or ornamental 
stone. He says that the Europeans have the 
technique and the market and the ACPs 
have the raw materials, so they should 
work out some form of association. 
The four main concerns here are 
to: 
— meet quantitative needs to make up for 
exhausted traditional sources or cater for a 
short-term or lasting increase in demand ; 
— meet what may be new qualitative 
demands (for, say, biological or green 
products) ; 
— secure supply via direct access and/or 
long-term agreements ; 
— seek better prices. 
A similar procedure is used to 
identify sources of semi-finished products. 
The second thing is to lower 
production costs, which ven/ often means 
lowering payroll costs, which are increas-
ingly burdensome for labour-intensive 
businesses in Europe. Such firms could be 
interested (in decreasing order of financial 
commitment) in assembly, subcontracting, 
first-stage processing of raw materials, the 
Industrial assistance should be transparent, 
fast, flexible and neutral 
-t 
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manufacture of finished products and 
partial or total delocation of an industrial 
unit. This is obviously where an interest in 
industrial free zones comes in. 
But as well as or indeed instead of 
seeking to save on payroll costs, some firms 
look to the ACP countries to reduce 
expenditure on other things too, such as 
energy, the transport of heavy or bulky 
raw materials produced locally or the costs 
of complying with the environmental 
requirements of the European Union. 
European firms may also be keen 
to move into markets in other indus-
trialised countries (in the European Union, 
North America and the Pacific zone). 
EU market protection can force 
firms to look for suppliers of industrial 
products in the ACP countries, which, in 
principle, have free access to the Union 
under Lomé. Some European operators 
have capitalised on the absence of quotas 
and customs duties for ACP products, in 
particular by shifting plants to the ACP 
countries or opting for subcontracting 
agreements there. Ready-made clothing 
from Mauritius is just one example of the 
considerable advantage already taken of 
this opening. In the same way, the 
Caribbean countries may also attract 
European firms interested in getting into 
the US market through the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative (CBI). 
It would be wrong to under-
estimate the extent of the search for direct 
outlets in the ACP countries. The ACP-EU 
industrial fora have shown that many 
European participants tend to look for 
outlets in one or several countries in a sub-
region (Western or Central Africa, for 
example). 
The opening of these markets, 
especially in Africa, as a result of structural 
adjustment policies, forces interested Euro-
pean firms to redeploy and go for what is 
often more a commercial than an industrial 
approach. So it is increasingly common to 
see non-material goods (technology, 
know-how, licences, franchises, brands, 
expert advice and training) joining the 
intermediate products and equipment 
which European firms have always sold on 
the ACP markets. 
European firms are also increas-
ingly keen to find innovative financial or 
technological set-ups because of their 
growing reluctance to commit finance to 
industrial schemes in the ACP countries. 
This is leading to the emergence of new 
and sometimes unusual forms of partner-
ship. To meet the new demand, develop-
ment finance institutions have had to lay 
on new facilities — soft/rebated loans, 
venture capital, shares etc. And new forms 
of investment, which saw the light of day 
in the early 1980s, have prompted a new 
kind of financial arrangement in which the 
European partner makes a technological 
contribution instead of shouldering any of 
the financial risk. Lastly, the possibilities of 
converting ACP debts into project capital 
have increased substantially over the past 
few years. European firms are very keen to 
find out about these various openings. 
Lastly, operators in the European 
Union are clearly interested in privatisation 
now that structural adjustment plans in a 
number of ACP countries are opening the 
way for a new kind of industrial cooper-
ation as the state withdraws from the 
productive sector. Here too, European 
firms want to know what the investment 
opportunities are. 
There is a seventh, more subject-
ive motive to add to the six main ones 
listed above and that is the human factor, 
which can come into play when a European 
businessperson decides to make a move 
towards an ACP partner. In most cases, it 
will be a question of affinity based on a 
sentimental attachment to particular 
countries because of personal or family 
ties, a shared language (in particular French 
or Portuguese or indeed English), or a 
personal interest (boating, deep-sea fish-
ing and hunting, for example). 
What is expected 
of the institutions?  I
Our analysis of the needs of firms 
in the North gives a better idea of 
the sorts of services they expect from the 
industrial cooperation institutions. They 
are of four main kinds. 
Information on potential ACP 
partners (credibility, finance, technical 
potential, commercial networks etc.). 
European operators attach the greatest 
importance to the credibility of their 
potential partners, which is why, inter alia, 
two thirds of CDI schemes involve es-
tablished ACP partners (expansion, re-
habilitation, consolidation, diversification 
etc.) and only a third relate to genuinely 
new projects. They also want details of 
business opportunities, of assistance avail-
able from specialist institutions (the CDI, 
the EIB and other multilateral and bilateral 
agencies) and of the ACP economies 
(micro- and macroeconomic statistics, de-
velopment plans etc.). 
But European firms also want 
European support for their plans, hence 
the attraction of the CDI, which is per-
ceived as a European Union organisation. 
They also often look for moral and 
psychological support in dealing with the 
ACPs, in particular if they have no previous 
experience of this sort. 
Confidentiality is another key 
criterion for firms embarking on industrial 
cooperation. The company and the indus-
trial cooperation institution which assists it 
should be able to establish trust and a 
proper dialogue between professionals. 
Direct, easy access to assistance 
from the industrial cooperation institutions 
is also very important. As far as the firms 
are concerned, it is more and more a 
question of 'time is money' and they want 
the assistance-mobilising procedures to be 
transparent, fast, flexible and neutral. 
This brief overview of EU oper-
ators and industrial cooperation with the 
ACP countries shows that this form of 
cooperation is not an end in itself, just one 
of the ways in which European firms can 
develop and cope with mounting competi-
tion on constantly evolving markets. There 
is no break between the various forms of 
industrial cooperation, for commercial, 
technical and financial partnerships are just 
different facets of different stages of 
company development. So industrial 
cooperation should not do just one thing, 
such as pair companies, but provide a 
constant response to changing needs, 
along the lines of the European Commis-
sion and the CDI. ■■ P.Q. 
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Most aid funders, including the 
Member States of the European 
Union, give priority to expanding 
the ACP private sector and the EU 
institutions are now doing so too. 
A prosperous private sector en-
courages dynamic, sustainable economic 
development and fairer, broader distri-
bution of the benefits of growth among the 
population by tackling unemployment and 
poverty at the roots. In Southern Africa, 
small firms have absorbed half the new 
arrivals on the job market, a recent study 
suggests. In the past, all aid to this sector 
went on the infrastructure the businesses 
needed, but more recently, structural adjust-
ment has tried to establish a macro-econ-
omic context in which private enterprise can 
thrive. But there are still obstacles, mainly 
institutional and legal ones, and they often 
prevent businesses from reacting positively 
and actually supplying more goods or 
services. 
Structural adjustment is necessary 
but not sufficient in itself for the develop-
ment of the private sector. Some ACPs have 
realised this and are starting to go for 
structural reform to encourage private 
enterprise, mainly by offering incentives to 
better competitiveness and improving the 
rules and regulations. 
Active donors have a concen-
trated, continuous dialogue going with 
the ACPs to encourage them to adopt the 
right economic policies and they offer 
them programmes of assistance with 
specific activities such as opening and 
improving businesses, privatising and over-
hauling state firms, adjusting the financial 
markets and promoting investment at 
home and abroad. The strategy is founded 
on dialogue, reform and assistance and is 
underwritten with Lomé funds. 
Features 
of the strategy  I
ACP governments are vital to the 
creation and maintenance of a 
climate conducive to the development of 
Priority to the private 
sector in EU-ACP 
cooperation 
by Paolo Logli* 
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private enterprise. In ACPs which 
have not yet created such an 
environment, the main aim of aid 
to the private sector should be to 
help the authorities bring in the 
relevant reforms. The dialogue 
with the government should 
therefore go further than the 
macro-economic reforms of struc-
tural adjustment and tackle insti-
tutional questions head on. 
The fundamentals affecting the 
life of a business — macro-economic 
factors (tax, prices etc.), which are covered 
by adjustment programmes, and insti-
tutional and legal factors — are in the 
hands of the government. The donors help 
the government cushion the blows of 
policies which harm the private sector 
(price control, various forms of discrimi-
nation etc.), but they should also help it 
improve policies which make it easier for 
businesses to open and expand. This means 
lowering the barriers on entrance to and 
exit from the firms, rationalising the tax 
system, creating and protecting property 
rights and so on. Banking reform is 
particularly vital, for governments must 
both have less to do with allocating loans 
and fixing interest rates and take another 
look at their relations with the banks in 
general. 
The donors should set up a 
permanent dialogue with the authorities 
to look at the nature and timetabling of 
the measures needed to pursue the liberali-
sation and deregulation of the economy 
and make the state sector smaller and 
more efficient so as ultimately to create a 
better institutional and legal framework 
for private enterprise. 
In addition to hel ping the author-
ities improve the economic environment, it 
would be as well to give direct assistance to 
private businesses and orgsnisations work-
ing in the sector, in general by providing 
intermediaries between them and the 
donors. 
The whole point of a strategy for 
the private sector is to make it easier to 
open and expand businesses. Some ACPs 
are trying to strike a balance between 
public and private business by encouraging 
the private sector to expand alongside a 
smaller and more efficient state sector. 
Privatisation support is essential to the 
balance vis-à-vis other ACPs, which want 
to see their firms do more on the inter-
national market. Donors encourage the 
promotion of their investments, in par-
ticular in the form of partnerships. 
Support offered to SMEs, and 
especially micro-firms and informal busi-
nesses has an immediate, significant and 
visible impact. This is because it makes 
them stronger and gives the most under-
privileged a better income and employ-
ment situation, the best guarantee of well-
being in such areas as food, health, housing 
and education. 
Private businesses should, in prin-
ciple, be offered aid on commercial terms 
and donors are careful not to include 
concessions which would involve distor-
tions damaging to the local economy, 
particularly when it comes to marshalling 
and utilising savings, allocating resources 
and the opportunity costs of inputs. 
Similarly, distortions on the market do not 
constitute automatic justification for a 
subsidy. Dialogue with the government 
should enable the donor to help even out 
the distortions and make the market more 
active before stepping in. 
There are exceptions to the rule 
in some ACPs, however, where the 
economy is still centralised or where the 
time it takes to even out distortions is too 
"Î 
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vantages to the sector accruing from 
offering incentives to some firms. So some 
form of subsidy would be acceptable on a 
temporary basis, but it would have to be 
phased out during a dialogue with the 
local authorities. 
Donors look more and more to 
intermediaries to reach a large number of 
SMEs and to capitalise on the local expert-
ise of European and local institutions. They 
have to do this because, liberalisation 
notwithstanding, the markets are still 
often over-regulated and businesses do 
not have access to credit. These inter-
mediaries may be organisations which 
represent the private sector or they may 
relay (particularly financial) assistance to 
private businesses locally. 
The traditional approach to 
financial intermediaries is to open a line of 
credit with them and let them keep their 
responsibility for awarding loans or buying 
shares after an independent appraisal of 
the SME's dossier. The basic question here 
is how free the financial organisation is of 
the political authorities when making 
decisions. The financial organisation must 
not be seen as just a vehicle either. The 
donors should help strengthen it so that it 
can mobilise the local savings potential 
and, with sound management, ultimately 
be financially independent. 
At the beginning, particularly in countries 
where other prices are fixed, interest rates 
need do no more than cover the costs of 
managing the operation and buying the 
money to lend, but they should gradually 
become at least positive, to mobilise 
savings and avoid the erosion of loaned 
capital. In the long run, however, they 
should edge nearer the going rates to 
prevent the financial resources offered to 
the businesses from creating distortions on 
the market. 
When it comes to non-financial 
intermediaries, the donors have to make 
sure that the local private sector is or-
ganised in such a way as to defend its 
interests properly — i.e. independent 
chambers of commerce, professional as-
sociations, producers associations etc. 
should help define the reforms, local 
regulations etc. 
Transforming ACP countries 
which have long had dirigiste policies and 
massive state intervention is far too 
important and delicate a task to be left to 
one donor or, worse, to donors who come 
piecemeal, each with its own amount. 
Cooperation between donors, 
which has already begun in a number of 
places, could be taken further at the level 
of the European Union. Clearly, the idea is 
not to replace what the Member States are 
doing at bilateral level, orto interfere with 
their decision-making. It is more a question 
of improving effectiveness by steering the 
Tannery in Kenya 
individual contributions and identifying 
and exchanging the best practices. This 
would involve making the individual assist-
ance of each donor more efficient by 
means of systematic data exchange. In 
some cases, some interventions could go 
together so as to put things on a more 
efficient scale. It is important to ensure that 
such elements as interest rates, subsidies 
and investment incentives are strictly 
coordinated beforehand, so that the work 
of the donors in the European Union is 
consistent. 
Means available 
under the 
Convention 
Since the private sector is of such 
importance to the ACPs, the Convention 
provides a wide range of instruments to 
help them with this. They are implemented 
by the Commission (via the indicative 
programmes), the EIB (via its own re-
sources and other monies it manages) and 
the CDI. 
Private sector programmes and 
projects run or scheduled in the indicative 
programmes involve a total of about 40 
countries and are worth about ECU 
230 million in financial and technical assist-
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ance. The breakdown by ACP region 
reveals an interest in Western and Eastern 
Africa (including the Horn), with nine 
countries each and an amount of ECU 
60 million. 
In the early days of Lomé IV, 
relatively few ACPs put priority on the 
private sector, but several of them have 
realised its potential over the past two 
years and applied for programmes and 
above all for specific technical and financial 
assistance schemes. 
The dialogue with the ACP 
governments has made it clear that private 
enterprise has to be taken into account 
when indicative programmes are drawn 
up. 
In ACPs which have put priority 
on the private sector, the Commission's 
support has been in the form of a 
consistent programme of schemes de-
signed to improve the environment, up-
grade the intermediate institutions and 
help businesses. In others, governments 
have requested specific projects (credit 
facilities for SMEs, technical assistance for a 
local body etc.). 
Various technical assistance 
schemes have been proposed and im-
plemented, with or after the indicative 
programme, as follows : 
— assistance to enhance the general 
context — i.e. surveys etc, or experts to 
help local institutions working towards this 
goal ; 
— support for specialised organisations — 
i .e. management and training, or help with 
disseminating information on possible 
measures or with identifying/promoting 
specific projects to be presented to the 
financing organisations; 
— investment promotion — i.e. the or-
ganisation of investors' fora to bring local 
and European businessmen into contact 
with each other and with local and 
international financial institutions. 
The drive to improve the econ-
omic environment is a particularly difficult 
undertaking for those ACPs which have to 
leave a state-dominated system behind 
them and create a new commercial-legal-
fiscal system which is suitable for private 
enterprise. But it is equally important for 
many others, which need, say, to open up 
to outside investments. 
In the majority of ACP States, 
despite better investment codes, outside 
investors are put off by all the red tape. In 
1992, following a Commission initiative, 
the European Union outlined its position 
on the principles of investment protection 
in the ACP States to the ACP Ambassadors. 
The ACPs agreed on the principle of asking 
for technical assistance and the first 
schemes are now in preparation. 
A number of (particularly Af-
rican) ACP countries find it difficult to 
attract European investors and this has 
prompted the organisation of investors' 
fora, particularly in Western and Central 
Africa, and other, sector-oriented meet-
ings are currently on the drawing board, 
particularly in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
Businessmen have to have ef-
ficient organisations — chambers of com-
merce, professional associations etc. — to 
count on to defend their interests and 
meet their technical requirements (train-
ing, technology transfer and data dissemi-
nation). Various ACPs have requested and 
had help from the Commission with setting 
up and improving local organisations on 
which firms rely for various services, 
sometimes as part of sector support 
programmes. 
One thing which the financial 
crisis has done is push some ACP States to 
apply for schemes to improve the oper-
ational capacity of their financial inter-
mediaries —■ which do their bit to support 
investments and the private sector in 
general — or indeed set up new ones. The 
Commission response has been to provide 
technical assistance to enhance the finan-
cial system, especially in Western Africa. 
In other cases (Eastern Africa), an 
ad hoc structure has been set up to 
privatise state companies and get SMEs 
going. At the request of the local author-
ities, the capital and management of these 
businesses have been kept local wherever 
possible. 
Technical assistance is not the 
only contribution from the indicative 
programmes, for the Commission can help 
finance ACP private businesses in a number 
of ways. 
— Import programmes, some of them run 
in conjunction with the adjustment pro-
grammes, can be used to finance imports 
of intermediate products for ACP export 
industries. 
— Counterpart funds from import pro-
grammes or Stabex and Sysmin payments 
help the private sector (as in some parts of 
Central Africa and the Caribbean) when 
they are used to finance agricultural loans, 
job creation programmes etc. 
If business problems are to be 
tackled better at the root, it would be wise 
to put priority on creating businesses and 
improving/modernising micro-firms and 
businesses in the informal sector. In sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, an estimated 
60% of the working population in the 
towns is employed in the informal sector. 
Many ACP applications are for 
financial assistance for these firms. But 
what sort of support do they need? 
Among the obstacles to their creation and 
development are two major constraints — 
access to finance and the promoters' 
limited skills — which cannot currently be 
tackled without outside help. 
The Commission has been re-
sponding to this specific need by gradually 
bringing in schemes to cope with par-
ticularly difficult local circumstances and 
refining and improving the conventional 
method (opening a line of credit with a 
local institution, which is then responsible 
for granting loans to businesses in the light 
of an independent assessment of their 
dossiers) to reflect its years of experience. 
A flexible organisation, often run 
by foreign experts to begin with, offers 
loans to promoters who do not have the 
experience and/or the guarantees to 
obtain a bank loan. 
The idea, first and foremost, is to 
ease these constraints on the small firms, 
giving them general, continuous support 
from the initial meeting with the promoter 
to the monitoring of his investment, 
through all the intermediate stages of 
surveys, financial set-up, management 
advice and adult training. 
In second place comes the inter-
mediate organisation. 
— The funds from the Commission do not 
have to be reimbursed, so all the resources 
can stay with the project to ensure the 
permanency of the revolving fund. 
— The organisation is entirely indepen-
dent of the authorities when it comes to 
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management and makes its loan decisions 
in the light of the comparative profitability 
of the proposed projects. 
By working to high standards 
and being independent in their manage-
ment, these organisations are able to 
ensure stringent customer selection and 
close, regular monitoring of activities, so 
repayment levels are high (80-90%). An 
organisation can be self-sufficient in the 
medium term and become a new financial 
institution. By going for non-traditional 
forms of guarantee, using the existing 
tontine formula
1 and setting up mutual 
guarantee societies. It can gradually help 
tap local savings and thus obtain local 
financing. 
A few years ago, this approach 
was launched in some parts of Western 
Africa, where it has triggered the creation 
of hundreds of micro-firms and provided 
jobs for millions of people, and it is now 
being applied, with the relevant adap-
tation to the local situation (possibly 
involving NGOs, non-traditional forms of 
guarantee etc.), in other ACPs. It is 
outlined in the text on basic principles of 
assistance to SMEs, as approved by ACP-EC 
experts in Gaborone in 1992. 
The variety of ACP applications 
for financial and technical assistance is such 
that the approach is only used for part of 
the Commission's work. In more developed 
ACPs, methods of assistance have had to 
be equally stringent but more conven-
tional in the choice of intermediaries and 
more varied in the type of financial 
backing, as mentioned in an article entitled 
'New approaches to SME projects — the 
role of intermediate organisations' in The 
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1. 
The EIB  I
The European Investment Bank 
can help private business projects 
in fields within its scope (industry, 
agri-industry, tourism, mining and energy) 
with interest-rebated loans from its own 
resources and from venture capital. 
' Indicative programme resources can also be 
used to support the creation or expansion of 
guarantee funds to cater for the fact that ACP 
businesses tend not to be able to provide any proper 
security, which may be a major barrier when seeking 
a loan. However, there is little interest in this 
instrument, which is offered at regional level 
(Western Africa), at national level. 
ElB-managed resources, venture 
capital especially, are suited to the par-
ticular needs of private businesses, because 
the EIB has a great deal of leeway in fixing 
the lending terms. Even joint EU-ACP firms 
may be offered this capital in the form of 
shares and conditional and subordinated 
loans, at a — heavily subsidised — rate of 
no more than 3%. 
However, various conditions (mi-
nimum amounts for the least developed 
ACPs, for example) and a centralised 
organisational structure sometimes pre-
vent the EIB from responding to requests 
for small amounts of direct financing and 
from actively looking for investment op-
portunities. It has successfully developed 
the global loan technique and, more 
recently, signed agreements with various 
financial institutions in the Member States 
with a view to facilitating the use of the 
resources which it manages. 
A significant percentage (about 
40%) of the venture capital is in any case 
already earmarked for investments in 
private enterprise in the ACP countries. If 
the many constraints on the EIB are eased, 
it is reasonable to expect the venture 
capital utilisation rate to be even higher, 
particularly if the 'opening up' to European 
financial institutions (INTERACT) of 1992 is 
taken further. 
The CDI  I
The Centre for the Development 
of Industry was set up by the 
Lomé Convention to : 
— promote sustainable cooperation be-
tween industrial SMEs in Europe and the 
ACP (via joint ventures, management 
contracts, licensing, sub-contracting etc.) ; 
— back the creation and/or improvement 
of these firms with the appropriate forms 
of technical assistance. 
It deals mainly with the problems 
of individual businesspeople in the phase 
leading to the investment decision and can 
finance technical and economic feasibility 
studies for industrial projects, look for EU 
partners with a view to joint EU-ACP 
investments etc. 
It has neither the intention nor 
the financial means of being an investment 
project finance institution, but one of its 
jobs, as a technical body, is to help 
businesses present feasible plans for local 
or international financing. It has already 
had sound results from the good cooper-
ation it has set up with some of the 
financial institutions in the Member States. 
Since it is an operational body, it 
has no overall policy, but the joint insti-
tutions envisage steering it towards con-
centrating its activity on priority countries 
and strengthening its ties with the financial 
institutions, in particular, and these would 
be a major asset when it came to boosting 
private enterprise in ACP countries which 
have put priority on the private sector. 
Coordinating 
the means  I
Under the Convention, tight oper-
ational cooperation must be 
maintained between the interventions of 
the Commission, the Bank and the CDI. The 
diversity of factors to be considered here 
and the complementary nature of their 
various roles indeed forces these three 
bodies to take every opportunity of tighter 
coordination of the resources which they 
manage. 
For example, the CDI has selected 
'bankable' projects — particularly in ACPs 
which have promoted export industries — 
which can benefit from easier access to EIB 
resources. 
Various global loans which the 
EIB has made to finance SMEs have been 
backed up with Commission-funded tech-
nical assistance to improve the analysis and 
monitoring of private sector investment 
projects by local (or, as in Western Africa, 
regional) banks which have no specific 
experience in this area. 
But the importance of ACP priv-
ate enterprise and the question of dia-
logue with the local authorities are every 
justification for trying to coordinate the 
resources available, even at EU level. It 
must also be possible to apply the methods 
of assistance consistently in each ACP 
State. 
The Commission could inform the 
Member States how aid has been program-
med, particularly for those ACPs which 
have elected to put priority on private 
enterprise, so as to trigger cooperation 
between all those involved in the Euro-
pean Union. ■■ p.L 
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We start with the cheerless finding 
that, within the Third World, the 
economies of sub-Saharan Africa 
are in absolute or relative decline. 
African industry, in particular, is in 
free fall. 
Industrialisation in the African 
nations south of the Sahara remains at an 
embryonic stage to this day but has been 
through two very different phases since 
independence. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
countries concerned gave political priority 
to industrialisation and by dint of effort 
overcame their industrial backwardness, to 
the extent that they actually stretched the 
economic possibilities past their limits: 
they set up the whole gamut of industrial 
concerns and also large numbers of enter-
prises, whether state-owned, parastatal or 
semi-public, which were uncompetitive, 
loss-making and unviable but were kept 
alive artificially by direct or indirect sub-
sidies. In an institutional environment 
which was unrealistic (UNCTAD's codes of 
conduct for the transfer of technology by 
multinationals and UNIDO's Declaration of 
Lima, for example), African countries 
affirmed that governments were all-
powerful and had to be involved in every 
sector of industry, and overdid investment 
in infrastructure and production capacity 
alike, mainly with official aid from abroad 
(grants and loans) and injections of private 
capital (petrodollars and borrowing). Logi-
cally, perhaps, but to excess, all industrialis-
ation polices relied on import substitution 
(for what were by definition very small 
national markets, for regional integration 
had either regressed or failed to take off), a 
small amount of processing of local re-
sources, very little sub-contracting (other 
than in Mauritius) and virtually no produc-
tion of capital goods, and they failed to 
lead to either self-sustaining industrial 
development or integrated industrial 
structures. What they did achieve, how-
ever, was the creation of bottlenecks, by 
exhausting opportunities, pushing up im-
ports, creating foreign exchange problems 
and more. 
The 1980s and early 1990s saw a 
critical debt situation (Africa's debt in fact 
doubled between 1982 and 1990), struc-
Industrialisation in the 
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turai adjustment, made slow and 
painful by its social effects and 
political resistance, greater 
priority being given to agriculture 
and the opening up of economies 
to international trade. And then 
there was the crisis itself, leading 
to economic stagnation or col-
lapse, de-industrialisation (with 
capacity underutilised, equipment run 
down, businesses closed and European 
companies withdrawing investments or 
pulling out entirely), thrusting black Africa 
onto the sidelines of the international 
game. 
The situation in black Africa is 
worse than anywhere else in the develop-
ing world. 
— Income and employment growth rates 
are in serious decline (i.e. negative) and 
poverty is on the increase. 
— Population pressure is at record levels. 
— Agricultural output cannot keep pace 
with the expanding population. 
— External trade has slumped, with a 
decline in the relative position of com-
modity exports and the stagnation of 
exports of (to some extent) manufactured 
goods. 
'—Investment is falling, in particular be-
cause foreign investors have been scared 
off. 
— The social (human development) indi-
cators are among the worst in the world 
and in some cases are going into reverse. 
The international environment 
has changed over the past few years too, 
to the detriment of the ACP countries, 
which no longer have the benefit of the 
East-West rivalry which brought them so 
many injections of aid up until 1989. 
Competition from the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe is beginning to bite. 
ACP countries' raw materials are not as 
important as they were. And the inter-
national economic situation is against 
them, for industrialised nations are seeing 
their growth rates stand still or decline, 
international trade has stagnated, com-
modity prices have dipped, interest rates 
are high, the climate is deflationary, the 
debt situation is critical (in Latin America 
and above all Africa), financial flows have 
changed direction, moving back out of the 
developing countries, structural adjust-
ment policies are proving painful to carry 
out — the list goes on. 
EU-ACP industrial 
cooperation  I
When it comes to industrial 
cooperation between the Euro-
pean Union and African ACPs and to 
partnership between European and ACP 
firms, it has to be admitted that black 
Africa's industrial assets are minimal and its 
economic and political climate unattract-
ive. So there are few comparative ad-
vantages to encourage partnerships and 
the additional constraints on industrial 
cooperation are consequently very heavy. 
There are many constraints and, 
basically, they are as follows. 
— Structural 
There are many reasons for the 
region's lack of appeal, starting, of course, 
with the narrowness of its markets. And 
then its inputs are expensive, foreign 
exchange is in short supply and there is a 
dearth of local businessmen and busi-
nesses. The ACP States can only change one 
or two of these handicaps. Regional 
integration, for example, would increase 
the size of the markets. 
— Political 
Non-transparency, frequent and 
or unpredictable changes in investment 
acceptance policies and in the laws and 
regulations governing their application 
are, clearly, of major importance. ACP 
governments can get all of these well 
under control. 
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The lack of industrial culture, 
combined with traditional modes of be-
haviour and social structures, seriously 
holds back industrial development. Better 
schooling and, more directly, better train-
ing for managers and the industrial labour 
force would go some way to improving this 
situation. 
Then there is the additional 
handicap of the dilapidated state of 
African industry. A 1983 survey of 1800 
firms showed 300 in dysfunction, 80 of 
them at a standstill, with only one fifth or 
all factories making adequate use of their 
capacity (although with any profitability 
difficulties covered by subsidies), and 
things have got much worse since. 
In these extremely trying times of 
incontrovertible industrial decline, albeit 
combined with the emergence of a climate 
more conducive to private enterprise, the 
resources provided by the Lomé Conven-
tion and, in particular, the existence of the 
CDI, constitute a remarkable asset and one 
which the ACPs must turn to best ad-
vantage. Industrial cooperation must be 
used more, and more effectively, than 
before. 
Cooperation and industrial part-
nerships are essential. They are even more 
important now that conventional country-
to-country development aid is drawing 
criticism, or at any rate generating grow-
ing disenchantment, and that some de-
veloping nations are meanwhile getting on 
with their industrialisation and dem-
onstrating the need to turn to those who 
can give them the most help with the task-
companies in the industrialised countries. 
In view of the currently dis-
couraging situation, industrial cooperation 
between businesses in North and South 
needs the support of the authorities — in 
our case, the European Union. 
The shortcomings of the markets 
are the main grounds for this kind of 
support. Vital information is missing or 
difficult to obtain, economies are com-
partmentalised, distances are great and 
there may be ignorance in the countries in 
the South. It all puts foreign businessmen 
off the idea of looking for partners 
overseas and reduces the amount of 
information that gets across concerning 
opportunities for investment and joint 
ventures, while overplaying the risks. 
Industrial promotion, in the shape of 
information, contact and various kinds of 
back-up, makes the market less opaque, 
lowers the cost of prospecting and reduces 
the risk, so that the opportunities for both 
potential partners to make a profit are 
increased. 
The size of the promotional field 
varies and may involve (in ascending 
order) : 
— providing information on countries and 
opportunities ; 
— putting potential partners in touch with 
each other ; 
— supporting projects with studies and 
advice ; 
Textile plant In Mauritius, one of the few ACP 
States to have industrialised successfully 
— assisting start-up (technical assistance 
and aid with training). 
Promotion tends to be efficient if 
it: 
— establishes clear priorities (countries 
and sectors) and avoids scattering ; 
— decentralises towards the companies in 
the field ; 
— focuses on small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs) ; 
— capitalises on all possible opportunities 
for interaction. 
Two further remarks are called 
for here. First of all, there is a very close link 
between North-South partnerships and 
the development of SMEs in the South. The 
development of SMEs in the developing 
world, and the ACPs more particularly, is 
extremely important to North-South or 
EU-ACP business partnerships, since the 
densification, diversification and 
strengthening of the ACP business fabric 
creates the operators and environment for 
partnerships. There cannot be partnerships 
without national firms, for European firms 
have to have credible local partners and be 
able to find a minimum of goods and 
services, and industrial outlets, locally. EDF-
financed industrial forums in Western 
(Dakar) and Central Africa (Libreville and 
Yaoundé) have often complained that 
European businessmen going out to Africa 
do not make good contacts. So it is 
important for SME promotion — proper 
credit facilities, technical assistance, train-
the Courier n° 146 · july-august 1994 r dossier 
ing, incentives to new classes of private 
operators such as informal-sector business-
men, traders, former public-sector com-
pany managers, redundant civil sen/ants 
and new graduates — to go hand in hand 
with the promotion of North-South busi-
ness partnerships and, to an increasing 
extent, South-South partnerships too. 
Secondly, there is a link with 
privatisation measures. Privatisation can be 
a great help in consolidating a dynamic, 
competitive private business sector in the 
ACP States. In the industrialised world, the 
basic argument for privatisation is that it 
should make for greater economic ef-
ficiency. In fact, it has four aims. 
— The political aim of returning to a 
market economy, reducing the public 
company sector and cutting down on 
government control. The countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe are particularly 
concerned here. 
— The financial aim of coping with the 
public companies' shortage of funds and 
the state's refusal or inability to come up 
with the necessary capital. 
— The budget aim of helping restore 
public finances, particularly by mopping up 
the external debt. In the developing 
countries, this could mean debt equity 
swaps. 
— The industrial aim of helping restructure 
industry. 
The first three of these are being 
pursued in the developing world in general 
and the (especially African) ACPs in par-
ticular, which goes to show how important 
and urgent a matter privatisation is. But 
the decline of the economy in general and 
state-owned companies in particular has 
raised a number of difficult questions. 
— What firms should be privatised? In 
theory, only those which can be re-
structured viably. This shows the limits of 
the process, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the barriers which have to be 
overcome. 
— How much should they be sold for? In 
the absence of a market, this is a major 
problem, given the general state of public 
companies. 
— How can willing buyers — i.e. venture 
capital — be found ? Despite their minimal 
powers of attraction, the countries con-
cerned are competing for foreign capital 
fiercely. 
For this reason, and because of 
the opposition of powerful vested inter-
ests, privatisation seems to have been a 
very slow and rather unsatisfactory process 
in black Africa so far.  ■
Conclusions and 
prospects 
In conclusion, the international 
development cooperation envir-
onment has changed markedly, with a 
more or less general swing towards the 
idea of a market economy. State manage-
ment is giving way to private initiative and 
the aim of economic policy is now to shape 
a macro-economic, political and social 
environment which is conducive to enter-
prise, markets which work and integration 
into the international economy. Aid 
donors, too, are beginning to take an 
interest in the private sector, SMEs, part-
nerships and so on. 
So the race for outside invest-
ment has begun and competition is fierce 
in an international context in which North-
South interdependence is changing, in 
most cases to the detriment of the 
developing countries (the least developed 
of them, primarily, and the ACPs espe-
cially), and the drawing power of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe is 
strong. The economic background against 
which it is all taking place is extremely 
gloomy: the fact is that almost all the 
private finance is going into a handful of 
attractive countries. The ACP countries, 
where every indicator is discouraging, 
stand very little chance. 
Since the quantity of external aid 
is unlikely to be going up in real terms 
(particularly with increasing amounts of 
emergency aid detracting from the struc-
tural aid which can help stimulate growth 
and development), then the quality — i.e. 
effectiveness — will have to improve. 
A number of priorities, new or 
still on the drawing board, point in this 
direction. 
Decentralisation of aid. Develop-
ment cooperation must hinge on operators 
other than the state. This means not only 
NGOs, local authorities, cooperative 
schemes and micro-projects, but also 
economic and social partners (i.e. profes-
sional associations, chambers of commerce 
and industry, producer groups, trade 
unions etc.) and, of course, the businesses 
themselves. 
A shift to directly productive 
sectors. Firms create jobs and income. 
which means growth and development. 
The first thing is to create directly product-
ive jobs, which add value and generate 
foreign exchange, so as then to be able to 
create the jobs also needed in the non-
trade sector. 
Of all the sectors, agriculture (in 
the broad sense, with all the activities 
which go with it) will be the biggest 
beneficiary of aid. But more broadly, 
businesses — primarily SMEs and SMIs, 
micro-enterprises and the informal sector 
— have to develop to halt the decline of 
the ACP economies. 
Development of SMEs. A whole 
fabric of private SMEs and SMIs is essential. 
Lomé IV took a firm line on this and the EDF 
must be encouraged both to pursue it and 
to step up its efforts. European develop-
ment aid for private enterprise should 
focus on countries where the conditions 
are generally satisfactory and part of the 
indicative programme has been allocated 
to the development of SMIs. The ACP 
countries and regions vary widely in this 
respect. 
Privatisation and debt. Company 
rehabilitation, privatisation and external 
debt conversion operations must be 
speeded up and implemented stringently 
and efficiently. The privatisation of 
government - owned companies should be 
a priority for the EDF and the CDI. 
Regional integration. Regional 
integration should be given a further 
boost, to provide businesses with bigger 
and more profitable markets and better 
possibilities of actual protection of those 
markets (currently ruled out by the perme-
ability of borders between many small 
African states in big sub-regions). 
Southern Africa. Great attention 
must be paid to the driving force which 
South Africa could be for the development 
of the southern part of the continent and 
to its potential contribution to the de-
velopment of black Africa in particular. It 
would be of every interest to the European 
Union and the ACP States to take this new 
factor into account in renegotiating the 
second financial protocol of Lomé IV (trade 
relations and the EIB and CDI mandates). 
Enhancing the CDI This is less a 
matter of boosting financial resources, 
even if it were justified, than of carrying 
out a complete overhaul to ensure greater 
continuity, independence, flexibility and 
professionalism, and freedom from over-
intrusion or administrative interfer-
"I 
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Schemes to encourage ACP-EU and 
ACP-ACP business cooperation and 
promote investments in the ACP 
States have been a constant, re-
gular feature of the successive 
Lomé Conventions. 
The bulk of these industrial pro-
motion operations have been in the hands 
of the Centre for the Development of 
Industry (CDI) and the Directorate-General 
for Development at the Commission, which 
have run sectoral and multi-sectoral indus-
trial fora in various sub-regions of the ACP 
Group and encouraged the creation of 
investment protection systems in the ACP 
States. 
What justification 
for promotion 
schemes? 
I Their main raison d'être is the 
¡mperfectstate of the market in data on 
ACP-EU business cooperation and invest-
ment in the ACP countries. These details 
are not available to potential European 
partners and investors. Identifying oppor-
tunities is a difficult and expensive under-
taking. And EU businessmen are not 
particularly motivated to go to the ACPs 
for information on cooperation and invest-
ment opportunities, often because they 
overestimate the risk of doing business 
there or are more attracted by similar 
offers in other parts of the world, such as 
Asia, Latin America, the Mediterranean, 
Eastern Europe and indeed the Union's 
own large internal market. 
So the ACP States need industrial 
promotion schemes to maintain a Euro-
pean business interest in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. 
We know that, when it comes to 
outside investments and cooperation be-
tween firms, company heads in the de-
veloped countries often copy the strategies 
of leading businesses in the field, i.e., they 
* Official with the Industrial Cooperation, Private 
Investment and Enterprises division of the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for Develop-
ment. 
Industrial promotion 
under Lomé — What does 
§1 the future hold? 
by Martin Minguella* 
follow the initiatives of the active 
pioneers. Not even the big busi-
nesses undertake systematic 
searches for cooperation and out-
side investment opportunities, 
although they take quite different 
attitude to the marketing of 
physical products and services. 
Industrial promotion schemes 
help both to establish a continuous flow of 
contacts between EU and ACP business-
people and to attract the attention of 
other entrepreneurs keen to follow the 
initiatives of leaders and pioneers, thereby 
prompting a further stream of interest and 
business contacts. 
Aims and methods 
of industrial 
promotion schemes 
The CDI is a joint ACP-EU organis-
ation, set up under Lomé, designed prim-
arily to promote coopération between 
industrial firms, SMIs especially, in the ACP 
States and the European Union. Its main 
job, therefore, is to promote technical, 
financial and commercial cooperation be-
tween ACP and EU firms, for which 
purpose it provides information, training 
and technical assistance direct to the firms. 
Industrial fora are business pro-
motion events which : 
— encourage ACP-EU and ACP-ACP busi-
ness cooperation at three-day meetings 
providing an organised framework for 
bilateral contact, focusing on short-listed 
business and cooperation proposals, be-
tween heads of firms in the countries 
taking part; 
— create a propitious framework for 
discussion of the development of business 
and the private sector in the ACP States, 
with a view to highlighting proposals for 
action in this field. 
The fora are run jointly by the 
regional organisations which request them 
and the Division for Industrial Cooperation, 
Private Investment and Enterprises in the 
Directorate-General for Development of 
the European Commission. The help of the 
CDI, the intermediate bodies representing 
the private sector and UNIDO is vital. 
With the ACP regional organi-
sations' mounting demands for fora and 
the Commission's new responsibilities for 
supporting and developing the private 
sector in the ACP countries, the following 
aspects will be given greater emphasis. 
— There will be an increasing degree of 
specialisation (sectors and subjects) and 
activity will be targeted more on existing 
firms. 
— The increase in the number of fora and 
the new specialisation will make for 
considerable changes to the work of 
promotion, monitoring and back-up in 
Europe and the ACP countries and even 
tighter coordination of schemes and re-
sources with the CD1. 
— The provision of a framework in which 
to discuss the development of the private 
sector and the organisation of seminar-
workshops should prompt ACP private 
sector support programmes and projects, 
in particular under the new financial 
protocol of Lomé IV. 
The Commission decided that 
schemes which encouraged the develop-
ment of investment protection systems in 
the ACP States were vital to the creation of 
a climate conducive to investments and so, 
with the help of the Member States, it 
embarked on a study of the main clauses of 
a framework agreement on investment 
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protection with a view to formulating a 
common EU position. 
The resulting document, on a 
Community position on the principles of 
investment protection in the ACP States, 
was an innovation in comparison with the 
Lomé III situation, in being the only 
yardstick which the Member States of the 
Union accepted for the negotiation of 
bilateral protection agreements with the 
ACPs. 
The draft presented in the docu-
ment detailed the basic principles applied 
by the Member States and laid down 
guidelines for the Commission when it 
offered technical assistance to the ACP 
countries. It was not particularly concerned 
with serving as a standard European accord 
to replace bilateral-type agreements. The 
approach was to stress the degree of 
protection which the investor needs and 
not therefore to take account of any of the 
Governments' potentially contradictory 
political interests. 
The ACP Secretariat is currently 
looking at the document, which is an 
important basis for the improvements to 
the investment climate in the Group which 
could take place during the second part of 
Lomé IV. 
Past performance 
and future 
prospects 
Under the first three Lomé Con-
ventions, the ACP Governments, essen-
tially, named their own priorities for the 
utilisation of Community aid in such areas 
as transport, communications, rural pro-
duction and social development. The state 
was often directly responsible for product-
ive activity over this period and the private 
sector was relegated to the background or 
entirely ignored. 
So the business environment and 
investment climate in many ACP states did 
nothing to encourage good performances 
from the industrial promotion operations 
of the CDI and the industrial fora. 
However, although the climate 
was not conducive to ACP business de-
velopment, independent evaluations of 
the two instruments have highlighted 
some very positive results. The 1994 
industrial fora evaluation, for example. 
says that these regional projects lead to the 
emergence and structuring of industrial 
and business projects in Africa and '40% of 
them would either not see the light of day 
or would be postponed without them.' 
The evaluation also states that 
more than 80% of the European firms 
present at these events would never make 
the journey if there were no fora and 70% 
of the African businessmen present make 
the sort of useful contacts they are seeking. 
The CDI and the industrial fora 
have had an important part to play in the 
past, in a context unfavourable to business 
development, and their continuing action 
under Lomé IV, particularly part two, is 
immensely important. 
The present Convention places 
particular emphasis on developing private 
enterprise and the private sector in gen-
eral, in accordance with what the ACP 
States hope is to be their new economic 
role. This is based on facilitating productive 
activity by creating an environment 
favourable to companies and investment 
and by providing the basic infrastructure to 
make business easier, rather than on direct 
state intervention in production. 
More than 40 ACP States in-
cluded support schemes for ACP private 
sector development in their indicative aid 
programmes during the first part of 
Lomé IV. The second part holds out even 
more promise. 
This new ACP enthusiasm for the 
development of private enterprise, CDI 
schemes, industrial fora and investment 
protection schemes augurs well for the 
future and with this in mind, it is 
worthwhile to improve the efficiency of 
these industrial promotion efforts. 
One of the most positive aspects 
of the instruments of industrial promotion 
here is of course the European businesses 
continuing interest in the ACP States, and 
Africa especially. Every year, the CDI 
handles something like 300 support oper-
ations for the heads of EU and ACP firms 
interested in working towards cooperation 
agreements and, every year again, there is 
at least one industrial forum to identify 
and disseminate something like 300 busi-
ness cooperation and investment opportu-
nities in the target ACP states. 
Although Africa's investment 
climate and business environment have 
precluded the expansion of direct outside 
investments over the past year or two, a 
large number of ACP-EU technical and 
commercial cooperation schemes have 
nonetheless seen the light of day, forming 
a basis for investments which might be 
made in the future in what is expected to 
be a more favourable environment in a 
number of ACP states. 
The instruments of industrial 
promotion are still fairly isolated, but it is 
reasonable to assume that they can be 
inserted into private-sector development 
support programmes of macro-economic 
(intermediate or institutional) and micro-
economic business development support 
schemes during the second part of the 
Convention. 
These programmes are to be 
devised by the ACP authorities, with the 
support provided for by the Convention, 
and to be set up with the help of DG VIII, 
the EIB and the CDI, in conjunction with the 
Member States and other funders. 
The second part of the Conven-
tion thus offers genuine encouragement 
for ACP firms and for European firms 
interested in making the most of cooper-
ation and investment opportunities in the 
ACP Group. ■■ 
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businesspeople? 
I
When countries of immigration 
want to restrict the number of 
foreigners on their territories, they 
often light upon assisted passages 
and settlement support as a way of 
encouraging aliens to go home. The 
policy is often decried as just a way of 
'getting rid of undesirables' in times of 
economic crisis, but it is an idea worth 
looking at more closely, because the reality 
is that current attitudes in Europe favour the 
design and maintenance of such polices and, 
above all, because if emigrants go home and 
get the opportunity to create an economic 
activity, they cannot but be a help to the 
developing countries, which are often short 
of enterprise and initiative in this sector. 
Although immigration is more 
topical in Europe now than ever before 
and everyone is making life harder and 
harder for immigrants, it is clear that none 
of the immigration control measures, 
however inescapable, will work unless they 
are backed up by a policy of getting to the 
root causes of emigration in the home 
countries. If immigrants are still flooding 
into the West despite the economic crisis 
here, it is not so much a question of liking 
the look of opportunities in the countries 
of destination (attraction) as of being 
repelled by the countries of origin (repul-
sion) and it is this repulsion that needs to 
be tackled. 
Development aid which makes 
return and/or stabilisation more attractive 
is usually considered to be the best way of 
dealing with economic migration at the 
source, and of responding to the in-
dividual's interest in both the country of 
departure and the country of arrival. It 
could therefore be useful to help such 
migrants as request it to return to their 
countries of origin and become business-
people and development promoters there. 
* The author, a trainee with the ACP-EU Courier, 
has also written a dissertation entitled 'Migration of 
River Senegal people to France - History, con-
sequences and prospects' for the Université Libre de 
Bruxelles. 
by Virginie Vanhaeverbeke" 
Exactly what assets do 
these migrants have to make 
them better businessmen? Com-
pared to compatriots who stayed 
put, their first advantage is that 
they have their own financial 
resources and at least some of 
these can be channelled into 
investment in the home country. 
And in addition to the savings 
they manage to put by when working 
abroad, migrants who want to go back to 
work in their home country are often more 
open-minded and more receptive to 
change than is traditional. Lastly, working 
in a western society may well have taught 
them method, given them the opportunity 
to train and made for easier contact with 
westerners back in the country of origin. 
So far, alas, it has been difficult to 
realise this potential. Opportunities for 
productive investment are rare in the 
developing countries, which have very 
small markets, poor infrastructure and 
banks which fall short or are entirely 
inadequate. And not all emigrants can run 
businesses or do at home what they were 
able to do abroad. An emigrant who 
worked on a factory production line, for 
example, would find it difficult to capitalise 
on this when he went home and he would 
probably not be able to organise his 
reintegration by himself. 
Even when an emigrant has 
obtained some useful know-how and 
invested in a profitable business, he may 
still find it difficult to be accepted by his 
compatriots again. By going home, he 
loses a source of income from which his 
family can no longer benefit and, if he is 
keen to work in a non-traditional way, he 
could easily create enemies. 
In short, it is not enough for those 
involved, governments and individuals 
alike, merely to support the economic 
reintegration of emigrants. Appropriate 
ways of achieving this goal must also be 
found. 
Examples from 
France  I
So there is a big step between 
theory and practice. Ill-designed 
reintegration programmes all too often 
lead to failure and often more migration, 
as has happened with, inter alia, the French 
official aid for reintegration programme, 
better known as the assisted passage 
scheme, set up in 1984. Under this scheme, 
aliens who were unemployed or 
threatened with redundancy and under-
took to hand in their residence permits and 
go home were given financial assistance to 
the tune of about FF 20 000 to help 
develop some form of business once they 
got there. For various reasons, it has been a 
failure from the point of view of both 
quantity (the number of applicants is 
increasingly insignificant) and quality (few 
returnees make a success of their home-
going). 
France's main aim is to reduce the 
number of immigrants, without worrying 
too much about what happens once they 
leave the country. But there have never 
been any agreements on official aid for 
reintegration with the countries of origin, 
which have therefore done nothing to ease 
the emigrants' path when they got back. 
Once home, the aid recipients are left to 
their own devices, without any back-up or 
monitoring for the plans they made in 
France. In fact nobody really cares whether 
any given plan is workable or not, or 
whether the immigrant really does intend 
to put it into practice or just wants the 
money to keep him going for a while when 
he gets home. 
Not only is there no supervision, 
but it is unqualified people who are 
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probably incapable of promoting business 
projects who are offered the opportunity 
of doing so. Surely those who failed to 
make the grade in France because they lost 
their jobs (or never even found work) are 
going to have the hardest time settling 
down again in their countries of origin. 
And the fact that they have to surrender 
their French residence permits leaves them 
no second chance, for if things do not work 
out at home, they cannot come back to 
France, at least not legally. Those who 
realise this at the beginning but still want 
to try reintegration are more likely to do so 
on their own initiative and resources, 
without asking for assistance and without 
surrendering their papers. Immigrants who 
want to go home for good will often let 
relatives use their residence permits rather 
than surrender them to obtain assistance. 
Others, who believe they want to return 
permanently or are seduced by the idea of 
getting a lump sum, apply for the assist-
ance and hand in their papers, but when 
they get home they spend the money and 
find that they have no job prospects. These 
people tend to feel that they have been 
'had' by France and want to go back on 
any terms. 
What it amounts to is that 
immigrants have learnt to be wary of this 
type of assisted passage, which is currently 
more or less defunct (for example, there 
were only three applicants for repatriation 
to Senegal in 1991, three in 1992 and two 
in 1993). 
not all emigrants can run businesses. ' 
Another French programme, Part-
ners for Africa, a pilot scheme which 
enabled 15 immigrants from Mali, Senegal 
and Côte d'Ivoire to put homegoing plans 
into practice, seemed far more realistic, but 
the experience has, alas, not been put to 
further use since one of the driving forces 
behind it, the Centre Parisien de Tech-
nologie/Export dans le Monde, a branch of 
the Paris Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (COP), was dissolved. 
In complete contrast with the 
Government's assisted passage scheme, 
Partners for Africa went in for strict 
"I 
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selection — there were 130 applicants, 
only 18 were chosen and three of them 
dropped out when assessment revealed 
that they would be making what they 
deemed to be inadequate profits. Each 
case was tackled individually and the 
candidates were given nine months' train-
ing, geared to the individual and com-
pletely underwritten by the organisers. A 
feasibility study was carried out in the field 
and, lastly, an attempt was made to look 
at all the problems with which the candi-
dates might be confronted. Nor were 
economic considerations the only element 
here, for members of the applicants' 
families who were in France were con-
sulted (without the applicant being pre-
sent). Families were also visited during the 
field surveys to try to find out what sort of 
reception awaited the applicants when 
they got home as well as the likely scale of 
financial demands they would face. So 
those selected were the most viable, from 
the point of view of economic environ-
ment, location, motivation, skill and family 
milieu of the candidate. 
Finance was still the most import-
ant factor, of course. Every candidate 
received FF 90 000 from the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) to cover 
their flight ticket, equipment (to be 
returned if their plans failed to last for at 
least two years) and some operating 
capital. They also had reductions on their 
equipment, customs exemptions in the 
home country and help from the COP to 
get soft loans from the local banks. 
Once the candidates returned to 
their countries of origin, which they had to 
do within a month of completing their 
training, the CPT/Export sent out monitor-
ing missions — every three months during 
year one and three times in year two. 
Although the programme was a 
relative success as far as the individuals 
were concerned (10 of the 15 are still going 
after three years in their home countries), 
it cost about FF 300 000 per person (in cash, 
assessment, training and monitoring). Can 
programmes involving this amount of cost 
and supervision really be repeated? With 
hindsight, the sums in question could have 
been reduced, but they were not and the 
programme is now a thing of the past. 
■
Assisting departure, 
not hastening it 
These schemes are two of many. 
Several countries in Europe have 
already devised various sorts of assisted 
passage and others, Italy for example, are 
now setting up programmes. Is the idea 
worth trying at European level? 
The European Commission has 
cofinanced other organisations with migr-
ant development schemes (the IOM and 
NGOs, for example), but, as yet, there is no 
actual EU policy for reducing migratory 
pressure from the developing world. 
However, the Italian Government made a 
proposal along these lines at the last 
Development Council in May and the 
Council has invited the Commission to 
devise a work programme, among other 
things, to assist the reintegration of 
migrants in their countries of origin. 
In some cases, unfortunately, 
countries which use development policy to 
combat immigration are more likely to be 
pursuing an internal agenda and relaunch-
ing cooperation rather than promoting the 
development of countries in the Third 
World. So a clear definition of the aims and 
an awareness of the limitations of such 
reintegration programmes are essential 
before they are taken any further. 
As we saw earlier, reintegration 
is primarily a matter of quality, not 
quantity, and this means being strict in the 
selection of candidates and willing to turn 
down those who are, say, only interested 
in the potential financial assistance or have 
apparently unworkable plans. Successful 
economic reintegration also requires feas-
ibility studies, tailor-made training and 
close monitoring during implementation. 
These are highly technical, relat-
ively expensive programmes, with a fairly 
limited quantitative effect and European 
governments anxious to show the voters 
that they are 'doing something about 
immigration' are likely to lose much of 
their interest in them. 
However, the first thing is to 
make sure that the home countries really 
will cooperate. Even if they do sign 
agreements, help can easily be more 
symbolic than practical, because they are 
short of the relevant resources or it is not 
really in their interest to have their 
nationals back. Emigration may well be an 
advantage for these countries, since it may 
relieve the pressure on the local job market 
and bring in foreign exchange (money sent 
home by emigrants) to boost the purchas-
ing power of the residents and make up for 
a flagging trade balance. 
The major obstacle is often the 
underdeveloped state of the home coun-
tries. With the best will in the world, 
decent training and a minimum amount of 
money, it is still difficult for an emigrant, 
and indeed his compatriots who have 
never been abroad, to develop economi-
cally profitable activities, largely because of 
the shortage of infrastructure and the 
narrowness of the markets. The whole 
problem of development lies in needing to 
start up a consistent series of what are 
often interdependent elements simul-
taneously. For example, it is difficult to 
achieve economies of scale when the 
demand for anything other than the basic 
essentials is minimal, when tools and 
energy (oil) have to be imported, when 
services and the technical environment are 
inadequate and when the transport and 
communications infrastructure is missing or 
unreliable. Low productivity then pushes 
up the cost of products and puts them even 
further out of reach of the underprivileged 
masses. There is not much point in acting 
on supply without considering demand. 
If the various countries of immig-
ration really did set up efficient economic 
reintegration aid programmes and helped 
a substantial number of immigrants to go 
home and set up businesses which brought 
them an income, their fellow countrymen 
might well be tempted to follow suit, 
thinking that the way to succeed was to 
emigrate to Europe, work there for a few 
years, save up, get some training and then, 
when they felt ready, apply for an assisted 
passage back ! 
Similarly, but more generally, 
countries which think that only proper 
development in the developing countries 
can stop migration must realise that this 
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A former emigrant 
Mrs Mbengue is a former 
emigrant whom Partners for 
Africa helped to set up a computer-
assisted publishing house in Dakar 
(Senegal). 
She spent 11 years in France, some of 
them studying to be a medical secretary. 
She developed an interest in computing 
and already had her project in mind when 
she heard about the Partners for Africa 
scheme, so she put the idea forward and 
was selected. 
She had finance of her own, had already 
purchased some equipment and she 
received a substantial amount of aid of 
various sorts on top of that to run her 
project. There were appraisals and 
counter-appraisals in France and Senegal, 
meetings with people working in the 
sector concerned, in-service traineeships 
etc. during the preparatory phase and 
financial assistance from the IOM (see 
main article) for her departure. 
It was only when she arrived in Senegal 
that things began to get difficult. The 
administrative formalities took a very long 
time and had to be started again from 
scratch, because correspondence sent from 
Paris had never been followed up. When 
she applied to a Senegalese bank, which 
actually had a CCCF line of credit 
earmarked for emigrants back from France 
wanting to open businesses in Senegal, 
she had to get her whole dossier together 
again to obtain what was a good loan 
(11%) for the Senegalese market. She only 
managed this with a great deal of help 
from the CCIP and the whole process took 
a year, which meant the project was very 
late in starting. 
There was more red tape to cut through 
to obtain the government-promised VAT 
exemption on her imported equipment — 
she still had to find the money 
temporarily — and pay customs duties 
and storage costs which she had not 
originally bargained for. 
Socially, however, settling down does not 
seem to have been difficult. She claims 
not to have had any more requests for 
money than any other compatriot and 
says that her two children, who came 
back with her, are following normal 
courses in a good school in Dakar. 
Lastly, despite all the support she has had 
from the CCIP, from the Senegalese 
Minister responsible for emigrants and 
from people with whom she has kept in 
contact in France and despite her personal 
involvement in a business which she set 
about creating by saving up, taking 
courses and deciding to go home, she has 
still been hit by Senegal's economic slump. 
The situation is worse than ever following 
the devaluation of the CFAF and she is 
currently keeping going at a minimum 
level in the hope of surviving until there is 
an upswing. Her experience suggests that 
it takes a great deal of courage and 
perseverance to invest in this kind of 
economic activity in Senegal — and that 
does not just apply to former emigrants. 
But she is still happy to have made the 
move, despite all the problems and the 
decline in her standard of living since 
leaving France. WEB 
of course, and emigrants are not the only 
ones to have it, but if one or two of them 
can be helped to set up in their own 
countries, without letting them think it is 
easy, is it wrong to give them that help ? 
Lastly, as the example given in 
the box article on this page shows, 
economic success is not the only criterion. A 
great many other things are equally 
important — the pleasure of being home 
again, for example, and the desire to be 
one's own boss instead of an eternal 
employee, even if it does mean taking a cut 
in salary. ■■ v.v. 
can only be a long-term result and that 
higher incomes may well boost migration 
in the short and medium terms. In the early 
stages of development, the economy will 
very probably not change fast enough to 
encourage people to invest any extra 
income in the local economy instead of in 
more migration. 
These are pessimistic conclusions, 
by and large, but some people still manage 
to reintegrate successfully and it would be 
wrong to dismiss all forms of assisted 
passage out of hand. Although, as we 
mentioned earlier, development involves a 
series of elements which have to be put in 
place simultaneously, the job has to start 
somewhere and it would not really be 
reasonable to expect to have all the right 
conditions in place before making a start. 
Not all emigrants have business potential. 
"I 
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in Mali 
I
In late 1987, the EU responded to a 
Malian Government request and 
set up a pilot scheme to support 
SME-SMI creation. It was original in 
a number of ways. 
In the first place, it combined 
three things usually dealt with separately 
— support for businesspeople (identifi-
cation, feasibility studies, financial evalu-
ation, monitoring and advice), financing 
(direct access to a line of credit to finance 
business schemes) and business motivation 
and savings incentives. 
Second, it was completely in-
dependent of the authority above it, in 
particular for recruitment, personnel man-
agement and financial decisions. 
Third, it was not aimed at par-
ticular sectors or categories, but at all 
businesspeople and their business projects, 
on the sole condition that those projects 
were profitable. 
Finally, it involved methods of 
intervention and conditions that were 
designed to meet the needs of the 
businesspeople and respect their socio-
economic skills (loan security rules, access 
to services etc.). 
It was a proper business support 
scheme, with all the facilities to cater for 
training, study and financing requirements 
and offer monitoring and advice. It started 
with three agencies, one in Bamako, one in 
Ségou and one in Sikasso, and, three years 
later, agencies were opened in Mopti, 
Kayes, Gao and Timbuktu, so all the major 
towns were covered. 
The project reflects the major 
economic policy trends in Mali and most of 
the countries of this sub-region, which, 
after the collapse of the big government-
run projects, are now passing the job of 
creating wealth and growth onto the 
private sector. This new approach, which is 
a feature of the structural adjustment 
programmes, signals a return to private 
enterprise after more than 30 years of 
essentially public initiative. The results of all 
previous attempts were very limited. Lines 
* Former co-director of the SME-SMI project in 
Mali. Currently technical adviser at the Mali 
Decentralisation Mission. 
by Olivier Donnei* 
of credit were not taken up, the 
rate of unhonoured debts was 
staggering, schemes went un-
financed, promoters got lost in 
administrative mazes, politics, if 
not nepotism, presided over the 
management of resources and 
more. 
It was against this back-
ground that the idea developed 
of combining all business services 
under one umbrella, close to 
the promoters and geared to the 'clients'. 
The scheme was therefore organised 
round a number of agencies, each of which 
was a consultancy, training centre, finan-
cial intermediary and credit organisation at 
one and the same time. It was more a 
private investment-support structure for 
private business than a development 
project and it replaced local support and 
financing structures, which were not 
working despite the incentive of external 
backing. 
Next, the procedures and con-
ditions of access to services and loans were 
adjusted to the promoters' potential by 
providing : 
— free surveys except in cases of finan-
cing; 
— loan security terms based on tontines 
(more as a kind of mutual and social 
guarantee than a financial one) and social 
sponsorship ; 
— permanent monitoring ; 
— gradual, free training throughout the 
survey and evaluation of the business 
scheme, both in the classroom and on site. 
The aim, first and foremost, was 
to produce businesspeople in a society 
which had no formal entrepreneurial 
tradition in a social and cultural environ-
ment in which people found it difficult to 
adhere to the basic rules of business 
management. 
Considerable potential emerged. 
In seven years, the project made contact 
with more than 14 000 promoters and 
gave backing to studies for 4500 business 
plans. CFAF 5.5 billion-worth of financing 
was allocated to 910 of these schemes, 
covering all areas of economic activity (21 % 
in farming and herding, 12% in industry, 
4% in traditional craft, 4% in transport, 4% 
in tourism, 29% in distribution and 27% in 
other services). 
The overall result was a genuine 
and dynamic movement whose impact 
was felt in a number of ways. 
From the human and cultural 
standpoint, the project mobilised and 
trained a large number of people. One 
need only look at the numbers involved to 
see how widely the net was cast in the 
effort to spread the word about how to 
run a business. 14 000 visits were or-
ganised, while 4500 promoters and almost 
1000 businesspeople were identified. The 
tontines formed to provide guarantees for 
the entrepreneurs involved some 4100 
people who thus shared in the experience 
of creating businesses. There were also up 
to 1000 sponsors — mainly older people 
and figures of renown — for whom the 
project represented a revolution in their 
thinking. Indeed, the project induced a 
kind of cultural shift, with the result that 
the enterprise concept is now seen as 
something that is both practical and 
familiar. 
From an economic perspective, 
the project injected more than CFAF 5.5 
billion into the economy and generated a 
total investment of more than CFAF 7 
billion (loans, plus the entrepreneurs' own 
capital). It also mobilised savings in excess 
of CFAF 1.3 billion (the entrepreneurs' 
capital plus the amount saved in the 
tontines). 
The project's social impact should 
also be mentioned : it provided direct 
employment for 3600 people and gene-
rated (both directly and indirectly) some 
5000 further jobs. 
The business potential thus re-
vealed and mobilised certainly goes some 
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way to explaining the Government's 
awakening to the need for a more de-
termined approach to the management of 
the problems of the legal, fiscal and 
administrative environment of private 
enterprise. In 1992, this led to the opening 
of a Ministry of Private Enterprise Pro-
motion. 
Shifting 
the emphasis  I
But the figures should not be 
allowed to mask the existing or 
potential problems lying in wait for or 
triggered by schemes of this sort. After 
seven years, the project is a fine ob-
servatory of the difficulties still to be 
overcome, of strengths and weaknesses 
and of the eternal problem of making 
(particularly economic) development 
schemes last. 
Objectives 
This sort of scheme may well be 
set up with confused objectives or gradu-
ally given extra objectives which are not 
particularly compatible with the initial 
ones. The political and social aim of 
creating jobs for sections of the population 
hit by the structural adjustment program-
mes (when the state stops recruiting new 
graduates and axes civil service posts etc.) 
becomes confused with the general econ-
omic aim of creating wealth and the 
particular economic aim of say, developing 
a particular area of activity or replacing 
imports. The only viable aim, dearly, is the 
creation and development of businesses. If 
businesses are created to meet the social 
aim of creating jobs for a particular 
category, their success will be compro-
mised from the start. This scheme is for 
businesspeople and their business projects, 
and these projects and the work method 
and decision-making that go with them 
must be geared to this alone. Viable, 
profitable firms will then create stable jobs. 
The project agency in Bamako 
was originally intended just for young 
graduates, but this soon created a problem 
— especially since it lent credence to a 
political idea suggesting that every young 
graduate was an entrepreneur — and the 
specialisation was stopped. 
Costs 
Projects are expensive, particul-
arly in the early years and particularly if 
they are assessed by conventional meth-
ods. If the cost of the project is divided by 
the number of businesspeople financed, or 
This Bamako honey maker had SME assistance 
from the Community 
the number of firms, or even the size of the 
loans awarded, then it may seem veny 
high, particularly if it has not reached a 
credit level to guarantee a certain amount 
of income (interest over loans). But it is 
wise to consider this sort of scheme from a 
new angle, which has more to do with 
investment or venture capital than the one 
used in development hitherto. In this new 
approach, costs are evaluated in the light 
of the balance sheets of the businesses 
financed, i.e. in the light of the various 
human, economic and social movements 
which have been generated. 
There is still a danger of costs 
keeping pace with the growth of activity 
and thus condemning the scheme to 
constant subsidy. Solutions have to be 
envisaged for this at the outset with such 
things as a policy of sub-contracting, bills to 
clients for services rendered, the relevant 
logistics and organisation and training for 
operators reflecting a private sector-type 
approach to productivity. The date by 
which the principal activities become self-
financing must also be fixed at the 
beginning. This has not happened in Mali 
and the project now has to break with 
some of the attitudes to spending and 
productivity which have made it difficult to 
do without funders and could prevent it 
from lasting. 
Functions 
There may be very good reasons 
for one person doing more than one job at 
the beginning, but it soon becomes prob-
lematic or dangerous to combine business 
support and advice with credit line lending 
and management. This combination of 
functions has been virtually institutional-
ised in the Mali project so far and it could 
herald all sorts of problems in the shape of 
conflicting interests, manipulation of the 
promoters, subjective choices and decisions 
etc. It is both the strength and the 
weakness of the scheme in that it gives it 
the means of applying its policy and 
achieving its goals, independently of any 
outside constraints, but it has to be phased 
out through changes in the organisation, if 
not the form of the structures set up to 
perform duties which are separate but 
nonetheless linked. dossier 
The formula  I
The development project may not 
be the right formula for our 
purpose. 
The informal, irregular, confused, 
breakaway project form tends to be seen 
as the arm of an administrative depart-
ment for national operators and the arm of 
funders for the expatriates. It induces 
reflexes, long-standing ones, which began 
with the institutional invention of under-
development and cooperation and now 
make it difficult for the principles of project 
organisation and management to be 
applied in the private sector — although 
that is in fact what is being done in this 
case. 
A project is usually a case apart. It 
is not concerned with fitting into its 
surroundings and its staff depend on a 
budget rather than results. The same goes 
for its future, which depends on political 
and/or administrative decisions rather 
than just performance. Management 
methods take no notice of returns or 
productivity and the main criteria are that 
the administration and the funder be 
satisfied and the budget used up properly. 
These 'development project' re-
flexes explain why schemes of the type we 
have here leave the conventional experts 
relatively impotent, as they do the con-
sultancies, which are keener to sell the 
man-months of people with CVs full of 
developing country experience than use 
the rules of profit margins in the profession 
to identify the 'businesspeople' who are 
too expensive, and provide proper expert 
advice. The same goes for national oper-
ators who are put forward by the adminis-
tration, have to be treated as civil servants 
(which they often are) and try to get as 
many perks as they can before the project 
is over. 
These numerous problems can be 
solved by tackling both the methods of 
recruitment, location and assessment of 
the so-called experts and the formal 
structuring of the project. 
This is why the Mali project has 
embarked on a major overhaul and is now 
converting to a credit initiative, a private 
financial establishment in the form of a 
semi-public limited company — a formal 
change which will have a large, positive 
effect on many of the aspects which we 
have raised, especially the following : 
— the natural partners of Mali's private 
sector (now associated with the project 
through their shares in the company), i.e. 
the Development Bank of Mali (BDM), the 
financial institutions with the National 
Insurance and Reinsurance Fund (CNAR), 
Malian economic operators, the state, and 
above all the 'clients' of the project via the 
guarantee money in their tontines, part of 
which they invest in company capital ; 
— the project itself, which now has to 
think of profitability and will gear its 
technical, human and financial organis-
ation to profit and therefore productivity 
(in terms of quantity and quality) and 
results ; 
— the project again, which has to obey the 
same rules as any legal entity in Mali and 
stop acting in an irregular manner. 
Finance  I
The project is not a bank in the 
conventional meaning of the 
word. It is not aimed at bank 
customers. It has neither the aims nor the 
procedures nor the philosophy of a bank, 
and the line of credit which it manages is 
just one of the means which promoters 
need, in the same way as information, 
studies and training. Project clients should 
not be credit seekers, but businesspeople 
with viable business schemes, for whom 
the project is a financial and technical 
partner with which to share any risks. 
The loan security procedures 
were designed with this in mind, in the 
light of the economic potential of the 
promoters, actual social circumstances and 
the cultural environment. They involve : 
— carrying out a sound assessment of the 
entrepreneur's qualities; 
— presenting a financial history of a high 
standard ; 
— arranging for close monitoring of the 
entrepreneur throughout the term of the 
loan; 
— requiring sponsorship of the promoter 
from prominent members of society ; 
— requiring a guarantee from a tontine of 
at least three members (including the 
promoter) ; 
— requiring the company's investments to 
be lodged as security. 
This system baffles all financial 
experts used to banking procedures, par-
ticularly since it offers guarantees out of all 
proportion to the size of the loan. But it 
does fit in with the whole approach of our 
scheme. 
The essential corollary of a 
system of this kind is stringency, from the 
first meeting with the entrepreneur 
through to the organisation of the moni-
toring of the business. The number of 
dossiers handled, the western-style re-
flexes of some experts, repayment prob-
lems and the anxiety for qualitative 
security lead inexorably to a return to 
conventional, recognised, bank-type guar-
antees (mortgages, mutual guarantees 
etc.). 
Paradoxically, the project is thus 
turning its back on a whole section of its 
clientèle and even competing with the 
banking system on its territory. At the 
same time, this formalisation of loan 
security is leading to a slackening of the 
standards of study, evaluation and moni-
toring. 
An analysis of the various project 
agencies cannot prove whether repay-
ments were better with or without con-
ventional security. Everyone knows how 
inefficient conventional guarantees, which 
often cannot be redeemed, are. 
However, this shift changes the 
direction of the project, in that it no longer 
produces entrepreneurs but borrowers, 
whose main task is to comply with the 
terms of credit access — and these are 
independent of the quality of their busi-
ness plans and depend on formal guaran-
tees. 
No procedure can replace a high 
standard of business study, monitoring and 
consultancy. The Mali project was prey to 
hesitation, did not think hard enough 
about loan security and thus triggered a 
move which, paradoxically, failed to im-
prove its results. The financial establish-
ment which took over from the project has 
reproduced the project's spirit and initial 
procedures in its handbook. Let us hope 
they are respected, for they created a 
dynamic movement and won the confi-
dence of thousands of small entrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, it could be confused 
with a new development bank along 1970 
lines. Hi o.D. 
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in the past few years, many coun-
tries in Africa have embarked on 
structural adjustment programmes 
in order to attract foreign invest-
ment and stimulate economic 
growth. Zimbabwe is no excep-
tion. The government has shifted from a 
controlled economy to a market-driven one 
while at the same time making concerted 
efforts to attract both domestic and foreign 
investment. From the onset of the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
the Zimbabwe Government has realised 
that one of the key strategies to expand the 
economic base of the country is through the 
development of a strong entrepreneurial 
culture among its population. The Empretec-
Zimbabwe programme is one of the tools 
that the government is using to encourage 
domestic investment. 
Empretec-Zimbabwe was set up 
in April 1991 as a joint programme, spon-
sored by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the Government 
of Zimbabwe, through the Zimbabwe 
Investment Centre (ZIC). The objectives of 
Empretec-Zimbabwe are to : 
Zimbabwe 
Developing 
entrepreneurship 
through Empretec 
by Tsitsi Masiyiwa* 
* Acting National Project Director of Empretec-
Zimbabwe. 
— help develop indigenous en-
trepreneurial capabilities and in-
novative small-to-medium scale 
entreprises ; 
— encourage linkages between 
SMEs and larger national and transnational 
corporations ; 
— stimulate cross-border ventures within 
the Southern Africa region ; 
— build institutional capacity to promote 
SME development. 
The Empretec Programme is an 
international one which was initiated by 
the UN's Transnational Corporation and 
Management division in Argentina 
in 1988. The word 'Empretec' comes from 
'empresario technologico' which is Spanish 
for 'technical entreprises'. Since 1988, the 
programme has steadily and successfully 
been expanded to other Latin American 
countries, including Brazil, Venezuela, 
Chile and Uruguay as well as to African 
countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe. 
Small retail businesses in Harare. Empretec-
Zimbabwe aims to develop indigenous 
entrepreneurial capabilities and promote SME 
development in the country 
"I 
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Tawadzana Enterprises 
Manager, Innocent Jemedze, 
tells his own story  I
What started off as a small mini-
market has grown into a large 
supermarket and it is still 
growing in an unprecedented way. For 
the people of Chikangwe Township in 
Karoi, Tawadzana Enterprises has now 
become a household name. 
The company was first incorporated in 
1988 but was dormant until July 1991. 
Since then, it has grown from strength to 
strength, from an outfit wfth only four 
employees to one which provides jobs for 
30 people — and this number is set to 
rise to 40 by the end of June. 
July 1993 saw our business expand with 
the opening of our ovenfresh bakery. 
Situated as we are, in the high density 
suburb of Chikangwe, we discovered that 
there was a niche in the market for fresh 
bread. Despite many challenges — the 
devastating drought, harsh economic 
dimate and tight liquidity — we managed 
to finance the full range of baken/ 
equipment. We supply the local 
community — the boarding school, 
hospital and shops — with fresh bread on 
a daily basis and we also get people 
coming from around Hurungwe to order 
our products. The company has become a 
household name due to its renowned 
quality of service. 
Services 
offered 
Management 
of the programme  I
While funding for Empretec-Zim-
babwe comes from the UNDP and 
the ZIC, the two institutions are not 
involved in the day-to-day running of the 
programme. This task falls to a Board 
comprising representatives of the private 
sector, government and other institutions 
working with both large corporations and 
small indigenous companies. A small Man-
agement Executive Committee is drawn 
from the Board and this meets once a 
month to monitor the progress of the 
organisation. 
The programme is implemented 
by a small staff consisting of the National 
Project Director, the Assistant National 
Project Director and secretarial back-up. A 
substantial amount of work is sub-con-
tracted to short term consultants. The 
sen/ices that Empretec offers are targeted 
at entrepreneurs who own small-to-
The bakery has been a major boost to our 
business and we hope by May to have 
opened two more retail outlets. The 
major constraint that we suffer from is 
one of transport. We need now to be 
able to deliver bread and confectionery 
outside the town. Currently, the bakery is 
operating at only 21 % capadty due to a 
lack of delivery lorries. It is my view that 
the acquisition of two 3-tonne delivery 
vehides would go a long way to boost 
the production and earning capadty of 
the bakery. 
I am happy to say that I benefited from 
attending an Empretec workshop in 
November 1993. Since then, I have seen a 
growth and improvement in my 
managerial skills. With good and proper 
planning, the ¡mage of my business has 
changed drastically for the better. 
From what I learned at the workshop, I 
was able to prepare a comprehensive 
business plan to back up a loan 
application to the Credit Guarantee 
Company (under the Z$400 million fadlity 
for small-to-medium scale businesses). I 
am proud to say that I was the first 
recipient under this scheme in the 
Mashonaland West Region. My salute 
goes to our facilitators — thanks for a job 
well done — and to my family for their 
sacrifices during this period. 
medium scale firms and at those en-
trepreneurs who have made fairly ad-
vanced plans to go into business. Those 
targeted have to be 'value-added' busi-
nesses that are using technology in some 
form and they must also have a strong 
growth potential. The sen/ices offered are 
not available to just anyone seeking 
assistance but only to those who have 
attended a two-week Entrepreneurial 
Development Workshop. Empretec be-
lieves that potential beneficiaries should 
first undergo a process whereby they are 
taught entrepreneurship, learning the 
basic essentials for future success. This 
approach is felt to be necessary because, 
historically, the political and economic 
environment made it impossible for blacks 
to go into business. As a result, active 
participation by black people in the 
economy only began around 1990. The 
programme is designed to speed up the 
pace at which the previously excluded 
majority can play a meaningful role in the 
economy. 
I
Once an entrepreneur has been 
through the workshop mentioned 
earlier, he or she then becomes eligible for 
the other services that are on offer. 
Courses that focus on management skills 
training are conducted on a monthly basis. 
In addition, talks, seminars and workshops 
are also organised for the benefit of the 
entrepreneurs. The majority of these 
courses are conducted by local consultants 
and they are open both to the en-
trepreneurs and to their employees. 
The Empretec-Zimbabwe staff 
also help to provide 'hands-on' and prac-
tical assistance. If a business is not achieving 
its profit targets, or if stocks are not 
moving, it provides a 'troubleshooter' to 
assist in identifying problems and in 
coming up with practical and sustainable 
solutions. This aspect of the programme is 
undertaken by both local and international 
'retirees' who come for short periods to 
offer the benefit of their particular ex-
perience. In the past, Empretec has re-
ceived assistance from the International 
Executive Services Corps (IESC) which is an 
American-based organisation providing 
retired executives for short periods to 
Zimbabwean companies. 
As a business organisation, Em-
pretec is aware that networking is a key 
component in developing and stimulating 
business growth. It therefore publishes a 
directory of entrepreneurs for distribution 
to its members and to large national and 
transnational corporations. This directory 
contains information on types of business, 
location, products made and services 
offered by each individual entrepreneur. 
The directory can, therefore, be a useful 
source of information for fellow-entrep-
reneurs. The majority of the firms that 
receive assistance have weak financial 
bases upon which to obtain loans from 
banks. Accordingly, the secretariat assists 
entrepreneurs in drawing up bankable 
business plans. It is important to note that 
all the data collection is undertaken by the 
entrepreneurs themselves. Empretec's role 
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is to put the information in such a way that 
the bank manager has the necessary 
confidence that the applicant will be able 
to repay the loan. However, entrepreneurs 
are strongly encouraged to attend courses 
and draw up their own business plans 
which they then submit to Empretec for 
vetting and with a view to obtaining a 
letter of support. 
Secretarial services are provided 
to those in need. Very few of the busi-
nesses concerned have telephone, fax or 
copying facilities and Empretec provides 
these services to entrepreneurs who re-
quire them. The services are not free 
— users pay fees for attending courses and 
using secretarial services — but the charges 
are well below normal market rates. 
Weaknesses 
of the programme 
I build profitable businesses, there 
are limitations which prevent it from being 
as effective as the secretariat would like. 
160 entrepreneurs, all located in Harare, 
are currently receiving assistance but there 
are a further 58 in Bulawayo who are 
unable to receive much help owing to 
limited financial resources. This, of course, 
has hampered the potential growth of 
these businesses as they do not have access 
The Empretec experience 
A training and research consultant, Isabel 
Manyande, gives her personal account 
I from being ambitious and 
^^^^ persistent by nature, the major 
factors that inspired me to overcome the 
problem of breaking into the male-
dominated world of business — in an 
economy, moreover, where racial 
discrimination was the order of the day 
— were faith and self-pride. These I 
derived from the teaching of my parents. 
According to them, there was no need for 
girls to apologise for being 'mere women' 
and no reason for any false sense of 
superiority on the part of the boys simply 
because they were 'men'. 
During the ten years that I spent in the 
private sector as a personnel manager, I 
learned to deal with people from all walks 
of life. I had access to useful information 
across the board, from the lowest to the 
highest placed individuals. In 1990,1 
decided to strike out on my own. I set up 
a publishing business and managed to put 
together a women's magazine of high 
quality. Faced with insurmountable 
problems caused by the lack of adequate 
printing equipment, I was, however, 
forced to diversify. I decided to change to 
the field of training and research 
consultancy, for which I am professionally 
trained. Before putting the new business 
together, I enrolled in the Empretec 
Entrepreneurial Development Programme. 
Through the programme, I had my 
business acumen and drive energised. I 
looked at myself as a business person, 
looked at all the areas in which I was 
falling short as an entrepreneur and went 
on a 'determination drive' to tackle my 
weaknesses. 
I now make it my business to acquire a 
wide knowledge, not only about my 
consultancy, but also about related 
organisations and institutions that are in 
competition with me. Above all, I seize 
even/ opportunity that comes up to 
participate in management and leadership 
courses which are offered by Empretec-
Zimbabwe. 
So far, the ones that I have attended 
have helped me improve my skills at 
managing people, decision-making and 
adapting to any change that may arise in 
my area of trade. 
The back-up service that is offered by 
Empretec has been of tremendous value 
to me. The 'no-cost' business advice
Tthat 
is offered to 'Empretecos' at any time 
must be mentioned. I have experienced a 
lot of problems and resistance from the 
male-dominated world but have received 
valuable assistance in terms of advice and 
networking from Empretec to help 
counter this. 
The organisation has made me feel that 
someone cares about me as α business 
person in my own right. Whatever 
obstacles I am faced with, I db, not 
hesitate to approach the Empretec staff, 
who always go out of their way to assist. 
Needless to say, through Empretec's 
networking approach, I have received 
substantial business from fellow 
'Empretecos'. 
I would like to encourage other women 
who want to venture into business to 
enrol on the Empretec Entrepreneurial 
Development Programme. To mer ft is the 
most worthwhile starting point for any 
would-be entrepreneur. 
to the management skills training which 
they so desperately require. 
The staff complement in Harare is 
too small to manage the programme 
effectively. The success of the programme 
must be measurable in both qualitative 
and quantitative terms. This means that 
data collection is necessary in order to 
obtain quantitative information such as 
turnover, profit levels, employment gene-
rated, new loans accessed and so on. 
Without this information, it is difficult to 
ascertain the impact of the services offered 
on the growth of the businesses. 
The majority of the businesses 
require 'hands-on' assistance whereby a 
consultant spends time observing and 
helping each individual concern. It is not 
easy to get local consultants as most of 
them are in full-time employment. In 
addition, international consultants can 
only come for limited periods of time. As a 
result, the programme has been rather 
slow in providing this kind of help for SMEs. 
The linkages programme, which 
is supposed to stimulate business activity 
between large and small corporations, has 
not taken off as expected. This is largely 
because the product quality and manage-
ment expertise of the SMEs do not yet 
match those of the larger companies. 
There is, therefore, still an air of mistrust as 
to the small businesses' ability to provide 
large companies with high-quality pro-
ducts or services within the required time. 
Conclusion 
"I 
I
The Empretec programme has 
only been in place for two years 
but, despite the weaknesses just 
outlined, its impact has nevertheless been 
felt within the small business sector. The 
entrepreneurs appreciate the fact that 
there is a place where they can receive 
meaningful and practical experience as and 
when they need it. However, the vision of 
Empretec becoming a major business 
support centre cannot be realised with the 
limited resources available. With additional 
manpower, equipped with experience in 
management skills, Empretec-Zimbabwe 
has the potential to develop a strong and 
dynamic small-to-medium size business 
sector that contributes to sustainable 
economic growth in the country. ■■ T.M. 
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Jamaican Governments have been 
counting on privatisation and priv-
ate sector support to drive their 
development strategy since the 
early 1980s. The most obvious 
result of this policy is that, not-
withstanding macro-economic problems 
such as currency devaluation and mounting 
underemployment, the Jamaican private 
sector is often set up as an example in the 
ACP Group, despite criticism about the 
results of choosing to go 100% private, to 
the detriment of the public sector which is 
supposed to act as a buffer in a country of 
deep-seated social inequalities. 
Privatisation, a series of oper-
ations in which Jamaica handed over the 
equivalent of 90% of its assets and attrac-
ted $2.5 billion in the space of 10 years, is 
unique, or at least rare, in the developing 
world. Jamaica was one of the first 
countries to follow in Mrs Thatcher's 
footsteps, if not to anticipate them, with 
its policy of liberalisation. 
Its reasons for launching and, 
since 1981, following through with the 
privatisation programme suggest that the 
idea was to salvage a national economy 
which was badly run down even before the 
world recession started. Despite great 
assets, including respect for a democratic 
system of alternation of power and funda-
mental freedoms such as freedom of the 
press (a very lively press, indeed) and the 
right to own property, the economic 
indicators were all at red. A relatively high 
standard of living, among the best in 
America after the USA, Canada and 
Venezuela, had created expensive con-
sumer habits and, by the end of the 1980s, 
the country's total consumption was 90% 
of its GDP and imports were swallowing up 
60% of it. GDP was growing by something 
like 2% p.a., but inflation, which was 18% 
p.a. in the 1970s, had climbed to 70% by 
the end of 1991. The Jamaican dollar, 
worth 12.3 American cents in early 1991, 
had dropped to 3.7 cents in March 1992 
and the international debt burden was 
getting heavier all the time. 
So successive Jamaican 
governments resisted all temp-
tation to go protectionist and 
decided to stimulate exports and 
local output by creating a dynamic 
private sector. The relevant laws 
were adopted and a government 
economic development agency, 
the Jamaica Promotion Corpor-
ation (JAMPRO), was set up. This 
one-stop shop for exporters and 
potential investors from Jamaica 
and abroad also coordinates much 
of the aid ploughed into the country's 
businesses and has become the major 
channel for foreign assistance to the 
private sector, particularly aid from the 
European Union. One original feature, in 
which it stands apart from the very 
bureaucratic systems of other countries, is 
that it motivates businessmen by backing 
them from the project design phase 
through to implementation and throug-
hout the life of their firms, which is why its 
offices on Trafalgar Road in Kingston are 
always full of businessmen. It puts special 
emphasis on agriculture, agri-industry, 
mining, manufacturing and services. 
JAMPRO's cooperation with en-
trepreneurs is not just a matter of the odd 
meeting, but involves proper monitoring, 
helping with administrative formalities, 
looking for partners and finance, fixing on 
the best location, designing financing plans 
and so on. The agency also registers and 
certifies product origin. Its range of services 
includes market surveys, product pro-
motion abroad (crowned with the ever-
greater success of the Best Jamaica brand 
and products such as Blue Mountain 
coffee) and investigations into the reli-
ability of Jamaican companies' foreign 
partners. There is also a school for cadres, 
offering training in such varied subjects as 
engineering, market surveys, industrial 
safety and the trade laws of other states 
and studies of European tastes in clothing 
and furniture. The courses are tailored 
either to some of the big firms or to 
particular sectors of activity. 
The Trade Commissions with 
various Jamaican embassies abroad come 
directly under JAMPRO. The head of the 
agency, I.V. Polly Brown, is proud to say 
that JAMPRO has coordinated the launch-
ing of four textile schemes, representing an 
investment of J$ 80 million (US$ 1 is cur-
rently worth about J$ 32), and the cre-
ation of 1800 jobs over the year. Between 
April and December 1993, 110 projects 
worth a total J$ 300 million were com-
pleted and there were audiovisual schemes 
on top of that. A further 300 projects are 
ready to take off, six of them (agricultural 
schemes) with an allocation of J$ 49 mil-
lion. 
There is plenty of legislation to 
help private investment. The Export Indus-
try Encouragement Act, for example, gives 
businesses exporting to strong currency 
countries up to 10 years' exemption from 
customs duties on their raw materials and 
equipment, plus exemption from some 
company tax. There is no time limit on 
these advantages forfirms in the free zone, 
which are also entitled to export their 
profits at will. 
Tax advantages granted in 1992 
have given the tourist industry a real 
boost. JAMPRO is managing the paper-
work for new installation projects (up by 
75% over the year) worth almost J$ 8 bil-
lion, and four of them, worth J$ 1.2 billion, 
will soon be adding more than 600 rooms 
to the island's hotel facilities. In 1993, 
tourist company profits grew by 10.7%, to 
US$ 950 million, tourist arrivals by 8% (1.6 
million tourists plus 980 000 stopovers) and 
projections for this year suggest US$ 
1.1. billion in profits. 
Alongside the traditional beach 
holidays, both SMEs and large operators 
are moving into ecology tours, which are 
tourism-health care-culture packages. 
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Conquering spirit 
Lloyd Wint is the managing 
director of NCB Investment, one 
of the companies in the NCB (National 
Commercial Bank) Group, privatised in 
1986. The NCB Group has US$ 780 million 
in assets, making it a Caribbean leader, and 
is currently rated seventh in the Caribbean 
(1992) top-10 sales league. NCB Invest-
ment is in charge of the major diversifi-
cation into agriculture and tourism which 
the group has gone for alongside its 
banking and insurance activities. 
One of the new ventures, export-
ing pawpaws to the USA and Europe, may 
seem of little significance to a business 
which made a net profit of J$ 500 m in a 
year, but it heralds new interest in the farm 
sector. The company is looking for Euro-
pean partners interested in marketing its 
products. It is vital to train the company's 
managers to get to grips with the foreign 
markets, Mr Wint maintains, especially 
those in Europe. Europe is the continent to 
conquer, he believes, which is why he has 
applied for help from Target Europe, the 
export promotion programme sponsored 
jointly by the EU and the Jamaican 
Government. 
The NCB Group bank is also one 
of the intermediate organisations involved 
in distributing EU loans to businesses. 
Jamaica Producers Group. Planting — 
transport — sales. Bananas from A to Ζ 
Dr Marshall M. Hall, chairman of 
NCB Group Ltd and managing director of 
the Jamaica Producers Group Ltd, is the 
cheery head of this Caribbean sales leader 
with sales worth approximately US$ 
260 million in 1992) and relates its history 
with enthusiasm and wit. It used to be 
Jamaica Banana Producers and it still sees 
bananas as the symbol and the driving 
force of its activities (60% of exports). This 
is a real success story. The company started 
out, as a banana producers' cooperative, in 
1829. It soon had 6000 members, then built 
up a transport fleet and acquired sales 
points abroad and now it has five refriger-
ator ships sailing to and from the ports of 
Kingston and San Antonio in Jamaica to 
Limón (Costa Rica), Vlissingen (the Nether-
Dr Marshall M. Hall, chairman of the NCB 
Group and managing director of the Jamaica 
Producers Group, two Caribbean giants 
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lands) and Newport (Wales). JP Ltd has 
subsidiaries in the USA and the UK, where 
its tropical produce (bananas, citrus fruit, 
mangoes, pawpaws, yams, sweet potatoes 
etc.) is processed, stored and marketed. 
Now for a businesswoman, a 
florist who is disarmingly frank about her 
discontent at the management of private 
sector aid in the developing nations. This is 
not the resentment of someone who 
wants assistance, but of someone who 
goes out to conquer and is ready to assault 
new bastions. Beverly Morgan, the eleg-
ant, decisive iron hand in a velvet glove is 
the managing director of Blooming Things 
and has a turnover of US$ 700 000, flatter-
ingly large for a small business. She exports 
40% of her output to Germany, 25% to 
Japan, 15% to the USA with the remainder 
going to a number of other countries 
including the Netherlands, Switzerland 
and France. She is appalled to hear that the 
aid from the European Union is not 
properly absorbed in Jamaica — the 
problem is that the aid is designed by civil 
sen/ants and not businessmen — and she is 
delighted that the EU is now insisting on 
the private sector in development. She 
advocates and is ready to launch the 
initiative for an ACP private-sector insti-
tution. The biggest problem for ACP SMEs 
wanting to penetrate the European and 
other major world markets, she says, is 
non-tariff barriers, of which the constant 
changes to the regulations on packaging 
are a telling example. The other major 
worry is Europe's green concern. 'If we use 
the fertilisers and pesticides which the 
Europeans and the Americans sell us, we 
end up with products which fail to meet 
their ecological demands,' she says. The 
answer is technological progress and help 
from research centres. Cooperation be-
tween private enterprise and ACP uni-
versities would be a good idea, she says, 
but the chain should be completed by 
collaboration between European and ACP 
universities and, in the case of her par-
ticular branch, with horticultural research 
centres in the Netherlands. 
We now turn to an entrepreneur 
with a very different image — and whose 
trade is in images. Lennie Little White is a 
film-maker, producer, cinema owner and 
audio-visual studio director. Most of his time is spent in the studio of Mediamix, an 
SME with a payroll of 32 permanent and 
10 temporary staff. A man of broad 
talents, he has written directed and 
produced a number of films, including the 
acclaimed 'Children of Babylon'. These are 
relatively low-budget productions, but 
they are now being shown on American 
and British TV, whose technical standards 
are very high. His complaint is that the laws 
designed to encourage film-making are 
geared to foreign productions, although 
he still hopes to get the spin-off from the 
advantages offered to foreign films made 
in Jamaica using local professionals. The 
current success of Walt Disney Studios' 
'Cool Running' and the many other 
Jamaican projects by this prestigious Amer-
ican company hold out a great deal of 
hope, but the best bet is still the intrepidity 
of this artiste-cum-businessman who says 
he wants to succeed in an industry where 
people do not normally expect to see 
someone from a developing country. 
Target Europe: 
aiming for 
better information 
Lennox Robinson, the head of 
Transfer Data, which sells computer ser-
vices to American businesses, is equally 
confident. Like many of his colleagues, he 
wants to know more about European 
initiatives for ACP businesses. He is quite 
open in his criticism of Europe's timid public 
relations efforts, the absence of European 
channels on the satellites covering the 
region and the way this forces people in 
the Caribbean to look to the American 
media for economic information on Europe 
— and he is ironical about the fact that the 
only European news to reach his part of the 
world is about football. But information 
would be helpful. 
Cooperation between the Euro-
pean Union and the Jamaican private 
sector is often held up as a model and its 
star performer is Target Europe, a two-
year programme which the EU and the 
Jamaican Government launched on 
1 January this year to promote Jamaican 
exports in Europe and European invest-
ments in Jamaica. It is run by JAMPRO, 
under the supervision of a committee of 
representatives of the Government, va-
rious private-sector professional organis-
ations and JAMPRO itself, and the budget, 
at ECU 3 million, is a slender one. However, 
its main purpose is not to provide subsidies, 
but to steer, mediate and act as a strategic 
centre for businesspeople. 
The European Union is also finan-
cing an import programme (ECU 14 mil-
lion, plus another ECU 8.4 million shortly) 
to help firms short of foreign exchange—a 
Blooming Things wants ACP firms, ACP 
universities and EU universities to collaborate 
timely move with the Jamaican dollar 
down 50% over the year. It is also 
supporting a credit programme for small 
businesses. The last EU intervention in 
Jamaica, a small one, is to enable local 
industrialists to go to trade fairs and study 
seminars. The island is also involved in the 
ECU 80 million Caribbean Regional In-
tegrated Programme (CRIP). 
Jamaican businessmen may well 
complain that the Lomé industrial develop-
ment instruments tend to organise meet-
ings which have no practical results, but 
they have new respect for Target Europe, 
which gives them the opportunity to 
expand their partnership outside the USA 
and the United Kingdom to which they 
admit they have long confined themselves. 
The organisers fear that they may even be 
expecting too much of the programme, 
but, even if they are, they have already hit 
one target : they have got the interest of 
the people most concerned. That can't be 
bad for a start ! ■■ H.G. 
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The lack of concern among most 
people running businesses in the 
Dominican Republic during the 
post-election crisis may well be a 
sign that they are mature and now 
independent of politics in a country 
where government and business have 
always been closely intertwined. One of 
these businessmen did miss an appointment 
when the Head of State, whose election 
victory was being disputed, needed sup-
port. Representatives of employers' associ-
ations did come out with statements criticis-
ing those — the opposition leaders, of 
course — who threw the country into 
disarray by questioning the seriousness of 
the Electoral Council and damaging the 
economy, especially the tourist trade. And in 
the name of private enterprise, voices were 
even raised to accuse the man responsible 
'for all this waste.' But by and large things 
were quiet, because, as the head of the 
Asociación Dominicana de Exportadores, 
Luis Rafael Pellerano, pointed out, regard-
less of the election results, in the private 
sector, the President will have to go on 
doing what the Dominican Republic has 
been doing for years. 
Private enterprise 
comes of age 
Instant impressions  I
On the bright side, Dominican 
business has about it an air of 
optimism, enthusiasm even. A 
new generation of entrepreneurs is 
moving into the market and most of them 
were trained abroad, know about modern 
management methods and do not feel 
they are tied to the apron strings of the 
political powers. On the dark side, the 
administration has flaws which do not 
square with a truly free-enterprise 
economy. Observers say that institutional 
shortcomings and obsolete state bodies 
are the biggest impediments to the de-
velopment of the private sector. Variable 
customs duties, for example, are much 
criticised. Such duties bring the State 70% 
of its tax revenue, but the amounts 
charged are apparently decided by state 
treasury managers and adminis-
trative fancy and the tax on any 
given article can fluctuate, for no 
good reason, between 20% and 
60%. Another handicap for priv-
ate enterprise is the yawning 
external trade deficit - Dominican 
exports slipped by 12% and im-
ports climbed by 20% in 1992. 
Management claims that this is 
because the Government failed to provide 
any support and suggests that the answer 
would be to have a private-sector aid 
policy like Jamaica's, which is often set up 
as an example, with much praise for 
JAMPRO, the island's private-enterprise 
promotion agency. It also wants the 
exchange rate for foreign exchange export 
earnings to be deregulated. 
On the eve of the election, 
various bills (on investment incentives, 
credit etc.) reflecting Dominican business 
requests were under discussion or about to 
be passed. 
Some businessmen were aware 
of the dynamism generated by private 
enterprise and called for the right to 
express their views in terms of political 
choices, without fear of reprisals from the 
old alliance. This new-found daring in the 
island's business circles is not confined to 
big businessmen either, for small firms are 
flourishing everywhere, with ingenuity 
and resourcefulness. 
Industrial free 
zones — a 
springboard 
The development of free zones 
has certainly been the springboard for 
Dominican business. Industries which set 
up in these zones pay no local taxes and no 
customs duties on any of the materials they 
import. In exchange, they provide capital 
for the workers' wages, know-how (which 
spreads outside these industrial estates) 
and the go-ahead outlook of American 
companies, which, as Eddy Martinez, the 
head of the Asociación Dominicana de 
Zonas Francas, points out, has been quick 
to spread throughout the private sector. 
More and more workers trained 
in these free zones set up little businesses 
of their own and take the work ethic with 
them, Eddy Martinez said. The zones 
currently house a total of 460 companies, 
most of them American, distributing $540 
million p.a. in wages and overheads. Many 
of the businesses are run by Dominicans, 
because, for many reasons, many of the 
foreign investors prefer to remain anonym-
ous. 
The first Dominican businesspeo-
ple to benefit from the free zones were 
those who built them. One of them, 
Samuel Conde, the engineer, had con-
siderable flair — not surprisingly, since it 
was his father who set up the country's 
first mortgage bank in 1972 by amalga-
mating various small exchange houses 
which had gone in for banking in a semi-
orthodox manner, presenting the state 
with a fait accompli at a time when there 
were supposed to be tight exchange 
controls. The turning point for Conde was 
in 1985, the year of devaluation, the end of 
the myth of parity between the Dominican 
peso and the American dollar. Shortly 
before that, American President Ronald 
Reagan had adopted the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), the USA's support pro-
gramme for Caribbean private enterprise, 
which excluded virtually all the Caribbean's 
traditional exports from the US pre-
ferences. Nothing daunted. Conde decided 
to develop the small existing free zone, 
wich had only created 20 000 jobs, far 
fewer than the 60 000 in Haiti's assembly 
industries. His lobbying took him asfar as a 
hearing before a senate committee in 
"f 
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Washington and helped bring about the 
agreement between the Reagan adminis-
tration and American industrialists in 
Puerto Rico, whereby the latter were to 
keep their tax advantages but invest in 
Caribbean countries benefiting from the 
CBI. 
Thus one of the free zones, the 
ITABO Industrial Park, directed by Emanuel 
Conde, saw the light of day. Conde's 
company put up all the buildings, and 
foreign firms which set up there can choose 
whether to rent them or just supply the 
capital and have the business managed by 
the Dominican team. Many opt for the 
latter. ITABO firms, with a combined 
payroll of 6000, include Westinghouse 
Electric Corp., Baxter Healthcare, Eli Lilly 
and many other pharmaceuticals com-
panies. 
In addition to the 160 000 free 
zone employees, these industrial estates 
have created an estimated 200 000 more 
jobs in the Republic. A major effort has 
gone into staff training, initially for under-
qualified people working in the textile 
industry, which represents 70% of the 
output of the free zones and has a payroll 
which is 65% female. But firms in free zones 
now offer secondary-level and even higher 
(college) courses and send their managers 
to teach at the university, as part of a 
three-year-old cooperation scheme, to 
gear the university courses to the needs of 
industry. 
I
Enthusiastic people, 
gloomy figures 
Dominican firms have heavy tax-
ation and all the hazards of the 
administration to contend with, Mr Mar-
tinez admits, and initially they had ob-
jected to the free zones. But, as time went 
The free zone stimulates the whole economy 
by and liberalisation continued on its way, 
they stopped complaining. 'Domestic' 
businesses supply free zone businesses with 
more and more of their goods and raw 
materials and they are reaping the benefit 
of them. 
The Government is paying more 
and more attention to claims from the 
private sector. Ricardo Valdez Albizu, the 
head of the Dominican Republic Industrial 
Association, for example, welcomes the 
results of the industrial reconstruction 
programme launched in 1990. Annual 
inflation was 100% in 1990, but it is now 
down to single figures. Fiscal discipline on 
the part of the Government has brought 
the budget into balance, from a deficit of 
5% three years ago. Customs duties, 
previously levied at 25%, have been 
slashed to 3%. The business profits tax is 
now 25%, which is still too high, but the 
ceiling used to be at around 45%. Total 
liberalisation of the market is a major 
challenge for Dominican industry, which 
has modernised and restructured to cope 
with it — a good example is the tourist 
industry, which brings in US$ 1 billion 
annually. 
Industrialists are counting on the 
future. A survey of 250 of them showed 
75% of bosses believing that the economic 
prospects were good to excellent and only 
7%fearing a decline in sales. The bad trade 
figures are primarily due to the state's lack 
of commitment and administrative short-
comings, Mr Albizu maintains, although he 
does admit that there is a great deal more 
professionalism in the public service. 
Osmar Benitez, director of the 
powerful 'Junta Agroempresarial Domini-
cana' (The agro-industrialists' council) 
which has 22 P00 members, echoes this 
view that the state has to shoulder its 
responsibilities. He represents a sector 
which has been badly hit in recent times, 
having seen a dramatic 50% drop in 
exports in the period between 1989 and 
1993 (export volumes now running at only 
a third of imports). He contrasts the 
situation of his members with the tax 
advantages enjoyed by their Costa Rican or 
Mexican competitors — the 25% tax on 
Dominican rice-growers compares very 
unfavourably with the 6% in Costa Rica, for 
example. Mr Benitez does not dismiss the 
shortcomings of Dominican agriculture and 
his association has set up a number of 
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research units, backed up by laboratories, 
to investigate the reasons for the lack of 
productivity on a crop by crop basis. 
The new-found dynamism of the 
chambers of the commerce is a sign of the 
times. It sometimes happens that very old 
ladies beautify themselves again. The 
Cámara de Comercio y Producción de Santo 
Domingo, founded in 1844, went through 
years of lethargy, but is now preparing to 
open a proper stock exchange (the existing 
one is only a formal institution). It chairs 
the federation of the country's 30 cham-
bers of commerce, provides an increasing 
range of technical assistance for its mem-
bers, runs trade fairs, conducts company 
audits and so on and it has launched a 
Dominican product promotion campaign 
in the USA, Europe, the Western Caribbean 
and the French departments in the Carib-
bean. Its president, Manuel Armenteros, 
emphasises that his organisation is keen to 
develop Caribbean cooperation and make 
the most of the fact that the countries in 
the region belong to both Lomé and the 
CBI. However, like most businessmen we 
met, he is sorry that information on the 
Convention is in short supply and its 
machinery so complex. 
An even better example is the 
resurrection of the Euro-Dominican Cham-
ber of Commerce, whose statutes ap-
peared in the Moniteur Belge of 26 Oc-
tober 1961 (an unusual distinction is that 
its leading creator, Alfredo F. Vorshirm, 
then the Dominican Republic's chargé 
d'affaires in Brussels, had the idea of 
setting up a 'Euro-something' chamber of 
commerce shortly after the advent of the 
common market). It has got new blood 
and one of the new members, José Ayuso, 
a very active young businessman, runs the 
local agency of the CDI (Centre for the 
Development of Industry, a Lomé body). 
The Euro-Dominican Chamber wants to 
become a parastatal body and coordinate 
the EU private-enterprise aid programme 
now on the drawing board. This is due to 
be allocated something like ECU 6,5m 
(subject to ratification) and the organisers 
believe that priority for these funds should 
go to providing technological and com-
mercial training to help Dominican busin-
essmen get a better grasp of the European 
market. 
Europe, the new 
adventure 
|_ 
I to getting to grips with Europe. 
He has invested in an audiovisual produc-
tion and distribution company, called 
Cometa Caribe s.a., and his video-club 
rents out the cream of European films by 
producers Wim Wenders, Kieslowski, Al-
modovar, Alain Resnais, Tornatore and 
Ivory. His books do not really balance for 
the moment, for 'people aren't going to 
partners seeking the best site for relo-
cation. Some 70% of the output of the free 
zones consists of textiles and clothing, a 
sector threatened by the GATT multi-fibre 
arrangement, and it is Europe, they 
maintain, which offers the opportunity to 
diversify. The country's size and population 
are such that it has had little benefit from 
international aid and it is very enthusiastic 
about this new cooperation with the 
European Union. There are none of the 
signs of disappointment that occur with 
long-standing partners. One indicator of 
this enthusiasm is that the Republic has 
embrace European films enthusiastically 
with just one wave of the wand. You can't 
say they actually prefer American films, 
because they are all they know.' Mr Metta 
is willing to spend his last penny to get 
European films on the cable, along with 
'Made in Europe' information from, say, 
Euronews. He sees himself as a commercial 
traveller for Europe because 'getting 
people to appreciate films from Europe is 
also getting them to appreciate European 
products.' 
The Republic's exports to the EU 
usually account for 20% of its total exports. 
Just a short time ago, they had stagnated 
at around a meagre 10%. Despite the 
dynamics of the free zones, the heads of 
several businesses are aware of the long-
term fragility of development based on 
You can't say they actually prefer American 
films, because they are all they know 
already committed virtually all the re-
sources of the national indicative pro-
gramme for the first part of Lomé IV. It will 
certainly not be a Sisyphean task to spend 
the ECU 6.5m for business promotion. ■■ 
H.G. 
"I 
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Periodically, the rice crop in Guyana 
comes under serious attack. Far-
mers fight back in the only way 
they know how and many have 
become dependent on chemical 
pesticides. Despite government 
controls, pesticides frequently make their 
way into the country from Spanish-speaking 
Venezuela. That means English-speaking 
Guyanese farmers cannot read the instruc-
tions, and application methods involve more 
guesswork than science. When one appli-
cation fails to work, farmers apply more. 
An agricultural extension worker 
gathered samples of the most serious pest, 
the paddy bug (Oebalus) and sent them to 
the International Institute of Entomology 
in London for identification. Specialists 
there discovered something that had not 
been previously known. The paddy bug 
was not a single insect at all. In other 
words, they discovered that more than one 
species was involved. Scientists theorise 
that the persistent attacks by the paddy 
bug could actually be a series of attacks by 
different species. But in Guyana, nobody 
knows for sure. Periodically, the paddy bug 
strikes, and if farmers can find the money 
and the pesticides, they spray in the hope 
of getting rid of it. 
The case of the paddy bug is just 
one example of how little is known about 
the creatures of the developing world and 
how that lack of knowledge hurts. 
Michael Morais, curator of the International 
Institute of Biological Control's collection of 
Caribbean insects, which Is held at the CABI 
regional office in Curepe, Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Compiling the 'who's 
who' of Caribbean 
biology 
by Donald Pittis* 
I Now those gaps in the science of 
| identification and understanding 
I of plants and animals — a science 
I called biosystematics — are on 
I their way to being filled in the 
I Caribbean by a project called 
I BioNET-INTERNATIONAL. Ac-
I cording to the organisers, the 
I purpose of BioNET-INTER-
| NATIONAL is to strengthen the 
biosystematic capability in the countries of 
the South where it is needed, and by 
sharing that strengthened capability 
within each region, to provide access to a 
pool of talent and information not avail-
able in any one institution or country. The 
Caribbean region is the first to establish 
such a regional network, with South East 
Asia and East Africa to follow shortly. 
According to Professor Tecwyn 
Jones, the founder of BioNET-INTER-
NATIONAL, knowing an organism's name 
is crucial to understanding its biology and 
its place in the local ecosystem. He com-
pares it to knowing the name of someone 
you will be meeting for lunch. If you don't 
know the person's name, you only know 
what you can see when you meet them : 
the way that they are dressed, the way 
that they eat their sandwiches and so on. 
'But if I know your name,' says Professor 
Jones, who is also head of CABI's Inter-
national Institute of Entomology, 'I can 
find out when you were born, who your 
parents are, where they come from and 
perhaps even whether you have a criminal 
record.' All before you have actually met ! 
Unfortunately, for a large 
majority of the developing world's organ-
isms, personal histories have yet to be 
written. So far, the skills needed to write 
* The author works for CAB INTERNATIONAL, 
Wallingford, Oxon, OX10 8DE, UK. CABI is an 
intergovernmental organisation providing services 
worldwide to agriculture, forestry, human health 
and the management of natural resources. 
those histories have also been in short 
supply in developing countries. 'The ability 
to identify, characterise and classify organ-
isms underpins the process of sustainable 
development,' says David Heydon, head of 
Development Services at CAB Inter-
national, the creator of BioNET-INTER-
NATIONAL (see box). 'It's idle to con-
template the design of projects and 
programmes which depend on the ac-
curate identification of biological organ-
isms, if basic skills don't exist within the 
region.' 
Mr Heydon gives the example of 
a recent project to stop the spread of one 
of the world's most serious fruit tree pests 
into the Caribbean - the Oriental Fruit Fly 
{ßactrocera dorsalis). This fly is widespread 
in Asia where it causes devastating 
damage. Funded by the European Com-
mission, CABI's goal was to establish a 
permanent detection and monitoring 
system for the fly and to recommend 
methods of control. CABI scientists have 
determined that an Asian pest related to 
the Oriental Fruit Fly has indeed found its 
way to the region, but further details 
remain in short supply. 
'Identifying the differences be-
tween the various fruit flies is a tricky 
business. But once local people get enough 
training they can perform a large propor-
tion of this task for themselves. The process 
of monitoring the fruit fly in the Caribbean 
would be significantly easier and cheaper if 
local scientists had the ability to spot these 
intruders,' says CABI scientist Ian White, 
who is co-author of Fruit Flies of Economic 
Significance. 
Just as in the planning for all the 
other regional BioNET networks, the 
Caribbean project has been designed with 
the full participation and approval of 
individual countries. After intensive work 
by people like Dr Ronald Barrow, of 
Trinidad and Tobago's Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Land and Marine Resources, the 
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BioNET-INTERNATIONAL concept was ad-
opted by a meeting of Caricom ministers. 
The BioNET-INTERNATIONAL 
plan, in the Caribbean and elsewhere, has 
three main thrusts; training, information 
and rehabilitation. The basic skills of 
identification and classification, especially 
of many well-known economic species, are 
not difficult to teach to local agricultural 
extension and plant quarantine workers. In 
cooperation with institutions in the Carib-
bean, CABI is helping to supply that 
training while sharing their expertise with 
local scientists for difficult identifications. 
Access to authoritative sources of inform-
ation is essential to differentiate accurately 
between organisms. Without definite 
descriptions of specific organisms, it is not 
possible to determine the identification of 
unknown new species. In many cases, 
museums and local collections have been 
allowed to degenerate over the years. The 
BioNET-INTERNATIONAL plan is to re-
habilitate those collections into active, 
current examples of Caribbean biology. 
'Our intention is to create — over 
a period of several years — the necessary 
capability within the Caribbean to support 
national and regional programmes for 
sustainable development,' says 
Mr Heydon. 'This kind of knowledge is also 
crucial to the proper' use of the environ-
ment and to the maintenance of bio-
diversity.' 
Traditionally, expertise in the 
biology of the developing world has been 
concentrated in the institutions of the 
developed world. But hiring scientists from 
the rich countries to do the work has 
become prohibitively expensive, especially 
considering the need for expanded bio-
systematics efforts. Professor Jones says 
that the money is better spent in the 
I
CAB International 
(CABI) 
BioNET-INTERNATIONAL is only 
one of many science-related 
development initiatives originating 
from CAB International, a non-profit 
intergovernmental organisation owned by 
its member countries. A majority of the 
36 current members are ACP States. 
CABI has a long history in science and 
development. More than 80 years ago, 
the Entomoligical Research Committee, 
out of which CABI grew, found that new 
science on tropical entomology was not 
getting published, so it founded a journal 
to keep pace with the rapid growth of 
literature in that field. 
In fact, the information explosion had 
only just begun. The Bulletin of 
Entomological Research has been in print 
since 1911 but now CABI's team of some 
100 scientists comb thousands of journals 
and non-serials in 60 different languages 
to add more than 160 000 abstracts to 
the CABI database each year. CABI 
produces more than 60 journals, in both 
print and electronic form, specialising in 
agriculture, forestry, human health and 
the environment. Its products and services 
are available worldwide, to members and 
non-members alike. 
CABI is constantly searching for new ways 
to improve the North to South transfer of 
information in support of research in 
agriculture, forestry and human health. 
With donor funding, it supplies its 
database to developing countries using 
modem portable computer technology as 
well as providing training in the use of 
developing world. 'Scientists within de-
veloping countries understand one anoth-
er's problems, such as the scarcity of 
money,' says Professor Jones. 'It is a system 
of cooperation. Through the connections 
of BioNET-INTERNATIONAL a scientist in 
Guyana who specialises in a certain kind of 
insect will provide his services to the other 
countries in his local network or, for that 
matter, to one of the other BioNET-
INTERNATIONAL networks. But in return 
for that, he will gain the services of an 
David Moore, a scientist with CABI's 
International Institute of Biological Control, 
helps to train scientists on the Windward Isles 
in the identification and control of coconut mite 
information science. CABI's biosystematics 
institutes : the International Mycological 
Institute, the International Institute of 
Parasitology and the International 
Institute of Entomology, provide 
authoritative identifications on crop pests, 
diseases, fungi and parasites. 
The International Institute of Biological 
Control, the fourth CABI institute, has 
spent more than 65 years spedalising in 
the use of natural enemies to attack 
harmful pests and weeds. As well as 
doing its own original research, the 
Institute has had considerable success in 
teaching developing country farmers ways 
of halting the excessive use of pesticides, 
while nurturing the creatures that protect 
their crops. Integrated Pest Management, 
as it called, is becoming more popular in 
ACP States, partly because of the 
potentially harmful effects of pestiddes on 
the environment, but even more so 
because of the prohibitive cost of 
pestiddes to small farmers. 
In more recent times, CABI has expanded 
its efforts in the field of human health. 
The Institute of Parasitology now has a 
team of scientists studying new drugs 
against malaria, the developing world's 
most deadly disease. The AIDS Newsletter 
is just one of CABI's publications on 
developments in HIV/AIDS. Other human 
health publication include the Tropical 
Disease Bulletin, Nutrition Abstracts, 
Abstracts on Hygiene and Communicable 
Diseases and Public Health News. 
expert in Trinidad who knows all about 
beetles, for example.' 
Already, CABI has been given 
funding from the UK Government under 
the Darwin Initiative for the advanced 
biosystematics training of more than 20 
regional specialists from developing coun-
tries. One of the first four candidates, or 
'Darwin Fellows', is Michael Philip from 
Barbados, who has spent four months 
learning biosystematics skills in the identifi-
cation of bacteria. The Darwin Fellows will 
be based at CABI's biosystematics in-
stitutes : the International Mycological 
Institute, the International Institute of 
Parasitology and the International Institute 
of Entomology. As well as developing their 
skills in identification and classification of 
organisms within their speciality, Darwin 
Fellows will become lynchpins in BioNET-
INTERNATIONAL's regional networks. 
'We are talking about training 
and linking an army of developing country 
scientists to share the growing load of 
biosystematic work required in the de-
veloping world,' says David Heydon. 'The 
Caribbean example shows it can be 
done.' ama D.P. I
On 6 December 1993, the European 
Union decided to set up a joint 
scheme to back the démocratis-
ation process begun in South 
Africa. It also opted to send out 
312 European observers for 
country-wide coverage of the national and 
provincial elections of April 1994. This 
signed the birth certificate of what was to 
be the European Union Election Unit in 
South Africa (EUNELSA) and gave me, and 
others, a chance to experience this turning 
point in South African history. 
The mission began in Johan-
nesburg. We spent the first couple of days 
on our special training, covering the 
nature, limitations and organisation of the 
mission, the institutional system which 
South Africa had created to manage 
transition and run the election — mainly 
the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), 
the Independent Electoral Commission 
(IEC) and the National Peace-Keeping Force 
(NPKF) — and the arrangements for the 
future ballot and the organisation of the 
police. We also visited a township and the 
European Delegation. This was a relatively 
passive phase in which we made contact 
and got a clearer idea of the observers' 
mission. But not only did we get to grips 
with the logistical problems of the enter-
prise, the first of its kind for the European 
Union. We also came to blows with the 
local deli nquents, as several observers were 
robbed by one or other of the bands of 
young tearaways operating in the streets 
of downtown Johannesburg. 
On the job  I
The next stage was to deploy the 
teams and thus I found myself in 
the field, with three other col-
leagues (there were nine of us by the time 
the mission came to an end), some 50 km 
* Ms Bouvier is a Professor of the Université Libre 
de Bruxelles and vice-president of CERIS (the Centre 
for the Study of International and Strategic Re-
lations) 
The South African 
elections 
A European observer's 
eye-witness account 
by Paule Bouvier* 
south of Johannesburg, at 
Vereeniging, which one of us 
handily christened 'glingling'. Our 
allotted territory (the Vaal and 
the western part of the East Rand) 
was southern PWV (Pretoria-Wit-
watersrand-Vaal) Province, 
whose importance is inversely 
proportional to its size, since it houses 
about a fifth of the total population of 
South Africa and accounts for nearly 40% 
of GNP and 45% of the value added in 
manufacturing. The Vaal itself, with a 
population of around 1 280 000, is even 
more heavily industrialised (the secondary 
sector, mainly heavy industry, accounts for 
58% of total production) and it is heavily 
urbanised as a result, with at least 800 000 
people in the townships of Boipatong, 
Bophelong, Evaton, Orange Farm, Ref-
enda,
 1 Rust-ter-Vaal, Shalimar Ridge and 
Sharpeville. The area has historical import-
ance to match its economic importance, for 
it was at Vereeniging that peace was 
signed at the end of the Boer War. But 
above all, this is where the blacks struck 
their first blows for freedom in the anti-
apartheid movement, which soon became 
a constant battle for liberation spreading 
out to the remotest parts of the country. 
The list of victims, from the Sharpeville 
massacres of 1960 to the Boipatong 
slayings of 1992, is long. They fell on 
marches, during demonstrations and at 
funerals. They were the victims of disputes 
between hostels, rivalry between the ANC 
(African National Congress) and the IFP 
(Inkatha Freedom Party), unauthorised 
action by the SDU (Self-Defence Units) or 
boycotting campaigns. Some were killed 
by local gangs like the one run by the 
notorious Monster of the Vaal. This is why 
' In the East Rand and not the Vaal. 
the region was described as politically very 
active, anarchic (despite attempts to fill the 
gap left when the official structures seized 
up) and with an atmosphere of paranoia 
about it. 
However, the general opinion 
seemed to be that the political scenery 
there had changed a lot over the previous 
two or three years, an opinion which we 
were able to confirm. With the exception 
of Sharpeville, where bands of delinquent 
youths are always on the prowl and self-
defence units always on the alert, other 
than for the unresolved problem of settling 
people who fled from Sebokeng after the 
troubles in 1990, the general climate is one 
of appeasement or even collaboration. The 
shift apparently is due to the determi-
nation of leading politicians and the 
commitment of eminent civil servants and 
businesspeople, who realised the need for 
change, and to the liaison network set up 
by, inter alia, the LPC (Local Peace Commit-
tee). 
So our mission began. There were 
interviews, meetings and talks with poli-
tical leaders. Almost every day, there were 
floods of data on all the aspects of the local 
situation from local economic operators. 
We visited municipal authorities, provincial 
and regional administrative services, poli-
tical parties, trade unions, civil associations, 
businesses, the police, the Local Peace 
Committees, the headquarters of the 
independent electoral commission (open 
two weeks before the election), an agricul-
tural cooperative, rural companies (a dairy 
and a ranch) and prisons and churches. 
Making contact was an easy and pleasant 
business, conversation was open and 
friendly and very often fascinating. Small 
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farms were the only places we found it 
impossible to visit. 
Whenever we could, we atten-
ded the rallies, meetings and forums set up 
by the ANC, the NP (National Party), the 
PAC (Panafricanist Congress of Azania), 
the FF (Freedom Front) and COSATU 
(Congress of South African Trade Unions) 
and listened to such speakers as Nelson 
Mandela, Tokyo Sexwale, Clarence Mak-
wetu, Benny Alexander, Frederik Willem 
de Klerk and Constand Viljoen. Their 
political messages were broadcast widely, 
but we were lucky enough to hear them 
live, and also to see how the atmosphere 
varied from one function to another. Some 
were exuberant, others less so, some were 
festive, others more formal, languages 
differed and audiences varied, as did 
degrees of police surveillance and numbers 
of observers etc., so no two events were 
alike. Our job was simply to check that 
there was no intimidation from the compe-
ting parties or indeed from members of the 
audience. There were no problems of this 
kind at functions held in our area. 
We attended a whole series of 
meetings, in some cases as a scheduled part 
of the mission, and in others by invitation. 
We went to general and other assemblies 
of the LPC at Vereeniging and Heidelberg, 
we went to sessions of the Vaal Triangle 
Regional Service Council and to meetings 
of the Executive Council of the Ratanda 
Youth Forum, the Local Government 
Negotiating Forum for the Vaal Triangle 
(leading to the installation of the Vaal 
Metropolitan Negotiation Forum, hailed as 
a high spot in local history) and the IEC 
after the opening of its Vereeniging office 
and we attended the inauguration of the 
NP headquarters in Sebokeng. All this was 
of course an opportunity to make contact 
and establish relations, but it also gave us 
an insight into the problems, disagree-
ments and tensions which the communities 
had to tackle and into all the effort which 
went into finding solutions, into the 
workings of local and regional structures 
and into the gradual design and establish-
ment of the future institutions. All this 
shed new light on the techniques used to 
bring the different sections of society 
together and neutralise or prevent dis-
putes. The LPC, for example, built bridges, 
set up contacts between the various 
operators on the local political scene 
(parties, civic associations, trade unions, 
the police, the army, administrative ser-
vices, the chamber of commerce, re-
sidents', students' and women's organis-
ations etc.) and sought solutions to prob-
lems arising in the communities. The 
message was that, although there was no 
doubt that the Peace Committees needed 
to improve their methods, the important 
thing was that they existed and that many 
of them were efficient in one way or 
another. This major commitment at va-
rious levels was unique — unknown in 
other countries striving to move from war 
to peace and from an authoritarian regime 
to democratic government — and many 
people had responded to the challenge of 
making the Committees work. 
Disagreements can also be hand-
led by a neutral mediator. The media had 
indeed spotlighted the international mis-
sion led by Henny Kissinger, invited to 
South Africa in mid-April to try to resolve 
the constitutional crisis between the IFP, 
the Government and the ANC, and, when 
this mission failed, all Professor Washin-
gton Okumu (of Kenya) did to break the 
stalemate. But the important thing is that 
the idea was used at local level too and we 
actually saw it applied in one dispute 
between employers and employees in the 
Transvaal Provincial Administration and 
another between two ANC and IFP youth 
groups. 
One last feature of transition 
management was the many negotiating 
forums in various areas — 'one of the most 
singular and important phenomena in 
contemporary South Africa.' 
Lastly, we followed the many 
training sessions for voters and LPC peace 
monitors fairly closely. The IEC and various 
other organisations (existing or set up for 
the purpose) were directly responsible for 
the voters' sessions, which were targeted 
on young people, students, workers, 
women, prisoners etc. and on township 
populations more widely. At these ses-
sions, the importance and organisation of 
the ballot were explained and the voting 
process was demonstrated using a mock 
polling station in simulations which set out 
the roles of the various offices and de-
scribed the procedures to be followed. The 
idea of the classes for peace monitors, run 
by the LPC, was, as already mentioned, to 
provide polling stations with teams of 
young men and women to head off any 
difficulties on polling day and it was up to 
us to see whether the teaching was both 
neutral and objective and in line with the 
aims and audience. In all these duties, we, 
as keen observers, reported to our regional 
coordinator, who then passed on the 
information to the Headquarters in Johan-
nesburg. The job was also an opportunity 
to meet and work with our opposite 
numbers from the UN, the Common-
wealth, the OAU, various churches, NGOs 
and others. 
The election days 
I campaign and the contrasting 
peace of the polling, everything has 
already been said. 
But it is worth emphasising two 
points. First, the extraordinary effort which 
went into the elections on every front. 
There was the specially created insti-
tutional framework, combining not just 
the EIC, already mentioned, but the IBA 
(Independent Broadcasting Authority), the 
IMC (Independent Media Commission), the 
NPKF (National Peace-Keeping Force) and 
all the fringe organisations. 
Added to this were the human 
resources, the civil servants, judges, teac-
hers, instructors, observers, clergymen, 
journalists, policemen and others, making 
up a formidable organisational network. 
There were nine provincial electoral off-
icers, 37 deputy officers, 1191 assistant 
officers, 2382 clerical staff, 9000 presiding 
officers, 193 706 voting officers and 90 838 
tellers on the IEC staff alone. 
And there were all the material 
facilities — more than 9000 polling s-
tations, some of them supplied with 
telephones, power and so on only at the 
last minute. There were thousands of 
ballot boxes and millions of ballot papers, 
not to mention such items as the IFP 
stickers and all the faxes sent over the 
election period. Things went wrong, there 
were irregularities and there was fraud, 
inevitably, and IEC leader Johann Kriegler 
made no secret of the fact, but do they not 
pale into insignificance beside a ballot 
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The second thing to highlight is 
the tremendous significance of the ballot. 
There was heavy emphasis on the fact that 
this was the first multiracial, democratic 
vote which South Africa had ever seen — a 
symbol of the end of a regime and the 
establishment of new structures. But it was 
more than that, for it took on the status of 
a defining event enshrining the birth of a 
new model of society ; the decisive catalyst 
in a process which began in the 1980s, was 
confirmed and accelerated when Frederik 
Willem de Klerk came to power against a 
backdrop of revolutionary struggle and 
was personified and galvanised by the 
charisma of the outstanding leader. Nelson 
Mandela. Thus ended what had become an 
increasingly intolerable anachronism, 
which was an outrage against its victims 
and anathema to black civilisations the 
world over and brought ostracism to its 
proponents. And the voters, urban and 
rural, experienced and inexperienced, 
educated and illiterate, old and young, 
male and female, able-bodied and hand-
icapped, made no mistake about it, as was 
witnessed by the patience, self-discipline, 
determination and calm which they dis-
played during these memorable days — 
and in a country known for its exception-
ally high crime rate. Every visit to every 
polling station was another opportunity to 
see the sense of responsibility, general 
good nature and efficiency with which 
even/one went about their duties. 
South Africa 
tomorrow?  I
As always in such circumstances, 
the period of grace will come to 
an end. But will it have been long enough 
to take up the enormous challenges now 
facing the Government? That is the 
question. And the stakes are high, of that 
there is no doubt. 
The first challenge is national 
integration. There is of course a South 
African identity, much-claimed and pro-
claimed, but, as things stand, it is powerless 
to transcend a society riven by socio-
cultural, linguistic, territorial, economic 
and political separation. But paradoxically, 
this heterogeneity, exacerbated by dis-
crimination, segregation, migration, emig-
ration, the homelands policy and more, 
was both intensified by party politics 
during the electoral period and to some 
extent neutralised by the ever-present 
common denominator of the fight against 
apartheid. This fragmentation of the body 
social is reflected in all the political options 
and convictions now canvassed, from 
Stalinism and anarchic communism to pure 
capitalism, through the pipedream of a 
volkstaat to redistribution of land and 
other tools of production to blacks alone, 
from affirmative action to meritocracy, 
from the Koran to the Bible and from 
federalism to centralism, through ecology 
and the defence of sport and art. Rarely 
has there been such a range of opinions. 
And it could get wider as exiles come 
home, new institutions bring new ideas 
and the last racial barriers come down. 
On top of that, South Africa's 
currently depressed economy has to bear 
the enormous burden of the social heritage 
of apartheid and the enormous expec-
tations which election promises have 
aroused. Although recent economic indi-
cators suggest a relatively rosy future. It 
would be wrong to overlook the need to 
marshal vast resources and arbitrate be-
tween the virtually irreconcilable aims of 
modernising the nation's partly obsolete 
industry, mobilising domestic savings and 
foreign investment and meeting the most 
urgent housing, health, education, em-
ployment, welfare and other needs. 
A third consideration is the trans-
formation of the State apparatus, an 
exercise which is far from complete. The 
political edifice just erected at national and 
provincial level has still to be built at local 
level and the communities are expecting a 
lot of it. The organisation and standards of 
the current administrative structures have 
to be adjusted. A national army, including 
all existing corps, has to be set up. And the 
civic education work which started with 
Some of the 312 European observers 
the voters' education campaign has to be 
pursued, a public service ethic created 
throughout the civil service and a' real 
democratic culture spread. The need to 
allow other forces to play their part comes 
into its own here, in a country not yet used 
to such practices. The fact that the English-
speaking press is still virtually in the hands 
of two groups, making it look as though 
power is in the hands of a small élite, has 
been highlighted, so the Government now 
has the new job of making sure that 
freedom of expression is not the privilege 
of a minority with the ability to make itself 
heard. 
How will the Mandela Govern-
ment handle these issues, which are 
fundamental to the future of South 
Africa? Can it resist the pressure of the 
population ? Can it reconcile the irreconcil-
able? The future alone can tell. MU P.B. 
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CT A has been sponsoring a series of 
four workshops to discuss the 
agricultural information needs of 
Central, Western, Eastern and 
Southern Africa. The first three 
have now taken place and the 
fourth is planned for later this year. At the 
workshop covering the Eastern region, 
which was held in The Seychelles last 
December, discussions highlighted a number 
of concerns. These centred around three 
main areas: the practical considerations 
surrounding maintaining and improving 
library and documentation services; the 
fundamental need to ensure that those 
services provide a route to agricultural 
development that is relevant to the farmers 
on whom that development depends; and 
the need to improve the flow of Information 
by ensuring that information specialists 
become communicators and not simply 
collectors and custodians of data. 
Information and 
development  I
Developing countries in sub-Sa­
haran Africa, sometimes by de­
finition and usually in practice, are highly 
dependent on agricultural production. It is 
the mainstay of their economies and the 
principal occupation of their people. 
Governments have realised that national 
* CTA. 
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Bridging the gap 
between information 
and communication 
by Ibrahim Khadar* & Sarah Reynolds** 
development depends, at least 
initially, on agricultural develop­
ment and yet lack of consistent 
commitment to rural develop­
ment has led to low agricultural 
productivity and high levels of 
external debt. These mark a trend 
away from the development so 
^^β many work so hard to achieve. 
Persistent food shortages mean 
that many countries are finding it neces­
sary to use scarce foreign exchange to 
import food. Until agricultural production 
improves to the point where a reasonable 
and sustainable level of internal food self-
sufficiency is achieved, as well as the 
capacity to add value to agricultural export 
commodities, this downward trend is 
unlikely to be reversed. Yet development 
could be accelerated by improved access to 
information. 
In order to encourage greater use 
of scientific and technical information as a 
means to agricultural and socioeconomic 
development, CTA took the initiative to 
review the agricultural information needs 
of countries in Eastern Africa. Reports were 
prepared on Comores, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. These 
national reports provided the basis for 
preparing a regional overview of agricul­
tural information needs in East Africa. The 
regional overview in turn, formed the basis 
for discussions at the workshop in Seychel­
les. 
The review and workshop con­
firmed that a noticeable effort is being 
made at national and regional levels to 
increase agricultural production, through 
removal of price controls on f arm products, 
strengthening of extension services and 
reorganisation and rehabilitation of agric­
ultural research. However, there remains 
an obvious gap between known agricul­
tural technologies that could lead to higher 
productivity and the adoption of those 
technologies by farmers. That gap could be 
bridged by putting effort, consistent 
commitment and energy into improving 
agricultural information systems — for 
without information there can be no 
development. 
Type of information 
needed: some 
examples 
For national development to 
move forward, agricultural productivity in 
the longer term has to move beyond the 
level at which internal food self-sufficiency 
is sustained. The capacity to add value to 
agricultural products needs to be enhanced 
and there are many instances, at village 
level processing for example, where the 
investment in technology is minimal but 
the role of information is crucial. One 
example, although at an industrial level, 
was given at the workshop. Uganda 
produces first class cotton and yet sewing 
thread is imported from China. It may 
appear to some people that high class 
technology and perhaps millions of dollars 
are needed to produce sewing thread 
locally, and yet a suitable machine costs 
only about US$ 300. The raw material is 
there, the market is there and there are 
competent people who can do the work. 
All they lack is information. 
In some countries in the region 
farmers are becoming more and more 
interested in information relating to mar­
kets for their products. For example they 
are turning to horticultural products and 
other cash crops which depend on markets 
in urban areas or overseas. They need to 
know what products to grow at what time 
and the likely economic benefits from such 
an enterprise. But this information is not so 
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readily available to small and medium scale 
farmers as it is to the big commercial 
enterprises. As a result many smaller 
farmers, on whom future developments 
depend, enter into such activities ill-
informed. Without adequate information 
and advice, such farmers can find themsel-
ves at the mercy of middlemen, and they 
may be left with a product they cannot sell 
and their entrepreneurial spirit crushed. 
This is a national as well as a personal 
setback. 
Access 
to information 
too costly? 
Researchers need to be able to 
gain access to world literature to ensure 
that research being undertaken elsewhere 
on one problem is not repeated in even/ 
country where such a problem occurs. 
In many ACP countries the cost of 
maintaining library services is becoming 
prohibitive. The Eastern African Frame-
work for Action on Agricultural Research 
(FFA), which is committed to revitalising 
and strengthening agricultural research in 
the region found, during their study of the 
existing system, that many libraries were 
nearly empty. Shortage of foreign ex-
change has meant that the number of 
international journals coming into libraries 
has been reduced to the few of common 
interest to many scientists. The specialist 
The December 1993 Seychelles Regional 
Workshop studied the agricultural Information 
needs of East Africa 
information needs of individual researchers 
are therefore not being effectively met. 
World literature on agriculture 
and development-related issues can be 
accessed on international databases. The 
development of CD-ROM databases has 
provided developing countries with an 
additional means of allowing many users 
to have access to relevant literature 
published world-wide. However access to 
on-line or CD-ROM databases by users in 
developing countries is constrained by high 
fees which have to be paid in foreign 
currency. 
Harnessing local 
sources of 
information 
By the same token that resear-
chers need to gain access to world litera-
ture, they also need to publish the results 
of their own research. 
The strengthening or establish-
ing of regional facilities for publishing 
research would enhance local publishing 
and provide an outlet for such work. These 
facilities would be far more accessible to 
researchers working on similar problems 
within the region, than if they tried to 
publish their work in international scientific 
journals. There is no shortage of excellent. 
relevant material. The challenge is to 
overcome the difficulties in establishing 
and sustaining such facilities. 
A small number of regional scien-
tific journals exist in the Eastern African 
region. They include the African Crop 
Science Journal, East African Agricultural 
and Forestry Journal, Revue Agricole et 
Sucrière de l'Ile Maurice, and Proceedings 
of the Collaborative Committee for Agric-
ulture for the Indian Ocean Islands (CO-
COLAG). However, some assistance is 
needed to ensure that these journals are 
published in a timely manner. Publishing 
can be further enhanced through training 
in scientific writing and editing. Support 
should also be provided for the publication 
and translation of books, conference 
proceedings, journal abstracts, and other 
publications relevant to the region. In 
addition to journal publications, resear-
chers in the region should be encouraged 
to publish research results in other forms, 
such as digests, newsletters, occasional 
papers, current awareness notes, and 
bulletins. 
Access to published scientific 
research is but one buttress of a much-
needed information bridge. Without the 
buttress of farmer knowledge and ex-
perience the information bridge collapses. 
So an important aspect of agricul-
tural information is the documentation of 
farming operations, not only dealing with 
technologies but also dealing with the 
social and economic aspects of farming. For 
example, the shortage of labour is often 
the overriding constraint to adoption of 
new technologies. 
The current trend towards farm-
ing systems research and the changing 
attitude of researchers towards their client 
farmers should in time discourage the top-
down direction of information flow which 
ignores the multiplicity of problems facing 
farmers and pursues a defined policy in an 
inflexible and unforgiving manner. The 
information bridge should provide for 
access in both directions. The one-way 
system has failed. But there is a need to 
provide better means of documenting 
farmer knowledge and the non-empirical 
experience for which there is not room in 
scientific journals. 
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Sharpening of 
communication 
skills 
The gathering, storage and re­
trieval of information is too often seen to 
be an end in itself. Information and 
extension specialists have to respond more 
effectively to client needs and this means 
developing communication skills. It is not 
enough to say that the information is here, 
the door is open, come and get it! The 
institutions that are in the business of 
producing documents and information 
worldwide are piling up information every 
day and any documentation centre must 
have the capacity to sift through this 
information, classify it, seek out that which 
is relevant for a specific problem and 
process it into a form that meets the needs 
of the potential user. This applies equally 
to users from research establishments or 
those providing the service at the interface 
between information and farmers — the 
extension service. And all need to be aware 
that the information must also be in­
tegrated in order to meet those needs 
effectively. 
Narrowly focused, commodity-
based information is too limiting but it is 
difficult to broaden when agricultural 
research systems have tended to separate 
livestock research from crop research or 
from forestry or other natural resources 
research activities. Information has re­
mained compartmentalised and most rea­
ders will have experienced the annoyance 
of finding too late that the missing bit of 
information which would have been so 
useful has been sent to the wrong ministry 
or the wrong office or was being stored by 
someone who had no need of it. 
Information systems in the fields 
of research and extension should adopt a 
client-oriented approach. This could be 
enhanced by organising short courses on 
communication skills, for information and 
extension specialists. Short-term training 
courses should also be set up, focusing on 
the development of scientific editing skills, 
specifically for repacking information into a 
form that is usable by farmers and other 
nontechnical users of scientific and tech­
nical information. 
Information 
management at 
national and 
regional levels 
Ensuring sustainable information 
sen/ices means building the information 
bridge on firm foundations. It means 
keeping the way clear so that all who need 
information can gain access to it. It means 
remembering that a bridge is a device for 
people who need to communicate with 
Some of the participants: left, Mrs J.E. Kenya 
of the Tanzanlan Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock and right, Tanzanian Professor S.M. 
Mbillnyi, member of the CTA Advisory 
Committee 
each other. It needs effort, consistent 
commitment and energy. 
It will be misleading to assume 
that once constraints are removed de­
velopment and increased prosperity will 
follow automatically. As in the world of 
physics or chemistry, an external input of 
energy is needed to overcome disorder 
within a given system. So for agriculture to 
move from the lower energy state of 
disorder and disintegration to the higher 
energy direction of development, it must 
be obvious that energy has to be intro­
duced into the system. That energy must 
come in the form of national commitment 
to a clear policy of supporting agricultural 
information sen/ices in a form that meets 
the needs of the users but which does not 
depend indefinitely upon external support. 
Participants at the Eastern Africa 
Workshop concluded that the identifi­
cation and management of available 
agricultural information resources is crucial 
in order to ensure that all information 
resources are better coordinated and 
available in the national agricultural re­
search systems (NARS) and also made 
available to coordinate the collection and 
dissemination of agricultural information. 
Cooperation at regional level should be 
established in order to improve efficiency 
in the use of information resources. In 
order to achieve this it was recommended 
that a lead institution, located within the 
NARS, be identified to act as a national 
information focal point with specific terms 
of reference and areas of responsibility. 
The roles of the national information focal 
points would include identifying national 
information and training needs as well as 
liaising with policy makers, planners, 
researchers, extension workers, and 
trainers. 
Finally, workshop participants 
were unanimous on the need to establish a 
single system that unifies the region. This 
could be in the form of a regional 
committee for planning, monitoring and 
evaluating regional information program­
mes. The committee may operate under 
the auspices of a regional focal point. The 
latter would support the activities of the 
regional committee by initiating, harmo­
nising and facilitating collaborative ac­
tivities regarding information and docum­
entation in the region. Ιβ ι.κ. & S.R. THE CONVENTION AT WORK 
The 19th ACP-EU Council of Ministers 
— Positive results in implementation 
of the Convention 
— Mid-term review of Lomé IV launched 
ing, said is not intended to be a one-off ar-
rangement. Mr Pángalos pledged that the 
European Union will continue to support re-
gional cooperation in southern Africa through 
the various instruments available under the 
Lomé Convention. In this regard, Vice-Presi-
dent Marin invited the countries of the region 
to suggest to him ways of moving this process 
forward. 
In the usual (probably the last) 'resolution on 
the situation in South Africa', the ACP-EU 
Council expressed 'the hope that solid and 
long-lasting relations will very quickly be es-
tablished between the new South Africa, the 
ACP Group and the European Union in the 
interest of all parties'. 
The 19th session of the ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers took place as scheduled in 
Mbabane, Swaziland, from 18 to 20 May 
1994. It was jointly chaired by the European 
Union Coundl President, Theodoros Pángalos 
(Greek deputy minister of foreign affairs) 
and ACP Council President, George Brizan 
(Grenada's minister of agriculture, trade and 
industry) and addressed by Vice-President of 
the European Commission, Manuel Marin 
and by the Swazi monarch. King Mswati III. 
Billed to examine progress in the implemen-
tation of the Convention and as the formal 
opening of negotiations for the mid-term 
review of Lomé IV, the session had the addi-
tional significance, totally unforeseen, of con-
vening at a unique period in the history of 
southern Africa. A couple of days earlier 
South Africa had completed its peaceful de-
mocratic transition to majority rule with the 
swearing-in of Nelson Mandela as State Pre-
sident and the formation of a government of 
national unity. 
South Africa and the 
Lomé Convention 
was brought about, South Africa, despite 
cropping up now and again during the three 
days of deliberation, in no way overshadowed 
the crucial objectives of the conference. It 
could not have, given the heavy agenda 
before the Council. 
Dealing with main 
issues  I
The Council did not waste time in 
dealing with the issues of immediate 
concern to the ACP States with the mid-term 
I
lt should be recalled that South 
Africa has featured prominently on 
the agenda of almost every ACP-EC meeting 
(whether Council or Joint Assembly) since the 
inception of the Lomé Convention. Often 
poisoning relations, it once led to the holding 
of a special meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, in 
1986, between foreign ministers of the 
European Community and those of the 
'frontline' states. It was right and proper 
therefore, as Mr Brizan said, that the Council 
should feel proud of its own contribution to 
the change. 
A source of tremendous satisfaction, especially 
for the exemplary manner in which change 
Theodoros Pángalos. 
EU Council President 
However, what kind of association South 
Africa would have with the ACP Group and 
the European Union, which has exercised the 
minds of many since the country's démocratis-
ation process began, did not emerge clearly. 
Mr Pángalos, in his opening address, referred 
to the cooperation programme unveiled in 
April which the Union is proposing to discuss 
with the new South African Government and 
to the meeting planned at the initiative of 
the German Government for September in 
Berlin to discuss cooperation between EU and 
southern Africa — a conference which the 
German representative, Mrs Ursula Seiler-Albr-
George Brizan, 
ACP Council President 
review close at hand. Mr Pángalos set the 
tone in his opening address by praising the 
courage with which a number of African 
countries have undertaken political and 
economic reforms. He sought to reassure 
them, as well as the rest of the ACP Group, 
of the Community's determination to 
continue its efforts to help them achieve 
sustainable development. The ACP-EU Council 
was meeting to take stock of what ACP 
problems were, to analyse them and seek 
solutions. 'Our ACP partners can count on the 
solidarity of the European Union' in this 
regard, Mr Pángalos affirmed pointing to the 
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Uruguay Round to which the Union has made 
positive contributions. He expressed satisfac-
tion with the implementation of financial and 
technical cooperation under Lomé IV. 
For his part, Mr Brizan emphasised the con-
tinued deterioration in the terms of ACP 
trade. 'Over the last ten years in particular', 
he told the Council, 'the movement of prim-
ary commodity prices can best be described as 
chaotic and the remuneration of producers 
has, for considerable periods, fallen below the 
costs of production'. The fall in export earn-
ings and the resultant domestic fiscal crises 
have forced many countries into heavy bor-
rowing and indebtedness and to undertake 
burdensome structural adjustment program-
mes whose costs are high and benefits uncer-
tain. Change, he said, is not cheap. 'The 
human and material costs of change may be 
onerous and this is doubly true of those 
changes' that would be made to the Lomé IV 
Convention. 
Vice-President Manuel Marin, however, put 
the review exercise in its proper context. Since 
the ACP States and the Community sat to-
gether to work out the philosophies and the 
content of Lomé IV, he said, there have been 
very important developments in the inter-
national scene : the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
efforts to find new geopolitical equilibria, the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union and the institutionalisation of Com-
munity development policy, the conclusion of 
a new global trade pact and the emergence 
of new forms of North/South interdepen-
dence. These were realities which, whether 
one liked them or not, have become part of 
our world. That was why the Commission has 
proposed to adapt the Convention. The pro-
posals are along three main lines : 'more em-
phasis in the Convention on democracy, 
human rights and good governance, new pro-
cedures for policy dialogue, and of course the 
review of a certain number of Lomé IV provi-
sions to make them more effective and to 
eliminate some of the red tape which exists in 
our relations'. 
The article 5 
boomerang 
| 
I was rarely absent from the minds of 
delegates. As a country which indirectly 
influenced (as far as many ACP States were 
concerned) the adoption of article 5 on 
human rights in the Lomé IV Convention, the 
irony of the situation was lost on no one. The 
new democratic South Africa contrasted 
sharply with the situation in many ACP States 
which is still characterised by political 
King Mswati III, 
the Swazi monarch 
instability, violence and undemocratic 
practices. The very grave situation in Rwanda, 
for example, was constantly evoked with 
speakers calling for an end to the massacre of 
innocent citizens, a halt to the fighting, the 
engagement of political dialogue and the 
emulation of South Africa's peaceful national 
reconciliation. The proposal to expand article 5 
to include democracy, the rule of law, good 
governance and human rights in the mid-term 
review could not have sounded more 
convincing and appropriate. 
While admitting that some ACP States still 
have to undertake remedial measures in the 
area of human rights, Mr Brizan stressed that 
the Group has not been found wanting in its 
embrace of these principles. 'All three regions 
can point to stable and reputable democratic 
regimes, some of which pre-date the introduc-
tion of democracy among some current mem-
bers of the EU', he said. 'Elsewhere, the ci-
tizens of ACP States have themselves taken 
up the struggle against autocratic and dicta-
torial regimes', he pointed out, citing the ex-
amples of the Congo, Madagascar and 
Zambia. Thus the ACP States accept the need 
to modify article 5 constructively to promote 
the desired goals, but Mr Brizan warned 
against the use of punitive measures as 'the 
principal instrument of change'. These can be 
'dysfunctional', he claimed. 
During his address, King Mswati III described 
the recent democratic reforms in his kingdom 
which he said were introduced after wide-
spread consultation. 
If there is any country where the Lomé Con-
vention has had very visible development 
impact it is Swaziland. The king enumerated 
some of the most important EDF projects in 
his country, and thanked the European Union 
for the support given not only to Swaziland 
but also to the ACP States as a whole — sup-
port which he described as reliable and const-
ant. 'In times of rapid change like this we na-
turally tend to rely more on our friends and 
partners to help us maintain a sense of econ-
omic stability in our efforts to develop and 
improve', he said. He expressed the hope that 
ACP-EU cooperation will not stop in the year 
2000, but will continue well beyond. 
But, as Mr Pángalos pointed out at the formal 
opening of negotiations, survival is what is at 
stake in the mid-term review. 'The continued 
vigour and survival of our cooperation are de-
pendent on our capacity to face up and adapt 
to new circumstances and constraints', he 
said. Returning to the subject of democracy 
Mr Pángalos spoke of the Community's inten-
tion to seek the insertion in the Convention 
of an 'essential element' clause that would 
enable 'appropriate measures to be taken in 
cases of grave and persistent violations of 
human rights or serious interruption of the 
democratic process... It is understood that 
such measures will take into account the spe-
cific nature of our relations with the ACP 
States, that they will be guided by objective 
and fair criteria and will be in proportion to 
the seriousness of any case which may arise'. 
In contrast to the Union, ACP States are 
laying considerable emphasis on trade cooper-
ation in the mid-term review in view of what 
they consider as the erosion of their preferen-
ces in the Community market. Vice-President 
Marin promised in his speech that the Com-
mission will look carefully at their requests. 
'We wish to enter into this exercise in an 
open and fraternal spirit. We are prepared to 
have a dialogue and look for solutions that 
are satisfactory for all parties'. 
In between the opening ceremony and the 
formal opening of negotiations for the mid-
term review, the ACP-EU Council of Ministers 
examined progress in implementation of the 
Convention in several areas, notably on trade 
cooperation, Stabex and financial and tech-
nical cooperation. The Council's deliberation 
here was considerably eased by work already 
done by various ministerial committees. 
Trade cooperation  I
Two ACP products — bananas and 
rum — which are still experiencing 
problems in the European market, 
were examined by the Council. 
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banana regime on 1 July 1993 there has been 
a fall in prices for ACP bananas. The Council 
took note of the fact the Commission was still 
studying a Regulation which is designed to 
help ACP States cope with the temporary dis-
ruption of the market and adapt to the new 
situation. An ACP request for transferability of 
unused quotas between ACP suppliers was 
also being examined. 
The problem of rum concerns essentially the 
ACP request for an increase in quota. Here 
the acting Director-General for Development, 
Peter Pooley, informed ministers that there 
were two major difficulties : one was that the 
system for increasing quotas as set out in the 
protocol of the Convention was devised at a 
time when quite a different development of 
exports from the Caribbean ACP States was 
envisaged. No one expected the very large in-
crease that had taken place in the last two or 
three years; the second was that in 1996 the 
Union will move towards the orderly abolition 
of quotas, and the Commission has great dif-
ficulties assessing the state of the Community 
market and the impact of the very large ex-
ports from the Caribbean. 'We have to avoid 
in particular that the increase in quota does 
not have the effect of moving us prematurely 
towards the abolition of quota', he said, 
promising that the Commission would make 
proposals 'shortly' and then have 'frank con-
sultation with the ACP States'. The Council 
took note of his statement. 
The enlargement of the European Union to 
include Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, 
it is agreed, opens new trade possibilities for 
the ACP States. The Council was informed 
that, as there would be no transitional arran-
gements, the four countries would apply the 
'acquis communautaire' regarding the ACP 
States on accession to the protocol to the 
Convention which is currently being ne-
gotiated. 
On the Uruguay Round, ACP concerns were 
twofold. Firstly they feel that, in spite of all 
the efforts made to ensure that their interests 
are safeguarded in the European market, they 
would experience considerable erosion in their 
preferential margins, and secondly, they are 
alarmed that developed countries 'including 
some Member States of the European Union', 
are advocating the introduction of labour 
standards in international trade. This initiative, 
Mr Brizan warned, contradicts the tenets of 
the global liberalisation of trade. 'Some ACP 
States', he explained, 'depend on labour as a 
factor of production to increase their wealth 
and competitivity in international trade'. 
The ACP States have indicated that they are 
currently evaluating the result of the Round 
with a view to submitting proposals to the 
Union for compensation. While noting this ex-
ercise, Mr Pángalos pointed out that the Con-
vention does not guarantee the maintenance 
of ACP preferential margins, but rather provi-
des for the safeguarding of their competitive 
position. Mr Marin reminded ministers that 
the Agreement has only just been signed and 
it would have to be implemented first before 
its real impact can be determined. A preli-
minary assessment of the effect of Community 
concessions in the areas of agriculture, tropical 
products and raw materials was under way 
and as soon as it was ready, it would serve as 
'a basis for a joint ACP/EU working party'. 
Stabex  I
On the stabilisation of export 
earnings, the 1993 year of 
application and the 'all destinations' 
derogation were the two issues. 
The Council was told that, although there will 
be fewer losses as a result of increases in the 
world prices for coffee and to some extent for 
Vice-President of the Commission, 
Manuel Mann (left) and Acting 
Director-General for Development, 
Peter Pooley (right) at the 
conference 
cocoa, as in the previous years, there will not 
be enough resources to cover claims on the 
1993 year of application. And, furthermore, 
data for determining losses were incomplete. 
The Council, as a result, delegated its powers 
to the Committee of Ambassadors. 
An ACP request for the extension of the 'all 
destinations' derogation until the end of the 
current financial year did not receive a dear 
response. However, Mr Marin felt that such 
an extension by Member States of the Union 
would be 'a political gesture of significant 
financial and economic content for the ACP 
States' — a sentiment which the Council duly 
took note of. 
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cooperation  I 
I 'nucleus and dynamic element' of 
the Convention, the implementation of 
financial and technical cooperation was judged 
by the Council to be 'very positive'. This 
followed a report, accompanied by a 
resolution, presented by the Development 
Finance Committee (the Committee set up 
under article 325 of Lomé IV to monitor and 
evaluate the implementation of this aspect of 
the Convention). The Council had no 
hesitation in adopting it and in congratulating 
the Committee for a job well done. 
The report highlighted, among other things, 
(a) an upswing in overall EDF transactions in 
the past two years (1992/1993) with commit-
ments and payments under the 6th EDF 
reaching 82.3% and 71 % respectively, (b) the 
low-level participation of ACP consultants in 
EDF projects which it says should be ad-
dressed, (c) the encouraging progress being 
made in implementation of the facility on 
structural adjustment, (d) the various initia-
tives at regional cooperation and integration 
which it deems vital for economic recovery 
and sustainable growth and (e) the positive 
proposals that have emerged from a study on 
the use of the existing provisions of the Con-
vention.in favour of the least developed, 
landlocked and island ACP States. 
Joint Assembly  ■
Without debate, the Council took 
note of the resolutions adopted by 
the Joint Assembly at its February 
session in Strasbourg; resolutions on 
topics which differ little from those being 
dealt with at the Council. They concern the 
final report on sustainable development, the 
interim reports on Lomé IV and on industrial 
development' and the report on the 
implementation of the Lomé Conventions. 
Mr Pángalos seized the opportunity to remind 
the Council of the significance for the Euro-
pean Union of the Joint Assembly which he 
described as a 'privileged instrument in our 
cooperation'. He went on to say the EU was 
'happy that there is an increasing number of 
parliamentarians from the ACP countries' par-
ticipating in its sessions and that it intends to 
propose during the mid-term review 'some 
measures to strengthen the efficiency of the 
work of the Assembly' which, he said, has 
been notable for its promotion of human 
rights and democratic freedoms in the ACP 
countries. ^^* Augustin Oyowe 
Mid-term review of Lomé IV 
Main themes and negotiating positions 
■ duration of 10 years, its financial 
protocol covered the first five years of the 
Convention. This will expire in February 
1995. In principle only the financial protocol 
for the second phase need be negotiated, 
but the profound changes that have taken 
place in the world since the Convention was 
negotiated and signed in 1989 dictate that 
it be adapted. Article 366 of the Convention 
itself gives both the European Union and 
the ACP States the right to request such an 
adaptation. 
Over the past year both sides have reflected 
on the amendments they consider as neces-
sary and each has produced a memorandum 
to this effect. Negotiations were formally 
launched by the ACP-EU Coundl of Ministers 
at its meeting in Mbabane, Swaziland, in 
May (see the main article). As the memor-
anda are not a point by point reply to 
issues raised by one side or the other and in 
order to help our readers understand these 
negotiations, we present below a summary 
of some of the main themes and the ne-
gotiating positions of the European Union 
and the ACP States as culled from their re-
spective memoranda (including ACP expla-
natory notes). We indicate 'none' where 
one side does not have a clearly stated po-
sition. It is dear, however, that the ACP 
Group is laying more emphasis on trade 
cooperation while the Union is focusing on 
faster and more efficient implementation of 
projects and programmes. The proposals will 
mean amendments to some articles, titles, 
protocols and annexes (and sometimes new 
provisions). These are seldom indicated here 
to facilitate reading. 
Human rights, 
democracy, rule of law 
and good governance 
The Union seeks to promote these 
prindples in the ACP States by making them 
the 'essential element' clause of the 
Convention. Article 5, which already deals 
with human rights, will therefore be 
extended to include these principles. In 
addition, the article will make reference to 
the promotion of an economic environment 
condudve to a market economy and 
development of the private sector. Funds 
will be earmarked to support measures in 
these areas. A sanction dause will be 
inserted to allow for the partial or full 
suspension of the Convention in cases of 
infringement. 
ACP Group affirms, 'within fts own sodo-cul-
tural environment, its abiding faith in and 
deep commitment to' these principles and 
proposes their introduction in the Conven-
tion 'without direct or indirect conditional-
ities or cross conditionalities'. It agrees with 
the idea of financial support in pursuit of 
these values, so long as the request for such 
support emanates from the ACP States con-
cerned. It advocates the introduction of 'an 
effective mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes arising from any perceived contra-
vention'. 
Parliamentary 
institutions (Joint 
Assembly) 
The Union believes that the work 
of the Joint Assembly will be more 
effective rf ft reflects the democratic process 
taking place in the ACP States. It would 
thus seek changes to its composition and to 
the frequency of its sessions. 
ACP Group (none) 
Policy dialogue and 
programming of 
Community aid 
The Union seeks to strengthen 
policy dialogue and to insert in the 
Convention a reference to the priorities of 
Community cooperation policy as stated in 
Article 130u of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. In order to speed up 
implementation, the procedure of which will 
have be spelt out in the Finandal Protocol 
and in Article 311, ft proposes a more 
flexible system involving two phases of 
indicative programme. It also proposes that, 
where an ACP State, for reasons of civil war 
or suspension of cooperation, is unable to 
implement its indicative programme, the 
Community and Member States should be 
able to use the resources of the ACP State 
concerned in a different manner from that 
originally planned. As the proposals 
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system of indicative programme will have 
finandal implications, the Finandal Protocol 
will have to be adapted accordingly. 
ACP Group (none) 
I
Support for economic 
development 
The private sector 
77?e Union hopes to strengthen 
and consolidate ACP States' basic economic 
infrastructure through the development of 
commercial structures, private investment, 
and finandal services and banking. It would 
advance these by using the funding 
opportunities offered in the indicative 
programme. It will review the structure and 
operation of the CDI, and seek greater 
flexibility in the terms and conditions of the 
risk capital operations of the EIB (European 
Investment Bank) and in its grant of 
automatic interest rate subsidies for loans 
granted from its own resources. It proposes 
the reservation of a proportion of risk 
capital for the least-developed countries to 
take account of their economic and finandal 
difficulties. 
ACP Group aims to place specific and sub-
stantial amounts of the financial resources in 
the Convention at the disposal of the priv-
ate sector and to facilitate entrepreneurs' 
access to them. This will involve, among 
other things, targeted use of ElB's risk ca-
pital resources for all aspects of private 
sector development (including technical as-
sistance, training, studies, etc), better terms 
and conditions (in particular as regards guar-
antees, interest rates, repayment and re-use 
of resources) and greater emphasis on 
equity investment aimed at reducing debt-
creating transfers. More adequate financing, 
it says, is imperative if comprehensive inter-
ventions by the CDI are to be realised. 
I
Trade cooperation 
The Union is prepared to examine 
with the ACP States how they 
could benefit more fully from the 
trade advantages already available to them 
under the Convention. 
ACP Group sees adaptation in this area as 
vital if the ACP-EU relationship is to have 
the greatest impact on the ACP States. This 
has become imperative because of the very 
many important changes that have taken 
place since Lomé IV was negotiated. These 
changes call for an improvement of the 
operational mechanisms of the trade sector 
and for greater attention to be given to 
ACP competitiveness and diversification. 
In this regard, the Group seeks amendments 
to the provisions of the Convention on 
access of agricultural products and for spe-
dai attention to be paid to enhancing ACP 
opportunities for trade in services with the 
European Union following the outcome of 
the Uruguay Round and the Union's final 
offer during the negotiations (It should be 
noted that the chapter of the Convention 
on trade services was not concluded before 
Lomé IV was signed due to the GATT talks). 
The Group proposes that resources be made 
available for the effective implementation of 
the provisions relating to cooperation on 
commodities and for the realisation of 
ACP's strategy in this area. As individual 
Member States of the European Union can 
no longer invoke safeguard measures (ar-
tide 177.1 and 2) since November 1993, the 
ACP States want amendments to the relev-
ant provisions to empower only the Union 
to do so. The Group also seeks improve-
ments in rules of origin in view of con-
tinued ACP dissatisfaction with their im-
plementation. 
I
Effective use of 
instruments 
Stabex 
The Union proposes to harmonise 
the use of Stabex funds with structural 
adjustment measures, and even to use the 
funds for structural adjustment if necessary. 
It proposes to reduce eventually the bases 
for transfer in the event of 'significant 
changes' (with exemptions for the least-
developed and landlocked states when their 
bases are below ECU 2 million and for island 
countries when their's are below ECU 1m) 
and for sums paid into block accounts under 
the framework of mutual obligations 
(FMOs) to be returned to the system's 
resources if the conditions for transfer are 
not met (the Union indicates that it reserves 
the right, in due course, to specify in more 
detail its proposals). 
ACP Group feels that Stabex has not 
achieved the objectives set out in the Con-
vention because of the inadequacy of funds 
and the new conditions introduced under 
Lomé IV. It therefore will seek an increased 
allocation of funds for Stabex (to take into 
account the rate of inflation and losses in-
curred by the ACP States), the adoption of 
a spedai mechanism to enable ACP States, 
which have not received their total transfer 
entitlements, to have the amounts deducted 
from their debt obligations to the European 
Union. It also agrees that the least-deve-
loped and landlocked states as well as island 
countries should be exempted from any re-
ductions in the event of insufficiency of re-
sources during the year of application when 
they fall below ECU 2m and ECU 1m re-
spectively. 
Procedures 
to improve the effectiveness of 
cooperation and speed up 
implementation, and without 
prejudice to the prerogatives which the 
Convention gives to the ACP States, a 
limited readjustment of the powers 
regarding finandal and technical cooperation 
is necessary. This concerns the attribution of 
responsibilities between the chief 
authorising officer and the national 
authorising officer (NAO) during 
preparation, appraisal and evaluation ι 
programmes and projects. It suggests the 
setting up of a technical management unit 
to assist in management and execution. To 
enable these measures to be implemented, 
the Union proposes that a specific amount 
be set aside in each indicative programme. 
ACP Group proposes that, in order to acce-
lerate procedures, the Delegate of the 
Union should be empowered to take on-
the-spot decisions on some technical and 
finandal issues which they are currently ob-
liged to refer to the Commission — issues 
such as preparation of shortlists of consult-
ants, the approval of tender dossiers for all 
types of contract and the award of all con-
tracts no matter their value (except where 
there is a disagreement between the NAO 
and the Delegate). It suggests that a system 
for settlements of disputes over implemen-
tation of projects and programmes be set 
up. And, with regard to technical assistance, 
the Group proposes that NAOs should, on 
their own initiative, use resources of the in-
dicative programmes and/or counterpart 
funds to acquire the human and material re-
sources necessary for effective and sus-
tainable management of projects and pro-
grammes. ■■ A.O. 
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DEVELOPMENT 
FUND 
Following, where required, 
favourable opinions from the EDF Committee, 
the Commission has decided to provide grants 
and special loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th 
EDFs to finance the following operations 
(grants unless otherwise stated) : 
Corrigenda - issue no. 144 of March-April 1994 
In the article 'Fourth time lucky with democracy' which was published in our Ghana Country 
report, a mistake has crept in regarding the date of the return of Jerry Rawlings to power at 
the outset of the PNDC era. As perceptive readers have pointed out, the 31 December coup 
took place in 1981 and not in 1991 as we reported (see page 31). Our apologies for any con-
fusion that may have been caused by this typographical error. 
In the artide entitled 'Cultural cooperation between the European Union and the ACP States' 
by Pierfranco Alloa, an error appears in the table on page 102. In the column headed 
'Amount (in ECU)' at point V1.2 (Support for the Foundation for ACP-EC cultural cooperation) 
the figure should be 3 926 787 and not 11 676 787. In consequence, the total amount is 
38 916 553 and not 46 666 553. 
■ 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Eritrea: ECU 3.7 million towards a rehabili-
tation programme in the fields of health, ve-
terinary services, water distribution, and the 
integration of former soldiers into civilian 
society. 
Mali: ECU 1.934 million for the reconstruction 
of primary schools in the north of the country 
(Gao, Bourem, Ménakaand Ansongoregions). 
Niger: ECU 18 million for a programme aimed 
at improving the exploitation of pasture lands 
(provision of water points), meeting human 
and animal health needs and commercialising 
the livestock sector. 
Senegal: ECU 1.99 million for the relaunch of 
artisanal fishing (infrastructure development) 
and for strengthening SMEs. 
Aruba: ECU 3.1 million for an extension to 
the airport. 
Wallis and Futuna: ECU 500 000 to acquire 
materials for public works aimed at providing 
road access for isolated communities. 
Wallis and Futuna: ECU 1.125 million for 
works to bring the main road on the island of 
Wallis up to standard. 
TRADE PROMOTION/ 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
Cameroon: ECU 20.2 million, of which ECU 
15.2 million is from the structural adjustment 
facility, for a general import programme. 
Chad: ECU 15.2 million from the structural ad-
justment facility for a general import prog-
ramme. 
Côte d'Ivoire: ECU 28.8 million to support 
phase three of the general import prog-
ramme. 
Gabon: ECU 13.2 million, of which ECU 5 mil-
lion is from the structural adjustment facility, 
for a general import programme. 
Niger: ECU 20 million, of which ECU 11.9 mil-
lion is from the structural adjustment facility, 
to support a general import programme. 
Senegal: ECU 16million, of which ECU 10 mil-
lion is from the structural adjustment facility, 
for a general import programme. 
All ACPs and OCTs: ECU 2 million for a 
second global commitment authorisation to 
finance trade and international tourism 
events, through the national indicative prog-
rammes (NIPs). 
All ACPs: ECU 7.2 million for an ACP-EU trade 
development project aimed at helping ACP 
States to set up commercial exchanges in 
order to increase their hard currency earnings. 
AGRICULTURE 
Congo: ECU 3.4 million for a project to im-
prove the market gardening belt in Brazza-
ville. 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda : ECU 
1.15 million for a regional project to support 
agricultural research. 
Niger: ECU 1.8 million for a small-scale irrig-
ation programme to allow for agricultural de-
velopment in 79 villages in the department of 
Zinder. 
West Africa : ECU 1.93 million for phase 2 of 
the OFAR (On-Farm Adapative Research) ag-
ricultural research project. 
ENTERPRISE 
Gabon: ECU 14 million from Sysmin funds for 
three projects relating to mines in difficulty 
and two projects involving investment for div-
ersification purposes in the Haut-Ogooué pro-
vince and Lambaréné region. 
HEALTH 
Burkina Faso: ECU 1.35 million to strengthen 
interventions in respect of sexually transmit-
table diseases (STDs) and AIDS. 
Zaïre: ECU 18.5 million for a programme of 
transitional support (PATS) for the health 
sector. 
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
Côte d'Ivoire: ECU 756 000 to support a pro-
ject allowing the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Animal Resources (Minagra) to strengthen its 
capacity to elaborate policies and programmes 
in the rural sector. 
EUROPEAN 
INVESTMENT 
BANK 
Loans 
Botswana: ECU 4 million to finance small and 
medium-sized enterprises in the industrial, 
agro-industrial and tourism sectors. The loan 
has been granted to the Botswana Develop-
ment Corporation which will intervene 
through partner banks that have close links 
with the private sector, a sound knowledge 
of local markets and priorities in the area of 
economic development. 
Namibia: ECU 6 million to finance the mod-
ernisation and extension of a water treatment 
plant serving the capital, Windhoek and its 
surrounding area — where most of the count-
ry's rapidly growing industrial and manufac-
turing activity is situated. 
Papua-New Guinea: ECU 4 million to finance 
small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
industrial, agro-industrial and tourism sectors. 
The loan is granted to the Bank of Papua-
New Guinea which will direct the funds 
through commercial banks. 
VISITS 
President Nujoma of Namibia 
Sam Nujoma, the President of Namibia, rec-
ently undertook his first official visit to the 
Commission since the independence of his 
country. 
The President was accompanied by Foreign 
Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, and was received 
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Commissioner Van den Broek. 
Independent since March 1990, Namibia is a 
multi-racial, multi-party democracy with a 
free-market economy. Despite substantial pro-
gress in the political, economic and social 
fields, it continues to require help from the 
European Union which offers an increasingly 
important market for Namibian trade. 
The position of this southern African country 
has always been a significant one. It is one of 
the key actors in the process of change that 
SADC (the Southern Africa Development Com-
munity) is undergoing in the wake of the 
elections in South Africa. 
President Nujoma's visit helps to reinforce the 
close links between the European Commission 
and Namibia, and highlights the importance 
that the latter attaches to a strengthening of 
its cooperation with Europe. 
Delegation from the French 
OCTs 
On 26 May, Vice-President Marin had a meet-
ing with a large delegation from the French 
overseas countries and territories (OCTs). 
These included elected members and represen-
tatives of socio-professional groups from 
Mayotte, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, 
St Pierre & Miquelon, and Wallis & Futuna. 
The visit took place in the context of the mid-
term review of the Association between the 
OCTs and the EU which entered into force for 
a ten-year period in 1991. 
The discussions focused on the implemen-
tation of the current association decision and 
on possible changes to : 
— the trade regime (the OCTs are the only 
partners of the EU to benefit from completely 
free access for products originating in their 
territories) ; 
— the right of establishment and the provi-
sion of services; 
— financial and technical cooperation through 
the European Development Fund (EDF) and 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) ; 
— the operation of the partnership in prac-
tice. 
Mr Marin explained to the delegation how 
this revision was taking place at an approp-
riate time given the new characteristics of the 
EU. He hoped that it could be carried out 
speedily and in tandem with the Lomé IV revi-
sion in respect of the ACP States, so as to 
avoid delays in the implementation of the 8th 
European Development Fund which was sche-
duled to come into force between now and 
the end of February 1995. 
As to the content of the mid-term review, 
Mr Marin said that the changes he was seek-
ing were broadly those that had already been 
agreed by the Council as regards financial 
cooperation with the ACP countries. 
Mr Marin gave assurances to the delegation 
that, in the elaboration of its proposal to the 
Council, the Commission would take full ac-
counts of the specific characteristics of the 
OCTs. He noted, for example, that the differ-
ences between British, Dutch and French OCTs 
were already formally recognised in their as-
sociation with the EU. He believed that the 
new Council decision should establish a 
suitably flexible framework. 
As regards the indirect consequences for the 
OCTs resulting from the establishment of the 
single market, Mr Marin stressed that a 
stronger and more unified European Union 
did not mean any diminution of solidarity on 
the part of the EU vis-à-vis its partners. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
'Budgétisation' of the EDF 
In conformity with the commitment made 
during the negotiation of the inter-insti-
tutional agreement of 29 October 1993, the 
Commission, at its meeting on 19 April 1994, 
adopted a report on the possible ways and 
means of 'budgetising' (ie integrating into the 
European Community budget), the European 
Development Fund. 
This report will be forwarded to the other 
two branches of the budgetary authority (the 
Council and the Parliament) for analysis and 
comments. 
If the report is favourably received by the 
other two institutions, formal negotiations 
will be initiated on the basis of the Com-
mission's proposal. 
Whatever the outcome, 'budgétisation' of the 
EDF cannot be undertaken before 1996. 
OCTs : Stabex transfers 
Definitive decisions under the Stabex (stabilis-
ation of export earnings) exercise for 1992, in 
respect of the Overseas Countries and Terri-
tories assodated with the EC, have been 
taken by the Council. 
These decisions involve the payment of ECU 
1 147 675 to the Falkland Islands and ECU 
52 325 to French Polynesia for export losses 
on wool and copra oil respectively. 
In fact, the compensation rights involved 
amounted to twice what was actually de-
cided, but it was necessary to reduce the sums 
paid in order to remain within the maximum 
amount budgeted for OCTs for 1992 (ECU 
1.2. million). 
EUROPEAN 
UNION 
Austria's decisive 'Yes' to EU 
membership... 
In a referendum held on 12 June, the Austrian 
electorate voted decisively in favour of joining 
the European Union. The final result was 
66.4 % in favour and 33.6 % against. Formal 
accession is due to take place on 1 January 
1995. Three other EFTA countries (Finland, 
Sweden and Norway) have referendums sche-
duled for later in the year. 
... but voters deliver a mixed 
message in European 
Parliament poll 
As was widely anticipated, there was a low 
turnout for the European Parliament election, 
other than in those Member States where 
voting is compulsory. The outcome of the 
poll, which was held on 9 and 12 June 
throughout the EU, appears to have been de-
termined principally by domestic concerns 
with many electors choosing to deliver a mid-
term protest against incumbent governments. 
In certain countries, notably Denmark and 
France, 'Euro-sceptic' groupings enjoyed some 
success although the bulk of those who voted 
continued to support parties which are 
broadly in favour of the European integration 
process. The Socialists performed well in the 
UK and Portugal but fell back in France, Spain 
and Greece. The Christian Democrats ad-
vanced in Spain and largely consolidated their 
position in Germany and the Benelux coun-
tries but the centre-right did badly in France 
and Britain. Liberal gains in the Netherlands 
and the UK were offset by losses in Germany. 
The German, Irish and Luxembourg Greens did 
well but elsewhere, the environmentalists slip-
ped back. Parties of the extreme right suf-
fered setbacks other than in Belgium. 
Overall, the left-right balance of the new Par-
liament is unlikely to change much although 
the exact composition of the various groups 
in the chamber will take some time to 
emerge. The group affiliation of a large 
number of MEPs, notably from Italy (where 
Prime Minister Berlusconi's Forza Italia scored 
a striking success), has yet to be decided. 
More than one third of the MEPs in the 
newly enlarged chamber of 567 members are 
newcomers. 
Development Council 
(6 May 1994) 
The ministers of the European Union Member 
States with responsibility for development 
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manship of Theodoros Pángalos, deputy Fore-
ign Minister of Greece. High on the agenda 
were the issues of coordinating development 
policies in the field of health, with particular 
reference to the battle against HIV-AIDS, and 
setting in train the 'operational coordination' 
of all the EU's development policy sectors. 
Member State representatives have, for some 
time, been urging greater coherence both be-
tween the various Community policies — the 
CAP, development cooperation, external trade 
and so on — and between these policies on 
the one hand and those of the Member 
States on the other. 
Declaring its concern about the insufficiency of 
resources allocated to the health sector, the 
Council anticipates additional means to help 
developing countries in this area. External aid, 
according to the resolution agreed by the 
Council, should achieve a certain balance, with 
priority being given to the poorest countries, 
the least-favoured groups in society and those 
facing the greatest threat. Women and child-
ren, displaced people, refugees and victims of 
catastrophes and wars deserved particular 
attention. 
On a strategic level, the Council considers, 
among other things, that it is worthwhile hel-
ping to improve living and health conditions, 
to finance preventive programmes and to sup-
port institutional reforms along with efforts 
to mobilise national resources —which in-
cludes contributions towards health costs by 
those who use the system. It recommends 
that, within the framework of support for 
structural adjustment, a significant allocation 
should be set aside for the health sector in 
national budgets. 
With a view to making the European Union's 
development policies more effective, the 
Council decided to establish a system of 'oper-
ational coordination' which would embrace 
the new measures in respect of health. Within 
the framework of this coordination, meetings 
of EU and Member State experts will be held 
regularly. The Council requested the experts 
to submit a list of countries which would, on 
an experimental basis, be the object of a 
follow-up in respect of the EU's development 
policies in the health sector. The Commission 
will present an annual evaluation report. In 
accordance with the Council resolution, a 
more concerted approach with other donors 
should also be pursued. This applies notably 
to the World Health Organisation whose im-
portant role was emphasised. 
The Council resolution took note of the nu-
merous and enduring inequalities within deve-
loping countries as between urban and rural 
areas and among different social classes. It 
also referred to the emergence of new health 
problems such as the diminishing effectiveness 
of anti-malaria and antibiotic treatments, the 
rise of AIDS and growing drug use, not to 
mention the weakening of health systems oc-
casioned by armed conflicts. 
More specifically, as regards the HIV-AIDS epi-
demic, the Council called for a strengthening 
of cooperation between developing and deve-
loped countries. This was also an area where 
coordination between Community and 
Member State policies should be improved. As 
a priority, such policies should be designed to 
support national policies, grassroots initiatives 
and the work of the NGOs. 
The Coundl said that there must be a dear 
political commitment from states benefiting 
from assistance in respect of the rights of the 
individual, and notably those who are ill, in 
the fight against the spread of the disease. 
For their part, the donors must take the 
social, economic, cultural and ethical realities 
of the recipient peoples into account. The im-
portance of education, stressed earlier in the 
resolution as regards health in general, was 
underlined again here. The resolution also 
refers to the need for measures to mitigate 
the sodo-economic consequences of AIDS. 
The Council reacted favourably to the Com-
mission proposal for financial allocations for 
the fight against AIDS. 
As regards the development policies of the 
Union as a whole, the Coundl approved a list 
of six countries in which Community coordi-
nation should be intensified with a view to 
learning lessons which could subsequently be 
applied in the EU's relations with all its deve-
loping country partners. The six states chosen 
are Bangladesh, Côte d'Ivoire, Costa Rica, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique and Peru. Henceforth, 
there will be a system of preparatory meet-
ings which will be held prior to major inter-
national discussions as well as an informal ex-
change of views among the Member States 
represented in the major international fora. 
The Commissioner with responsibility for De-
velopment Cooperation, Manuel Marin, sug-
gested that a meeting of all ministers concer-
ned with these policies should be set up. On 
behalf of the Commission he also made a 
commitment to present a working document 
on the subject in the autumn. 
A number of other points also appeared on 
the Coundl's agenda. 
On Rwanda, a decision was taken to study 
the idea of sending a mission from the Union 
to the adjacent countries in order to examine 
the refugee problem and the possibility that 
the crisis might spill over into these neigh-
bouring states. 
Regarding the mid-term review of Lomé IV, 
following an introductory exposé by 
Mr Marin, the Council reviewed the important 
points to be discussed with the ACP partners. 
On South Africa, the Coundl has just presen-
ted a set of initial measures, in the context of 
the cooperation between the Union and 
South Africa, to the new government. A con-
ference on regional cooperation in Southern 
Africa will take place in Beriin on 6-7 Sep-
tember. 
On the subject of human rights, the Commit-
tee of Permanent Representatives of the 
Member States (Coreper) has been given the 
task of studying proposed improvements to 
administrative procedures so as to allow the 
Union to react rapidly, in cases where such 
rights have been seriously violated. 
As regards migration and development, the 
Council asked the Commission to establish a 
working timetable for the adopting of a Com-
munity policy aimed at reducing migratory 
pressures from countries of the South to those 
of the North. The Commission recently for-
warded a communication on this subject to 
the Council. This proposes that the general 
orientations of Community policy should ¡n-
dude assistance in the fight against unemploy-
ment, better integration of women and 
young people, the reintegration of emigrants 
and tackling the problem of overpopulation in 
the countries concerned. 
COMMON FOREIGN 
AND SECURITY 
POLICY  I 
framework of its Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy (CFSP), recently issued the follow-
ing statements on events of international 
interest : 
Statement on Rwanda 
25 April 1994 
The European Union, recalling its declaration 
of 18 April 1994 on Rwanda, appeals urgently 
to all parties to the conflict to bring an early 
end to the continuing violence in Rwanda. 
The European Union expresses its full support 
for Security Council Resolution 912 and calls 
on all parties to cooperate in its implemen-
tation. The European Union expresses its ap-
probation and support for the efforts of the 
OAU and to President Mwinyi of Tanzania for 
his initiative in convening on 23 April a re-
gional conference to which the authorities of 
Rwanda and the RPF will be invited. 
The European Union urges the two sides to 
agree on the need to respect the Arusha ag-
reement, which offers the best available basis 
for national reconciliation. 
For its part, the European Union is ready to 
assist in humanitarian aid as soon as a degree 
of normality has been restored and the par-
ties involved have demonstrated their willing-
ness to respect the Arusha agreement. 
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25 April 1994 
The European Union welcomes the successful 
holding of the constituent assembly elections 
in Uganda on 28 March 1994. 
The European Union notes with satisfaction 
that the people of Uganda were able, in 
great numbers and in a peaceful manner, to 
exercise their democratic right to vote and 
that the international observers were able to 
accomplish their mission. Whilst there were 
blemishes in the election process, both of an 
organisational and a political character which 
will need addressing in due course, the elec-
tions were conducted in a satisfactory degree 
of transparency and the results by and large 
reflect the popular will. 
The European Union considers that the elec-
tions mark an important step in Uganda's de-
mocratic evolution, as it proceeds down the 
path of elaborating a new constitution and 
holding legislative and presidential elections. 
Statement on Rwanda 
5 May 1994 
The European Union, recalling its declaration 
of 18 April 1994 on Rwanda, appeals urgently 
to all parties to the conflict to bring an early 
end to the continuing violence in Rwanda. 
The European Union expresses its full support 
for Security Council resolution 912 (1994) as 
well as for the statement of the President of 
the Security Council of 30 April and calls on 
all parties to abide by them and to cooperate 
in their implementation. 
The European Union expresses its appreciation 
and support for the efforts of the OAU and 
to President Mwinyi of Tanzania for his initia-
tive in convening on 3 May 1994 a new round 
of talks of a regional conference, to which 
both the authorities of Rwanda and the RPF 
have been invited. 
The European Union urges the two sides to 
agree on the need to respect the Arusha ag-
reement, which offers the best available basis 
for national reconciliation. 
For its part, the European Union is ready to 
assist in humanitarian aid as soon as a degree 
of normality has been restored and the par-
ties involved have demonstrated their willing-
ness to respect the Arusha agreement. 
Statement on South Africa 
6 May 1994 
The European Union warmly welcomes the 
holding of the first democratic elections in 
South Africa and congratulates all the people 
of South Africa and its leaders on this historic 
occasion. 
The European Union is ready to support the 
efforts of the new government to accomplish 
the goal of leading the country to a democ-
ratic and non-radal society in which respect 
for human rights, the rights of minorities and 
the rule of law, the promotion of social justice 
and the elimination of all forms of discrimi-
nation, will prevail. 
Furthermore, the European Union recalls its 
ministerial decision of 19 April 1994, in which 
it pledged a package of immediate measures 
for the new South Africa. These will focus on 
a dialogue centred on important sectors for 
the new South Africa, such as trade, economic 
cooperation and development cooperation, in 
order to provide support for addressing the 
immediate needs of South Africans. The meas-
ures will be coupled with the commencement 
of a political dialogue, in order to enhance 
and consolidate the democratic institutions 
upon whidi the new South African society 
will build its future. 
The European Union rejoices for the new era 
into which South Africa has officially entered. 
It is confident that this era will be characte-
rised by adherence to commitments made 
during the negotiating process and urges the 
South Africans to continue to find solutions 
through dialogue and peaceful means. 
The European Union expresses the hope that 
the new South African government will do its 
utmost to address the legitimate aspirations 
of all South Africans, who have dreamt and 
fought for this day, and whom it now 
represents. 
Statement on Rwanda 
16 May 1994 
The European Union, recalling its declaration 
of 18 April on Rwanda, again appeals urgently 
to all parties to the conflict to bring an end 
to the genocide now taking place in the 
country. 
The European Union expresses its full support 
for the United Nations' humanitarian efforts 
and in this context welcomes the resolution 
that is currently before the Security Council. 
The European Union looks forward to an 
urgent decision on measures which can be im-
plemented soon. 
The European Union welcomes the initiative 
of the UN High Commissioner on Human 
Rights to carry out a mission to both Rwanda 
and Burundi and supports the call for a special 
meeting of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights. 
The European Union expresses its support and 
appreciation for the efforts of the OAU and 
to President Mwinyi of Tanzania for their ini-
tiatives in convening a regional conference, to 
which both the authorities of Rwanda and 
the RPF will be invited. 
The European Union urges the two sides to 
agree on the need to respect the Arusha ag-
reement, which, through the way of negoti-
ation, offers the best available basis for 
national reconciliation. In this context the 
European Union supports the call for the early 
imposition of an arms embargo on Rwanda, 
and calls on all concerned to refrain from any 
action that is liable to exacerbate the situ-
ation. 
The European Union is eager to increase its 
humanitarian aid whenever and wherever 
such aid can be brought to the populations 
that have suffered so cruelly from the vio-
lence. In this respect it will continue its im-
mediate assistance to refugees in the neigh-
bouring countries. Equally, it will endeavour, 
where conditions allow, to assist the stricken 
population within Rwanda. 
On 6 May, the European Union decided to dis-
patch a Troika mission of Development Minis-
ters, to visit as soon as possible the countries 
bordering Rwanda, with a view to evaluating 
the humanitarian situation in the light of the 
influx of refugees. 
Statement on Haiti 
27 May 1994 
The European Union condemns the provisional 
investiture of Emile Jonassaint, President of 
the Supreme Court of Haiti, as President of 
the Republic, by a faction in the Haitian 
Senate. 
The European Union regards this appointment 
as unconstitutional and reaffirms its full sup-
port for the efforts of both the United 
Nations, in particular through Security Council 
Resolution 917, and the Organisation of 
American States, to restore democracy and re-
spect for human rights in Haiti and to bring 
about the return of the legitimately elected 
President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 
Given that the investiture of Mr Jonassaint is 
in blatant defiance of the international com-
munity, thereby justifying the additional em-
bargo measures recently approved by the UN 
Security Council, the European Union joins the 
Security Council in stressing that persons par-
ticipating in illegal governments since the 
1991 coup are subject to the measures provi-
ded for in Resolution 917. 
Statement on Malawi 
27 May 1994 
The European Union congratulates the people 
of Malawi, their leaders and members of all 
political parties on the successful transition to 
a democratic system of government. In this 
context, the EU welcomes the holding of pre-
sidential and parliamentary elections on May 
17, in which there was broad participation by 
the people of Malawi, thus demonstrating 
their commitment to peaceful change. 
The European Union also appreciates the 
peaceful and orderly way in which the elec-
tions were held under the supervision of the 
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result as the free expression of the people's 
will. 
The European Union appeals to all parties to 
work together in their respective roles, in a 
spirit of cooperation, tolerance, mutual trust 
and nation-building, and expresses satisfaction 
at the entry into force of a new Constitution 
on May 18, which firmly entrenches the pro-
tection of human rights, a pluralistic system of 
government and the independence of the 
judiciary. 
The European Union recalls that it has consis-
tently encouraged and supported the pro-
•motion of human rights and the advancement 
of accountable, democratic and transparent 
government in Malawi. It reiterates its deter-
mination to support, in close cooperation with 
other bilateral and multilateral donors, Ma-
lawi's efforts to tackle its problem of poverty 
and to achieve economic stability and social 
progress. 
The European Union is ready to assist the de-
mocratically elected government in assuring 
the protection of human rights, strengthening 
the new democratic institutions and fostering 
the political culture of pluralism and tolerance. 
Statement on South Africa 
27 May 1994 
The European Union, wishing to assist the 
new South African government, taking into 
account the decision of the UN Security Coun-
cil of 25 May 1994 concerning the lifting on 
UN sanctions, and following the decision of its 
General Affairs Council of 18-19 April, has de-
cided to lift all remaining restrictive measures 
in place against South Africa. 
GENERAL 
INFORMATION 
Mr Marin visits Cuba 
Vice-President of the Commission, Manuel 
Marin, was in Cuba on 27-29 April on a visit 
which is expected to have important con-
sequences, notably as regards the organisation 
and strengthening of the EU's humanitarian 
assistance to this country. 
In Havana, Mr Marin inaugurated a liaison 
office for ECHO (the European Community 
Humanitarian Office) which will work in 
cooperation with NGOs already operating in 
the field. The office will be able to intervene 
autonomously in accordance with a set of 
competences agreed with the Cuban author-
ities. The opening of this 'antenna' follows a 
technical evaluation mission to Cuba which 
was undertaken in March on behalf of the 
Commission, and which identified serious 
problems facing the population including pro-
tein deficiencies, epidemics and increased mor-
tality rates particularly among children. 
ECHO has already had significant involvement 
in Cuba, committing some ECU 7.8 million 
during 1993, to help combat in particular an 
epidemic of optical neuritis. The plan is for 
this medical assistance to be developed and 
increased in 1994. The newly-established office 
will manage the aid in close liaison with NGOs 
working on the ground (The Red Cross, Ca-
ritas, Médecins sans frontières and Medicus 
Mundi). 
A further element of the visit concerned the 
evolution of relations between the European 
Union and Cuba. Mr Marin had a long meet-
ing with President Castro and also had discus-
sions with the Minister of External Affairs, 
Trade and the Economy. These meetings pro-
vided an opportunity for a broad exchange of 
views on the humanitarian situation, but also 
on the economic and political prospects for 
the country. 
During the press conference which took place 
after the discussions, Mr Marin indicated that 
he was not in Cuba to talk about any hypo-
thetical cooperation agreement. The negoti-
ation of such an agreement, he said 'would 
presuppose a transformation of the economy 
and political conditions which have not been 
met'. He had, he stated, spoken with the Pre-
sident about 'the way in which the European 
Union could contribute to the opening-up and 
progressive transformation of the Cuban 
economy into a market economy.' 
The Commission Vice-President went on to 
stress that it was for the Cubans themselves 
to define this opening-up process. 'The EU can 
establish a framework for assistance and tech-
nical advice, having acquired considerable ex-
perience in other 'transition' situations, but 
we need first to analyse the Cuban Govern-
ment's reform programme.' 
He concluded his statement to the press by 
saying ; 'I believe that Cuba is at a crucial 
moment in its history, where it needs to 
make courageous responses at the political 
level. 
It is evident that the world has changed and 
Cuba itself also needs to change. I hope that 
the opening up of the economy will be an im-
portant element in stimulating and accelerat-
ing a political opening. The recent efforts at 
working with the exile community, whilst of 
limited scope, represent a step in the right 
direction. Cuba must continue to follow the 
path of reconciliation.' 
Commission-US meeting 
on Horn of Africa 
On 3 June, Vice President Marin met with 
Mr Brian Atwood, who is Administrator of 
USAID and President Clinton's Special Envoy 
for the Horn of Africa. 
The main purpose of Mr Atwood's visit was 
to coordinate the activities of the United 
States and the European Commission concern-
ing aid in general and in the Horn of Africa in 
particular. The Special Envoy explained that, 
in his opinion, crisis prevention should form 
the backbone of international cooperation. In 
Africa, the US administration was focusing on 
the Horn where the situation is a cause of 
concern. 
UN agencies (the FAO and WFP) estimate that 
between 4.5 million and 4.7 million people 
may be threatened by famine in the region. 
The food aid needs for 1994 are estimated at 
2.24 million tons (Ethiopia — 1.19m, Sudan 
0.575m, Eritrea 0.3m, Somalia 0.175m). 
Global donor pledges to date amount to 
1.52 million tons of which 0.462m is from the 
Commission food aid budget. As recently as 
24 May, the Commission pledged 80 000 tons 
(ECU 20m) of direct food aid for Ethiopia. 
Vice President Marin and Mr Atwood decided 
to establish regular contacts between their re-
spective administrations. Henceforth, US and 
Commission officials will meet twice a year to 
discuss issues ranging from joint assessment of 
aid requirements to improvement of food se-
curity and disaster prevention. 
As regards the Horn of Africa, Mr Marin ex-
plained to Mr Atwood the initiatives that the 
Commission has taken, particularly since the 
famine of the mid-1980s. These related to 
food early warning systems, food security and 
market liberalisation programmes and trans-
port infrastructure to facilitate the distribution 
of aid. 
Since the European Community Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO) became fully operational at the 
beginning of 1993, it has become clear that 
the two biggest donors of international hu-
manitarian aid could work together in this 
field. It is now proposed to extend this 
cooperation beyond humanitarian aid to 
tackle longer term issues, and to establish re-
gular contacts between the two administ-
rations with this in mind. 
Commission-UNFPA meeting 
On 9 June, Vice President Marin met with 
Dr Nafis Sadik who is Director of the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in her ca-
pacity as Secretary-General of the UN Confer-
ence on Population and Development which 
will be held in Cairo in September. 
ht 
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of the Commission to deepen its support for 
the UN Population Fund, and its full support 
for the objectives of the Conference. He 
underlined the point that population prob-
lems had to be approached realistically, with 
an open mind and in accordance with the 
needs of the developing countries. 
The UNFPA was established in 1969 and is the 
largest multilateral agency for population ac-
tivities, with an annual budget of some ECU 
200m. UNFPA undertakes projects and prog-
rammes in almost all developing countries. In 
1993, the Commission committed ECU 18.6m 
to UNFPA and it has also contributed to the 
special budget of the Cairo Conference. 
In May, the Commission, at the initiative of 
Mr Marin, introduced a communication on the 
European Union position on population 
growth. In this document, the Commission 
stressed the need for a substantial increase in 
public development assistance to population 
programmes by the year 2000. Currently, the 
Member States spend approximately ECU 
200m a year (0.4% of total development assis-
HUMANITARIAN 
AID 
tance). It is proposed that the increase should 
be attained both through new funds and 
through the redistribution of existing resour-
ces. 
Present demographic trends show global 
population growth declining from 2.1% per 
annum in 1965-70 to 1.7% today. However, 
no decline has been recorded in sub-Saharan 
Africa (3%) or North Africa and the Middle 
East (3%). Between 1991 and 2000 the world 
will gain an additional 1 billion inhabitants — 
the equivalent of the entire population of the 
world at the beginning of the 19th century. 
In its communication, the Commission has set 
a target of ECU 300m as a minimum for 
annual expenditure in this area, to be financ-
ed from the resources both of the EC budget 
and the Lomé Convention. 
Population policies essentially have three ele-
ments : social policy directed towards health 
and education ; the provision of information 
on family planning ; and increasing the avail-
ability of family planning and contraceptive 
devices. 
Rwanda 
A comprehensive regional humanitarian 
aid programme 
In view of the scale of the Rwandan crisis, the Commission has decided to implement a com-
prehensive regional humanitarian aid plan to help those affected throughout the Great Lakes 
region. 
Under this plan, a commitment of ECU 19 million has just been agreed. This is in addition to 
the ECU 10m allocated to the UN High Commission for Refugees (decision of 27 May) giving a 
total, in initial assistance, of ECU 29m. This is intended to provide assistance, for a period of 
three months, to Rwandan and Burundian refugees in Burundi (430 000), Rwanda (80 000), 
Tanzania (410 000), Zaire (130 000) and Uganda (8000). 
A further sum of ECU 3m, which has been directed through the ICRC to help victims in the 
conflict zone, can be added to this figure. 
Since 6 April, humanitarian aid to the value of ECU 35.73m has been provided by the Euro-
pean Community to help the populations affected. Aid from the individual Member States of 
the EU has reached almost ECU 30m. 
ECHO aircraft for East Africa 
The week commendng 16 May saw the arrival 
of four aircraft, operated by the European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), in 
Nairobi (Kenya), Djibouti and Mogadishu (So-
malia). The aeroplanes will, henceforth, pro-
vide a regular link for the humanitarian agen-
des with cities and other destinations in So-
malia as well as with Lockichoggio in Kenya 
which is the support base for humanitarian 
operations in southern Sudan. 
This pilot project to provide regional assist-
ance using aircraft was agreed by the Com-
mission on 12 April and responds to a concern 
for more efficient and secure transport of the 
EU's humanitarian assistance in this region. 
The project is initially for a period of five 
months, and the sum allocated for this pur-
pose is ECU 2.5 million. 
It is important to recall that aid deliveries and 
movements of humanitarian personnel in So-
malia are generally done by air, for obvious 
reasons associated with security, the distances 
that need to be travelled, and the lack of 
infrastructure. 
Hitherto, ECHO has helped to finance trans-
port which has been organised on an ad hoc 
basis either by NGOs operating in Somalia or 
through private initiatives. 
As a result of the decision which has just been 
implemented, ECHO has now assumed finan-
cial and operational responsibility for a re-
gional transport system. With one medium-
sized plane (capable of carrying 6 tonnes of 
supplies or 30 passengers) and three smaller 
aircraft (capacity : 2.5 tonnes or ten passen-
gers) a better and more regular service, co-
ordinated with the humanitarian agencies and 
meeting the logistical requirements, can be 
assured. 
Aid decisions 
The Commission has recently taken the fol-
lowing decisions to provide humanitarian aid 
(including emergency and food aid) : 
ACP countries 
Chad: ECU 287 000 to provide food aid for 
victims of the drought in the Kanem area, to 
the east of N'Djamena. 
Liberia: ECU 236 000 for additional shelters 
and basic sanitary installations in the Buch-
anan refugee camp and for the setting-up of 
nutritional centres in the town of Bong Mines. 
Liberia : ECU 133 000 for medical aid to a hos-
pital and 12 health centres in the Cape Mount 
district. 
Malawi: ECU 3.74 million to help Mozambican 
refugees in the country. The aid will be used, 
among other things, to maintain access roads 
to the reception areas, provide sanitary instal-
lations and equipment and support schools. 
Nigeria: ECU 340 000 to build huts in the 
south of the country for people displaced as a 
result of ethnic conflicts. 
Sierra Leone: ECU 973 000 to supply food aid 
for displaced people in the town of Kenema. 
Somalia: ECU 688 000 to help victims of the 
civil war. The aid will be used to counter a 
cholera epidemic in Giohar, ensure the func-
tioning of a hospital in the Gedo region and 
provide basic health care in the town of 
Borhache. 
Somalia: ECU 165 000 to cover, for a six-
month period, the costs of storage in Nairobi 
(Kenya), and transport, of medicines. These 
cannot be stored in Mogadishu because of the 
prevailing insecurity. 
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A summary of 
aid provided 
The European Commission has just decided to 
allocate a further ECU 47.34m to help victims 
of the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia. This brings 
the total amount of humanitarian aid provi­
ded to more than ECU 762m ($900 million 
approx.) since the beginning of the war. The 
annual breakdown so far is as follows : 
Year  Amount (ECU thousands) % 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
13 000 
277 000 
396 000 
76 015 
2 
36 
52 
10 
TOTAL  762 015 Ί  100 
1 This does not include the cost of the European Union's 
common action agreed by the Council on 22 December 
1993, of which ECU 14.3m falls under the budget of the 
European Community. 
Somalia: ECU 1.153 million to continue and 
extend, for a period of six months, four med­
ical/nutritional projects, three of which are in 
Mogadishu. 
Sudan : ECU 17 million towards a global hu­
manitarian aid plan designed to help victims 
of the continuing conflict in the country. 
Tanzania: ECU 680 000 to help Rwandan re­
fugees with medical assistance, medicines and 
basic essentials. 
Tanzania: ECU 450 000 to help Rwandan re­
fugees meet their immediate needs, particul­
arly as regards access to drinking water. 
Togo: ECU 200 000 for immediate assistance 
to Ghanaian refugees who have taken refuge 
in the north-west of the country following 
the ethnic conflict in northern Ghana. 
Zaire: ECU 320 000 to help people of Kasai 
origin who have been expelled from Shaba to 
Kananga. The aid will be used, in particular, 
to provide water and medicines. 
Non-ACP countries 
Bolivia: ECU 230 000 in the form of food and 
medical aid to help isolated rural communities 
affected by the torrential rains in the La Paz 
and Cochabamba departments. 
Bolivia: ECU 250 000 in further aid to comple­
ment the above. 
Peru: ECU 780 000 to help victims of the 
recent floods in the north of the country and 
for essential medical assistance for people in 
the Satipo province, north-east of Lima, who 
have been displaced as a result of terrorist ac­
tions. 
he aid most recently agreed will be divided 
as follows : 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: ECU 21.2m. A large part 
of this will be in the form of medical assist­
ance — medicines and equipment, the provi­
sion of services and training actions. The hy­
giene programmes currently under way will 
be completed and a number of special psycho­
social and educational projects will be deve­
loped. 
Croatia: ECU 11.29m. ECU 6m of this will be 
for an initial coordinated programme involv­
ing the Community's 'Task Force' (ECTF) and 
the NGOs which will cover the full range of 
hygiene requirements. In addition, a number 
of medical and psycho-social actions will be 
extended. 
Serbia/Montenegro: ECU 14.85m. ECU 8m of 
this has been set aside to provide basic food­
stuffs to some 380 000 refugees and 150 000 
others who are now in need following the 
deterioration in living conditions in the 
country. 
Armenia: ECU 200 000 to maintain, for a six-
month period, three centres for handicapped 
people in Yerevan, Gueremavan and Vartenis. 
Kirghizistan: ECU 250000 to buy tents for 
victims of floods, landslides and avalanches 
provoked by the spring thaw. 
Russia: ECU 940000 to extend for a further 
six months, a project to provide hot meals for 
indigent people in Moscow. 
Tadjikistan: ECU 360 000 for a drinking water 
and sanitation programme to help people dis­
placed by the civil war. 
Ukraine: ECU 350 000 for medical aid to help 
child victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. 
Algeria: ECU 550 0O0 to provide food aid and 
basic essentials for Tuareg refugees from Niger 
and Mali in the south of the country. 
Palestine: ECU 2.4 million for medical aid for 
the people of the West Bank and Gaza, in 
the form of medicine supplies, medical equip­
ment and technical assistance. 
Yemen: ECU 300 000 in medical aid for vic­
tims of the civil war. 
Yemen: ECU 200 000 to take care of the 
wounded in two camps, to provide basic es­
sentials for displaced persons and to help 
Somali refugees in the country (in the Al 
Kawd camp). 
Afghanistan: ECU 1 million for essential 
equipment and medical supplies for displaced 
people. 
Bangladesh: ECU 500 000 to provide basic es­
sentials for victims of the recent cyclone. 
Laos: ECU 1.5 million to help victims of the 
drought which has led a shortfall in rice 
production. 
Pakistan : ECU 715 000 to help Afghan re­
fugees in the country by increasing the ca­
pacity of the Nasirbagh reception camp in the 
Peshawar district. 
FOOD 
AID 
The Commission took a decision to finance food aid as set out in the chart which 
follows : 
185 
2042 
4000 
85O0 
250 
2948 
1800 
2 million (for one co-financing action) 
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Information Bulletin from the Centre  for the Development of Industry 
CDI Day at the ACP House 
Plea for a new impetus 
The presentation of the CDI's 1993 Annual Report last May gave rise to a con-
sensus of opinions in favour of redefining the financial resources available to the 
CDI, in order to fully respond to the needs of ACP countries. 
he CDI presented its 
1993 annual report on 
10 May 1994 at ACP House 
in Brussels. In his opening 
speech, the Centre's Direc-
tor, Mr Paul Frix, pointed 
to better project evaluation 
and greater proximity as be-
ing the CDI's main assets for 
developing the private sec-
tor*. He also noted that, 
despite the fact that the 
Centre's reputation is now 
beginning to be acknowl-
edged, the future will de-
pend on a growing general 
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full version of this issue of Partner-
ship can be obtained on request to 
fax: + 32 2 675 26 03. 
awareness of the need to pro-
mote the emergence of a 
large class of industrial en-
trepreneurs, principally in 
ACP countries. He ex-
pressed the hope that, dur-
ing negotiations for the sec-
ond Lomé IV financial 
protocol such an awareness 
would result, in material 
terms, in a strengthening of 
CDI resources, especially on 
the ground in the ACP coun-
tries themselves. 
Mr Frix was also delighted at 
the emergence of South Afri-
ca, a country which could 
provide the main driving 
force behind the renewed 
growth Africa so much 
needs, and he expressed the 
wish that the CDI's mandate 
be extended to encompass 
the possibility of South Afri-
ca becoming an additional 
source of technology, part-
nerships and co-funding for 
ACP countries. 
In his address, Mr Ghebray 
Berhane, Secretary General of 
the ACP Group of States, stat-
ed that the Centre does not 
currently have enough re-
sources at its disposal to satis-
fy the needs of all ACP coun-
tries, and that it should be 
given such resources. He also 
supported the CDI Director's 
appeal for improving the Cen-
tre's access to Convention re-
sources, in order to give it the 
means to satisfy the growing 
demands of countries which 
look to it for assistance. 
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On the rostrum: CDI Deputy Director Mr S. Sharma: Dr G. Berhane. 
Secretary-General, ACP Group of States: CDl Director Mr P. Frix; Mr 
R. Andrews, member of the CDI's Joint Executive Board: and Airs N. 
Koutrakou. Co-chairman of the ACP-EU Committee on Industrial Coop-
eration. 
A long term mission 
Mrs Niki Koutrakou, Co-
chairman of the ACP-EU 
Committee on Industrial 
Cooperation, who was 
speaking on behalf of the 
Greek Presidency of the 
Council of the European 
Union, welcomed positive 
developments in the CDI, 
which was considered as «a 
vital link in the chain bet-
ween the Commission and 
the EIB» (see our «Opin-
ion» column on page 2). 
Finally, Mr Richardson An-
drews, member of the CDI's 
Joint Executive Board, who 
chaired the meeting, under-
lined the fact that the CDI 
suffers from one major 
weakness - it is an institu-
tion for developing long-
term policies, whereas its 
own statutes, management 
and resources are short-
term, changing every five 
years... The Centre there-
fore remains in a permanent 
state of infancy quite un-
suited to current require-
ments which are essentially 
to give priority to promot-
ing the private sector. Ac-
cording to Mr Andrews, a 
more appropriate structure 
is the only way for the Cen-
tre to have any real impact 
on promoting SMEs which 
are the key to the develop-
ment of the countries re-
ceiving support. ■ 
* An article on the CDV s 1993 
financial results appears in 
Partnership number 13, provid-
ing a detailed analysis by its Di-
rector, Air Frix. of the Centre's 
'93 performance and'its prospects 
for 1994. 
Partnership No 14 -July/August 1994 Madagascar 
Projects are beginning to 
bloom on the 'Big Island' 
uring four days in April 
1994, the hotel hosting 
the Madagascar International 
Industrial Forum (FIMAG) 
was a hive of activity and a fo-
cal point for business life on the 
island. Candidate business 
partners had travelled in from 
the four corners of the island to 
defend their dossiers and meet 
the partners they were looking 
for. Following the opening 
day's speeches, the rest of the 
forum was given over entirely 
to meetings between econom-
ic players from North and 
South. 
In his speech inaugurating the 
Forum, CDI Director Mr Paul 
Frix emphasized the island's 
pivotal position between Afri-
ca and South-East Asia, as well 
as its proximity with a rapidly 
changing South Africa. Nor 
did he forget to mention the pi-
oneering work carried out in 
Madagascar by CDI, which for 
a number of years has provided 
assistance - in many cases in 
cooperation with the Caisse 
française de développement - to 
some fifty or so local enterpris-
es, whilst helping them set up 
partnerships with European 
enterprises. 
The CDI was anxious to play a 
very active role in this Forum, 
and although it was not the di-
rect organiser, it was very much 
in evidence. 
An International Industrial Forum was held for the 
first time in Madagascar from 12 to 15 April last. 
Organised by UNIDO, it also received support from the 
CDL 
The prominent Pro-Bo maize mill stand at FIMAG presented samples of maize 
flour and semolina. Technical assistance from CDI has helped Pro-Bo meet the 
growing demand on the island for its products. 
A full time office was staffed by 
Mrs Mary-Jane Caudron, CDI's 
country officer for Madagascar, 
Mrs Acquah Dodet Malenge, 
in charge of the textile and 
leather sectors and Mr Paul 
Chotard, responsible for the 
agro-food sector. 
An assessment 
The outcome of FIMAG can be summed up in a few figures. 
486 participants, 307 of them from abroad and around 2,000 
business meetings. These figures prove the success of the op-
eration in attracting foreign investors by promoting the 
business opportunities offered by this island since it started 
down the road to economic liberalisation. 
Milestones 
1985: Madagascar takes the road towards economic 
liberalisation. 
1989: Adoption of the new investment law. 
1990: The free zone system becomes operational. 
1993: A new political regime is elected in the spring. 
Four testimonies 
Four Malagasy companies (Le-
cofruit - gherkins and green 
beans, Joie - children's clothes, 
Macotex - sportswear and Pro-
Bo - maize flour) told of the sig-
nificant assistance provided by 
CDI in the area of personnel 
management and training, and 
the determinant role which this 
had played in theirgrowth. The 
Centre had also invited a dozen 
enterprises from the European 
Union and Mauritius in what it 
believed to be three key sectors: 
aromatic plants, shrimp food, 
and textiles/garments. 
But it is still early days yet. The 
country needs to keep its prom-
ises and prove that it is irrever-
sibly committed to the process 
of economic liberalization. If it 
wants to attract investors, it 
must first of all guarantee them 
a safe economic environment, 
and stable administrative, legal 
and fiscal frameworks. 
In his closing speech, Mr Frix 
looked forward to the follow-up 
to the Forum, and promised fu-
ture partners the help of the 
Centre's technical services, 
with a special emphasis on 
CDI's specialist segments: food 
and food processing - including 
fisheries and aquaculture, ani-
mal feedstuffs, aromas and es-
sential oils, textiles and gar-
ment-making. I 
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Productive fishing 
at Walvis Bay 
A new professional meeting on the fishing sector was or-
ganised by the CDI, this time at Walvis Bay, Namibia, 
in April 1994. In this newly independent country, the 
fishing sector has been entirely restructured, and Europe-
an companies are showing interest in establishing busi-
ness links. 
his meeting between 
European and Namib-
ian fishing industry profes-
sionals which took place from 
25 to 27 April 1994 was 
an outright success. This 
was undoubtedly due to 
the meticulous prepara-
tory work carried out in 
the field prior to the 
event. 
Close cooperation with 
an expert working with 
the Namibian Ministry 
for Fisheries allowed to 
realistically assess local 
conditions and needs, as 
well as to make a judi-
cious selection of Na-
mibian producers who 
are effectively in a posi-
tion to export their prod-
ucts. 
The Walvis Bay meeting days 
focused on direct contacts bet-
ween businessmen and visits to 
firms. One example which il-
lustrates their pragmatic ap-
proach was the visit of Europe-
an participants to Luderitz, 
another important Namibian 
fishing port. The initial plan 
was changed to accommodate 
popular demand... 
In total, 18 Namibian firms 
were directly involved in the 
meetings - 14 in Walvis Bay 
deals were concluded between 
some of those present. These 
are good results which meet 
the expectations of the Namib-
ian government. 
Namibia's advantages 
The fishery meetings last April 
took place at a key time for Na-
mibia. Shortly beforehand, 
new fishing firms had received 
Fish caught in Namibian waters can easily be sold on European markets. 
and 4 at Luderitz. Europe was 
represented by 10 companies, 
among them market leaders in 
the European fishing sector: 
two Portuguese, two Spanish, 
two British, one French, one 
Danish, one Belgian and one 
Italian. 
Without breaching the rules of 
confidentiality, we are able to 
reveal that several business 
operating licences. The idea of 
the Namibian government was 
to encourage these firms to deal 
with a broader range of Euro-
pean countries. Up until now, 
most of the business dealings 
of Namibian fishery firms 
have been with Spain. 
Interest from European 
firms in these trade meetings 
was no less keen. Fish caught 
off Namibia (particularly 
hake) resemble the species 
found in today's overfished 
European waters. Another 
advantage is that Walvis 
Bay, formerly a military 
zone, has its own airport and 
good road links. 
New opportunities 
Last April's business meetings 
were far from fruitless. 
With the support of the 
CDI, several Namibian 
fishery firms were invit-
ed to a trade fair held 
last June in Bremen. An 
extensive market for 
frozen hake exists in 
Germany. 
It now remains for Na-
mibia to rise to the chal-
lenge of improving the 
quality of on-site fish 
processing, which pro-
vides added value to lo-
cal fishing and creates 
new jobs. 
At the end of 1995, Eu-
rope will be imposing new heal-
th regulations for imported fish. 
For Namibia as well as for oth-
er ACP countries, factories need 
to be brought up to standard. A 
Namibian organisation is due 
to receive European certifica-
tion to authorise it to carry out 
controls. The necessary prepar-
atory work is under way with 
CDI assistance... 
Partnership No 14 -July/August 1994 Mauritius 
Improving the productivity 
of textile companies 
extile industries in the 
Mauritius free zone 
were confronted with serious 
productivity problems. The 
source of the difficulties need-
ed to be carefully identified and 
targeted assistance provided. 
This is just what the CDI did 
to help these companies raise 
their productivity levels. 
Over the past ten years the in-
dustrial free zone has been the 
driving force behind industri-
al growth on Mauritius. The 
annual growth rate was around 
15%. The free zone provided 
employment for 90,000 peo-
ple, 90% of them in the textile 
and clothing sector. 
However, wage costs have re-
cently risen, reducing the com-
parative advantage enjoyed by 
the country, and access to 
American and European mar-
kets has become more difficult. 
As a result, a significant num-
ber of export-oriented textile 
companies have closed down 
over the past few years. 
Urgent action had therefore to 
be taken to raise productivity 
to compensate for the loss of 
comparative advantage in 
wage levels. The CDI lent its 
assistance to this vital objective 
for the Mauritian economy. 
The first step in this operation, 
also supported by the Europe-
an Commission, involved the 
EPDZA (Export Processing 
Development Zone Author-
ity), an i nstitution set up by the 
Mauritian authorities to sup-
port SMEs in the free zone. The 
EPDZA selected twenty prior-
ity companies and an initial ex-
amination of the problems was 
undertaken with visits to these 
companies. 
Following this assessment, 
twelve SMEs (out of 
the twenty) were se-
lected to benefit from 
an assistance pro-
gramme. Over a pe-
riod of 45 weeks, 
three specialists in 
quality manage-
ment, clothing man-
ufacturing tech-
niques, and design 
and marketing re-
spectively were made Training 
available to these en- **?*«· at 
■ ι factory.  terprises to help
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them overcome their 
major handicaps: low pro-
ductivity, inadequate work-
ing practices and insuffi-
cient training. 
This intervention proved to be 
well worthwhile. At the be-
ginning of 1994 productivity 
gains of between 7 and 50% 
were being recorded, depend-
staff in more efficient production tech-
the Manupan trouser manufacturing 
ing on the company. 
These first successes certainly 
illustrate the sound basis of the 
CDI approach which concen-
trates its attention on a specif-
icsectorafter having identified 
and grouped together the 
companies with the most ur-
gent need for assistance. I 
T h  m 
A new form of assistance 
n the Comoros Islands, 
a small country with no 
real traditional industry, the 
CDI supported an existing or-
ganisation, the Centre d'appui 
au secteur privé (CASP - Pri-
vate Sector Support Centre). 
The objective: to make on-the-
spot integrated assistance ser-
vices available to local SMEs. 
«Working with ...» These two 
words sum up the philosophy 
of the Centre when providing 
assistance in this Indian Ocean 
archipelago. In June 1992, The 
UNDP/ILO (United Nations 
Development Programme/ 
International Labour Organ-
isation) set up the CASP, a pri-
vate sector support centre, in 
the Comoros Islands. The 
CASP is a one-stop shop offer-
ing integrated services to 
micro-enterprises and local 
SMEs in the shape of project 
start-up support and assistance 
for companies in difficulty. 
At the end of 1992, a coopera-
tion agreement was concluded 
making the CASP a CDI corre-
spondent. Through the CASP, 
the CDI funded a visi t by an in-
dustrial engineer, Mr Henri 
Metrat, with the task of provid-
ing a wide range of direct sup-
port to companies, in 1993 and 
the beginning of 1994. 
Mr Metrac, who has multiple 
skills and a great deal of expe-
rience in the field, was not con-
Samples of products from Socorev, a ce-
ramic tile manufacturing unit which 
started up with joint support from the 
CASP and the CDL 
tent to provide assistance to 
just one company; he made 
himself available to several lo-
cal companies. In this way he 
was able to solve a number of 
technical problems seven en-
trepreneurs in sectors as diver-
se as construction materials, 
chemicals, food and food pro-
cessing, textiles, mechanical 
engineering and even paper-
making. 
The results from this form of 
on-the-spot assistance and fol-
low-up, which are both flex-
ible and decentralised, are 
clearly more significant than 
those obtained by brief, ad hoc 
visits to a single beneficiary 
company. B 
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EEC-financed development schemes 
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC 
development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows: 
Geographical breakdown 
The summary is divided into three groups of 
countries, corresponding to the main aspects of 
Community development policy: 
— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific), which signed the multilateral 
conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), 
Lomé II (31 October 1979), Lomé III (8 De-
cember 1984) and Lomé IV (15 December 
1989), plus the OCT (overseas countries and 
territories) of certain member states of the EEC, 
which get the same type of aid as the ACP 
countries; 
— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and 
Mashraq), which signed cooperation agree-
ments with the EEC since 1976 and 1977; 
— the ALA developing countries of Asia and 
Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of 
annual aid programmes. 
The information within each of these groups is 
given by recipient country (in alphabetical 
order). 
Note 
As the information provided is subject to 
modification in line with the development 
aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, 
or with the conditions laid down by the 
authorities empowered to take financial 
decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this 
summary, which is for information only. 
Information given 
The following details will usually be given for 
each development scheme: 
— the title of the project; 
— the administrative body responsible for it; 
— the estimated sum involved (prior to financing 
decision) or the amount actually provided (post 
financing decision); 
— a brief description of projects envisaged 
(construction work, supplies of equipment, 
technical assistance, etc.) ; 
— any methods of implementation (international 
invitations to tender, for example) ; 
— the stage the project has reached (identifi-
cation, appraisal, submission for financing, 
financing decision, ready for implementation). 
Main abbreviations 
Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority 
Int. tender: International invitation to 
tender 
Ace. tender: Invitation to tender (ac-
celerated procedure) 
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to 
tender 
TA: Technical assistance 
EDF: European Development Fund 
mECU: Million European currency units 
Correspondence about this operational summary can 
be sent directly to : : 
Mr. Franco Cupini 
Directorate-General for Development 
Commission of the European Communities 
G 12 4-14 
200, rue de la Loi 
B-1049 Brussels 
Please cover only one subject at a time. 
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Al Planning and public administration 
A1A Administrative buildings 
A1 Β Economie planning and policy 
A1C Assistance to the normal operations of 
government not falling under a different 
category 
A1 D Police and fire protection 
A1 E Collection and publication of statistics of all 
kinds, information and documentation 
A1 F Economic surveys, pre-investment studies 
A1G Cartography, mapping, aerial photography 
A1 H Demography and manpower studies 
A2 Development of public utilities 
A2A Power production and distribution 
A2AÌ Electricity 
A2B Water supply 
A2C Communications 
A2D Transport and navigation 
A2E Meteorology 
A2F Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-
power) 
A3 Agriculture, fishing and forestry 
A3A Agricultural production 
A3B Service to agriculture 
A3C Forestry 
A3D Fishing and hunting 
A3E Conservation and extension 
A3 F Agricultural storage 
A3G Agricultural construction 
A3H Home economics and nutrition 
A3I Land and soil surveys 
A4 Industry, mining and construction 
A4A Extractive industries 
A4Ai Petroleum and natural gas 
A4B Manufacturing 
A4C Engineering and construction 
A4D Cottage industry and handicraft 
A4E Productivity, including management, auto-
mation, accountancy, business, finance and 
investment 
A4F Non-agricultural storage and warehousing 
A4G Research in industrial technology 
A5 Trade, banking, tourism and other 
services 
A5A Agricultural development banks 
A5B 
A5C 
A5D 
A5E 
A5F 
A5G 
A5H 
A5I 
A6 
A6A 
A6B 
A6BÌ 
A6CÌ 
A6D 
A6E 
A6F 
A6G 
A6H 
A6I 
A6J 
A7 
A7A 
A7B 
A7C 
A7D 
A7E 
A7F 
A8 
A8A 
A8B 
A8C 
A8D 
A8E 
A8F 
A8G 
A8H 
A8I 
A9 
A9A 
A9B 
AIO 
Industrial development banks 
Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities 
Export promotion 
Trade, commerce and distribution 
Co-operatives (except agriculture and hous-
ing) DI 
Publishing, journalism, cinema, photog-
raphy 
Other insurance and banking 
Archaeological conservation, game reserves 
Education 
Primary and secondary education 
University and higher technical institutes 
Medical 
Teacher training 
Agricultural training 
Vocational and technical training 
Educational administration 
Pure or general research 
Scientific documentation 
Research in the field of education or training 
Subsidiary services 
Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc. 
Health 
Hospitals and clinics 
Maternal and child care 
Family planning and population-related 
research 
Other medical and dental services 
Public health administration 
Medical insurance programmes 
Social infrastructure and social wel-
fare 
Housing, urban and rural 
Community development and facilities 
Environmental sanitation 
Labour 
Social welfare, social security and other 
social schemes 
Environmental protection 
Flood control 
Land settlement 
Cultural activities 
Multisector 
River development 
Regional development projects 
Unspecified 
ACP STATES 
New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left 
Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics 
ANGOLA 
Rehabilitation national roads in the 
South-West region: Mamibe-Serra da 
Leba section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Construction. 18.5 mECU. Road rehabili-
tation by int. tender (conditional). Supply of 
equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF ANG A2d 
Health project «After urgency». 15 
mECU. T.A. to the Ministry of Health, supply 
of médecines, health projects in Luanda, 
fight against AIDS. Works, supplies, T.A. 
and training. Project in execution. 93. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF ANG 7007 A7 
Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: UTA CE-ANG. Estimated cost 
16 mECU. Identification, appraisal and exe-
cution of rehabilitation actions for rural and 
urban development. Actions managed by 
NGOs. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF ANG 6036 A2, A3 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
Livestock development. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 
mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF AB 5003 (7001) A3a 
BELIZE 
Community Development Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social 
Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation 
study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF BEL 6002 A6b 
BENIN 
Fish breeding. Applied research and 
popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: 
MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6009 A3d 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Construction works. Loti b Parakou -
Djougou road. Km 65.000- Km 136.634. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics 
et des Transports. 16 mECU. Works, super-
vision, geotechnical control, follow-up and 
evaluation. Works by int. tender. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 7004 A2d 
Beroubouay — Malanville road re-
habilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics et des Transports. 
29 mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6022/7001 A2d 
Rehabilitation of the Cotonou-Hi-
lacondji Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics et des Transports. Estimated 
cost 17 mECU. Rehabilitation works over 93 
km. Works by int. tender. Supervision, 
geotechnical control, follow-up, evaluation. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 6017 A2d 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Phase 111-94-95. Estimated cost 
9.4 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF BEN 7200/002 A1 c 
BOTSWANA 
Wildlife Conservation in Northern 
Botswana. Resp. Auth.: Department of 
Wildlife and National Parks. (DWNP). 6.800 
mECU. New tracks, construction of adminis-
trative office quarters and accommodation. 
Supply of equipment (earthmoving — trac-
tors — 4x4 pick-ups). T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF BT 6026 A3e, A5i 
Wildlife conservation and utilization 
in Central and Southern Botswana. 
Resp. Auth.: DWNP. Estimated cost 6.4 
mECU. Construction of buildings and staff 
houses, supply of equipments, T.A. and 
training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BT 6001/7001 A3e,A5i 
BURKINA FASO 
Douna Plain development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de 
l'Elevage. 2.050 mECU. EDF 2 mECU, local 
0.050 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 6005/7002 A3a 
Tougan — Ouahigouya — Mali 
border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des 
Travaux Publics. Modem earthroad. Super-
vision : short-list to be done. Estimated cost 
*13.5m ECU. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing July 94. 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7004 A2d 
Support programme to S M.E's. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie, du 
Commerce et des Mines. 10.500 mECU. 
Investments, agencies, T.A. and training, line 
of credit. Projet in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7006 A4,A5 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. 93-95. Hard currency allowance 
to import ACP and EC goods, with negative 
list. 38 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-
up. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7200 A1c 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Livestock. 9.6 mECU. 
Works for production, supply of equipments, 
T.A., training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7008 A3a 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural — Cereals. Estimated cost 
12.500 mECU. Support for institutional 
reform, works, supply of equipments, T.A., 
lines of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7009 A3a 
Sectoral Adjustment Programme — 
Agricultural— Environment. Estimated 
cost 1.950 mECU. Soil map and inventory, 
soil management and T.A. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7010 A3a 
Support project for fight against 
AIDS and STD's. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de 
la Santé. 1.350mECU. Rehabilitation works, 
■*■ supply of equipments, training. Date finan-
cing June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF BK 7013 A7b,c 
structures et transports. 1.290 mECU. 
Roads, electricity and telephone network 
■k and sanitation. Work supervision. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CV 7002 A2.A8 
Support to the start-up of the Praia's 
technical school. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Education. Direction Générale de l'En-
seignement. Estimated cost 0.980 mECU. 
TA., supply of equipments, scholar-ships. 
* Date financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF CV 6001/003 A6d 
Rural electrification - Praia. Resp. 
Auth. : Municipalité de Praia. Estimated cost 
1.457 mECU. Works and supply of equip-
ment for the electrification of 3 centres in 
Praia rurale'. (Diesel power station and LT/ 
MT distribution network). Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CV 7005 A2ai 
BURUNDI 
Ruvubu Game Development. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement, du 
Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 4 mECU. 
Supervision and management. Elimination 
of conf lictual sources between the game and 
population. Make the game accessi ble to the 
tourism. Works, supplies, T.A., training and 
awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF BU 6029 A5i 
Support project for micro-enter-
prises. 10 m ECU. Support to prepare 
technical dossiers, management follow-up. 
T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF BU 7004 A4, A5 
CAMEROON 
Support to the health services. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 
8.5 mECU. Works, supplies of medicines by 
int. tender, T.A. by restr. tender after pre-
qualification. Project in execution. 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6030 (7004) A7e 
Road maintenance programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
22.5 mECU. Maintenance in 3 regions : Tikar 
plain, Ayos-Bertoua, Yaunde. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6031 (7005) A2d 
Integrated rural development pro-
gramme in the North-East and North-
west Benoué regions. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du 
Territoire. Estimated cost 13.350 mECU. 
Works, equipments, T.A., training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6002/7001 A3a 
Development of the Mandara 
Mounts region. Resp. Auth.: Mission de 
Développement Intégré des Monts Mandara 
(MIDIMA). 9 mECU. Works, supply of 
equipments, T.A. evaluation, studies. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 6026 A3a 
General Import Programme. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and EC 
goods with negative list. 20.200 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF CM 7200/001 A1c 
CAPE VERDE 
Development of an industrial zone in 
Praia. Resp. Auth.: Ministères des Infra-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
North Region development prog-
ramme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Economie, du Plan, des Statistiques et 
de la Coopération Internationale — Minis-
tère des Eaux, Forêts, Chasse, Pêche et 
Tourisme (M.E.F.C.P.T.). 14.6 mECU. 
Works, supplies and T.A. Works by direct 
labour, supplies by int. tender, T.A. by restr. 
tender after prequalification. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CA 6002/7002 A3a 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment. General Import Programme. 
Hard currency allowance to import ACP and 
EC goods with negative list. 10 mECU. T.A. 
foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
CA 7200 A1 c 
COMOROS 
Seed, support and market-garden 
development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
l'Agriculture. Total estimated cost 5.912 
mECU. EDF 5.4 mECU, local 0.512 mECU. 
Production of improved vegetable material. 
Rural development actions, infrastructures, 
training teams. Works, supplies and T.A. 
+ Project on appraisal. Dafe foreseen for 
financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 5002(7001) A3a 
Micro-projects. Estimated total cost 3.4 
mECU, EDF 2.5 mECU, local 0.4 mECU, 
local communities 0.5 mECU. Warehouses, 
rural hydraulic and electrification, health, 
education, works, supplies, T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7102 A3a 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. 93-95. Hard currency allowance 
to import ACP and EC goods, with negative 
list. 5.500 mECU. T.A. for starting and 
follow-up. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7200 A1c 
Sea-access to the Moheli island. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Equipement — 
Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. 
3.250 mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. for 
further investigations, tender dossier and 
works supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF COM 6006/7003 A2d 
the Courier no. 146 — july-august 1994  III Development of cultivations for 
export. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dev. 
Rural. 1.900 mECU. Vanilla and improve-
ment of quality (laboratory, management 
marketing). Supply of non wood ovens. 
Crop diversification. Equipments, T.A. and 
training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COM 7004 A3a 
CHAD 
Cotton rural roads maintenance. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
7 mECU. Rehabilitation works and super-
vision. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7004 A2d 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment. General Import Programme. 
Hard currency allowance to import ACP and 
EC goods with negative list. T.A. foreseen. 
• 15.200 mECU. Date financing June 94. 
7th EDF. 
EDF CD 7200/001 A1c 
CONGO 
Support to the anticipated general 
elections. 0.200 mECU. Contribution for 
the printing of ballot papers. Imprimerie 
Nationale and Imprimerie des Armées. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF COB 7004 A1c 
Support to the Health Development 
National Programme. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istère de la Santé. 10 mECU. Construction 
and rehabilitation works, T.A., training, 
supply of equipments and medicines. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF COB 7005 A7 
Market-gardening around Brazzav-
ille. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture, 
des Eaux et Forêts, de l'Elevage et de 
l'Environnement. Agricongo. 3.400 mECU. 
Works by ace. tender, supply of agricultural 
inputs, training, evaluation, line of credit. 
* Cofinancing with France. Date financing 
June 94. 5th, 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF COB 7001 A3a 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
Health sector support programme. 
11.2 mECU. Strengthening basic care, cor-
recting balances between regions and sup-
port to decentralization. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC6011 (7001) A7 
Support programme to coastal 
cities. 28.5 mECU. Social and economic 
infrastructure, planning and management of 
municipalities. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF IVC 7002 A8a, b 
Wholesale market in Bouake. 10 
mECU. Market construction and installation 
and starting. Works and T.A. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6009(7) A5c 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. Phase II. 18.5 mECU. 
Projet in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7200 A1c 
Support to the Planning Directorate 
in the Ministère de l'Agriculture. 0.756 
*mECU. T.A., equipments, training. Date 
financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 7010 A3b 
Support programme to the 'pineap-
ple market'. Estimated cost 7.780 mECU. 
EDF 6.100 mECU, O.C.A.B. (Organisation 
Centrale des Producteurs - Exportateurs 
d'Ananas et des Bananes), 1.680 mECU. 
Works, supplies, TA., training, studies, line 
*of credit. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing July 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF IVC 6016 A3a 
* Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. Phase III. 28.800 
mECU. Hard currency allowance to import 
ACP and EC goods, with negative list. T.A. 
foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF 7200/002 A1c 
DJIBOUTI 
Fight against desertification and 
development of livestock husbandry in 
Western-Djibouti. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 
1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 6008 A3a 
Health training programme. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministère de la Santé Publique et des 
Affaires Sociales. 0.750 mECU. TA., 
scholar-ships, seminars, training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DI 7101/002 A7e 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Integrated rural development pro-
ject in the NOROESTE (PROLINO). 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EDF 
23.61 mECU. Building of earth-dams, infra-
structure, supply of equipment, T.A. and 
lines of credit. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7006 A3a 
Integrated programme to develop 
primary education at local level. Resp. 
Auth. : Secretaría de Estado de Educación, 
Bellas Artes y Cultos (SEEBAC). Total cost 8 
mECU. EDF 7 mECU, local 1 mECU. Build-
ings, equipment, T.A. Works by direct labour 
or ace. proc, the equipment will be pur-
chased locally. T.A.; short-list done. Project 
in execution.7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7007 A6a 
Integrated health programme in the 
south-east. Resp. Auth. : Secretaría de 
Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social 
(SESPAS). Total cost 9.8 mECU. EDF 8.8 
mECU, local 1 mECU. Physical health 
infrastructure by direct labour or ace. proc, 
health materials and equipment by int. 
tender, training, health education, T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7008 A7a,b,c,e 
Geological and mining development 
programme. 23 mECU. Studies, program-
mes managements, works, T.A. and evalu-
ation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO SYS 9999 A4a,e 
Hydroelectric project «Los Toros». 
Construction of an hydroelectric power 
station. Civil works, supply of electrome-
chanical and hydromechanical equipment. 
Capacity 9.2 Mw. Annual output 57.27 
Gwh. Estimated cost 25.4 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF DO 7005 A2ai 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
Essential goods import programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Presidency of the Republic. 
Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency 
allowance to import essential goods. Project 
on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF EG 0000 A1c 
Conservation and rational utilisation 
of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth. : 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, 
Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General 
for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classifi-
cation and Use Master Plan — National 
System of Conservation Units — Forest 
Training and Research Centre. T.A. and 
supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 
6th EDF. 
EDF EG 6001 A3c e, i 
Rural development programme in 
the South-East. Resp. Auth.: Ministerede 
l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies 
and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF EG 6005 (7001) A3a 
ERITREA 
Rehabilitation Programme. 3.7 
mECU. NGO projects for health, veterinary 
services, water supply and demobilization of 
* soldiers. Date financing April 94. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF ERY 7255 A7,A8 
ETHIOPIA 
Strengthening of water supply and 
sanitation in Addis Ababa. Resp. Auth.: 
Addis Ababa Water Supply and Sewerage 
Authority. Estimated cost 1.990 mECU. 
Supply of metering and control equipment. 
T.A. and consultancies. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ET 5006/7 A2b,A8c 
Rehabilitation of the Addis-Ababa -
Modjo - Awasa Road. Resp. Auth.: 
Ethiopian Road Authority. Estimated cost 40 
mECU. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7005 A2d 
Support programme for éthiopien 
students in former Soviet Union. Sup-
port to 1,153 students to finish studies and 
come back in Ethiopia. Estimation 1.900 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ET 7006 Ale 
FIJI 
Construction of 2 bridges (Sigatoka, 
Ba). Resp. Auth.: Public Works Dept. 10.6 
mECU. EDF 10.240 mECU, local 0.360 
mECU. Bridge reconstruction after cyclone 
Kina. Study to revise drawings: short-list 
done. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF FU 7001 A2d 
GABON 
Support for rehabilitation of the 
national health system. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la 
Population. 11 mECU. Supply of equip-
ments, essential medicines, T.A. and train-
ing, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF G A 7002 A7 
Mining development programme 
and diversification. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère des Mines, de l'Energie et des Re-
ssources Hydrauliques. Estimated cost 14 
mECU. Works by direct labour and int. 
tenders, equipments by int. tender, T.A., 
* follow-up and evaluation. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF/SYS/GA 9999 A4a 
IV  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Support to the Structural Adjust-
■k ment. 13.2 mECU. Date financing June 
94. 7th EDF. 
EDF GA 7200 A1c 
GAMBIA 
Rural Development Programme; 
Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omic Affairs. 14.5 mECU. Rehabilitation of 
water schemes, supply of road equipment 
and materials, T.A. and supervision. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF GM 6004 A3a 
GHANA 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. 5 mECU. Supply of equipments. 
T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF GH 7003 A6 
Small and Medium Enterprises De-
velopment Programme. Assistance in the 
preparation of business development plans. 
Financial contribution to the Ghana Venture 
Capital Fund. 4.8 mECU. Projet in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF GH 7004 A5b,e 
GRENADA 
Microprojects programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Labour, Social Service, 
Community Development. 0.220 mECU. 
Water supply, road improvements, repairs 
and extension of schools, medical and 
community centre and sports grounds. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7102 
Rehabilitation of the Bellevue-Gren-
ville Section of the Eastern Main Road 
- Grenville - Mama Cannes portion. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 2 mECU. 
Works by direct labour, small T.A. and supply 
of equipment for repairs. Project on ap-
praisal. Date foreseen for financing July 94. 
7th EDF. 
EDF GRD 7002/001 A2d 
GUINEA 
Agricultural Programme in «Guinée 
Maritime» (PAGM) II. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources 
Animales. 15 mECU. Inf restructurai works, 
supply of agricultural inputs, equipments, 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF GUI 6001(1) A3a 
Development of the secondary 
towns. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Aména-
gement du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 
mECU. Buildings, market, railway stations, 
roads, T.A. and training, management, work 
supervision, supply of equipments. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUI 7008 A8a,b 
Information System for the National 
Programme to Support Food Security. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Agriculture et des 
Ressources Animales. 1.600 mECU. Supply 
of equipments, permanent T.A. follow-up, 
evaluation. Date financing June 94. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF QUI 7004 A3a 
GUINEA BISSAU 
Rural development programme. 
23.8 mECU. Improvement of food and fish-
eries production, line of credit, micro-
projects, T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. 6th EDF. 
EDF GUB 6001 A3a 
Project for the rehabilitation of 
social and economic infrastructures. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 11 
mECU. Road rehabilitation, schools, health 
centres, urban roads, markets, water and 
sanitation. Construction of secondary brid-
ges, access roads, supply of a ferry. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 6013 (PRI) A7, A8 
Farim bridge construction. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Es-
timated cost 11 mECU. Bridge over Cacheu 
river. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 7006 A2d 
Cultural actions promotion prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : Secrétariat d'Etat à la 
Culture et à l'Information and EEC Deleg-
ation in Bissau. 1.650 mECU. Safeguard of 
the cultural heritage, training, manifes-
tations, studies. Projet in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF GUB 7008 A5g,i 
General Import Programme. 8 mECU. 
Hard currency allowance. T.A. foreseen. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUB 7200 A1c 
GUYANA 
Immediate action prog ramme forthe 
Demerara Harbour Bridge. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance. 8 mECU. Works, sup-
plies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF GUA6011 (7002) A2d 
New Amsterdam water supply. Resp. 
Auth. : Ministry of Finance. 4.5 mECU. Con-
struction of the ring main system, reservoir, 
supplies T.A. and training. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUA 601 2 (7003) A2b 
General Import Programme. Phase II. 
Hard currency allowance to the Bank of 
Guyana to import E EC-AC Ρ goods with 
negative list. 1.850 mECU. 0.150 mECU for 
T.A. follow-up and evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 
94. 7th EDF. 
EDF GUA 7200/001 A1c 
KIRIBATI 
Seaweed development programme. 
Total cost estimated 1.280 mECU. EDF 
1.100 mECU, local 0.180 mECU. Buildings, 
equipment, credit, T.A. to the general man-
ager, monitoring evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF Kl 7002 A3a 
Training for Kiribati. Estimation 1.440 
mECU. Human resources development. 
Supply of equipment, T.A. monitoring evalu-
ation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF Kl 7004 A6 
LESOTHO 
Structural Adjustment Programme. 
Phasell. Hard currency allowanceto import 
ACP and EC goods with negative list. 
Estimated cost 8 mECU. T.A. foreseen. 
·*· Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF LSO 7200/001 A1c 
LIBERIA 
Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: EC aid coordination office in Mon-
rovia. 25 mECU. Essential repairs to water 
and power supply systems, restauration of 
basic health and school facilities, distri-
bution of seeds and tools, improved access 
to isolated regions, assisting the re-integ-
ration of ex-combatants and returning re-
fugees. Implementation by local NGOs and 
European NGOs. Project in execution. 6th 
and 7th EDF. 
EDF LBR 7001 A1c 
JAMAICA 
Credit scheme for micro and small 
enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning In-
stitute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex 
Institution and Coordination and Monitor-
ing Unit. 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing 1st half 94. 5th, 6th and 
7th EDF. 
EDF J M 5020 A4,A5 
Water Supply, sewerage, insti-
tutional strengthening programme. 
Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission 
(NWC). Estimated cost 18 mECU. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF J M 7005 A8a,b,c 
KENYA 
Revival and Development of the 
Swahili Culture. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Home Affairs and National Heritage. 
National Museums of Kenya (N.M.K.). 
1.990 mECU. Safeguarding, acquisition and 
restoration, supply of equipment, T.A. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF KE 7004 A5i 
MADAGASCAR 
Kamolandy bridge reconstruction. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. 
Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 6027 A2d 
Renovation of provincial airports. 
Cofinancing with France. EDF 16.4 mECU. 
Works, equipment and supervision. Project 
in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAG 6016 A2d 
Improvement of the agriculture and 
fishing in the Far South. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministère d'Etat, du Développement Rural. 
1.900 mECU. Works, supplies, study, T.A. 
* and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MAG 7003 A3a 
Road infrastructure rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 
Estimation 72.500 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supervision. Project on appraisal. 
* Date foreseen for financing June 94. 
6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF MAG 7004 A2d 
MALAWI 
Aid for refugees. Resp. Auth. : Food Aid 
Coordination Unit in the Office of the 
Presidentand Cabinet (OPC). 3.740 mECU. 
The programme concerns basic needs for 
refugees from Mozambique. Roads, wells, 
drinking water, health, education. Manage-
ment by UNHCR, Red Cross, MSF, Concern 
Universal. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 7255 A6, 7, 8 
Structural Adjustment Facility 
(SAF) — General Import Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Reserve Bank of Malawi. 30.6 
mECU. Hard currency allowance to import 
the Courier no. 146 — july-august 1994  V ACP and EC goods, with negative list. T.A. 
for management and audit purposes. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 7200 A1c 
Limbe-Thyolo-Muloza Road. Works, 
construction by int. tender (conditional). 
Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 
6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF MAI 6021 A2d 
cost 2.520 mECU. Infrastructural works 
(tanks, wells, pipes) and sensibilization, 
training and follow-up for the recipient 
communities, works and T.A. Project on 
* appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
July 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6116/001 A2a,ai,b 
MALI 
Fight against erosion around the 
road Bandiagara-Dourou. Dogon 
region. Estimated cost 0.900 mECU. Resp. 
Auth.: Commandant du Cercle de Ban-
diagara. Works by direct labour, T.A. by 
Association Française des Volontaires du 
Progrès (AFVP). Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/003/7 A3i 
Support to develop rural credit. Resp. 
Auth.: Banque Nationalede Développement 
Agricole. BNDA. ED F part 1.910 mECU. T.A. 
and line of credit, training. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/002 A5a 
Fight against silting up and develop-
ment of forest resources in the 
Northern regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
de l'Environnement - Direction Nationale 
des Eaux et Forêts. 6.810 mECU. Infra-
structural works, forest and trees, supplies, 
follow-up and training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6001/001 A3a 
Development of secondary towns in 
the 4th and 5th regions. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministèrede l'Administration Territorial et de 
la Décentralisation. 5 mECU. Water supply in 
3 towns, sewage works, markets, schools, 
waste collect systems in 6 towns. Works by 
ace tenders. Supply of equipments and T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7008 A2b 
Better use of surfacing waters in the 
5th region. Consolidation. Resp. Auth.: 
Gouvernoratde Mopti. Estimated cost 5.750 
mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 0.750 mECU. 
Works, irrigation, supply of pumps, inputs, 
T.A., follow-up and evaluation, training, 
research. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 6005/002 A3a 
Reconstruction of primary schools 
inthe North (Gao region). Estimated cost 
1.934 mECU. Reconstruction of ±21 
schools (±1 26 class-rooms), water points, 
supply of equipments. Works by direct 
labour, coordination and supervision by 
• volunteers organization. Date financing 
May 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF MLI 7013 A6a 
MAURITANIA 
Second Road Programme. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 7.350 
mECU. Supply of equipment and materials 
by int. tender. Studies, auditing, T.A. and 
training. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 
94. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6004-7004 A2d 
Support to the management of the 
Kaedi Municipality. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère du Plan. 0.850 mECU. Works and T.A. 
• by the NGO AFRICA 70. Date financing 
June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAU 6007/001 A1c 
National measures to support the 
Solar Regional Programme. Estimated 
MAURITIUS 
Mauritius Institute of Public Admin-
istration and Management (MIPAM). 
1.205 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. 
■k Date financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAS 7101/001 A6e 
Human resources Centre in Rod-
rigues. Estimated cost 0.800 mECU. Works, 
supply of equipment, T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MAS 7101/002 A6e 
Support to the Industrial and Vo-
cational Training Board. IVTB. Esti-
mated cost 2.500 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supply of equipments, T.A. and 
• training. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen lor financing June 94. 6th EDF. 
EDF MAS 6101/001 A6b,d 
Cyclone Hollands rehabilitation pro-
gramme. Estimated cost 2.312 mECU. 
Rehabilitation of the telecommunication 
inrastructure for both national and inter-
national grid. Supply of equipments and 
alternative communication systems. Project 
on appraisal. 3rd and 5th EDF (remainings), 
6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF MAS 7003 A2c 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Training for railway staff. Phase II. 
T.A. for the regional School at Inhambane 
and the provincial centres of railway training. 
20 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF MOZ-REG 6409 A2d, A6d 
Rehabilitation project for the re-
instatement of refugees and returned 
people in the rural sector. 12 mECU. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7012 A3a 
Roads rehabilitation programme in 
the Zambezia and Sof ala provinces. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la Construction et 
de l'Eau. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Roads 
and bridges rehabilitation. Works and super-
vision. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF MOZ 7005/001 A2d 
Beira-lnchope Road Rehabilitation. 
Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la Construction et 
de l'Eau. Estimation 25 mECU. Works over 
111 Km. Supervision. Project on appraisal. 
7th EDF. 
EDF MOZ (REG) 7005/002 A2d 
Institutional Support to the Ministry 
of Culture. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la 
Culture. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Es-
tablishment of a culture and development 
forum, improvement of the Documentation 
Centre, staff training, planning unit, equip-
ment, and T.A. Training. Project on ap-
praisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7016 A6 
Youth's social-economic reinser-
tion. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de la Culture et 
de la Jeunesse. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. 
Supplies, T.A. and pilot actions. Project on 
appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF MOZ 7017 A8b 
NAMIBIA 
Support programme for the mining 
sector. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. Day-to-day administration by the 
Industrial Development Corporation. 40 
mECU. Mine development, expansion, dril-
lings, tiling plant, recuperations, small scale 
mining. Works and supplies by int. tender. 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF NAM SYS 9999 A4a 
Institutional support for the Min-
istry of Agriculture, Water and Rural 
Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 
1.3 mECU. T.A. for agricultural planning and 
marketing and production economics. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7003 A1c 
Namibia Integrated Health Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of Health and 
Social Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastruc-
tures, equipment, training and T.A. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd 
half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7007 A7 
Expansion of NBC transmitter net-
work and production facilities for 
educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: 
Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Es-
timated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, 
local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equip-
ments, technical training and technical 
consultances. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7005 A6i 
Rural Development Support Pro-
gramme for the Northern Communal 
Areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, 
Water and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. 
Strengthening of the agricultural extension 
service, training of extension officiers and 
establishment of a rural credit system. 
Supply of office equipment, vehicles, agric-
ultural inputs, T.A., training, evaluation. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NAM 7011 A3a 
NIGER 
Small-scale irrigation in the South 
Zinder. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Agricul-
ture et de l'Elevage. 1.800 mECU. Works, 
• supplies, training. Date financing June 
94. 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 7009 A3c 
Vocational and technical training 
project (NIGETECH). Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère de Finances et du Plan. 3.8 mECU. 
Seminars, scolar-ships, trainer training, T.A. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 7101 A6d 
Road infrastructures and telecom-
munications. Rehabilitation of Tillabery-
Ayorou (Tender launched), Farie-Tera and 
Say-Tapoa roads. For telecommunications: 
hearth station in Arlit and administrative 
centre in Niamey. Works and supervision. 
* Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing June 94. 7th EDF 
EDF NIR 7005 A2d, c 
Integrated development programme 
in the sheep-farming zone. (Azaouak, 
Tadressand Nord-Dakoro). Resp. Auth.: 
Ministères de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environ-
nement, de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage, de la 
Santé Publique et de l'Education Nationale. 
18 mECU. Rehabilitation works, wells, 
drillings, supply of equipment, T.A, training, 
evaluation and follow-up. Date financing 
VI  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY April 94. 7th EDF 
• EDF NIR 7012  A3a 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to 
import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 
* 20 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF. 
EDF NIR 7200 A1c 
Strengthening of the «Centre de 
Formation et de Promotion Musicale». 
(CFPM). 0.632 mECU. To continue and 
develop musical cultural actions. Supplies 
and T.A. Date financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
NIGERIA 
Katsina Arid Zone Programme. Resp. 
Auth. : Governor of Katsina State. 25 mECU. 
Soils and forests protection, livestock, in-
crease agricultural productivity, irrigation, 
rural and social infrastructure, management 
and coordination, training. T.A. : restr. tender 
after prequalification. Project in execution. 
7th EDF 
EDF UNI 7005 A3a 
Urgent assistance for the News 
Agency of Nigeria (N.A.N.) Resp. Auth.: 
N.A.N. 1.300 mECU. Repair-reconstruction 
of N.A.N, communication building, procure-
ment — installation of new telecommuni-
cation equipments. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7007 A5g 
NITEL Maintenance training pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Telecom-
munications. 10.5 mECU. Rehabilitation 
works, supply of equipment, T.A. and train-
ing. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7008 (6004) A2c 
Borno region anti-poverty prog-
ramme, improvement of the agricultural 
productivity and water management. Assist-
ance to the farmer associations. Estimated 
total cost 16,100 mECU. EDF 15.400 mECU, 
local 0.700 mECU. Works, supplies T.A. 
training, research, line of credit. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF UNI 7009 A3a 
T.A. for 30 man/months and technical 
consultancies. Training. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF 
EDF PNG 7001 A4a 
RWANDA 
Drinking water supply in the Bu-
gesera East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de 
Travaux Publics. 9.920 mECU. Pumps, 
treatment, tanks, renovation existing net-
work. Works, supplies and supervision. 
Works: int. tender already launched. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1 st 
half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF RW 6007 (7002) A2b 
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 
Development of Social Infrastruc-
ture - Phase II. Resp. Auth. : Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Works, Com-
munications and Public Utilities. 
0.925 mECU. Construction and supply of 
furnitures for primary schools, supply of 
equipments, T.A. for supervision of works. 
• Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing July 94. 5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF SCN 6001 A6a 
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 
Improvement of the port. 0.450 
mECU. Works and supervision. Projet in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF STP-REG 6202/001 A2d 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Third Structural Adjustment Pro-
§
ramme. General Import Programme. 
.5 m ECU. Same as 2nd programme. Pro-
ject in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF PNG 7201 A1c 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: National Dept. of 
Education (NDOE) and Commission for 
Higher Education (CHE). 15 mECU. Works: 
building renovation, university construction, 
rehabilitation works, works supervision, 
scholarships, training. Works for the un-
iversity by int. tender. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF PNG 6008/7001 A6a,b 
Ramu road improvement. Resp. Auth. : 
Department of works. Estimated cost 20 
mECU. Upgrading of 73 Km of the Ramu 
highway (Pompuquato bridge to Usino 
junction) from the present gravel pavement 
to a bituminous sealed pavement and as-
sociated bridge works. Works and super-
• vision. Design study: short-list done. Pro-
ject in execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF PNG 6017 A2d 
Environmental Monitoring of 
Mining. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of the Environ-
ment and Conservation. EDF 1.6 mECU. 
SENEGAL 
St-Louis regional development pro-
gramme. 22.5 mECU. Jobs creation, lines 
of credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training, 
studies. Health centres, clinics, medical 
equipments and consumables, training, in-
formation. T.A. to the Direction Régionale in 
St-Louis and to the Sen/ice des Grandes 
Endémies in Podor. Drainage network, 
sanitation. Environmental protection with 
wind-breaks. T.A. Study of a water-en-
gineering scheme in Podor. Works by ace 
tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by restr. 
tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 6002/7002 A3a 
Support to the national programme 
to fight AIDS. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Comité National de Lutte contre le sida. 
CNLS. 1.700 mECU. Works, rehabilitation, 
supply of equipment, T.A., management, 
training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 7003 A7 
Support to the economic develop-
ment of the Ziguinchor region. 1.990 
mECU. Line of credit for SME's and support 
to the artisanal fishen/. Supply of equip-
ments, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF SE 5024/7001 A3a 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to 
import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 
Estimated cost 16 mECU. T.A. foreseen. 
• Date financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 7200/001 A1c 
Support to develop SMEs in the 
Dakar region. Estimation 1.990 mECU. 
Line of credit, management unit in coordi-
nation with Banks, projects and NGOs. T.A. 
and supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 7010 A5 
Priority programme to generate em-
ployment. P.P.G.E. Resp. Auth.: Minis-
tère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Plan. 
1.990 mECU. To alleviate the social impact 
of the austerity mesures and of the F.C.F.A. 
devaluation of the most devaforised urban 
populations. Line of credit, supplies. T.A., 
audit. Date financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF SE 7009 A8b 
SEYCHELLES 
Marin and coastal centre. Resp. Auth. : 
Ministry of Foreign Affair - Planning and 
Environment. Estimated total cost 0.675 
mECU. EDF 0.325 mECU, local 0.350 
mECU. Renovation and equipping of a 
centre for international, regional and local 
research. Works and supplies. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SEY 7003 A8f 
SIERRA LEONE 
Agricultural Sector Support Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agricul-
ture. 14.3 mECU. Construction of stores, 
rehabilitation of feeder roads, vehicles, 
agricultural inputs, materials, T.A. for project 
management, training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF SL 7001 A3a 
Rural water supply and sanitation. 
Estimated cost 7 mECU. Wells rehabilitation, 
water points, equipments and T.A. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF SL 5001/7 A2b, A8c 
Improvement of Freetown - Conakry 
road link. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Re-
construction of about 120 Kms of road from 
Masiaka in Sierra Leone to Farmoreah in 
Guinea. Works and supervision. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF SL 7004 A2d 
SOLOMON ISLANDS 
Rural fishing entreprises project -
Phase II. Total cost estimated 1.630 mECU. 
EDF 1.5 mECU, local 0.130 mECU. Con-
struction works, fishing and office equip-
ments and T.A. for project coordinator. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF SOL 6010/001 A3a 
Cyclone Nina Rehabilitation Pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministres of Trans-
port, Work, and utilities. Agriculture, 
National Resources and Education and 
Human Resources development and the EC 
delegation. 1 mECU. Rehabilitation of roads 
and public schools. Projet in execution. 7th 
EDF 
EDF SOL 7002 A8g 
Malaita rural infrastructure prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Malaita Provincial 
Government (MPG). 6 mECU. Roads and 
wharves, supply of equipments and T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF SOL 5013 (7) A2d 
SOMALIA 
Rehabilitation programme. 38 mECU. 
Project in execution. 6th EDF 
EDF SO 6029 
SWAZILAND 
Technical Cooperation programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Government of Swaziland 
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to selected agencies in the public and 
parastatal sectors. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF SW 7001 A1f 
Science and Mathematics Advice 
and Regional Training (SMART). Resp. 
Auth.: The University of Swaziland -Train-
ing Dept. 0.720 mECU. Supply of equipment 
and materials by int. render. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF SW 6101/7 A6b 
TANZANIA 
Port development, Zanzibar and 
Pemba ports, phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Works. Zanzibar. Estimated total 
cost 13.4 mECU. EDF 10 mECU, Italy 
3.4 mECU. Procurement and rehabilitation 
of cargo handling equipment. Rehabilitation 
of transit sheds, construction of passenger 
terminal with RO-RO facilities. Study: 
design of passenger terminal with RO-RO 
facilities for Zanzibar port. Short-list done. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6009 A2d 
Support for Aids Control in Tan-
zania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 
3 mECU. To strengthen health and other 
support services. Supply of equipment and 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 08000/000 (7001 ) A7c 
Serengeti Conservation and Devel-
opment project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Tourism, Nat. Resources and Envir. 9 mECU. 
Road and water supply rehabilitation, supply 
of equipments, studies and T.A. Projet in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7002 A3a 
Mwanza-Nyanguge Road Rehabili-
tation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transports 
and Communications. Estimated cost 35 
mECU. Rehabilitation of 62 Km of trunk 
roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza 
airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza se-
werage system (main works). Design study 
ongoing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6021 A2d 
Training and Training Institutions 
support project. Training materials, 
equipments, training, University Twinning. 
T.A. Projet in execution. 7.1 mECU. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 6001 A6b 
Support to Ministry of Finance, Zan-
zibar. Estimated cost 1.300 mECU. Equip-
ments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF TA 7007 A1c 
Support Unit to N.A.O. Estimated cost 
2 mECU. Equipments and T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7008 A1c 
Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water energy and 
minerals. Estimated cost 11.100 mECU. 
Works, pumping equipments, studies and 
supervision. Short-list done. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 5005(7) A2b 
Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of water, energy and minerals. 
Estimated cost 9.100 mECU. Pumping, 
Treatment, storage and distribution. Works, 
equipments, design and supervision. Short-
list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7009 A2 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Phase III. Resp. Auth. : Bank of 
Tanzania. 30 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
July 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF TA 7200/002 A1c 
TOGO 
General Import Programme. Hard 
currency allowance to import ACP and E.C. 
goods. T.A. for management and implemen-
tation. 17 mECU. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF TO 7200 A1c 
TONGA 
Vava'u Airport Development Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation 
2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment 
and training. Works by direct labour, sup-
plies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 
5th and 6th EDF. 
EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Support to the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance to pur-
chase EEC and ACP goods with negative list. 
T.A. for six months for GIP implementation 
and the use of counterpart funds. 9.7 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 94. 6th and 7th EDF. 
ED F TR 7200 A1c 
Rural Electrification. Resp. Auth.: 
Trinidad and Tobago Electricity Commis-
sion. 2 mECU. Connection of isolated rural 
comunities to electricity supply network. 
Works, supply of equipments and T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
ED F TR 5014 A2ai 
Road rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Min-
istry of Works. 16 mECU. Rehabilitation of 
several road segments in Western Trinidad. 
Works by int. tender. Supervision. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF 
EDF TR 6003 A2d 
Small business development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Small Business Dev. 
Corp. SBDC. 2 mECU. Supply of line of 
credit, training and supervision and evalu-
ation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF 
ED F TR 5016 A5e 
Training project for young farmers 
(AYTRAP). Assistance for the young far-
mers to create rural enterprises. Estimated 
cost 7.300 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 2.300 
mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and monitoring. 
Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF TR 7002 A3a 
T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 7001 A6b, c, d 
Smallholder Tea Development Pro-
gramme. (STDP). Resp. Auth.: Uganda 
Tea Growers Corporation (UTGC). 20 
mECU. Increase in the production and 
quality, management improvements, infra-
structure development, institutional and 
financial sustainability, environment conser-
vation and regional development. Works, 
supply of equipments, T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 6002/7002 A3a 
Uganda health project. Phase III of the 
Rural health Programme, West Nile Health 
Programme and the Uganda Blood Transfu-
sion Service Project Phase II. Infrastructure 
rehabilitation equipment (vehicles, furnish-
ings, offices), medical supplies and tests, in 
service training and T.A. and management. 
20 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF UG 6012/7003 A7 
Support to the Uganda Investment 
Authority. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Finance. 1.950 mECU. Supply of equip-
ments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 7005 A5e 
Road maintenance programme in the 
South West. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of 
Works. 20 mECU. Works, supplies and 
supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF UG 7004 A2d 
UGANDA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme General Import Programme. 
Phase II. 30,250 mECU. Hard currency 
allowance to import ACP and EC goods. 
There is negative list of items not eligible 
(military-luxury items). Project on appraisal. 
Identification study: short list done. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF UG 7200 A1c 
Human resources development pro-
gramme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Department. 12.8 mECU. 
Infra structura I rehabilitation, equipments. 
ZAIRE 
Temporary assistance programme 
for health care (P.A.T.S.). Rehabili-
tation programme. Estimated cost 18.500 
mECU. To ensure that the health-care 
services that are still operating survive. 
Implementation by NGOs and local organi-
• zations. Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZR 6029 A7a,b 
ZAMBIA 
SYSMIN III - General import. Resp. 
Auth. : Bank of Zambia. 60 mECU. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 9999 - SYS A1c 
Zambian Centre for accountancy 
studies. Phase II. EDF 6.8 m ECU, T.A., 
supplies and Works. Projet in execution. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF ZA 6001/7001 A6a 
Social Sector Support Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Health, Education, 
Water Affairs and Local Governments. 12 
mECU. Rehabilitation works and health 
infrastructures, water supply, education. 
Supply of drugs and equipments, and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7003 A7,A8 
Reorganisation and restructuring of 
the Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Services. Resp. Auth.: Depart-
ment of National Parks and Wildlife services. 
Estimated cost 5 m ECU. Works, supplies and 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZA 7002 A3c,d 
Assistance to Angolan and Zairean 
Refugees. 1.2 mECU. Project in execution. 
7th EDF 
EDF ZA A8 
VIII OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Private and Cooperative Livestock 
Service Network Development Pro-
gramme. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. 
Short and long term T.A. Privatisation 
Funds, training. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF ZA 6018 A3a 
ZIMBABWE 
OMAY Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe 
land use and health programme. Resp. 
Auth.: A.D.A. 4.6 mECU. Raising the stan-
dard of living of rural populations. Conserva-
tion and improved utilisation of the Wild Life 
resource, support to agriculture and im-
provement of social infrastructure. Road 
network, water, sanitation, building of a 
district hospital, equipment and supplies. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 6004/7002 A3a 
Structural Adjustment Programme. 
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance, Economic 
Planning and Development. 32 mECU. 
• General Import Programme and T.A. Pro-
ject on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 7200/001 A1c 
Support to the Faculty of Veterinary 
Science of the University of Zim-
babwe. Resp. Auth.: Faculty of Veterinary. 
9.1 mECU. Supply of vehicles and equip-
ments. T.A., University link, fellow-scholar-
ships. For Zimbabwe and SADC region. 
Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 5004/7001 A6b 
Mashonoland East Fruit and Veget-
able Project. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Agricultural Development Authority. 3.300 
mECU. Provision of transport, construction 
of houses and assembly markets. Supply of 
equipments and T.A. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF ZIM 5012/7003 A3a 
Wildlife Veterinary Project. Resp. 
Auth.: Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Management. EDF 1.500 mECU. 
Increase of wildlife population, particularly 
of endangered species: black and white 
rhino — tourism development, works, sup-
plies, T.A., training and evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF ZIM 6018 A5c, A8f 
Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCT) 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 
Curaçao - Business Development 
Scheme, phase 2. Estimated total cost 
5.366 mECU. EDF 4 mECU. Development of 
international competitiveness in the export 
sector. Management training strategy. Pro-
ject on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NEA 601 3/001 A5d,e 
Support Public Library in Curaçao. 
Resp. Auth.: Public Library Curaçao. Estim-
ation 0.650 mECU. Works, supply of equip-
ment, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NEA 7003 A6g 
ARUBA 
T.A. for managerial training. Es-
timated cost 2.320 mECU. EDF 1.980 
mECU, local 0.340 mECU. A training unit 
will train private and public executives and 
will advise companies on demand. (These 
services will be paid). Supplies T.A. and 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF ARU 6006 A6b 
NEW CALEDONIA 
Construction of a vocational train-
ing centre for apprentices. Estimated 
total cost 2.95 mECU. EDF part 0.830 
mECU. Works by ace tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF NC 7002 A6d 
FRENCH POLYNESIA 
Pearl Oyster programme. Resp. Auth. : 
EVAAM. 1.150mECU. Supply of research 
equipmentandtraining.T.A. and researches. 
Projet in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF POF 6006 A3d 
FRENCH SOUTHERN AND AN-
TARCTIC TERRITORIES 
Rehabilitation of the «Vie com-
mune» building in the Kerguelen Is-
lands. Lasting improvement of the daily life 
quality for scientists, researchers, tech-
nicians, meteorologists on duty. Works, 
supplies. Estimated total cost 0.900 mECU. 
EDF 0.600 mECU, France 0.300 mECU. 
Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. 
EDFTAA/6001/001 A6f 
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS 
Water and sewerage in Providen-
ciales. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of works. 
3.600 mECU. Water supply works a nd pipes. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF TC 7001 A8b,c 
WALLIS AND FUTUNA 
Holo-Fakatoi Road in Wallis (RT2). 
EDF 0.600 mECU. Bitumen road. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF 
EDF WF 7001 A2d 
Normalisation works in the terri-
torial road n°1 (RTI) in Wallis. 1.125 
• mECU. Rehabilitation works. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF 
EDF WF 7002 A2d 
Construction of the territorial road 
n°1 in Futuna. 0.840 mECU. Works and 
rehabilitations. Project on appraisal. 7th 
EDF. 
EDF WF 7003 A2d 
Purchase of public works equip-
ments. Resp. Auth.: Service des Travaux 
• Publics du Territoire. 0,500 mECU. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF WF 7004 A2 
Regional Projects 
MEMBERS COUNTRIES OF 
UMOA (UNION MONETAIRE 
OUEST AFRICAINE) 
Assistance to the BOAD (Banque 
Ouest Africaine de Développement) 
for the support programme for pro-
motion and financing the private 
sector in the member countries of 
UMOA. 0.512 mECU. Study, T.A. and 
training. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7106 A5 
BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER 
Regional project for the manage-
ment of the 'W' national park and 
adjoining game reserves. Estimated total 
cost 10 200 mECU. To establish three 
management units and 10 bridges and 20 
observation posts with their equipment. 
Building and rehabilitation of administrative, 
technical and social buildings, tracks and 
bridges. T.A., training and studies. Project on 
appraisal 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f 
CAMEROON - CHAD - CENTRAL 
AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
Faisability study: Ngaoundéré -
Touboro - Moundou Road. 1.900 mECU. 
Short-list to be done. Date financing June 
94. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG - CA 7203 A2d 
CENTRAL AFRICA AND UDEAC 
Regional Centre Bananas and Plan-
tains (C.R.B.P.). Resp. Auth.: C.R.B.P. 
Strengthening of infrastructures and man-
agement. 2 mECU. In Nyombé. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 6217 A3a 
Inter-states transit in Central Af-
rican Countries (T.I.P.A.C). 5.5 mECU. 
To set up a regional scheme for transit 
transport. T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7202 A2d 
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Statistical training centre for 
Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: 
Secretariat of the centre. 5 mECU, Widening 
of capacity. Construction of class-rooms, 
offices and housing. Project on appraisal. 
5th EDF. 
EDF REG 5311 (7) A6b 
Strenghtening Economic and Policy 
Research in NARS in Eastern Africa 
(NARS: National Agricultural Sys-
tems). Technical and logistic support for 
building-up strong socio-economic pro-
grammes in NARS in Eastern Africa. Es-
• timated cost 1.150 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7306 A3c 
PALOP COUNTRIES - ANGOLA -
MOZAMBIQUE-GUINEA BISSAU 
- SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE - CAPE 
VERDE 
Support to improve educational sys-
tems. 4.450 mECU. Trainers training, pro-
duction of pedagogical equipment, T.A. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901-001 A6b 
Regional training for Middle Staff 
Statisticians. 3.5 mECU. Training of 900 
middle staff statisticians in the five countries. 
Building-up a modular training system, 
training for trainees, workshops-newsletter. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901-002 A6b,j 
Regional Centre for Health Develop-
ment. 3.480 mECU. Strenghtening of 
public health systems in the 5 countries and 
better management of 385 sanitary districts. 
Training programmes, trainers training, T.A. 
forstarting. Projet in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7901-003 A6bi 
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administration and enterprise man-
agement. 7 mECU. Supply of equipments 
and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7901-004 A6b, e 
COTE D'IVOIRE - ETHIOPIA -
MALI 
PAN African Rinder - Pest Cam-
paign. Phase III. To improve financial 
autonomy of the livestock services, improv-
ing the vaccination programmes, supporting 
farmers associations and privatisation of 
certain profession in the livestock sectors, 
estimated cost 15.600 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5007/003 A3a 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF C.O.I.-
INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION 
COMORES - MADAGASCAR -
MAURITIUS - SEYCHELLES 
Support for environmental program-
mes in C.O.I, countries. Resp. Auth.: 
Mauritius Regional Authorising Officer. 11 
mECU. T.A. for the regional coordinating 
unit - for national coordinating units - for 
surveys on the coastal area and on the 
protection of plant biodiversity. Supply of 
equipment by int. tender, training. Project in 
execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6511/7 A8f 
Regional programme to develop 
tourism in C.O.I, countries. Resp. Auth. : 
C.O.I. - Comité Permanent du Tourisme -
C.P.T. 6.239 mECU. T.A. for setting-up the 
training programmes, sale, promotion and 
marketing, back-up operations to assist 
management, transfer of know-how and 
intra-regional solidarity, specific studies. 
Supplies and training. Project in execution. 
6th and 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6944/7 A5c 
Integral automatisation of telecom-
munications in the Indian Ocean. Resp. 
Auth.: C.O.I. 3.3 mECU. Project in exe-
cution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 5512 (7) A2c 
BURUNDI — RWANDA — TAN-
ZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — 
KENYA 
Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabi-
litation of the road Kigali-Butare-
Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère 
des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d 
cost 22.5 mECU. EDF 3.8 mECU - Others: 
France, Germany, E.I.B., Commercial Banks 
(E. U.). Development Agencies. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 
94. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7115 A5 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF P.T.A. 
Regional integration in East and 
Southern Africa. Assistance to PTA 
Secretariat. (Preferential Trade Area). 
Short and long-term. T.A., studies, training. 
Estimated cost 1.500 mECU. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7316 A1 b 
PACIFIC ACP STATES 
Pacific Tourism Development pro-
gramme. Phase III. To assist Pacific ACP 
countries and OCT to develop their tourism 
sector. 11.530 mECU. Tourism marketing 
and promotion of the Pacific destination. 
Planning and policy capacities, research and 
statistics, manpower. Projet in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7701 A5c 
Senior Public Sector Management 
Programme. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secre-
tariat. Institute of Social and Administrative 
Studies (ISAS) of the University of the 
South Pacific (USP). 1.855 mECU. Training 
programmes, seminars, T.A. and evaluation. 
Projet in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7703 A6j 
Integrated Regional Programme for 
management and Control of Fishery. 
Resp. Auth.: South Pacific Commission. 
4.650 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. 
Project in execution. 
EDF REG 6709/001 A3a 
South Pacific Regional Tuna resour-
ces assessment and monitoring pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: South Pacific Commis-
sion 5 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A., 
evaluation, training. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6709/002 A3a 
Assistance to the Pacific Plant Pro-
tection Service. Resp. Auth.: South Pa-
cific Commission. 2.950 mECU. Supply of 
equipments, T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 6th EDF. 
EDF REG 5719/6 A3a 
Pacific regional agricultural pro-
gramme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum 
Secretariat. Fiji. 9.265 mECU. Improvement 
and dissemination of selected crops, agricul-
tural information and techniques to farmers. 
T.A. and supply of equipments. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 
94. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 67041001 A3a 
MEMBER 
ECOWAS 
COUNTRIES OF ANGOLA — MOZAMBIQUE 
Improvement of postharvest utilis-
ation of artisanal fish catches. Resp. 
Auth.: Sierra Leone National Authorizing 
Officer as Regional Auth. Off. Technical 
Secretariat in Abidjan. 8 mECU. Interven-
tions in 16 countries. Project in execution. 
7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6126 (001) A3a 
Guarantee Fund for Private Invest-
ments - Financing in Western Africa. 
FGIPAO - Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee 
Fund to cover partially credit risks given by 
Banks to the private sector. Total estimated 
Training in the port and maritime 
fields. Training by experts and consultants. 
T.A., training and equipment. 0.950 m ECU. 
Project in execution. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 7403 A6b 
SADC 
SADC Regional Customs Training 
Programme. Long-term. T.A. to the Bot-
swana, Lesotho, Namibian and Swaziland 
customs services. Training and equipment. 
1.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 5412/7 A1b 
SADC Language Training Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth.: Institute of Lan-
guages in Maputo as Regional Project 
Coordinator (RPC). 2 mECU. English lan-
guage training and Portuguese language 
training. Monitoring-evaluation. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
E D F R EG 6415/6430/ 6433/7 A6 
Regional training programme for 
food security. Resp. Auth.: Food Security 
Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) 
in Harare. 5 mECU. Training and T.A. Supply 
of equipment by int. tender. Project on 
appraisal. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6420/7 A6ci 
S.I.M.S.E.C. - Sade Initiative for 
Mathematics and~Science Education 
Cooperation. To establish a professional 
unit, called SIMSEC Unit for information 
exchange, teacher training curriculum de-
velopment, staff development, research 
cooperation and support for teachers' or-
ganisations. Project on appraisal. Estimated 
cost5mECU. Date foreseen for financing 1st 
half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 6428 A6b 
Wildlife Management Training Pro-
ject. Resp. Auth.: SADC Sector for Inland 
Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife. 8 mECU. 
Staff training, equipment and teaching 
materials, long-term T.A. evaluation. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
March 94. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 6408/002 A3e, A6b, A8f 
SADC — MOZAMBIQUE 
Beira port dredging contract. Resp. 
Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 
15 mECU. Dredging for two years of the 
access channel to the port of Beira. Works: 2 
years, 4 million m
3/year. Supervision and 
training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 1st half 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7401 A2d 
BENIN — COTE D'IVOIRE — 
GHANA — GUINEA — GUINEA 
BISSAU—TOGO 
Regional programme to increase 
awareness in western coastal African 
countries of natural resources protec-
tion. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Environne-
ment-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. 
Priorities: fight against bush fires and 
deforestation and for soil protection. Project 
on appraisal. 6th EDF 
EDF REG 6113 A3e 
EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AF-
RICAN COUNTRIES 
Support to the Eastern and Southern 
African Mineral Resources Develop-
ment Centre (ESAMRDC). Resp. Auth.: 
ESAMRDC - Dar es Salaam - Tanzania 
4.950 mECU. T.A., consultancies - data-
bases, training, supply of equipment. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7407 A4-A7 
TANZANIA- KENYA- UGANDA-
RWANDA-ZAMBIA-BURUNDI-
ETHIOPIA - ERITREA - DJIBOUTI 
I
Development and installation of the 
Advance Cargo Information System. 
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY ACIS. 11 mECU. Supply of computers 
software and T.A. Managed by UNCTAD. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing July 94. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 7312 A2c, d 
ACP COUNTRIES 
Programme for fighting AIDS. Fund-
ing of regional actions. 20 mECU. Support 
for regional structures, improvement of 
information, funding of research and training 
actions. Supplies, T.A. and training. Project 
in execution. 7th EDF. 
EDF REG 8000 A7 
Trade promotion. Trade develop-
ment project. ACP-EC. To improve com-
mercial performances. Estimated cost 7.200 
mECU. T.A. actions, in twenty ACP coun-
tries on a preliminary period of two years. 
• Date financing June 94. 7th EDF. 
ED F R EG 70001 /010 A5d, e 
ACP COUNTRIES AND REGIONS 
Programme of Community Support 
for Statistical Training (COMSTAT) 
9.650 mECU. Production of reliable and 
up-to-date statistics by increasing the 
number of qualified statisticians working in 
national statistical systems. Project on ap-
praisal. 7th EDF 
EDF REG 70.004/005 A1e, A6e 
and managerial issues (employment and 
labour issues, public sector indebtedness, 
financing of the restructuring operations, 
use of privatisation proceeds). Training 
action programme. Project Management. 
Estimated EEC contribution 43 mECU. Pro-
ject in execution. 
SEM EGT 506/93 A1b 
Nile Valley regional programme — 
Phase 2. 5 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT A3a 
JORDAN 
Water sector intervention. 11.715 
mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM JO A2a 
Improving Teacher Education. Resp. 
Auth.: Universities of Jordan and National 
Centre for Educational Research and De-
velopment (NCERD). EEC contribution 
3.900 mECU. T.A., fellowship, and equip-
ments. Project in execution. 
SEM JO 1 283/93 A6b 
Support for Structural Adjustment. 
Phase II. Hard currency allowance with 
negative list. 30 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for fiancing July 94. 
SEM JO 414/94 A1c 
MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES 
ALGERIA 
Structural Adjustment Support Pro-
gramme. Sectoral Import Programme 
for building materials to finish 100,000 
social houses. 70 mECU. hard currency 
allowance to cover CIF imports. Manage-
ment by Crédit Populaire d'Algérie (C.P.A.). 
Special accounts in the Central Bank. 
Banque d'Algérie (B.A.). Purchase by a 
positive list (electrical equipment — spare 
parts). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing 1st half 94. 
SEM AL 688-92 A1c 
Support to the algerian rural sector. 
30 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM AL A3a 
CYPRUS 
Mapping and property valuation. 
Resp. Auth.: Dept. of Land and Surveys 
(DLS). 0.800 mECU. Supply of equipments 
and T.A. Project in execution. 
SEM CY 1309/93 A1 g 
EGYPT 
Channel Maintenance Project 
(CMP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public 
Works and Water Resources (MPWR). 40 
mECU. Integrated weed control, irrigation, 
biological control, institutional support, 
training, T.A. for general management, pro-
curement and contracting, planning, moni-
toring and supervision, works, supplies and 
training. Project in execution. 
SEM EGT 881 /92 A3c 
Public Enterprise Reform and Priv-
atisation Programme. Privatisations, re-
structuring operations, addressing policy 
MALTA 
Protection of Malta's coastline 
against oil pollution. Resp. Auth.: Oil 
Pollution Executive 2.4 mECU. Supply of 
specialized equipment, training and T.A. 
• Project in execution. Int. tender launched 
in May 94. 
SEM MAT A8f 
Strengthening educational and 
economic relations with the Com-
munity. 1.7 mECU. Scholarships and 
traineeships, establishment of a Euro-In-
formation Centre,-integrated marketing pro-
grammes and tourism promotion. Different 
T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM MAT 91 /431 A5c, d 
Support to the «Caisses Locales de 
Crédit Agricole». EEC contribution 16 
mECU. To strengthen local banks for loans 
to small farmers. Allowance to the CNCA -
Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole. T.A. 
foreseen for training, follow-up and parallel 
evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date fore-
seen for financing July 94. 
SEM MOR 486/94 A3a 
TUNISIA 
Date-palm trees in the Rejim-
Maatoug region. Resp. Auth.: Office de 
Mise en Valeur de Rejim-Maatoug. EEC 
contribution 15 mECU. Italy 7 mECU. 
Drilling works by int. tender. Drilling equip-
ment— Italy. Electrical equipment: Italy. 
Irrigation equipment: int. tender. T.A. Italy 
Project in execution. 
SEM TUN A3a 
Support for the Structural Adjust-
ment Programme. General Import Pro-
gramme. Hard currency allowance. T.A. for 
follow-up and evaluation. EEC contribution 
40 mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 000/92 A1v 
Building of two vocational centres. 8 
mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN A6d 
T.A. Programme to promote quality. 
Resp. Auth. : INNORPI - Institut National de 
Normalisation et du Registre de le Propriété 
Industrielle. ECC contribution 5 mECU. T.A., 
• training, supply of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
SEM TUN 1 -94 A4e 
Rural development project in Séj-
nane. Phase II Resp. Auth.: ODESYPANO 
(Ministry of Agriculture's North-West Agro-
forestry Development Board). EEC contri-
bution 5 mECU. Work by direct labour, 
supply of equipments, T.A. and studies, 
training. Project in execution. 
SEM TUN 1 286/93 A3a 
MOROCCO 
Rural development in the Central 
Haouz and Tassaut Aval. Resp. Auth.: 
Office régional de Mise en Valeur Agricole 
de Haouz. 0RMVAH. EEC contribution 21.5 
mECU. Irrigation works, tracks, T.A. and 
training. Works and supplies by int. tenders. 
Project in execution. 
SEM MOR 1088/93 A3a 
Drinking water supply and sani-
tation in the small center. 16 mECU. 
Project in execution. 
SEM MOR A2b 
Support to promote and develop-
ment of remote sensing. Resp. Auth.: 
CRTS - Centre Royal de Télédétection 
spatial. EEC contribution 4 mECU. Action for 
soil vegetation sea (surface temperature), 
forests control, identification and support to 
the management of acquacolture zones and 
macro-seaweed. Specialized T.A. training, 
supply of equipments by Int. tender. Project 
on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 
July 94. 
SEM MOR 486/94 A3a 
SYRIA 
Electricity Sector Support Prog-
ramme. Resp. Auth. : Ministère de l'Elec-
tricité - Société Publique d'Electricité. SME. 
EEC contribution 11 mECU. Project man-
agement unit, training, master plan, trans-
mission and distribution, fonctionning and 
control, computerized management system, 
assistance to the supervision of works (5 
sub-stations - funded by E.I.B.). T.A. ex-
pens, supply of equipment by int. tender. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing July 94. 
SEM SYR 415/94 A2a, i 
TURKEY 
Vocational training programmes for 
tourism and mining. EEC contribution 5.4 
mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of 
equipment, studies. Project in execution. 
SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d 
Programmato broaden relations be-
tween EEC and Turkey. EEC contribution 
3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equip-
ment for the Universities of Ankara and 
Marmara. Training centre and language 
laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a 
Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in 
execution. 
SEM TU A6b 
WEST BANK AND GAZA 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
Assistance to the Palestinian popu-
lation of the West Bank of the Jordan 
the Courier no. 146 — july-august 1994  XI and of the Gaza strip. EEC contribution 
15 mECU. Health, education, production, 
environment, water, research and T.A. Pro-
ject in execution. 
SEM OT 93 A3,A6,A7,A8 
Assistance to the Palestinian popu-
lation of the West Bank of the Jordan 
and of the Gaza Strip. EEC Contribution 
20 mECU. Asssistance to the educational 
sector and T.A. Project in execution. 
SEM OT 93/Ex A6b 
Sanitation and drainage in Rafaj. 15 
mECU. Project in execution. 
SEM OT A8c 
Assistance to the housing prog-
ramme of the Palestinian Housing 
Council. 10 mECU, Works and T.A. Project 
in execution. 
SEM DT 94/01 A8a 
Assistance to private credit insti-
tutions. 8 mECU. Lines of credit to Econ-
omic Dev. Group (EDG), Arab Technical 
Dev. corp. (RDC), Agricultural Dev. and 
Credit Company (ADCC), United Agricul-
tural Foundation (UAC) and T.A. Project in 
execution. 
SEM OT 94/02 A5b 
Construction and equipping schools 
and classrooms. Resp. Auth.: UNRWA.10 
mECU. Works by ace. tender and T.A. 
Project in execution. 
SEM OT 94/03 A6a 
Establishment of industrial park. 10 
mECU. Construction and equipment of 
industrial parks. T.A. Project in execution. 
SEM OT 94/04 A4 
T.A. for the implementation of the 
development for the Occupied Ter-
ritories. 5 mECU. Ad-hoc T.A. for different 
sectors. Project in execution. 
SEM OT 94/05 A1 b 
Rehabilitation programme for Pales-
tinian ex-detainees. 10 mECU. To re-
integrate into Palestinian economy and 
society 12,000 ex-detainees. Education, 
training, job conselling, vocational rehabili-
tation, medical assistance, business stort-up 
training and follow-up, family support, wage 
subsidies. Project on appraisal. 
SEM OT 94/06 A6,7,8 
Support programme to the Pales-
tinian Police Forces. 10 mECU. Supply of 
vehicles and equipments. Date financing 
June 94. 
SEM OT94/05 Aid 
Demographic indicators for the Oc-
cupied Territories. Resp. Auth.: Pales-
tinian Bureau of Statistics (PBS). 1.400 
mECU. Project on appraisal. 
SEM OT94/06 A7c 
ENTREPRENEURS OF EUROPEAN 
AND MIDDLE EAST SMEs 
Europe-Middle East Partenariat -
Programme- Phase II. EEC contribution 
1.400 mECU. Search for potential partnerein 
the European Union. Sectors: construction, 
infrastructures, sub-contracting: clothing, 
electro-mechanics, electronics-tourist faci-
lities and food and drinks, for companies 
located in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, occupied 
Territories, Lebanon, Syrie. Implementing 
Agency: German-Arab Chamber of Com-
• merce (GACC) - Cairo. Date financing 
June 94. 
SEM REG 251/94 A5c,d,e 
EURO-MAGHREB COMMUNI- CAMBODJA 
CATIONS S.A.R.L. PARIS 
Euro-Maghreb training programme 
in communications. EEC contribution 
1.400 mECU. Seminars, scholarships for 
young professionals from Maghreb coun-
tries. Project on appraisal. 
SEM REG 687.92 A5g 
A.L.A. 
developing 
countries 
ASIA and LATIN 
AMERICA 
BANGLADESH 
Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation 
Project (CERP). EEC contribution 15 
mECU. Flood protection, forestry, agricul-
tural development. Works, supplies and T.A. 
Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing 1st half 94. 
ALA BD 9320 A3a 
Bangladesh rural advancement 
Committee (BRAC). EEC contribution 
8.150 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA BD 9307 A3a 
BOLIVIA-PERU 
Master Plan for TDPS System. 
(Operational). 0.750 mECU. Execution of 
the bi-national master plan for the develop-
ment of the integrated zone of the Titicaca 
Lake. T.A. : short-list to be done. Project on 
appraisal. 
ALA REG 93/139 A3a 
BOLIVIA 
Promotion and assistance for small 
private companies. EEC contribution 
8.795 mECU. T.A. and credit management. 
Short-list to be done. Project in execution. 
ALA BO 9339 A5e 
Ministry of Development and En-
vironment. T.A. to support the execution of 
programmes. 1 mECU. Project on appraisal. 
ALA BO 94/42 A3a 
Rural development in the Mitzque 
and Tiraque valleys. 13 mECU. Different, 
T.A. for bridges, canals, improvement of 
cultivated soils. Project on appraisal. 
ALA BO 94/49 A3a 
Support to the export promotion. 
0.980 mECU. T.A. and training for 30 
bolivians trade représentatifs. Establishment 
of 2 trade promotion offices in Europe. 
Information data system. Project on ap-
praisal. 
ALA BO 94/52 A5d 
Support to the artisanal fishery and 
acquaculture. T.A. to improve know-how. 
4 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing October-November 94. 
ALA BO 94/53 A3a 
BRAZIL 
Disadvantaged childhood in the 
urban 'milieu'. EEC contribution 8 mECU. 
T.A. and micro-projects. Short-list to be 
+ done. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing June 94. 
ALA BRA 94107 A8e 
Support to the agricultural sector 
and primary education. EEC contribution 
49.800 mECU. Supply of equipments, dif-
férents T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing July 94. 
CHILI 
Integrated development programme 
in the South. EEC contribution 5.500 
mECU. T.A. and supplies. Short-list to be 
done. Project in execution. 
ALA CHI 9358 A3a 
CHINA (R.P.) 
Development project to improve 
potato production in Qinghai. EEC 
contribution 3.100 mECU. T.A. and supply 
of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing June 94. 
ALA CHN 9410 A3a 
International Trade School China-
Europa. EEC contribution 14.85 mECU. 
Situated in Jinqiao Pudong region - Shan-
gai. Conception - supervision of the con-
struction equipments, teachers, non ac-
ademic staff, training. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing June 94. 
ALA CHN 9408 A6b 
COLOMBIA 
Drinking water-Sanitation-Pacific 
Coast. 7.5 mECU. Water conduits and 
sewers in 57 villages. Supplies: int. tender to 
be launched. Project in execution. 
ALA CO 9239 A7c 
Basic service: Ciudad Bolivar. 8 
mECU T.A. to the local services. Training. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA CO94/101 A8b 
ACTUAR Project — Family enter-
prises. 4 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal 
ALA CO 94/40 A5c 
Support to the creation of basic 
technological enterprises. 0.900 mECU. 
T.A. Project on appraisal. 
ECUADOR 
Support to develop woman peasants 
and families in the Chimborazo Pro-
vince. Resp. Auth.: Ministerio de agricul-
tura y ganadería (MAG). EEC contribution 
3.562 mECU. T.A., supply of vehicles and 
office equipments training, studies, line of 
credit. Projet in execution. 
ALA EQ 9317 A3a 
Relaunching the production and im-
proving the quality of cocoa. EEC 
contribution 2.870 mECU. T.A. and equip-
ment. Project in execution. 
ALA EQ 93/50 A3a 
Management and control of charge 
and demand of the electricity. (CO-
GECEL). EEC contribution 0.400 mECU. 
Energy cooperation programme for Cuenca 
and Ambato cities. Project on appraisal. 
ALA EQ 93130 A2ai 
Rehabilitation of the Paute zone. 
Estimation 12 mECU. T.A., training, supply 
of équipement. Project on appraisal. 
ALA EQ 94/44 A3a 
XII  OPERATIONAL SUMMARY EL SALVADOR 
Health and basic health programme 
in the western region. EEC participation 
10 mECU. Drinking water, sanitation, health 
centres, infrastructures, training, T.A. Projet 
in execution. 
ALA SAL 9330 A7c 
Sonsonate Hospital Rehabilitation. 
EEC participation 7 mECU. Infrastructures, 
supply of equipment, T.A. and training. 
Projet in execution. 
ALA SAL 9331 A7a 
Support to the rural reform - Usul-
atan - Phase II. EEC contribution 10 
mECU. T.A. and supplies. Short-list to be 
done. Project in execution. 
ALA SAL 9347 A3a 
Training in the géothermie energy 
sector. 0.600 mECU. T.A. and training. 
Project on appraisal. 
ALA SAZ 94/36 A2a 
equipment. Short-list done. Project on 
appraisal. 
ALA IND 9212 A3c 
MERCO SUR 
EC-Merco Sur cooperation prog-
ramme and T.A. for the agricultural 
sector. EEC participation 11.200 mECU. 
Institutional and technical support in the 
phyto-pharmaceutical and veterinary sec-
tors. T.A., supplies, training and popularis-
ation. Project in execution. 
ALA REG 9316 A3a 
MEXICO 
Multi annual programmes for busi-
ness meetings. EEC-Mexico. EEC contri-
bution 5.930 mECU. Business meetings in 
Europe and Fora in Mexico. T.A. and follow-
-up. Date financing May 94. 
ALA M EX 94/02 A5d, e 
GUATEMALA 
Rural development programme in 
the Quiche Department. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministero de Desarollo (MINDES). 
17.500 mECU. Support to the agricultural 
production and environment production. 
Support to the micro-industry. Works, 
supply of equipment, line of credit, T.A. 
Projet in execution. 
ALA GUA 9322 A3a 
Development aid to the indigenous 
populations in Central America. EEC 
contribution 7.500 mECU. T.A. and supply 
of equipments. Project in execution. 
ALA GUA 9355 A3a 
Programme to help children in the 
street in Guatemala City. EEC contri-
bution 2 mECU. T.A. and training. Short-list 
• to be done. Project on appraisal. Date 
foreseen for financing June 94. 
ALA GUA 94109 A8e 
Support to the in formal sector. 7.500 
mECU. T.A. training, time of credit. Project 
on appraisal 
ALA GUA 94/47 A5 
INDONESIA 
Palawija Seed Production and Mar-
keting. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General of 
Food Crops Agriculture. Ministry of Agricul-
ture. EEC Contribution 9.7 mECU. Improve-
ment of production and marketing of certi-
fied Palawije Seed Crops. Seed processing 
equipment by int. tender foreseen in 94. 
Project in execution. 
ALA IND 8621 A3a 
EC-Indonesian Forest Sector Sup-
port Programme. Resp. Auth.: Directorate 
General for Forest Inventory and Land Use 
Planning - Ministry of Forestry. EEC contri-
bution 25.882 mECU. Forest Inventory and 
monitoring. T.A. for detailed forest survey 
and mapping, training. Integrated Radio 
Communication Systems: T.A. for instal-
lation and training. Short-lists done. Project 
on appraisal. 
ALA IND 9242 A3c 
EC-Indonesian Forest Programme: 
Forest Fire Prevention and control in 
South Sumatra. Resp. Auth.: Directorate 
General for Forest Inventory and Land Use 
Planning Ministry of Forestry. EEC contri-
bution 4.050 mECU. T.A. for establishment 
of fire prevention analysis and procedures, 3 
pilot projects for fire management units and 
NICARAGUA 
TROPISEC — Development of small 
rural production in the dry tropical 
zone. EC contribution 7 mECU works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA NI 9354 A3a 
Consolidation of the 'Low-State' 
and promotion of the economy. EEC 
contribution 18 mECU. T.A. : short-liststo be 
done. Project in execution. 
ALA NI 9356 A1b 
PAKISTAN 
Rehabilitation and protection pro-
ject after floods. 20.5 mECU. T.A., road 
works, dam construction. Works by ace. 
tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen 
for financing July 94. 
ALA PK 94/04 A8g 
PANAMA 
Kuna Yala Project. EEC Contribution 
0.560 mECU. Sustainable development for 
and by indigenous communities of Kuna 
Yala. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PAN 93140 A3a 
ENERFRIP- Energetic improvement 
in the 'cold' chain. EEC contribution 
0.400 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. 
Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PAN 93183 A2a 
PARAGUAY 
Durable development of the Para-
guayan Chaco (protection of the in-
digenous zones and ecosystem). EEC 
contribution 14.800 mECU. T.A. and train-
ing. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for 
financing July 94. 
ALA PAR 93/40 A3a 
PERU 
Support for disadvantaged rural 
populations in the RENOM and INKA 
regions. EEC contribution 10 mECU. 
Microprojects, reafforestation, road infra-
structure rehabilitation, improvement of 
production and marketing, educational and 
health programmes. T.A. and training. Pro-
ject in execution. 
ALA PE 9244 A3a 
Support to the export promotion. 
EEC contribution 3.774 mECU. T.A. Short-
list to be done. Project in execution. 
ALA PE 9357 A5d 
Development programme of the 
Coica valley. EEC contribution 5 mECU. 
T.A. and supply of equipments. Short-list to 
be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PE 9433 A3a 
Women in rural milieu. EEC contri-
bution 5 mECU. Piura and Ayacucho re-
gions. Improvement of the women con-
ditions. Social services. Project on appraisal. 
Date foreseen for financing July 94. 
ALAPE 94/106 A3a 
Vocational training programme. 6 
mECU. T.A. training technical qualifications 
for non qualified youngs. Project on ap-
praisal. Date foreseen for financing sep-
tember 94. 
ALA PE 94/55 A6d 
PHILIPPINES 
Rural integrated development pro-
gramme in the Aurore zone. EEC contri-
bution 13 mECU. Works, supply of equip-
ments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 
ALA PHI 9326 A3a 
Tropical forests protection in Pa-
lawan. EEC contribution 17 mECU. Works, 
supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 
ALA PHI 9337 A3a 
COSTA RICA — HONDURAS — 
NICARAGUA 
Action programme for adolescent 
women and young unmarried mothers. 
4 mECU. T.A., coordination, management, 
follow-up. Supply of equipment. Project in 
execution. 
ALA REG 9246 A8e 
THAILAND 
European Community Business In-
formation Centre ECBIC Phase I. 2.204 
mECU. Supply of equipment, materials, T.A. 
• monitoring and evaluation. Project in 
execution. 
ALA THA 93/761 A5e 
URUGUAY 
Integral development for rural com-
munities. 4.800 mECU. T.A. Project on 
appraisal. 
ALA URU 94/39 A3a 
VENEZUELA 
Rural development pilot project in 
the Cojedes State. EEC participation 
5.275 mECU. Improvement of the agricul-
tural products and farmer's organisations. 
T.A., supply of equipments, line of credits. 
Project in execution. 
ALA VE 9346 A3a 
Biosphere reserve upper Orinoco-
Casiquiare. 6.396 mECU. Development 
plan, management, Cortography, inventory, 
T.A. and equipment T.A.: short-list to be 
done. Project in execution. 
ALA VEN 93/09 A3a 
Support to the establishment of the 
National Centre for Energy and En-
vironment. EEC contribution 1 mECU. 
T.A., local services, training, seminars. 
Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. 
ALA VE 941 5 A2a,A8f 
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T.A. programme for transition to 
market economy. EC contribution 16 
mECU. Project in execution. 
ALA VIE 9336 A1b 
ASEAN 
EG-ASEAN patents and trademarks 
programme. Resp. Auth.: EPO — Euro-
pean Patent Office. EEC contribution 
6.5 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in 
execution. 
ALA/ASN/REG 9223 A4g 
COGEN Programme EEC-ASEAN 
Phase II. Technology transfert for co-
generation of energy from bio mass. 
EEC contribution 5 mECU. Execution: In-
stitut Asiatique de Technologie (AIT) in 
Bangkok. T.A. and equipments. Project on 
appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 
94. 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
IASO-EXPO — Commercial Data Bank. 
I Phase II. 0.500 mECU. Creation of a 
I
Commercial. Data Bank concerning exports 
toward EEC. Project on appraisal. 
ALA REG 93/132 A5 
AL-FA 
AL-FA (Latin America - Academic 
Training). Community Latin America un-
iversity exchange programme. EEC contri-
bution 32 mECU. Post graduate exchanges, 
• students exchanges and T.A. Project in 
execution. 
ALA 94/03 A6b 
DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION 
In ACP countries 
Angola 
Rua Rainha Jinga, 6 
Luanda CP. 2669 
Tel. 393038 — 391277 — 391339 
Telex 3397 DELCEE AN 
Fax (2442) 392531 
Barbados 
James Fort Building 
Hincks Street, Bridgetown. 
Tel. 427-4362/ 429-7103 
Telex 2327 DELEGFED WB 
BRIDGETOWN 
Fax (1-809) 4278687 
Benin 
Avenue Roume, Bâtiment administratif 
B. P. 910, Cotonou 
Tel. 31 26 84/31 26 17 
Telex 5257 DELEGFED — COTONOU 
Fax (229) 31S 328 
Botswana 
P.O. Box 1253 - 68 North Ring Road 
Gaborone, Botswana 
Tel. (267) 314 455/6/7 
Telex BD 2403 DECEC 
Fax (267) 313 626 
Burkina Faso 
B.P. 352 
Ouagadougou 
Tel. 307 385/307 386 - 308 650 
Telex 5242 DELC0MEU — BF 
Fax (226) 30 89 66 
Burundi 
Avenue du 13 Octobre 
B.P. 103, Bujumbura 
Tel. 3426/3892 
Telex FED BDI 5031 — BUJUMBURA 
Fax (257-22)4612 
Cameroon 
QUARTIER BASTOS 
B.P. 847, Yaoundé 
Tel. (237) 20 13 87-20 33 67 
Telex DELEFED 8298 KN 
Fax (237) 202149 
Cape-Verde 
Achada de Santo Antonio 
C.P. 122-Praia 
Tel. (238)61 55 71/72/73 
Telex 6071 DELCE CV 
Fax (238) 61 55 70 
Central African Republic 
Rue de Flandre 
B.P. 1298 Bangui 
Tel. 61 30 53/61 01 13 
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU — BANGUI 
Fax (236) 616535 
Chad 
Concession Caisse Coton. Route da Farcha 
B.P. 552, N'Djamena 
Tel. 51 59 77/51 22 76 
Telex 5245 KD 
Fax (235) 51 21 05 
Comoros 
Boulevard de la Corniche. 
B.P. 559 — Moroni 
Tel. (269) 73 23 06 — 73 31 91 
Telex212DELCEC KO 
Fax (269) 73 24 94 
Congo 
Av. Lyautey 
near Hotel Méridien 
B.P. 2149, Brazzaville 
Tel. 83 38 78/83 37 00 
Telex DELEGFED 5257 
Fax (242) 83 60 74 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Immeuble 'AZUR' Bd, Crozet, 18 
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01 
Tel. 21 24 28 — 21 09 28 
Telex 23729 DELCEE — ABIDJAN 
Fax (225) 214089 
Djibouti 
Plateau du Serpent, Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre 
B.P. 2477 Djibouti 
Tel. 35 2615 
Telex 5894 DELCOM DJ 
Fax (253) 350 036 
Dominican Republic 
Calle Rafael Augusto 
Sanchez 21 
Ensanche Naco 
Santo Domingo 
Tel. (809) 540 58 37-540 60 74 
Fax (809) 567 58 51 
Telex 4757 EUROCOM SD DR 
Equatorial Guinea 
Apartado 779 — Malabo 
Tel. 2944 
Telex DELFED 5402 EG 
Ethiopia 
Off Bole Road 
P.O. Box 5570, Addis Ababa 
Tel.251-1-61 2511 
Telex 217 38 DELEGEUR — ET 
Fax (251-1) 61 28 77 
Gabon 
Quartier Batterie IV 
Lotissement des Cocotiers 
B.P. 321, Libreville 
Tel. 73 22 50 
Telex DELEG FED 5511 GO — LIBREVILLE 
Fax (241 ) 736554 
Sambia 
10 Cameron Street 
P.O. Box 512, Banjul 
Tel. 227777 — 228769 — 226860 
Telex 2233 DELCOM GV — BANJUL 
Fax (220) 22621 9 
Ghana 
The Round House— Cantonments Road, 
K.I.A.-Accra 
P.O. Box 9505 
Tel. (233-21) 774 201/2-774 236-774 094 
Telex 2069 DELCOM — GH 
Fax (233-21) 774154 
Guinea Bissau 
Bairro da Penha, C.P. 359, 
Bissau 1113 
Tel. (245)25 10 71/2510 27/ 
251469/251471-72 
Telex 264 DELCOM Bl 
Fax (245) 2510 44 
Guinea 
Commission 
Central Mail Department 
(Diplomatic Bag Section — B 1/123) 
Rue de la Loi 200,1049 Bruxelles 
Telex via Embassy Fed. Rep. of Germany 22479 
Tel. (224) 41 49 42 
Fax (224) 41874 
Guyana 
72 High Street, Kingston 
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown 
Tel. 64004-65 424-63 963 
Telex 2258 DELEG GY — GEORGETOWN 
Fax (592-2) 62615 
Haiti 
Delmas 60 - Impasse brave n. 1 
(par Rue Mercier-Laham 
B.P. 15.588 Petion-Ville 
Port-au-Prince - Haiti - W.I. 
Tel.: (509) 57-5485, 57-3491, 57-3575, 57-1644 
Fax (509) 57-4244 
Jamaica 
8 Olivier Road, Kingston 8 
P.O. Box 463 Constant Spring, Kingston 8 
Tel. (1-809) 9246333-7 
Telex 2391 DELEG EC JA 
Fax (1-809) 9246339 
Kenya 
"Union Insurance House" 2nd and 3rd floors 
XIV OPERATIONAL SUMMARY NOUAKCHOTT 
Ragati Road 
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi 
Tel. (254-2) 713020/21 -712860-712905/06 
Telex 22483 D ELEUR — KE 
Fax (254-2) 716481 
Lesotho 
P.O. Box MS 518 
Maseru, 100. Lesotho 
Tel. 313 726 
Fax 266 —310193 
Liberia 
34 Payne Avenue, Sinkar 
P.O. Box 10 3049, Monrovia 
Tel. 26 22 78 
Telex 44358 DELEGFED LI — MONROVIA 
Fax (231) 262266 
Madagascar 
Immeuble Ny Havana — 67 hectares ■ 
B.P. 746, Antananarivo 
Tel. 242 16 
Telex 22327 DELFED MG — ANTANANARIVO 
Fax (261-2) 32169 
Malawi 
Europa House 
P.O. Box 30102, Capital City 
Lilongwe 3 
Tel. 78 31 99-78 31 24-78 27 43 
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR Ml — LILONGWE 
Fax (265) 78 35 34 
Mali 
Rue Guégau — Badalabougou 
B.P. 115 Bamako 
Tel. 22 23 56/22 20 65 
Telex 2526 DELEGFED— BAMAKO 
Fax (223) 223670 
Mauritania 
Mût V, Lot 24 
B.P. 213, Nouakchott 
Tel. 527 24/527 32 
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN -
Fax (222-2) 53524 
Mauritius 
61 /63 route Florea Vacoas 
P.O. Box 10 Vacoas 
Tel. 686 50 61 /686 50 62/686 50 63 
Telex 4282 DELCEC IW VACOAS 
Fax (230-686) 6318. 
Mozambique 
C.P. 1306 —MAPUTO 
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe — 
Tel. 1-49 02 66 — 1-491716-
1 -49 07 20 
Telex 6-146 CCE MO 
Fax (258-1) 491866 
Namibia 
Sanlam Building 
4th floor 
Independence Avenue 
Windhoek 
Tel.:264-61-220099 
Fax 35135 
Telex 419 COMEU WK 
Niger 
B.P. 10388, Niamey 
Tel. 73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32 
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED — NIAMEY 
Fax (227) 732322 
Nigeria 
4, Idowu Taylor St, Victoria Island 
PM Bag 12767, Lagos 
Tel. 61 78 52/61 08 57 
Telex 21868 DELCOM NG LAGOS— NIGERIA 
Fax (234-1) 617248 
Abuja 
Tel 09/5233144/46 
Telex 0905/91484 
Fax 09-5233147 
Pacific (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu) 
Dominion House, 3rd Floor 
Private Mail Bag. GPO. Suva. Fiji 
Tel. 31 36 33 
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ — SUVA 
Fax (679) 300 370 
Papua New Guinea 
The Lodge, 3rd floor, Bampton Street 
P.O. Box 76 
Port Moresby 
Tel. (675) 21 35 44-21 35 04-21 3718 
Telex NE 22307 DELEUR — PORT MORESBY 
Fax (675) 217 850 
Rwanda 
Avenue Député Kamuzinzi. 14 
B.P. 515. Kigali 
Tel. 755 86/755 89/725 36 
MAPUTO 
- 1 -49 02 71 
Telex 22515 DECCE RWMCI 
Fax 250 — 74313 
Senegal 
12, Avenue Albert Sarraut, Dakar 
Tel. 2313 34 -23 47 77 -
23 79 75 
Telex 21665 DELEGSE SG 
Fax (221) 217885 
Sierra Leone 
Wesley House 
4 George Street 
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown 
Tel. (232.22) 223 975-223 025 
Telex 3203 DELFED SL— FREETOWN 
Fax (232-22) 225212 
Solomon Islands 
2nd floor City Centre Building 
Solomon Islands 
P.O. Box 844 — Honiara 
Tel. 22 765 
Telex 66370 —DELEGSI 
Fax (677) 23318 
Somalia 
Via Makka Al Mukarram, n° Z-A6/17 
P.O. Box 943. Mogadishu 
Tel. 21 118/21 049/811 18 
Telex 628 EURCOM — SO 
Fax (2521 ) — 21118 — 21049 — 81118 
Sudan 
3rd Floor — The Arab Authority for Agricultural 
Investment and Development Building 
Army Road, Khartoum 
P.O. Box 2363 
Tel. 75054-75148-75393 
Telex 23096 DELSU SD 
Suriname 
Dr S. Redmondstraat 239 
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo 
Tel. 4993 22 - 499349 - 492185 
Telex 192 DELEGFED SN 
Fax (597)493076 
Swaziland 
Dhlan'ubeka Building, 3rd floor 
Cr. Walker and Tin Streets 
P.O. Box A.36 
Mbabane. Swaziland 
Tel. 42908/42018 
Telex 2133 WD 
DELEGFED MBABANE 
Fax (268) 46729 
Tanzania 
Extelcoms House. 9th Floor 
Samora Avenue 
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam 
Tel. 46459/60/61 /62 
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR — 
DAR ES SALAAM 
Fax (255-51 ) 46724 ' 
Togo 
Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky 
B.P. 1657, Lomé 
Tel. 21 36 62/21 08 32 
Telex 5267 DELFED-TG 
Fax (228) 211300 
Trinidad and Tobago 
The Mutual Centre 
16, Queen's Park West 
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain 
Trinidad W.I 
Tel. 62-2 6628/62-2 0591 
Telex 22421 DELFED WG 
Fax (809) 622-6355 
Uganda 
Uganda Commercial Bank Building, 
Plot 12 
Kampala Road, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 5244, Kampala 
Tel. 233 303/ 233.304 
Telex 61139 DELEUR — UG — KAMPALA 
Fax (256-41) 233708 
Zaire 
71, Av des Trois Ζ 
B.P 2000, Kinshasa 
By satellite: tel. 00871 1546221 
Telex 00 581 154.62.21 
Fax 00871 1546221 
Zambia 
P.O.Box 34871 
Plot 4899 
Los Angeles Boulevard 
Lussks 
Tel. 25 09 06-25 07 11 -251140 
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA — LUSAKA 
Fax (260-1 ) 250906 
Zimbabwe 
P.O. Box 4252 
NCR House (10th Floor) 
65 Samora Machel Ave. 
Harare 
Tel. 470.71.20/39/40/43 
Telex 24811 ZW HARARE -
Fax (263-4) 725360 
■ZIMBABWE 
In the OCT 
Netherlands Antilles 
Scharlooweg 37 
P.O. Box 822. Willemstad 
Curaçao 
Tel. (599.9) 618488 
Fax (599.9) 618423 
Aruba 
LG. Smith Blvd. 50, (P.O. Box 409) 
Oranjestad 
Tel.297-8-34131 
Fax 297-9-34575 
In the Mediterranean 
Countries 
Algeria 
36, Rue Arezki Abri 
Hydra-16035 Alger 
Tel. 59 08 22 — 59 09 25 — 59 09 42 
Telex 66067 EURAL DZ — ALGERIE 
Fax (213-2) 593947 
Cyprus 
Irish Tower Court, 8th Floor 
242 Agapinor Street, Corner of Makarios Avenue.PO Box 
3480 
Nicosia 137, Cyprus 
Tel. (357-2) 36 92 02 
Telex (605) 4960 ECDELCY 
Fax (357-2) 36 89 26 
Egypt 
6, Ibn Zanki St.-Zamalek 
Tel. (20-2) 340 83 88 — 341 93 93 — 34011 84 — 
340 74 09 
Telex 94258 EU ROP UN ZAMALEK 
Fax 3400385 
Israel 
The Tower, 3 Daniel Frisch St., 
TEL AVIV 64731 
Tel. (972-3) 696.41.66 
Telex 3421 08 DELEG — IL 
Fax (972-3) 695 1983 
Jordan 
Al Jahez St. 15, Shmeisani, Amman 
P.O. Box 926 794 
Tel. 66 81 91 /66 81 92 Amman 
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN 
JORDAN 
Fax (962-6) 686 746 
Lebanon 
Immeuble Duraffourd, Avenue de Paris, Beirut 
B.P. 11 -4008. Beirut 
Tel. 3630 30/31 /32 
Telex DELEUR 23307 
Malta 
Villa 'The Vines', 51 
Ta'Xbiex Sea Front. Ta'Xbiex-Malta 
Tel. : (356) 34 48 91 -93-95, 345111 
Telex: (356) 910 EC M LA 
Fax (356) 34 48 97 
Morocco 
2 bis rue de Meknés-Rabat 
B.P. 1302, Rabat 
Tel. 7612 17/7612 46/7612 48 
Telex 32620-(M) 
Fax (212-7) 761156 
Syria 
73 rue Rachid 
P.O. Box 11269. Damascus 
Tel. (963-11 ) 327640-641 
Telex 412919 DELCOM SY 
Fax (963 11) 320683 
Tunisia 
Avenue Jugurtha 21 
B.P. 143, Cité el Mahrajene. 1082 Tunis 
Tel. 78 86 00 
Telex 14399 —TUNIS 
Fax (216-1) 788201 
In A.L.A. countries 
Argentina 
Plaza Hotel. Florida 1005, Buenos Aires 
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Telex: 22488 PLAZA AR 
Telefax: (54-1) 313 2912 
Bangladesh 
Plot 7. Road 84 
Gulshan — Dhaka 
Tel. 88 47 30-31 -32 
Telex 642501. CECO BJ 
Fax (88.02) 88 31 18 
Brazil 
Q.I. 7 — Bloc A — Lago Sul — Brasilia (D.F.) Brasil 
Tel.:(55.61) 248.31.22 
Telex.: (038) 61.25.17/61.36.48 DCCE BRE 
Fax.: (55-61) 248.07.00 
Chile 
Avenida Américo Vespucio SUR 1835, Casila 10093, 
Santiago (9) Chile 
Tel.: (56) 22.28.24.84 
Telex: (034) 34.03.44 COMEUR CK 
Fax (56) 22.28.25.71 
China 
15 Dong Zhi Men Wai Dajie 
Sanlitun, 100600 Beijng 
Tel.: (86-1)532 44 43 
Telex: (085) 222 690 ECDEL CN 
Fax (86-1)532 43 42 
Colombia 
Calle 97 n° 22-44 
94046 — 14 Bogota 8 
Tel. (57-1 ) 236 90 40/256 48 28/256 84 77 
Fax (57-1) 610 00 59 
Costa Rica (HQ of the Delegation for Central America) 
Centro Calón — Apartado 836 
1007 San José 
Tel. 332755 
Telex 3482 CCE AC 
Fax (506) 210893 
India (HQ of the Delegation in South Asia) 
65 Golf Links 
New Delhi 110003 
Tel. 462 92 37/38 
Telex 61315 EUR-IN 
Fax 462 92 06 
Indonesia (HQ of the Delegation for Brunei, Singapore 
and the ASEAN Secretariat) 
Wisma Dharmala Sakti Building, 16th floor 
J.L Jendral Sudirman 32 
P.O. Box 55 JKPDS Jakarta 10 220 
Tel. 570 60 76/68 
Telex 62 043 COMEUR IA 
Fax (62-21 ) 570 6075 
Korea 
ICON Building 
33-12 Changchoong-dong 1-ga 
Choong-Ku 
Seoul 100-691 - Korea 
Mexico 
Paseo de la Reforma 1675, 
Lomas de Chapultepec C.P. 
11000 Mexico D.F. 
Tel. (52-5) 540.33.45 to 47 — 202.86.22 
Telex: (022) 176.35.28 DCCEME 
Fax (52-5) 540.65.64 
Pakistan 
No 9 Street n. 88 
G-6/3, Islamabad 
P.O. Box 1608 
Tel. 82 18 28-82 24 15-82 30 26 
Telex 54044 COMEU PK 
Fax (92) 822604 
Peru 
B.P. 180 792. LIMA 18 
Manuel Gonzales Olaechea 247 
San Isidro. Lima 27 
Tel. (5114) 41 58 27/32-403097 
Telex 21085 PE-COMEU 
Telefax (51-14) 41 8017 
Philippines 
Salustiana D. Ty Tower, 
7th Floor 104, 
Paseo de Roxas corner 
Perea Street - Legaspi Village - Makati 
Metro Manila 
Tel. (63-2) 8126421-30 
Telex 22534 COMEUR PH 
Fax (63-2) 812 66 86 - 812 66 87 
Thailand (HQ of the Delegation in Indochina, Thailand, 
Malaysia) 
Kian Gwan House 11 — 19th floor 
140/1 Wireless Road 
Bangkok 10 330 
Tel. 255 91 00 
Telex 82764 COMEUBK TH 
Fax (66 2) 2559114 
Uruguay 
Edificio Artigas (1
o Piso) — Calle Rincón 487 — Monte-
video 
Tel.: (598) 2.96.37.44/96.37.45/96.31.66/96.31.80 
Telex: 23925 CCEUR UY 
Fax (598) 2-95.36.53 
Venezuela 
Calle Orinoco - Las Mercedes 
Apartado 768076. Las Americas 1061 A 
Caracas 
Tel. 91 51 33 
Telex 27298 COMEU 
Fax (582) 993 55 73 
OFFICES OF THE COMMISSION 
In ACP countries 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Alpha Building 2nd floor 
Redcliffe Street 
St. John's, Antigua W.I., 
P.O. Box 1392 
Tel. and fax (1 -809) 4622970 
Bahamas 
Frederick House, 2nd floor, Frederick St. 
P.O. Box N-3246. Nassau 
Tel. (32)55850 
Telex DELEGEC NS 310 
Belize 
1 Eyre Street 
P.O. Box 907 
Belize City, Belize 
Tel. (501 -2) 72785 and fax 
Telex 106 CEC BZ 
Grenada 
Archibald Avenue 
P.O. Box 5, St George's, Grenada, West Indies 
Tel. (1809) 440 4958 — 440 3561 
Telex 3431 CWBUR GA 
(Attn. EEC Delegation) 
Fax (1809) 4404151 
São Tomé & Principe 
B.P. 132— Sao Tomé 
Tel. (239 12)21780-21375 
Telex 224 Delegfed ST 
Fax (239-12) 22683 
Seychelles 
P.O. Box 530 — Victoria. Mahé 
Tel. (248) 32 39 40 
Fax (248) 323890 
Tonga 
Malle Taha 
Taufa'ahau Road, private mailbag n° 5-CPO 
Nuku Alofa 
Tel. 23820 
Telex 66207 (DELCECTS) 
Fax 23869 
Vanuatu 
Orient Investment Building, Ground Floor, 
Kumul Highway 
P.O. Box 422, Port-Vila 
Tel. (678) 22501 
Fax (678) 23282 
Western Samoa 
PO Box 3023, 
Loane Viliamu Building, 4th floor, Apia 
Fax (685)24622 
In the OCT 
New Caledonia 
21 Rue Anatole France 
B.P. 1100 Noumea 
Tel. (687) 27 70 02 
Fax (687) 28 87 07 
Commission of the 
European Communities 
Representation Office 
in Turkey 
15. Kuleli Sokak 
Gazi Osman Paca, Ankara 
Tel. 137 68 40-1-2-3 
Telex 44320 ATB E TR 
Fax (90-312) 437 79 40 
Commission of the 
European Communities 
Programme Coordination 
Office. 
South African Republic 
207, Infotech Building 
1090 Arcadia Street 
Hatfield- Pretoria 0083 
Tel.: (012) 436 590 
Fax (012) 436 594 
XVI OPERATIONAL SUMMARY Mémoires d'un 
Foyalais. Des îles 
d'Amérique aux 
bords de la Seine 
(Memories of a Foyalais. From the 
islands of the Americas to the 
banks of the Seine) — By Victor 
Sablé — Maisonneuve et Larose, 
15 rue Victor Cousin, 75005 Paris 
— 267 Pages — 1993 
Victor Sablé is a likeable man. 
No-one who has met him has 
failed to be won over by his joie 
de vivre, his warmth and a cul-
ture embracing literature, the hu-
manities and the law (he was 
once a lawyer). He has — and 
indeed still has, for he is in fine 
form — all the quotations and 
the eloquence of the lawyers of 
his youth, with, as he admits, a 
occasional grandiloquence that is 
both appreciated and necessary in 
election campaighs in the French 
West Indies. In this book he re-
counts lively and amusing mem-
ories of a period covering three 
Republics. 
He hails from Fort de France in 
Martinique, where his father was 
a judge in whom 'derisory treat-
ment and noble robes were a na-
tural combination, 'although he 
was very fond of both his (very 
different) grandfathers — Victor 
Sévère, MP and mayor of Fort de 
France, and Francisque Sablé, first 
deputy mayor in a small local au-
thority in the south. 
Victor Sablé, an intellectual 
achiever, went to study law in 
the Quartier Latin in Paris. He 
then practised as a lawer, but 
soon became a member of the 
Council of the Republic, a 
member of the French National 
Assembly and a Euro-MP for Mar-
tinique (which became a French 
department in 1946). As chair-
man of the influential inter-prof-
essional Committee for the 
Banana Industry, he was bound 
to sit on the European Par-
liament's Committee on Develop-
ment, attend ACP-EEC Joint As-
semblies and take an interest in 
the application of Lomé and the 
basic OCT issues (structural funds, 
tax, agricultural produce, alcohol 
and sugar). 
Like many other West Indians (he 
himself refers to Professor Louis 
Achille, as the first coloured 
person to get the agrégation), 
throughout his long life, Victor 
Sablé has been an example of a 
combination of cultures, of a to-
lerant and democratic approach 
and an art of living which people 
certainly need in the difficult 
world of today. ■■ Alain Lacroix 
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Rapport 1994, La Liberté de la 
Presse dans le Monde 
(Freedom of press in the world -
Report for 1994) 
By Reporters sans frontières, with 
the help of Le Point - Supplement 
to the Lettre de Reporters sans 
frontières No 57 - April 1994 -
ISBN 2-908830-15-9 - FF 85-FS 22 
- Bfrs 520 - Can$ 20. 
This reports attacks on freedom 
of the press in 149 countries in 
1993 - 124 journalists were in 
prison on 1 January 1994 and 63 
died for their opinions or were 
killed in the course of their work 
in 1993, almost half of them in 
Europe. 
L'Emploi au Sud - Regard croisés -
Des exemples au Zaïre, au Pérou 
et au Chili 
Employment in the South - A 
comparison - Examples in Zaire, 
Peru and Chile 
By G. Fonteneau, Lokota Ekot'e 
Panga, Isabel Yepez del Castillo, 
Ignacio Larraechea and Marthe 
Nyssens - Approche - Louvain-la-
Neuve 
Approche and Gresea, two associ-
ations working for solidarity in 
development in North and South, 
bring out research in a combined 
edition to allow for comparisons 
of employment issues in different 
parts of the world. 
Le Secteur non-structuré urbain 
en Afrique - Rétrospective et per-
spectives - Biographie commentée 
The non-structured urban sector 
in Africa - Past and future - An 
annotated bibliography 
ILO - ISBN 92-2-207747-4 -
Geneva - 1994 
This lists and comments on 250 
recent (French and English) publi-
cations on Africa's non-structured 
urban sector and its employment 
and growth potential. 
The state of the world's refugees, 
The Challenge of protection 
First two-yearly report of the 
United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
Penguin Books - ISBN 0-14-
023487-X - USA - 1993. Currently 
available in French. Available in 
German, Italian, Spanish and 
Japanese soon. 
This takes stock of the crucial 
problem of refugees (18.2 million 
around the world and about 24 
million displaced within their own 
countries in 1993), pleads for the 
right of asylum and makes an 
urgent call for the international 
community to step in to prevent 
crises in the future. 
Water for sustainable develop-
ment in the 21st century 
By Asit K. Biswas, Mohammed 
Jellali and Glenn E. Stout -
Oxford University Press - ISBN 0 
19 563302 4 - Delhi - 1993 
It is increasingly apparent that 
water cannot be wasted without 
compromising the future of man-
kind and that management of 
water quality is vital to the 
future of the planet. The authors 
consider how this complex task 
can be sustained over the coming 
century. 
Environment and agriculture - Re-
thinking development issues for 
the 21st century 
Winrock International Institute for 
Agricultural Development - ISBN 
0-933595-85-9 - Morrilton (USA) -
1994 
Papers of a May 1993 symposium 
during which development spe-
cialists looked at the connections 
between the environment and 
agriculture and on the need to 
cater for them in future develop-
ment decisions. 
Developing African agriculture -
New initiatives for institutional 
cooperation 
W.E. Swegle - D.F. - SAA/Global 
2000/CASIN - Mexico - 1994 
Report of a July 1993 workshop, 
one of a series of seminars look-
ing at ways of boosting food se-
curity in sub-Saharan Africa and 
other subjects related to the de-
velopment of the continent. 
Schwarz-Weisse Mythen - Afrika 
und der Entwicklungspolitische 
Diskurs 
Black and white myths - Africa 
and the development policy 
debate 
By Dirk Hansohm and Robert 
Kappel - Münster - Hamburg - Lit 
1993 - 2 - Revised edition - 1994 
- Bremer Afrika Studien, Bd 5 -
ISBN 3-89473-699-2 
The African crisis is primarily one 
of global concepts of develop-
ment policy, the authors main-
tain. The discussion of African de-
velopment problems is abstract 
and dichotomic and the 'truths' 
which emerge from it are often 
no more than ideological preju-
dices which neither explain the 
reality nor open the way for sol-
utions. This book attempts to 
highlight the central myths in the 
discussion and suggest practical 
alternatives. ■■ 
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